TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE AND
THE FUTURE OF THE GRECO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT

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The Questions
Conflicting signals are emanating from Ankara regarding its bilateral relations with Greece, its next move vis-a-vis Cyprus, and the unfolding, frequently tempestuous, relations of Turkey with the European Union. Most of these developments began taking shape by the European Council at Helsinki. They are also being conditioned by Turkey's prolonged economic crisis, widespread social frustration, and political uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is indubitable that Greece and Turkey have been forging a bilateral modus vivendi akin to détente. This is the case after the change of leadership in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Spring of 1999; the "seismic diplomacy" that followed the catastrophic earthquakes of August-September of the same year; the "citizens diplomacy" that erupted almost ex nihilo at the same time; and, most important, by the December 1999 Helsinki summit.

On the other hand, Turkey's foreign policy exhibits signs of indecision or confusion in the post-Helsinki period and especially since November 2001. Instead of exploiting richly the historic opportunities afforded by Helsinki, regarding both its disconcerting domestic problems and its serious external difficulties, Ankara's decision-makers behave ambiguously vis-a-vis the EU. Moreover, Athens still awaits reciprocation to its rapprochement gestures, especially regarding its tangible assistance to Turkey's EU candidacy ambitions at, and after, Helsinki. In fact, in tandem with some promising, bilateral "low politics" agreements, Turkey keeps challenging Greek sovereignty in the Aegean and remains intransigent on Cyprus.

The main question, therefore, arises as follows: how should one account for Ankara's aforementioned policies which, by contradicting the Copenhagen criteria lato sensu, the foreign-policy related acquis communautaire, and the European Commission's strict warnings,1 endanger Turkey's occasionally expressed eagerness to join the EU? Similarly, why does Ankara seem to bypass the opportunity provided by Helsinki and, instead of embarking on gestures of reciprocation to Athens' moves of rapprochement, keeps challenging Greek sovereignty and obstructing the resolution of the Cyprus problem, even though such obstruction contradicts another sine qua non condition for the upgrading of Turkey's EU candidacy?

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To be sure, in recent months we have witnessed extensive soul-searching among Turkey's decision-makers, its newly ascending elites, and the Turkish people at large. Its final outcome will determine if - through advanced interdependence with the European Union - Turkey will achieve rapid domestic modernisation, economic recovery and thorough democratisation, coupled with tangible implications for regional stability and co-operation. Alternatively - that is, by erroneous choices of strategy and tactic - Turkey could plunge into tragic regional adventures, with evident domestic implications. Examples of erroneous strategy by Ankara would be to keep insisting that Cyprus' EU accession would "force Turkey to react without limits"; or to continue challenging Greek sovereignty and the international status quo in the Aegean; or to allow narrow conceptions of "national dignity" to obstruct its own EU prospects.

This essay will argue that appreciation of Turkey's idiosyncratic political culture is presupposed for the valid understanding of its foreign policy tendencies and options. It favours optimism regarding Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey's capacity to transcend its present crisis. This follows from five primary convictions to be defended below. First, Turkey's post-1990 strategy in "Eurasia" (conceived in part as an alternative to "Europe") has yielded limited fruits, rendering the EU option irresistible. Second, most of Turkey's elites increasingly recognise the EU's superior capacity to fulfil the country's colossal needs. Third, what I term "the Simitis doctrine" provides Ankara and Athens with an unprecedented opportunity (unavailable since the Venizelos-Ataturk Rapprochement of the 1930s) to build solid conditions for bilateral peace, co-operation and friendship, and to resolve the messy Cyprus conundrum. Fourth, after some skilful "pazarlik" - i.e. oriental-type bargaining - with NATO, Washington, and the EU, rationality will force Turkey to embrace the European Union as its new vocation, thereby fulfilling most of the aforementioned expectations.

Finally, it is important to emphasise that, in recent months, both Greece and Turkey are experiencing the therapeutic effects of self-criticism with respect to their foreign policy. In the case of Turkey, which constitutes the primary concern of this essay, it becomes highly salutary that the aforementioned "soul-searching" is coupled with authentic self-criticism. Hence, I shall rely here on features of Turkey's political culture as they are presented and evaluated primarily by Turkish analysts and commentators, being convinced that, beyond their validity, their relevant assessments also serve the best interests of Greco-Turkish rapprochement.

