The nexus between climate change and migration is not newly emerged; yet it has recently started gaining territory in political agendas. It constitutes a complex phenomenon which involves various fields, making it harder to collect accurate and up-to-date data. Climate migration can take different forms-internal or cross-border, temporary or permanent- and is usually affected by a combination of factors. Therefore, this policy paper advocates for addressing climate migration in relation to existing agendas and frameworks, and not as a stand-alone issue. It also promotes the conceptualisation of climate migration by focusing on how we talk about people who migrate because of climate change and not what we call them. The last section provides a set of policy recommendations, advocating for tailor-made solutions based on regional and national needs and vulnerabilities. Overall, the policy paper underscores the importance of addressing the complexity of climate migration and calls for concerted policy efforts.

· Climate change is one of the factors among others that lead to human mobility.

· Climate migration is a multicausal and multi-form phenomenon.

· Climate migration should not be perceived as a stand-alone issue for which an entirely novel legal and political framework should be adopted. Au contraire, it needs to be addressed in relation with other agendas and existing areas of cooperation.

· The focus should be placed on how we talk about people moving for climatic reasons and not what we call them.

· Attention should be paid to internal and inter-regional displacement.

· One-size-fits-all policy responses are unrealistic; thus, tailor-made solutions should be promoted.

· Mitigation policies can be developed through existing frameworks.

· Reinforcement of National Adaptation Plans is of significant importance.

· Migration can be seen as an adaptation strategy.

· Promotion of humanitarian visas as well as bilateral free movement agreements are some policies that need to be reinforced.

Read here in pdf the policy paper by Emmanuella Doussis, Professor of international institutions, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, UNESCO Chairholder on Climate Diplomacy, Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme, ELIAMEP and Maria Eleni Pantazi Psatha, PhD candidate, KU Leuven, Programme Officer at METAdrasi-Action for Migration and Development.


Undeniably climate change has adversely impacted different areas in the world and has caused damages to human and natural systems. It has always been the case that the most vulnerable people or countries are also the most affected ones. Floods, hurricanes, droughts, and fires have historically led people to migrate. Several examples from the Great Irish Famine of 1845 to the Dust Bowl Migration of the 1930s, prove that mobility triggered by climate change has not recently emerged (Ionesco et al., 2016).

Mobility due to climate change has been- and still is- one of the widest academic debates of the last decades, with a dominated divide between the “maximalist” (or alarmist) and “minimalist” (or sceptical) school of thought. From the devastating hurricane Katrina to the gradual desertification of Guatemala, the outcome remains the same: people have to move either for a short-term or permanently in order to protect themselves. However, and as the years pass, the intensity and frequency of extreme climatic events have increased the urgency to deal with the nexus of climate change and human mobility.

The state of research and data has remarkably improved during the last decade. The publication of landmark reports and studies has led to a more concrete conceptualisation and a clearer understanding of the links between climate change and migration. However, this binary view of migration is still persistent; people are forced to either migrate due to political reasons, thus, being able to seek asylum protection, or they are willingly moving for economic reasons. This dual perspective of migration is being questioned by climate change (Doussis, 2023). It is important to underline though the complexity of the relationship between climate change and migration, which is also affected by other factors (McLeman & Smit, 2006, 31-32).

Newly emerged questions are already at the forefront of the political and academic agenda: what policy responses are needed at an international, regional, and national levels when migration is the only solution? What is the role of the states? How can people who move because of climate change be protected? To provide an answer to these questions, we need to start by addressing some of the so-called “classic questions”: how is climate change linked to migration and what do we already know about the people who are moving due to climatic events? How should these people be called? Can we refer to them as “climate refugees” or “environmental migrants”? Therefore, the objective of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it will respond to the aforementioned “classic” questions, and on the other hand, it will draw policy recommendations in order to better understand and address climate mobility.

How is climate change linked to migration?

Historically, an amplitude of examples proves that climate change and migration are interlinked. However, the former constitutes one of the factors that can trigger mobility and it should not be examined in isolation from other drivers. Specifically, climate change interacts with “five categories of drivers” (Foresight Migration and Global Environmental Change, 2011) that influence the decision to move: social, political, economic, environmental, and demographic. For this, climate migration is characterised by many scholars, such as Norman Myers and Etienne Piguet, as a multi-causal phenomenon. Piguet underlines that ‘pure environmental migration does not exist, and multicausality is the norm’ (Piguet, 2011).

