The CAP between a rock and a hard place: its new challenges and uncertain prospects

• The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently at a crossroads of a changing world environment which impacts demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and agri-food trade (geostrategic tensions).
• EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.
• CAP ongoing policy orientation aims at increasing its environmental performance while retaining its economic and social achievements, but excessive targets set by the Farm to Fork Strategy and the impact of changing market conditions brought tensions in the debate between on food security and climate action with respect to priorities on primary agriculture.
• Higher food costs increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces exogenous to their tastes and preferences.
• Addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture.
• Despite clear progress of Greek agriculture in recent years three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture relate to an uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments the underestimation of the role of extensive livestock or the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Tassos Haniotis, Senior Guest Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Special Advisor for Sustainable Productivity, Forum for the Future of Agriculture.

Introduction

That the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union is currently at a crossroads is probably an understatement. The Farm to Fork Strategy, part of the Green Deal, is essentially in suspension, at least with respect to achieving its overly ambitious targets. A rapidly changing world environment impacts the demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and trade of agricultural commodities and food products (geostrategic tensions) altered fundamental assumptions underlying the strategy.

Although this reality seems to have changed little in terms of the policy narrative, the results of successive European elections and the new composition of the European Parliament and national governments add a political dimension to the policy uncertainty. Add to the picture the preparation of the EU next budget, a tiny part of total EU public expenditure that, despite its fixity, is expected to address more priority areas, and the prospects for a rational debate about the future of the CAP look rather dim.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform. This is further supported by a rather permanent criticism of the CAP by those not benefiting from the EU budget (most sectors, that is). This paper will argue that this impression does not match the facts. It’s not just the space covered by the CAP (initially just six countries of a net importer, now 27 of the largest food exporter and importer in the world) that has fundamentally changed. It is the structure of the policy itself, and its successes and failures, which differ over time.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

Greek agriculture has been an integral part of the CAP process for more than forty years. Yet, in sharp contrast to most EU member states, including those with similar structure in their farming sector, Greece has often failed to exploit the benefits of CAP reforms that these other member states did, whether on trade, farm income, competitiveness or structural adjustment.[2]

Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment.

Instead, Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment. More importantly, it systematically appears to be a phase behind in its internal debate about the future of the CAP; when other member states already prepare the ground and their positions about what needs to change with the next CAP reform, often the Greek debate focuses not just on what is needed on the basis of the most recent reform but to a large extent on what was not implemented in the previous reform.[3]

How the above play in the current context will be the focus of this paper. Its aim is not to cover exhaustively and descriptively the details of the policy, as the literature is rich in this area. Rather, the aim is to identify the different set of challenges faced by the CAP in the present context of the EU, outline a few possible scenarios for the future as these emerge from the current debate, and examine the serious challenges and untapped opportunities that Greek agriculture has as one of the biggest financial beneficiaries of the CAP in the EU.

The three distinct CAP phases: introvert, extravert, uncertain

That the EU’s agricultural sector, despite its small size, is still of strategic importance becomes evident by referring to four figures – 1% of the economy and 4% of labour manages 50% of land and supplies 99% of food consumed in the EU. Furthermore, the EU food chain is arguably the most demanding globally in terms of food safety and quality, and highly sophisticated in terms of technology, setting standards worldwide. It is also highly competitive as the EU’s agrifood trade balance demonstrates, with a strong surplus based on value-added products despite being the biggest global food importer.

Even when it comes to its environmental performance, an area where results are lagging behind needs and expectations, concrete progress has turned EU’s agriculture as the only major agriculture worldwide that has managed to “produce more with less”. In China, India, Brazil, US and EU, farm production has increased in both volume and value. Yet only EU emissions have declined, by 24% since 1990 (with a clear slowdown in progress lately), while those of the US have slightly increased, and those of China, India and especially Brazil massively increased.[4]

How come then that the policy behind such results rarely receives any credit? The answer lies in the very structure of the EU institutional setting. The CAP still represents roughly a third of the EU budget, still a very significant share, despite its decline by half compared to the past. The focus therefore easily centres on the high part of a small budget, and not on the insignificant share of the EU budget in total EU public spending – on the 35% of the EU budget and not on the fact that this represents roughly 1% of GDP or 2% of total EU public spending, and the CAP 0.7% of total EU public spending.[5]

Within such an environment the CAP generates ‘subsidy envy’ among other EU policies since, being a big part of a small budget, the CAP remains the only policy with a real EU-wide impact. Consequently, it always attracts criticisms whenever the EU raises its ambition to address emerging policy challenges in a rapidly changing global environment. It is true that criticism to the CAP rightly points to the need to assess how this funding, whatever its size, is spent. However, very often this assessment is not done judging the CAP by its successes and failures with respect to its declared objectives, for example on its distributional impact, but with respect to failures in other policy areas (trade or food safety in the past, environment more recently).