**Helsinki's Potentially Catalytic Role**

Athens has extended valuable assistance to Turkey's EU ambitions, before, at, and after, Helsinki. This assistance went beyond withholding the traditional veto which Turkey's occupation of Cyprus had made inevitable for long. It was prompted by a general change of heart towards Turkey, perceptible already in the spring of 1999, as mentioned at the outset. Certainly, it was also premised on a wager: that Greece's policy of genuine and sustained
rapprochement - in tandem with the progressive "Europeanisation" of EU-Turkey relations and of the Cyprus problem- would render Ankara's challenges to Greek security misplaced and its intransigence in Cyprus counter-productive.

The grounds for Greek optimism included two Helsinki-related facts. First, Cyprus' accession was now explicitly de-coupled from the prior solution of the Republic's political problem. As the Presidency Conclusions put it,

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all the relevant factors.4

Second, should EU candidates not have solved their "border disputes" with any Member-state of the Union, Helsinki demanded their submission to the International Court of Justice by 2004.5

Both decisions of Helsinki had the potential to end the Greco-Turkish Cold War and to reshape their bilateral relationship. To date, this potential is confined primarily to the aforementioned "low politics" agreements signed and ratified by the two neighbours. They refer to protocols of co-operation from tourism to trade, to fighting terrorism, to environmental protection, to mutual assistance in the event of natural disasters. It is also promising that, following the visits to Ankara of Greek Economy Minister, Nikos Christodoulakis, and Minister of Development, Akis Tsochatzopoulos, a number of agreements were completed in relation to the transport, via Turkey and Greece, of Iranian gas to Europe. Finally, in view of the (hugely politicised) World Soccer Cup in Japan and South Korea, it is worthwhile mentioning that Greece and Turkey submitted a common proposal to hold the 2008 European Football Championship in their respective countries.6

**Turkey's "Revisionism" in the Aegean and Intransigence in Cyprus**

At the same time - and with palpable deterioration in May-June 2002- Turkey's challenges of Greece in the Aegean remain unconscionable while its Cyprus policy remains intolerable. Specifically, the violations of Greece's airspace and the Athens FIR by Turkish military aircraft continue since 1974.7 In fact, in the spring of 2002 the violations increased and the Turkish aircraft were flying armed. Such violations are essentially meant to demonstrate Ankara's "revisionist" designs in the Aegean. The revision is related to Turkey's demand that Greece's airspace of 10 n.m. be reduced to 6 n.m., the same as its territorial waters. However, the governments of Greece since the 1974 restoration of democracy have made abundantly clear that no "revision" is conceivable in the Aegean Sea. They stress that the status quo has been established by solid treaties and conventions since the 1930s; and that Turkey's provocations began only in the early 70s, almost simultaneously with the invasion of Cyprus. Moreover, Athens insists that the new Law of the Sea
legitimises Greece's right to extent its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. But this would legitimise identical limits -i.e. of two more n.m.- in the air. Knowledge of the nuances of the issue -including the associated matter of the continental shelf- shows, according to Athens, Greece's proven good faith. For it has refrained to date from declaring the 12n.m. limit and has called for the submission of the continental shelf issue to the International Court of Justice. On the contrary, Ankara still refuses to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Therefore, Athens has seen Ankara's orchestrated Aegean "revisionism" as a euphemism for subtle expansionism.

As regards Cyprus, the Turkish government keeps supporting the inflexibility of Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. This support conflicts with the incessant, if elegant, calls by the international mediators, the UN and the EU, to both Ankara and Denktash, to conduct the inter-communal negotiations in good faith. Meanwhile, the violation of International Law by Turkey's 1974 military intervention and the continued occupation of over one third of the Republic's territory were principal reasons for the European Community's rejection of Turkey's 1987 application for membership. The illegality and immorality of the invasion and occupation also explain Turkey's ongoing condemnation through the United Nations resolutions, the EC/EU reports, resolutions and decisions, and the parallel condemnation by independent critics. For instance, U.S. Congressman, Donald M. Payne, wrote recently:

The Cyprus problem is neither unique nor complex. It is aggression by one state against another and a violation of basic norms of international law. A total of ninety-nine UN Security Council resolutions and thirteen General Assembly resolutions have been adopted urging an end to the occupation of Cyprus; none was enforced.

Moreover, Turkey's violations of human rights in Cyprus have been condemned repeatedly by the European Court of Human Rights: first, by the 1996 and 1998 decisions in the Titina Loizidou versus Turkey case; and second, by its 10 May 2001 decision in the fourth case of the Republic of Cyprus versus Turkey.