It is important to understand the complexity of the links between climate change and migration; on the one hand, this relation is affected by other factors, such as conflict, economic or political instability, while on the other hand, climate impacts can intensify these factors that shape peoples’ intentions to move, acting as a “threat multiplier” (Doussis, 2023).

Moreover, climate migration is perceived as a multi-form phenomenon as well, as it varies in form. Concretely, temporary movements are often caused by extreme weather events, with people usually returning home once conditions improve, such as in the case of unpredicted rainfall in Peru. Conversely, slow-onset events, such as droughts or sea-level rise, usually lead to a more permanent form of migration. Internal movements or cross-border is another distinction; nevertheless, and as it will be highlighted in the next section, internal movements are more common, as people are more prone to moving within the borders of their country, or within the same region. Displacement might take the form of a voluntary adaptation strategy or can be also forced in so far as people have no other option than to leave their homes. However, it is noteworthy to mention that there are some grey areas when we talk about forced or voluntary migration. What happens in the case of people who do not want to leave their homes, but they have to since their habitual place has become uninhabitable? What about people who migrate in order to avoid being forced to do so at a later stage?  (Ionesco et al., 2016, 18).

Another linkage between climate change and migration is the notion of vulnerability. Specifically, vulnerability is defined as “the risk of adverse outcomes to receptors or exposure units (human groups, ecosystems, and communities) in the face of relevant changes in climate, other environmental variables and social conditions” (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2015, 26). It is considered as a multidimensional concept and is a function of three main elements: (a) sensitivity; (b) degree of exposure; and (c) resilience. As underlined in the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, vulnerability varies among and within regions, while at the same time it is affected by other socioeconomic factors (IPCC, Summary for Policy Makers, 2022, 12). Complementary to the above, we can better understand the linkage that vulnerability creates if we see it analogically to conflicts and wars; certain groups become more vulnerable during wartime, while the same applies for climate change. “During natural disasters, women tend to die or suffer injury more often than men because they are not warned, cannot swim or cannot leave the house alone.” (Cohen & Bradley, 2010). Therefore, it is crucial to ameliorate the quality of information and data in order to minimise vulnerability (Birkman et al., 2022).

The 2005 hurricane Katrina, which temporarily displaced over a million people, was extremely destructive due to the lack of protective capacity, poor disaster planning, in combination with the gradual destruction of the wetlands.  Almost twenty years later, in July 2022, Pakistan faced the most severe floods which led to the internal displacement of 8,2 million people, marking it as the world’s largest disaster displacement of the last decade. Despite the country’s progress in risk reduction, the level of preparedness minimised the country’s resilience. Contrariwise, an example of state action that has reduced vulnerability is South Sudan’s four-year project which aims at reducing flood risk by developing local early warning systems, water management and flood resilient infrastructure (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2023). Therefore, “it is worth recalling that climatic hazards do not automatically lead to displacements” (Piguet, 2011).  The examination of vulnerability as a linkage between climate change and migration provides us with the opportunity to focus on warning signs and be better prepared for future climatic events. A hurricane or a flood, by itself does not signify a disaster; it needs to be followed by factors such as poor planning, lack of information, or unpreparedness.

Hence, climate migration should not be perceived as a stand-alone issue for which an entirely novel legal and political framework should be adopted. Au contraire, it needs to be addressed in relation with other agendas and existing areas of cooperation. The Groundswell report highlighted that, “there is no straight line of causation between climate change and migration, as mobility itself is complex, driven by multiple processes that interact” (World Bank Group, 2018). 

Existing Data and numbers

A general remark regarding existing data and estimates on the number of people who are moving due to climate change is that, up-to-date, there is no accurate number because of the difficulty in gathering data, since seldom do people migrate only for climatic reasons. It is important to clarify though, that this is the case for cross-border climate migration, and not for internal mobility. The importance of having accurate and updated data lies on the fact that they can contribute to early warning, mitigation of climate change, and enhancement of adaptation strategies (Norwegian Refugee Council).