In the absence of sufficient budgetary allocations, such policies tend to expect the partial delivery of their objectives via the CAP. The uncomfortable truth is that available policy tools, whether for agriculture or other policy areas, reflect the space that Member States were willing (or not) to give to the Commission – i.e., short in budgetary terms, long in the decision process. In the past, budgetary constraints acted as an incentive to consider the consistency and coherence of the CAP with other EU policies as a prerequisite for its reforms. The increasing gap between expectations from the policy and perceptions about its performance begs the question of how the big picture of its reform path is assessed now.

The CAP has undergone three distinct periods during its long and parallel to the EU history (the CAP was already part of the Treaty of Rome, though its first implementation started in 1962).

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive in its narrative, running the full cycle of initial design, implementation, success and failure. Succes because the initially impressive increase in farm productivity and structural adjustment turned the food deficits of the post-war Western Europe into surpluses in most major agricultural commodities. Failure because the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

High support prices and a trade regime based on high tariffs and export subsidies helped boost productivity, but at a high cost, both budgetary and as well as political. The high budgetary costs were needed to accommodate these surpluses either in the form of intervention stocks or heavily subsidised exports. The high political costs resulted from the internal Member State infighting between those pushing for and those resisting reform and the international isolation of the CAP, which became the culprit of depressed world market prices.[6]

In its second period, extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. 

The second period of the CAP, which includes the reforms of 1992, 2000, 2003/04 and 2008, was characterised by the gradual but complete transformation of the policy within the span of less than two decades. More and more isolated at the international scene, the CAP faced the paradox that, in the trade policy debate, experts and policy makers alike saw the CAP as an obstacle in integrating agriculture into the global system of Institutions established by the Breton Woods Agreement (having by that time long forgotten that it was US, and not EU farm policies that kept agriculture out of world rules).[7]

In summary, in this extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. This was achieved by reducing support prices below world market price levels, abolishing export subsidies, massively decoupling direct payments from production decisions and linking them to some degree of environmental conditionality, introducing and significantly strengthening the agri-environmental nature of Rural Development, constraining the remaining (less than 10% of total payments) product-based support by ceilings based on area or animal payments, and abolishing the twin “sacred cows” of sugar and dairy quotas.

No wonder the above process, still grossly underestimated in its difficulty of designing, deciding and implementing it, allowed the EU to assume gradually a less defensive and finally a more offensive position after the abolition of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. No other proof is needed than a look at the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) of the OECD, an indicator measuring the impact of farm policy support measures at farm gate level. The global gradual farm reform process it depicts, reflected in a downward trend of the most distorting policies, becomes almost a horizontal line when the EU is removed from it.[8]

…by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century.

Although the above is factually not contested, already by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century, including those of the new decision- making process, co-decision with the European Parliament. Fischler himself, in his introduction to a book on the CAP after his reform, raised the need for new policy instruments addressing a wide range of areas, from volatility, knowledge, environmental responsibility and climate change, to food chain, social balance among farmers and the wider role of rural areas.[9]

…the third period of the CAP was insecure and uncertain.

Developments in the last decade have confirmed the above concerns, leading to the third period of the CAP, characterised by the impression that the CAP is rather immovable, sort of cast-in-stone policy, reflecting a growing reform fatigue in the farming community and by Member States despite efforts by the European Commission and, until recently, by the European Parliament to adapt it to the new, mainly environmental and climate change challenges global agriculture is facing. Understanding what led to this impression is important in assessing what went wrong with the recent CAP reform and its link to the Farm to Fork strategy of the Green Deal, rendering the CAP prospects seemingly insecure and uncertain.

This period has also not been smooth, with exogenous events influencing the mood and the performance of the policy, with the first attempt to address them under co-decision left its mark by identifying a gap between expectations as expressed in proposals and reality as reflected in decisions.[10] A series of exogenous events explain much. One of them, the COVID crisis, demonstrated the resilience of EU’s food system and boosted confidence in it, against all odds and perceptions of “broken food systems”. Yet three other factors acted in the opposite direction.