Turkey also remains the only state in the world, which recognises the legally non-existent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The recognition contradicts the permanent condemnation of the 1983 unilateral declaration of the "pseudo-state" ("TRNC") by the United Nations and the European Community/Union. Ankara, nonetheless, keeps "demanding" the creation in Cyprus of a "confederal state", amounting to the loose joining of two separate states. But such a notion -which contradicts the fundamental legal principle *ex injuria jus non oritur* - is vehemently rejected by the Greek Cypriot majority (now about 90% of the Cypriots) and by all international fora. Moreover, were such an entity to be created, the European Union would deny its accession. Finally, in early June 2002, with the inter-communal talks now underway, Ankara dispatched to Cyprus 5,500 more troops. They were added to the 35,000 soldiers stationed in occupation since 1974.
In view of this picture, most Greek analysts express frustration at the danger of missing the Helsinki-created opportunity for tripartite détente, cooperation and authentic peace between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. Simultaneously, incomprehension accompanies frustration: for Ankara's stance conflicts with Athens' consistent rapprochement efforts, which I will associate with a "Simitis doctrine"; it also contradicts the EU's own expectations from Turkey, which formally remains an ambitious candidate for membership.

The "Simitis Doctrine"
Coining this term seems justified by the fact that, as compared to Andreas Papandreou's vociferous radicalism and his generally "inflexible" stance towards Turkey, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis' policies and operational code have crystallised some distinct features. This is shown by their twofold foundation: first, the principles and practice of International Law, International Ethics, mutual support with like-minded international actors, and the utilisation of the relevant International Institutions. Second, there is a coherent commitment to the manifold (but primarily economic and diplomatic) strengthening of Greece and to a rational (i.e. never excessive) strategy of deterrence. In any event, and as demonstrated by the low-key "verbal acts" which voice his operational code, Simitis' rhetoric is mild, moderate, and authentically constructive.

Costas Simitis' foreign policy has derived solid support from two sources. First, he inherited the fruits of earlier policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which amounted to "europeanising" the Cyprus Problem in 1995. And second, since March 1999, he is receiving invaluable support from his popular Foreign Minister, George Papandreou. To some, Simitis' policies may conjure up recollections of such leaders of the "like-minded middle powers" of the Cold War, as Lester Pearson, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, and Olaf Palme. Similarly, the ideological and philosophical (Kantian-cosmopolitan) framework implied by Simitis' operational code recall analogous principles of fellow-social-democrats, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Francois Mitterand. Finally, his doctrine is founded solidly on such "cosmopolitan" values, as moderation, communication, mediation, peaceful resolution of disputes, caring, generosity, and ecological sensitivity.

During the Simitis premiership (since January 1996), Greek foreign and security policies exhibit the persistent avoidance of conflict with Turkey; the utilisation of the United Nations support for Cyprus; repeated peace-making initiatives in the Balkans and the Middle East; the progressive "Europeanisation" of the Cyprus problem and Greece's relations with Turkey; participation of Greek armed forces in peacekeeping and peace-building operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan; and the assumption of entirely new commitments to support numerous NGOs and various foreign-aid campaigns. Of special interest for Greece's bilateral relations with Turkey and by implication for the resolution of the Cyprus conundrum, is the Simitis-Papandreou cultivation of the principles and practice of a "citizens'
"diplomacy", established after the spontaneous eruption of the Greco-Turkish "seismic diplomacy", in the aftermath of the 1999 earthquakes.

Both forms of diplomacy have helped substantially the Greco-Turkish rapprochement. They also constitute a decisive test of Turkey's preparedness to join Europe. And they suffice to falsify Mr Denktash's favourite assertion that "Greeks and Turks in Cyprus cannot live together". In contradiction to this assertion one should recall the outpouring of concern, caring, and affection by ordinary Greeks and Turks in response to the earthquakes. There followed sustained exhibition of humanity, solidarity and friendship, as if both sides were eager to prove that the end of the Greco-Turkish Cold War was long overdue. Beyond the ordinary people, this sea change in emotions and mentality keeps being affirmed by countless non-governmental organisations, by mayors and other local governors, by artists, intellectuals, academics, journalists, businessmen, and athletes. If all this could occur spontaneously between the two neighbours across the Aegean, no argument can show that it cannot follow, if only allowed, between the two communities in Cyprus.

Finally, this sketch of the Simitis doctrine justifies recollecting the tripartite distinction supplied near the end of the Cold War, as an alternative to the bifurcation of "Hawks" and "Doves", by Joseph Nye, Albert Carnesale and Graham Allison. The notion of "Owls" serves those who regard the analytic categories of "Political Realism" narrow and its prescriptions narrow-hearted. It also resists the angelic naivete of the dovish worldview. Costas Simitis may well be regarded as a paradigmatic Owl. However, I prefer to label him a "pragmatic idealist".