Moreover, the majority of existing studies are of a qualitative character, focusing on the causes of migration, or a definitional approach, making empirical studies extremely rare (Gemenne, 2018). As highlighted in the 2023 IOM report (Beyer & Milan, 2023, 18), the existing methodologies do not allow for a consistent gathering of data, and the numbers that are used are usually predictions and estimates. From 1997, we have the first predictions provided by Norman Myers (Myers, 1997), who estimated that there are at least 25 million “environmental refugees” at the time, while as many as 200 million people could be at risk of displacement in the nearest future. Another report showed that at least 36 million people have been displaced due to natural disasters (IOM, 2009). However, these numbers were mainly used to raise awareness and bring at the forefront the issue of climate migration.

The most accurate data so far concern internal mobility and are provided by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Specifically, the latest report of 2023 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2023, 48) highlights that 71,1 million people live in internal displacement, with a 20 per cent increase in one year, making it the highest record of internal displacement up-to-date. Of those, 8,7 million were displaced solely due to environmental disasters. The five countries that face the highest figures are Pakistan, the Philippines, China, India, and Nigeria, in which the majority of disaster displacements were triggered by weather-related hazards. To illustrate the increase of internal displacements, the example of Greece is considered. In 2020, there were 13,000 internal movements, whereas in 2021 there was a significant increase reaching 67,000 displacements. Overall, in 2022 the highest rate of internal displacements was recorded, with 41 per cent higher than the annual average of the last decade.

Hence, human mobility is hard to predict, while it is almost unrealistic to be able to know the exact number of people who have crossed borders due to environmental degradation. However, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has shed some light regarding internal displacements through its yearly reports. These data are considered more accurate due to the methodology used which relies on a baseline of events. Yet, they concern solely internal and forced mobility, which means that the need to produce more empirical studies remains of significant importance.

How should we call people who are moving due to climate change?

The definitional approach of climate migration has been at the forefront of the academic debate. Throughout the years many notions, such as “environmental refugee”, “climate displacee”, “eco-migrant”, have emerged; yet they remain controversial and rather unclear. The first and most commonly used definition was provided by El-Hinnawi in 1985, who defined environmental refugees as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life” (Bates, 2002).

Although it is the first try to provide a definitional conseptualisation of this phenomenon, it still remains a wide approach which encompasses every type of climatic displacement, without making any distinction nor providing concrete criteria that could make clearer of who can be perceived as an “environmental refugee”. To put it simply, this definition puts under the same umbrella people who are moving due to a severe flooding and people who are gradually leaving their homes due to events such as sea-level rise or desertification. Also, we cannot include in the same definition people who are moving internally and those who are crossing borders, as their only common element is their movement due to environmental factors.

The term “environmental refugee” has also been introduced by Norman Myers in most of his reports which has received criticism for the confusion it creates (Black, 1998). Professor Guy S. Goodwin-Gill raised an interesting point, shifting the focus from how we define refugees to why we define them the way we do. He emphasised that “the main purpose of any definition or description is to facilitate, and to justify aid and protection” (Juss, 2006, 198). This also explains the definition of a “refugee” under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which provides specific criteria under which a person can acquire the refugee status. In that case, climate change and natural disasters are not one of them. Hence, talking about “environmental refugees” does not have a legal basis as a notion and its use would imply the need to expand the Convention. Such an expansion is not seen very positively and may be unnecessary as climate change is usually not the sole factor driving migration.

Is it therefore, necessary to adopt a specific term when we refer to people moving due to climate change? One school of thought is in favour of the adoption of a legal notion supporting that this would lead to a clearer conceptualisation of climate migration, enabling the development of legal and policy responses. As Gemenne has also underlined, “terminology is at the heart of political responses” (Ionesco et al., 2016, 18). This emphasis is crucial for the development of protection mechanisms for people who are migrating also due to environmental degradation. Undeniably, the adoption of a concrete notion would terminate the confusion that terms such as “environmental refugee” create. Nevertheless, an internationally agreed definition seems unrealistic, while its generic nature will not suffice for the development of effective policy responses.