First, the Paris Agreement shifted attention on the need to prioritise climate action, with agriculture being one of the most affected sectors in terms of impact, contribution and complexity in finding solutions. Second, twice in the past decade a farm price boom and bust revealed major problems in the price transmission of farm prices at the consumer level; the law of price gravity seems nowadays to apply at farm-gate, but not at the shelf! Inflation has rendered food more expensive due to factors that are exogenous to agriculture and has thus put a big question mark to claims that the path to best internalise food systems’ externalities is by increasing the cost of food.[11] Third, geostrategic tensions have added to uncertainty with their direct impact on natural gas prices, and thus on nitrogen fertilisers, and their more indirect on food security concerns.[12]

Therefore, higher food costs, prospects for higher energy costs driven by the green transition, and increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces that are exogenous to both their existing and the often-desired tastes and preferences. This introduced a clear affordability challenge for food security that has not been witnessed in the history of the EU, and led to a polarisation of the CAP debate on whether food security (as advocated by farm groups) or climate action (prioritised by environmental stakeholders) should be prioritised – a false dilemma as both are interlinked in problem definition as well as in problem solving.

…co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. 

To the above one should add also a major institutional change; co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. In previous reforms until 2009, the Commission (which had and continues to have the legislative initiative) proposed and the Council negotiated with the Commission the final outcome; the European Parliament was in all effects an observer.

The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

After 2009, at the “second reading” of a proposal, which determines that final outcome, the Commission the becomes the “facilitator”; in essence, it turns into the observer. This change altered the manner by which all Institutions negotiate; the Commission, willing to avoid the second reading, has the tendency to compromise at earlier stages of the process, the Member States, negotiating with the Presidency (another Member State which is trusted less than the Commission) have the tendency to overload their “red lines” and the European Parliament comes with an endless list of amendments. The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

The suspended step of the Farm to Fork: what went wrong?

It is customary that the discussion about the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) starts before the ink dries on the regulations that set its future framework. In the beginning, this is usually limited to a group of policy experts and stakeholders within the “Brussels bubble” as Member States and farmers are busy first understanding and then implementing what was decided (as a rule, quite different and more complex than what was proposed). But the latest CAP reform brought a novelty; massive demonstrations of farmers before the elections for the European Parliament led to the weakening of exactly the CAP part that was supposed to be strengthened, leading the CAP to renege on the conditionality of best practices introduced two decades ago.

The CAP’s ambitious integration into the Green Deal, approved as the the centre-piece of the von der Leyen Commission in 2020, was expected to come through the Farm to Fork Strategy, which aims at  reducing the environmental and climate footprint of the EU food system, strengthen its resilience, ensure food security in the face of climate change and biodiversity loss and lead a global transition towards competitive sustainability “from farm to fork”.[13]

Already in 2018, under the Junker Commission, the then Commissioner for Agriculture Phil Hogan proposed a CAP reform which, by recognising the need to enhance the environmental performance of the CAP, aimed also to make the policy more result-oriented. Based on an extensive Impact Assessment, the proposal outlined ten specific objectives that the CAP needs to serve (three each on the economic, environmental and social dimension of the CAP, one cross cutting on innovation) but let its more flexible implementation through Strategic Plans of its Member States for the 2023-2027 period.

The Farm to Fork Strategy added a series of initiatives upstream and downstream of the food chain, but with respect to primary agriculture and the CAP it essentially delayed the reform process by two years by adding four main EU quantitative targets to be achieved by 2030 as a measure of success of what was decided by the previous the CAP orientation.  Despite the explicit conclusion of the Impact Assessment that such targets did not make sense at EU level as “one size does not fit all”, and the specific needs of Member States need to be addressed based on evidence, the so called “aspirational” and non-binding targets failed to inspire Member States and farmers. Instead, they demonstrated the huge gap between the exuberance in expectations and the reality on the ground.

All targets set were on areas whose orientation was already desired and prioritised. But their setting undermined from the start the prospects for success. The most promoted target, the doubling of the area for organic farming to 25%, went against the conclusion of any analysis (the EU’s outlook for the sector expected the relative figure to be 14% before reform) and any logic of supporting a sector whose growth was based on value-added and not on area.

The target to reduce the use of pesticides by 50% (a figure that has become sort of fixation not just in the EU but at UN level no matter what the problem or the target is) was proposed to be reached by 2030 while the first data would become available by 2028 and the baseline of what they represent is still unknown. The reduction of nutrient losses in the soil (another 50%) exceeded both in both timing and magnitude what FAO considered feasible for European soils (a 40% reduction by 2040). Even the target of a 50% reduction in the use of animal antibiotics (a theme of one of the Workshops of the Impact Assessment) had already been achieved at EU level, thus reducing any incentive for further progress.