Hypotheses on Ankara's Motives

Especially through its decisive support for Ankara's ambitions at Helsinki, Simitis' government has addressed Turkey with hard-nosed pragmatism and soft-spoken idealism. Greece seems eager to reach a peace-building regime with Turkey for the benefit of their peoples and all Cypriots. The present coalition government in Ankara - in association with some other Turkish hegemonic circles - is resisting. To account for this apparent disregard of Helsinki, analysts have advanced three main hypotheses:

(1) Ankara's elites -- and primarily the "pashas", as Eric Rouleau calls the Turkish generals -- do not really wish their country to accede to the EU;
(2) Turkey traditionally counts on US and NATO favouritism to tolerate its "revisionist" behaviour; and
(3) Turkey's policy-makers are accustomed to raising maximalist demands so as to appear "accommodating" when they subsequently moderate their stance.

Without denying their valid elements, the three hypotheses seem inadequate. Therefore, I submit two alternatives. First, it seems evident that Ankara's policies towards Cyprus, Greece and the EU can best be assessed in the context of the broader strategic framework of Turkey's post-Cold War
ambitions. And second, another *sine qua non* condition for understanding Turkey's foreign policy and strategy is to penetrate crucial elements of Turkey's *sui generis political culture*. For the tensions among the country's decision-makers, its influential elites, and its people are given and increasing, as will be seen through the eyes of self-critical Turkish analysts and commentators.

Consequently, I submit for testing two supplementary theses. The first holds that the decisions, actions and omissions of Turkey's elites - from the political leadership to the military and from the business and industrial elites to the intelligentsia and the emerging other influential opinion-making centers\(^{16}\) - frequently exhibit a synthesis of contradictory psychological patterns. These patterns incorporate excessive regional and international role-playing ambitions. Turkey, however, is simultaneously marked by signs of pessimism and insecurity. According to the second thesis, after the diplomatic and strategic success at Helsinki, Turkey's foreign policy towards Greece, Cyprus, and the EU has exhibited signs of indecision and even confusion. These considerations create our analytic framework. The available empirical material, which should help to verify or modify the said hypotheses and theses, will be distinguished as follows: (a) Turkey's broad post-Cold War regional ambitions and strategic orientations; and (b) Turkey's political-cultural idiosyncrasies, given the country's historical, geographic, demographic, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics.

**Turkey's Post-Cold War Strategic Ambitions**

In the immediate post-Cold War period, Turkey appeared eager to play the role of a major regional power. Presumably conceived as an alternative "Eastern" strategy - in case of a failure to accede to Europe - the envisioned role engulfed the Caucasus, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and, secondarily, the Balkans. A series of colourful statements and telling declarations by leading Turkish policymakers, at the beginning of the 90s, attest to the nature of the ambition. Thus, the late president, Turgut Ozal, declared that "The 21\(^{st}\) century will be a Turkish century"; he was followed by Suleyman Demirel who stated, in March 1993, that "Eurasia is tantamount to the Turkic world".\(^{17}\) And, as Turkish professor Selim Deringil concluded, Turgut Ozal's "vision", formed by the late 80's, comprised the following elements: "Turkey as the only member of the 'European Club'; Turkey the leader of the Middle East in economic and political terms; Turkey the leader of the Turkic peoples in a Soviet Union now in disintegration".\(^{18}\)

Arguably, the outcome of these "Eurasian" ambitions is not impressive, as shown by the following picture. Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan have been close and improving. They include defence and economic ties as well as political and cultural bonds. Similarly, relations with Eduard Shevardnadze's Georgia have developed substantially, in view of the Georgian president's pro-western policies and his perennial conflicts with Moscow. As regards Armenia, however, Ankara has no diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Primarily because of the Armenian campaign for recognition of the genocide, and because of
Turkey's pro-Azeri stance in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict, the relations between the two neighbours remain hostile for the last 12 years. As regards Kazakhstan, Kirgistan and Tajikistan, Turkey has attempted to cultivate various common interests, from the economy to defence. However, the three former soviet republics' ties with Turkey are proven inferior to those they have maintained with the Russian Federation. Three principal reasons can explain this fact. First, as against Russia, Turkey is separated from them by a substantial geographic distance. Second, all three of them face security threats, primarily from Islamic fundamentalists, and Russia can be relied upon to assist them. And third, substantial Russian minorities, constituting powerful political and socio-cultural bridges with Moscow, have remained in all three Central Asian states.