On the other hand, an interesting point of view is described by Morrissey (Morrissey, 2021) who highlights that focus should be placed on how we talk about people migrating due to climate change and not what we call them. Undeniably, using a single term to define people who are moving due to climate change is appealing, as it helps with conceptualising this group of people, it creates an understanding of the links between migration and climate, while it also allows their enumeration. However, Morrissey underlines that the adoption of one term can lead to an oversimplification of the climate change-migration nexus and put its multicausal character aside, while also creating an anti-immigrant sentiment. It can also lead to inappropriate policy responses that will likely not address the hardships that many people moving due to climate change will face. Thus, what needs to be taken into consideration is how to reduce vulnerability and increase the choices of people who are moving due to climate change, and not see migration “as a problem”, but rather as an alternative to climate change. The complexity of climate migration demands an emphasis on better understanding and conceptualising climate migration, which will offer pathways for policy responses.

What kind of policies are needed?

From the aforementioned analysis it appears that climate migration is at the junction of several fields, which means that policy responses should be developed in a tailor-made way, and not through the lens of a one-size-fits-all approach. This section aims at unfolding the policies that will allow for better prevention and adaptation to the consequences of climate change, taking into consideration regional and national vulnerabilities. It is important though to firstly provide an overview of the existing frameworks in order to respond to the following questions: What kind of policy responses are needed? What is the role of the states? What kind of protection for people moving due to climate change is needed?

Undeniably, the existing international, legal regulations do not explicitly address climate mobility. For instance, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) acknowledges the adverse effects of climate change- and the vulnerability especially of developing countries, low-lying and other small island countries and highlights the importance of global cooperation by all countries. However, it left the details of implementation to be settled later through negotiations within a mechanism set by the same convention, the so-called COPs (Conference of the Parties) to be convened every year.  The 2015 Paris Agreement, which complements the UNFCCC, refers to migrants and reaffirms the responsibility of States to uphold their rights while implementing actions to combat climate change; yet this does not establish any new state obligation beyond those existing under Human Rights Law.

Although there are few binding legal texts that explicitly refer to climate migration- such as the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)-, there are several soft law and policy instruments that offer solutions to guarantee the protection of people moving due to climate disasters. Undeniably, as every person who is migrating needs legal protection, the same applies for people who are moving because of climate change. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Cancun Climate Change Adaptation Framework, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, are some examples that depict the importance of respecting and protecting the rights of individuals, while taking into consideration the phases of displacement (prevention-protection and assistance during displacement) (Maru, 2009). These can serve as a basis for protecting the rights of people moving due to climate change and enhance policy dialogues. Nevertheless, better tailored legal solutions will still be necessary to effectively tackle migration partially driven by climate change. Some scholars have suggested adopting a new convention which will explicitly deal with climate migration at an international level or expanding existing ones, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, in order to include climate emergencies. However, these suggestions are not only unrealistic due to the complexity of climate migration, but they will also face political unwillingness. On the other hand, and as the up-to-date practice has proven, a soft law approach is perceived as a more viable solution.

According to international standards, it is the duty of States to safeguard all individuals within their borders, and their citizens overseas. Within this framework, people who move due to climate change should receive the same protection. As underlined in the landmark ruling of Teitiota v New Zealand, “states have a ‘continuing responsibility’ to take into account ‘new and updated data on the effects of climate change”.[1] Although the claim of Mr. Teitiota was dismissed, this decision acknowledged the severe effects of climate change to the well-being of people, leading to a violation of their right to life.

It should be noted that three initiatives requesting advisory opinions to international courts and tribunals have been provided recently. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was tasked with providing an opinion on State obligations in order to respond to climate emergencies, within the framework of Human Rights Law, underlining the importance of further elucidating States’ duties. Accordingly, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea received in 2022 a request from the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change to provide an advisory opinion on the concrete obligations of State Parties to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. The International Court of Justice was also tasked by the United Nations Assembly to render an advisory opinion regarding the obligations of States to ensure the protection of the climate system, as well as the legal consequences that could arise from these obligations. Although non-binding, such opinions are highly impactful, establishing the groundwork for future legal initiatives.