With such a mismatch between expectations and reality, it should come as no surprise that anti-EU populists used the opportunity for a comprehensive attack on whatever “Brussels” is meant to represent during the European elections, and with some success. What should come as surprise is that the Commission did not seem to relax what already was considered as “not legally binding”, its quantitative targets, but chose instead to alter the means meant to achieve broader and absolutely necessary objectives. For example, the relaxation, in the guise of simplification, of certain Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions already in place since the 2003 reform has nothing to do with an impact on the cost of production. On the contrary, it saves production costs.

This asymmetry between initial expectations and reality is not just an EU phenomenon; in the EU it was expressed strongly because the EU policy has been the most ambitious in real terms, with UN such initiatives at limited declaration level. But it reflects the difficulty in delivering policy-relevant outcomes addressing environment challenges and covering the food chain (an “holistic, food systems approach”) and the reality of its available policy instruments. In the EU the latter, adapted over time through a series of reforms, were designed to address clearly set Treaty objectives that mainly address the supply side of agriculture, adapted to make production more demand-driven. Such measures are nonetheless unfit to address growing food demand complexities, often characterised by individuals demanding as citizens what they cannot afford as consumers.

Greek agriculture and the CAP: a cow to milk or a policy to apply?

Greek agriculture is fully integrated into EU policies for more than four decades now, and is one of the largest beneficiaries of CAP funds. EU funds supporting Greek agriculture represent one of the highest percentages of GDP among Member States, lagging behind only Bulgaria’s share; 1.7% for the latter in 2021 vs 1.4% for Greece (for comparison, Spain’s share was 0.6%°. Up until recently, CAP funds have accounted for more than half of all EU funds to Greece, but the exceptional Recovery and Resilience Facility changed this by boosting EU funding to all Member States. Yet, in contrast to the objectives set by the CAP, Greek agriculture seems to have struggled to reap the benefits that other Member States with comparable conditions as those faced by Greece did.[14]

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. 

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. That the reversal of the negative trend of Greece’s agri-food deficit happened during the economic crisis is a sign of resilience of the sector; that this trend continues a promising sign for the future. There are also numerous examples of innovative applications of best practices, stemming the full spectrum from organic farming to precision farming. But there is a paradox when one looks into the details of such progress; it is as if the CAP is absent.

In fact, while the implementation of the CAP in Greece would require a separate analysis, three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture point to the administration as the root of problems as all three relate to decisions (not) taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. The first major persistent weakness is the uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments. Successive reforms of the CAP since 2008 allowed Member States to move away from a level of support based on past data, which was consciously chosen in 2003 by the Commission as a necessary step in order to avoid a negative Impact on land prices and farm asset values. Minimising such changes, Greece has systematically avoided assuming an unavoidable political cost to reap the policy benefits of such a move.

This choice directly impacts the second weakness, the role of extensive livestock as such a redistribution would have required a clear demarcation between permanent grazing land and forest areas. Since the budgetary allocation of direct payments is fixed, increasing the support of the livestock would have reduced the support for crops. It would have also allowed Greece to reduce the average level of area support with the integration of more land into the system (something that was possible already in 2008). Instead, it now leaves Greece vulnerable to a future path of further harmonisation of support, while the poor implementation continues to generate a significant level of penalties.[15]

The third major weakness relates to the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System. A requirement since the 2003 reform, this continues to be weak. It is not that there is an absence of advisers, or lately even a list of certified advisors. A system requires a commonality in the principles applied, an understanding of the implementation challenges of the policies and suggestions that are well integrated into a Strategic Plan with priorities. While the Greek Strategic Plan generally follows the new orientation of the CAP and the Farm to Fork Strategy, it is unclear to which extent and in which directions the measures chosen will impact the structures of Greek agriculture.

What the future brings

…the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out.

As a sign of the parallel universes EU Institutions sometimes work the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out (and any numbers whatsoever in a 100-page report of one of the most challenging sectors).  Yet facts are more stubborn than any biases. With a world population that is still increasing at faster rates than production in the two most populated continents and with climate change impacting every aspect of agricultural production, the question of where food covering the additional demand needs will be produced and how and with which footprint this will happen is more pertinent than ever.

EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.

Thus, the capacity of agricultural supply to respond to increasing food security concerns amidst climate change priorities is at increasing risk. EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions. To do so requires a closer look at how new obstacles and longer-term constraints driven by recent developments impact on the expected path of transition towards sustainability. This not some “treason” of high ambitions; rather it represents the reality check to test how these ambitions could be met.

EU agriculture did well in its purely economic and social dimension, as evidenced by increases in its trade balance and farm income. EU agriculture did comparatively much better than other global players when judged by its performance in emissions. To accept this fact does not imply complacency or ignoring the need to improve significantly the the environmental performance of the CAP. Rather, it implies that in attempting to do so, understanding the role of EU agriculture in the global context is a must if climate action and food security are to be addressed as what they are, global in nature.