Finally, Turkey's relations with post-soviet Uzbekistan never flourished, partly because of President Islam Karimov's own regional ambitions and his concomitant pro-Western stance. But as Shireen Hunter noted, other reasons at play here include the fact that numerous Uzbek opposition figures sought refuge in Turkey in the early 90s, while panturkist Muhammad Salih was involved in the invasion of neighbouring Kirgistan by Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists. As a consequence, "the Uzbek Government ordered the closing down of a number of Turkish schools and the relations between the two countries cooled substantially".

The apparent failure of Ozal's vision seems essentially caused by Turkey's hyperbolic sense of self-importance. For it entailed a serious mismatch of strategic intentions and actual capabilities for role-fulfilment. Turkish professor Bahri Yilmaz put it best in the mid-90's, when he called on Ankara to proceed to any regional ambitions only after putting its own house in order. As he noted,

the politicians in Ankara have neither elaborated a basic and future-oriented foreign policy which takes into account the transformed international and regional political situation nor redefined Turkey's foreign policy interests and priorities. Through an inconsistent line of policy, Ankara threatens to drift into discredit in this region.

Ankara also miscalculated its ability to penetrate the region using its own "model" as an alternative to both Russia's and Iran's. But, given Turkey's problematic socio-economic development, its occasional bouts of political instability and its confusing combination of secularism and Islam, the former soviet republics of Central Asia soon declined politely Ankara's persistent offers.

Similarly, Turkey's relations with the EC/EU have been marked by vicissitudes for two primary reasons. First, while Turkey made passionate but hurried attempts to attain candidacy for membership, the Europeans showed reservations about the propriety and the timing of Ankara's pressures. And second, Turkey has long suspected the EC/EU of unfair treatment and
discriminatory biases, convinced that it hesitates to accept it because it constitutes "the Christian Club", and not because of Turkey's limited readiness to meet membership obligations and tasks.

On the other hand, Turkey has cultivated special economic and strategic relations with Israel since the mid-90s. These relations go beyond Israel's apparent expectation to enjoy Turkey's abundant water resources or the latter's decision to treat Israel as an alternative source of military hardware. Ankara also perceives Israel as a lobby-mate in Washington. Turkey, moreover, has been strengthening its defence links with the US since the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 1991 Gulf War. By now, Ankara could justifiably talk of a "special strategic relationship" with Washington. After September 11, too, Ankara has attempted to "cash in" an advance for the future role it might play in and about (post-Taliban) Afghanistan, by being available for Washington's anti-terrorism campaign.

Neither the Israeli nor the American connection, however, could suffice to cope with Turkey's massive economic, political, socio-psychological and cultural needs. Certainly, they could not equal the enormous benefits that the European Union promises to provide Turkey, "in the medium term" and the long run. Hence, domestic support for Turkey's most rational strategic course is increasing. After the apparent failure of the "Eurasian" experiment and much intellectual meandering, most of Turkey's elites--including, presumably, the military-- appear to be concluding that the EU is, after all, their most probable source of need-satisfaction, hence Turkey's best strategic bet. This is certainly implied by numerous pro-EU declarations and statements by Turkish policy-makers since late 2001, and by various legislative initiatives to harmonize Turkish laws with some aspects of the acquis communautaire.

And yet, caution is advisable regarding this conclusion, if only because, simultaneously, Turkey experiences the ongoing struggle between "Europhiles" and "Euroskeptics" and around the dilemma "EU or Cyprus". On 2 November 2001, Foreign Minister Ismael Cem warned the Grand National Assembly that the Cyprus case was developing unfavourably; therefore, hard decisions about serious costs were called for. His speech was skilfully vague and silent on prescriptions. Its presumed goal, however, was fulfilled: within days, a debate, akin to massive national self-examination, started raging across the land. Although the final outcome will remain indeterminate for a while, reasonable hypotheses can be advanced on the probable outcome and its causes. Here, insights from Turkey's political culture seem indispensable.

**Elements of Turkish Political Culture**

Since Helsinki, soon after becoming convinced that the Europhiles have won Turkey's History-making debate, one confronts the Euroskeptic opposition's orchestrated counter-attacks. And yet, au fond, a gigantic consensus seems to be forming in favour of Turkey's EU vocation. For it is now endorsed by most political leaders and parties, by the economic elite --eloquently represented by the powerful Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen...
Association (TUSIAD)--, by leading academics, by the most influential opinion-makers in the mass media, and by the overwhelming majority of the Turkish people. That the debate continues and that new policies and laws aim explicitly to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria demonstrate that the Turkish military -still a most respected and decisive force in Turkish politics and society- are, at least, going along.

A crucial if unspoken feature of the Zeitgeist seems to me to be emerging. The EU is finally perceived as capable of fulfilling two of Turkey's deepest needs: for "identity" and a sense of "belonging". Even though discourse on political culture inevitably contains subjective material, Turkey's "identity problem" is at the heart of analyses by sophisticated Turkish specialists.