In general, climate migration needs overarching policy responses, that consider mobility at its entirety. Therefore, the present policy paper will examine two categories of policies: mitigation and adaptation policies. The former aims at addressing the root causes of climate change, while the latter focuses on increasing the resilience of people and communities who are facing the consequences of climate change. As mentioned in the IPCC Sixth Assessment report, mitigation and adaptation policies go hand-in-hand, since even if countries are fully prepared to face climate change consequences, they still should remain ready to adjust to its effects. It is thus, important to promote climate resilient development, and gradually achieve sustainable development.

In the past century, we have seen the rise of temperatures resulting in negative effects around the globe, emphasizing the critical importance of mitigation measures. Over the past 28 years, the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have made it clear that global cooperation, financial aid for the most vulnerable, and transitioning to cleaner economies are essential in combating climate change. Consistent with the agreements at the most recent COP28, moving away from fossil fuels, enhancing adaptation strategies, and transferring $100 billion from developed to developing countries were highlighted as crucial actions. As also underlined in the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), “States must adopt and adhere to policies and measures to […] mitigate climate change. In doing so, they should pay extra attention to protect the rights of the most vulnerable, who tend to be disproportionally affected by environmental degradation”.[2] This preventive strategy is closely aligned with adaptation measures, which must establish and enforce a comprehensive set of environmental and social safeguards to guarantee that no project adversely impacts human rights or the environment.

Secondly, adaptation policies play a crucial role in diminishing exposure and susceptibility to climate change, while increasing resilience even after a climatic disaster. For this reason, the 2022 Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2023, 1)  calls for further action, as there is still a lot to be achieved in order to keep up with climate risks. One favoured framework linking adaptation objectives to migratory opportunities and challenges is the National Adaptation Plans. Specifically, they aim at identifying the needs and gaps of a country while ranking its priorities and allowing for better planning and coordination. A great example is Chad’s 2016 National Adaptation Plan, through which the national authorities identified adaptation needs and deficiencies based on the vulnerability factors and the impacts of climate change in the area. Also, the Dominican Republic through the development of socio-economic scenarios combined with climate projections, was able to map the countries vulnerabilities, risks- with flooding being the most important- and priorities.

Another adaptation response which has not been widely acknowledged as such is migration. Human mobility is often portrayed as a failure in response to the grave consequences of climate change and viewed negatively.[3] Already in 2010, the Cancun Adaptation Framework had acknowledged that migration is not the last choice of people who are facing the consequences of climate change, it is yet perceived as a “maladaptive response” (Warner, 2010). Contrariwise, migration can be considered as an adaptation strategy and may be viewed as either a reactive policy following a natural disaster or as a preventative measure taken before such an event occurs. Of course, the spectrum of adaptive responses can take several forms since climate mobility differs from region to region. For instance, the Egyptian government has implemented an internal migration scheme in order to combat desertification, promoting a migration flow from urban to rural areas. It is interesting to also mention pre-emptive relocation which has been used as an adaptive measure in Vietnam- through the “Living with Floods” project- and Ethiopia- through the “Voluntary Relocation Programme”. These projects relocate people living in areas who are prone to environmental disasters-or where slow-onset disasters such as droughts are already affecting the populations- in order to avoid forced displacements (Ionesco et al. 2016, 26). However, as an adaptation measure, pre-emptive relocation still divides the research community, while concrete guidelines for a more regulated relocation are deemed as necessary.

It is crucial to note that discussions around adaptation policies vary by region and are influenced by the type of mobility involved. For instance, the adaptation policies for Tuvalu and Kiribati regarding sea-level rise differ from policies aiming at mitigating the impact of sudden events, such as tsunamis, that will lead to mass- and probably internal- migration. For the development of adaptation measures, it is essential to identify and address any existing gaps, and vulnerabilities which will lead to higher resilience and the development of early warning systems or better infrastructure. Yet, muchΑρχή φόρμας remains to be done in the area of migration and climate change. Further developing National Adaptation Plans by creating guidelines or tools, is a process that needs to be developed additionally, as it is currently stalled due to insufficient data or funding shortages. Optimizing human mobility as an adaptation policy and perceiving it from the standpoint of the advantages it can create are still some challenges that need to be faced at a policy level.  