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. 

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. Though imperfect, all three areas are necessary conditions for moving forward. To become also sufficient in addressing the global need to produce more with less, they require addressing misperceptions about them.

…improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

Productivity, in contrast to productivism, does not imply ignoring the need to incorporate the environmental footprint in its measurement. On the contrary, it implies identifying and better integrating the full spectrum of alternative practices that, in different conditions, allow output to grow with lower inputs. In this respect, prioritising soil management offers some clear prospects. This is where better data on the performance of practices at regional, and increasing cases at farm level, are available. Soil is also where the CAP has a leverage since most farmland is covered through the provision of direct payments conditional on better practices, and measurable impacts are possible. Furthermore, improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

…unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression 

Unfortunately, soil is also where resistance to science in the EU is evident. Reduction in nutrient losses implies less and better targeted use of both fertilisers and pesticides, and alternatives in the products that are being phased-out. Yet, unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression – even in Nobel-winning technologies. But while increasingly scientific evidence provides a more balanced assessment of the role of agriculture, including of livestock (from the recognition of the nutritional value of red meat to the very different role of methane when livestock numbers are in steady state as compared to when they have been increasing), negative public perceptions and prejudice about the role of science in agriculture are well entrenched.

…notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors.

So are negative perceptions about the role of trade. Partly this has to do with the fact that the benefits from trade are often idealised, ignoring that it comes with winners and losers; and the former need to introduce measures that compensate and accompany in transition the latter. The EU is still, more than anything else, a free-trade area which includes such compensation mechanisms (CAP, regional funds); however, agriculture is a late comer to the global trade system, often pressured to ‘give’ so that other sectors ‘take’. Combined with the absence of global rules on safety and environmental footprint, this renders the debate difficult and prone to isolationist ideas. It is interesting in this respect how notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors (from energy, metals and minerals to microchips).

In conclusion, addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture. This, in turn, will to a large extent also determine the EU’s capacity to lead based on evidence in the joint challenge to produce more food with less emissions and pollution and adapt its policies accordingly.

[1] Views expressed here are strictly personal, and do not reflect my current affiliation with the above entities or my previous affiliation with the European Commission. My 33-year career with the latter heavily influenced these opinions, which here reflect only information that is in the public domain.

[2] K. Karantininis, A New Paradigm for Greek Agriculture, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, or more recently https://www.dianeosis.org/2024/09/o-agrotikos-tomeas-stin-ellada/

[3] See https://www.dianeosis.org/2023/07/i-nea-koini-agrotiki-politiki-tis-periodou-2023-2027/ for the manner by which Greece chose to implement the recent CAP reform. As for the manner by which the debate on the CAP usually evolves, the point raised here is based on my experience from over 100 missions in Greece during my career. While introductory interventions at public conferences and meetings habitually would start with an update of what needed to be done in the future, the discussion very soon would turn into what was not done from previous requirements. That implementation is the problem is evidenced by heavy penalties, which in the decade before the economic crisis exceeded 2 billion euros.

[4] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/IndicatorsEnvironmental/EmissionsFromAgriculture.html and https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-security-climate-change-times-covid-19-tassos-haniotis/

[5] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardIndicators/Financing.html

[6] At the EU level, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark were leading the reform CAP camp, with France and Ireland strongly resisting change. US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were pushing globally for reform, despite also having significant trade distorting policies in place. See for example McCalla A.F. and Josling, T. E., Agricultural Policies in World Markets, New York, 1985.

[7] T. Haniotis, Agriculture in the WTO: A European Union Perspective, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 32,2(August 2000): 197-202.

[8] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2023_b14de474-en

[9] A. Sorrentino, R. Henke and S. Severini (eds), The Common Agricultural Policy after the Fischler Reform, Ashgate, England, 2011.

[10] J; Swinnen (ed), The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: an imperfect storm, CEPS, Brussels, 2015.

[11] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-inflation-blues-tassos-haniotis-qhj6e

[12] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/blissful-linearity-ag-market-outlook-nonlinear-nature-tassos-haniotis-iwqpe

[13] https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-05/f2f_action-plan_2020_strategy-info_en.pdf

[14] For a detailed comparison of Greek agriculture with the EU average and those of other Member States see https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DataPortal/analytical_factsheets.html.

[15] Although technical in nature, the issue of incorrect integration of grazing land into the payment system brought the expected average per hectare payment in Greece from 380 euros per hectare to 580 euros per hectare already in the 2008 “Health Check” Reform. Total funds were not affected, but their  distribution was, negatively affecting the extensive livestock sector.