Turkey's identity problem is linked, first, with its uncertain place and role in the world. In great measure, this springs from its complex imperial past and the concomitantly antagonistic (nay, even hostile) relations with many neighbours. Second, it also derives from its frustration when Turkey encounters serious difficulties to participate in groups of states (such as the European Community/Union) or have its demands endorsed by international organisations (such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference). Third, Turkey's ingredients as a state are confusing. For it is Muslim and secular; developed, newly industrialising but also "developing" (i.e. underdeveloped); and "democratic", but also suffering from limited freedoms, violated human rights, and the decisive political role assumed by the Armed Forces. Finally, the contradictory psychological patterns already mentioned hide inevitable identity problems. That is, a vicious psychological cycle is created by the operation in tandem of insecurity and pessimism, and by narcissism and excessive nationalist ambitions. Thus, a source of blurred identity becomes, through dialectic osmosis, a consequence, which in turns leads to enhanced insecurity, in part on account of recollecting past "stigmata".

According to a psychological cliché, individuals and groups handle insecurity through the vocal assertion of past glory. Incidentally, neighbouring Greeks also exemplify this problem. The difference, I think, is that, since the 1922 Greco-Turkish War -which ended with the catastrophic defeat of the Greek forces in Asia Minor- Greece harbours no expansionist or irredentist sentiments, whereas neo-Ottoman or "panturkist" sentiments surface time and again in the Turkish psyche. As Hercule Millas, a moderate expert, showed recently, extreme nationalist theories circulate in Turkish literature and historiography. For instance, in the decade of the 30s,

there appears a racist interpretation of "turkism" which finds its imagined roots in Central Asia and expresses itself via the "Turkish Historical Thesis". Essentially, this theory held that almost all civilisations are a creation of the Turks.
Narcissism gesturing to Megalomania

While it may be hard to distinguish the psychological penumbra of megalomania from that of narcissism, it is as arguable that social narcissism can lead to immodest national ambition as it is that, au fond, many over-ambitious statements or narcissistic declarations by Turkish politicians aim as much to enhance their electoral chances as to raise the public’s morale.

Typical is the panegyric embedded in Ecevit and Cem's declaration, only days after Helsinki, that "Turkey will be a full member of the EU in three years". Similarly, Cem's book, *Turkey in the New Century*, asserted about Cyprus that "decisiveness and self-confidence enabled Turkey to abandon the federation model, which worked against Turkish interests, and allowed it to propose a new, and much bolder, idea of confederation". Three weeks earlier, Mr Cem's interview in the *Turkish Daily News* was entitled: "Turkish model is paradigm of civilization".

Besides their imperial History, probable sources of the Turks' proverbial self-confidence include: the power of the Turkish military machine, traditionally the second largest in NATO; the sense of strength flowing from the over-65 million population; the expectation that, in view of its geopolitical and geo-economic significance, Turkey's economy can excel in the near future; and the benign attitude towards Turkey by NATO and the US.

Revealing manifestations of Turkey’s self-satisfaction include the aforementioned statements to the effect that the 21st century will be a Turkish century. Secondly, Turkish reactions to international (EU, UN, INGO, etc.) decisions or actions which do not meet with Turkey's approval can be vociferous. In these cases, representatives of the Turkish elites have tended to explain them away as resulting from the "ignorance", "confusion", "discrimination", and even "racism" of the West. Recently, however, one observes more constructive self-criticism manifesting itself as a therapeutic and liberating alternative to the former tendency. Finally, a narcissism not unlike that exhibited at different times by the Greeks, is reflected in the Turkish elites propensity to disregard international calls to return to legitimacy and to ignore the decisions of the international community, when Ankara's perception of its "national interest" disagrees. Consequently, subjective definitions and self-serving discourse are employed instead of the terms used by the rest of the world, even when the latter is founded on entrenched international norms. Thus, Ankara defies international resolutions and decisions when it stubbornly insists on supporting "President" Rauf Denktaş of the (unrecognised) "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", who is currently negotiating with "the leader of the Greek Cypriots" (i.e. the universally recognised President of the Republic of Cyprus), whom it describes as leader of "Greek Cyprus". Arguably, although this defiance risks backfiring on those who employ it -given its arrogance- such airs of invincibility might be thought by some Ankara decision-makers to entail prospects of gains.
And yet, another consequence of narcissism is suspiciousness and even a siege mentality. For it is commonly felt in Turkey that others fail to understand it, discriminate against it, and even threaten its sovereignty or existence. Because such phenomena tend to signify insecurity, it is here unclear whether insecurity causes suspiciousness or whether suspiciousness results, in fact, from the self-satisfaction of feeling really superior. Many Turkish decision-makers occasionally speak and behave as though they cannot comprehend how it is possible for others not to share Turkey's self-perception of greatness or importance. And yet, once again, things have recently begun to change in the country. A moderate commentator, who concluded that the EU does not, after all, antagonise Turkey so much, introduced his pedagogic reasoning as follows:

*We don't deny that the EU has little sympathy for Turkey and moreover has a number of prejudices against it. However, when we look more closely at the situation, we find that these prejudices are neither as strong nor as deep as we think.*

**Aggressive Tendencies**

If narcissism normally implies excessive self-confidence, it can easily slide into aggressive or hostile behaviour. Turkey has produced both kinds against some of its neighbours, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Cyprus and Greece. For any attempt to throw explanatory and predictive light on the shaping of Turkish foreign policy, revealing is the "pride" that can be exhibited by or on behalf of Turkish policy-makers. For instance, as reported by Niyazi Kizilyurek, a Turkish-Cypriot academic, Suleyman Demirel once called Rauf Denktash "kara'dae". This imprecise term potentially combines elements of pride and honour with (even banal) aggressiveness. For Denktash, then, it was an opportunity to provoke. Asked by a journalist whether Demirel evaluated him correctly, he replied:

The people that I represent are [kara'dae]. It is a proudly fighting people. The nation on which I depend is [kara'dae], because it attaches significance to national honour. Mr Demirel understood correctly. The Turkish nation is [kara'dae].

Apparent is here the conscious conflation of many concepts, ranging from honour to valiance to hostility and more. After all, "kara'dae" also covers the connotations "bully" and "trouble-maker". By implication, Ankara's external behaviour, judged or shaped by proven chauvinists, such as Rauf Denktash and his "left-nationalist" advisor, professor Mumtaz Soysal, is "kara'dae" with all the above denotations and connotations.

Thus, the politics of being *kara'dae* constitutes one implication of the patterns of (crypto-megalomaniac) narcissism. Turkish foreign policy has manifested this frequently: as indirect or immediate threat, as intimidation of antagonists and enemies, and even as blackmail of allies. Neighbours such as Armenia and Syria have been intimidated effectively through the threat of the use of
military force. The same purpose was shown with regard to the S-300 surface-to-air missiles bought by the Republic of Cyprus from Moscow. Turkey's repeated threats against their installation led Nicosia to cancel their deployment, suspecting that Ankara might have meant what it repeatedly said. Moreover, the "kara'dae policy" remains in force against the Republic of Cyprus, since Ankara regularly threatens to respond "without limits" in case the EU accepts the Island as full member. Similarly, despite recent bilateral co-operation in some fields, the explicit Turkish threat --that Greece's extending its territorial waters to 12 n. m. is *casus belli*-- remains in force, in tandem with the constant violations of Greek airspace and the Athens FIR.

Turkey's idiosyncratic political culture, however, is not reflected particularly in the narcissism of some of its elites or in Ankara's use of threats or a "diplomacy by blackmail". Rather, it springs from the synthesis of overt ambition and insecurity, which I propose to call "the Turkish syndrome". After touching above on the former side of the syndrome, I shall now sketch the latter.

*Insecurity and Pessimism*

A main source of Turkey's sense of insecurity is the apparent conviction that antagonists and enemies surround it. Associated with the military defeats of the Ottomans at the beginning of the 20th century, it was intensified by the choice of allies in the First World War and by Ankara's behaviour during the Second. In addition to sources of friction with Arab states and Muslim countries in the region, Turkey cannot easily forget experiences of tension and conflict with Western states. As Selim Deringil noted with regard to the Second World War:

> Turkey came under severe criticism for its 'egotistic' foreign policy. The apparent contradiction between the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation with Britain and France (1939) and the Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact signed with Germany in 1941 was seen by the western allies as a sign of Turkey's unreliability. It was this *stigma of unreliability* that Turkey felt obliged to shake off in the post-war years.

Progressively, Turkey's geopolitical importance during the Cold War minimised the effects of the "stigma of unreliability". However, the EC's rejection of its application for accession was a severe trauma for Turkish self-esteem and self-perception. Moreover, the subsequent rejections by the pre-Helsinki summits (such as Luxembourg and Cardiff) were further causes of massive and profound discontent.