Furthermore, there is a move away from the idea of a one-size-fits-all solution; whereas it appears that the regional level provides a favourable setting for collective action, particularly because most international movements occur at this scale. It is usually the case that neighbouring countries frequently face similar challenges and opportunities, and it is thus, easier to negotiate agreements or establish joint policies at a regional rather than international level. For this reason, this paper is in favour of focusing on internal and inter-regional migration. The adoption of regional instruments and bilateral agreements will accommodate each region’s needs as already proven through the examples of the Kampala Convention and the Cartagena Declaration.

Some interesting examples of regional responses are the “humanitarian visa” that Argentina launched in 2022, and the “free movement agreement” between Australia and Tuvalu, signed in November 2023. Specifically, the former concerns people from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean and provides the opportunity to remain in Argentina for a three-year period in case of sudden-onset climate displacement. This visa functioned within a rights-based legal framework, viewing migration as a human right regardless of legal status. It is also crucial to note that the speed of approval processing may vary, largely depending on the resources available to Argentina’s immigration services. Consequently, obtaining approval could potentially take several months. The second example refers to the Falepili Union, or the so-called “bilateral, new treaty” in which Australia will offer residency to Tuvaluan citizens affected by sea-level rise. Amongst others it includes the establishment of a special visa arrangement for Tuvaluan citizens to live, work and study in Australia. Specifically, Australia will offer up to 280 people access to permanent residency each year, while it will also help the citizens of Tuvalu to remain in their homes with safety. Additionally, Australia will provide financial support for Tuvalu’s Coastal Adaptation Project and assist in enhancing their climate resilience.

Overall, enhancing regional and national policy dialogues will enable the understanding of the impacts of climate change, the existing gaps and promote the exchange of good practices, while reinforcing resilience and adaptive capacities. The general idea is that “states should undertake measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regards to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels”.[4]Therefore, the sole realistic solution is a combination of existing legal documents, soft law, and migratory policies. The creation of guidelines for cross-border migration, in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement seems like a solution that will be more easily “digested” by states.


The nexus between climate change and human mobility is a new area of interest, and a challenging one. It combines several policy fields, from migration and climate change to risk management and human rights. Its complexity and multicausality are growing, necessitating robust, and multifaceted policy responses. The discourse around climate migration has evolved significantly towards a clearer conceptualisation; yet this signifies the amplitude of the remaining and emerging challenges as well. Although it appears as easier to have accurate data on the cost and damages of climate disasters, the human cost of climate change is not easily estimable.

A recurring issue in discussions about climate migration revolves around how to define individuals who move due to climate change impacts. The response is that focus should be placed on how we talk about them and not what we call them. Although the adoption of one term seems appealing, it can lead to oversimplification and inappropriate policy responses. Environmental disasters are clearly challenging many of the long-standing conceptual, legal, and organizational frameworks of dealing with mobility. Therefore, more work needs to be done in the reinforcement of existing legal and policy frameworks that will safeguard the rights of people.

Integrating both mitigation and adaptation strategies should be further promoted taking into consideration the needs and vulnerabilities of regions. The introduction of specific cases, such as the humanitarian visa in Argentina and the bilateral treaty between Australia and Tuvalu, illustrates the importance of tailor-made solutions, instead of an overarching international approach. Moreover, there is still space for development regarding the optimization of the benefits that migration can offer as an adaptation strategy. Understanding the complexity of climate migration will lead to the right questions, and to proactive policy responses. Thus, it should not be perceived as a stand-alone issue. Contrariwise, a more flexible approach is preferred, including a combination of soft laws and migratory policies, while developing regional cooperation and national responses. Policies should emphasize on three axes: prevention, protection, and adaptation in order to offer sustainable and long-term solutions.




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[1] Teitiota v. New Zealand [United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2019], CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, para. 9.14.

[2] Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland App. No. 53600/20 (ECtHR, 2024) para 198.

[3] One example that has adopted a more positive response of migration as an adaptation strategy is Ethiopia through its National Adaptation Plan. For more see

[4] Cancun Climate Change Adaptation Framework (2010), Article 14(f).