In the second place, insecurity has been used explicitly by the country's politico-military leadership to justify its defence expenditures, even though they seem astronomical for a developing country in protracted socio-economic crisis. Similarly, this ground was mobilized by Ankara's recent decision to spend $90 billion for "defence modernisation" in the next 20 years, over and above the country's regular military budgets. Of course, left-wing Turkish
critics of Ankara's relevant decisions insist that a different rationale hides behind them. Whatever the truth, it is ironic that, alleging insecurity caused by surrounding hostile powers, Turkey's enormous military expenditures may threaten its numerous neighbours and certainly cause profound socio-economic insecurity at home.

Thirdly, anxiety derives from Turkey's manifold internal conflicts. The one between secularists and Islamists has had implications for the nature of the Turkish state. The conflict created by the Kurdish uprising of the early 1980s has been bloody and protracted. The relevant insecurities felt by most Turks have not been alleviated by the Kemalist principles of secularism and the denial of the existence of (dozens of) minorities.40

Fourthly, deep remains the fear of the country's splitting, either by a separatist uprising or by foreign (including European) conspiracies, the latter known as the "Sevres syndrome". As a British analyst observed in his article, "Turkey: Angry Man of Europe":41

Much of the paranoia about European intentions [vis-à-vis Turkey] dates back almost a century to the birth of the modern republic. An obscure treaty [Treaty of Sevres], never implemented, is still a byword in Turkey for European duplicity...Even today, senior politicians believe there are influential forces in Europe who want to revive the "spirit of Sevres" and see Turkey weakened and divided. In a country, which is often described as being in the throes of a prolonged identity crisis, it can be comforting to blame the outsider.

Turkish anxiety and insecurity are also caused by the protracted struggle for a national identity, the Kemalist dream to "join Western civilisation", and by the fear that the relevant hopes seem permanently frustrated. According to Hercule Millas,42 beginning in the 1970s, various Turkish social groups and strata dared to doubt the "Turkish identity" that descended from above, thereby challenging simultaneously the state's social coherence. These groups include the Kurds ("who declare that they are not 'Turks'"), the self-proclaimed nationalists (who attempt to develop the Ozalian "Turco-Islamic Synthesis"), and various socialist formations, which challenged Kemalism itself. These socialists "characterized Kemalism as an oppressive and autocratic regime, and regarded the kemalist attempts at creating a nation with a homogeneous identity - founded on a 'national' basis - as erroneous and unrealisable".

As regards the Islamists, they challenged "Kemalism and the state practice of modern Turkey on the subject of social identity", cultivating the thesis that the religious tradition and values could constitute "society's connecting link". Moreover, Millas observes that in Turkey, "the term 'Islam' cannot identify precisely, since there are numerous differentiations within this religion". Besides the fundamental distinction between Sunnis and non-orthodox Islamists (such as Alevis, Bektashists, et. al.), today we may add such
subdivisions as "higher, popular, elitist, populist, koranic, historical, practical, and state Islam"; and such geographic specifications as "north-african, mediterranean, arab, persian, etc."

Millas recalls Nilufer Gole's thesis that "the Islamic movement of Turkey ensures the re-entering of a large sector of the people in a historical setting of its own ethical and aesthetic choice. The traditional islamic dress acquires the symbolic meaning of an islamic identity." And referring to left-wing intellectual, Murat Belge - who has long studied Turkey's ideological conflicts - Millas quotes from his 1993 book: "What is this Turkish identity? I am thinking that it is a traumatised, exhausted identity...It is only that Turkish society, by the violence of its own state, has entered a process whose meaning it does not even understand".

Finally, Turkey's current insecurity is deepened by the manifold socio-economic crisis that plagues it since February 2001. Not even the arrival from the World Bank, as deus ex machina, of distinguished international economist, Kemal Dervis, managed to restore full domestic and foreign confidence in the economy, despite the gradual securing, with Washington's decisive help, of $16 billion from the International Monetary Fund. Turkish pride was hurt by the need to seek such massive foreign aid and, among other reactions, has led to elegant ironies by sophisticated Turks. For instance, asked by Greek state TV in early October 2001, "Exactly what Ankara aims at by joining the anti-terrorism campaign?", columnist and author, Mehmet Ali Birand, replied smiling: "The nine billion dollars [of the IMF]...

The magnitude of the current economic crisis was captured succinctly by Hurriyet columnist, Dr. Cuneyt Ulsever. In a January 2002 article, he noted:

2001 has been very difficult for Turkey. She has witnessed the hardest economic crisis of the republic era. More than 1.5 million people have lost their jobs, 25-40,000 business enterprises have been closed down, and the economy has shrunk by around 8.5 percent overall.

The socio-economic malaise may suffice to explain the pessimism currently marking most Turks. An immediate consequence has been the near de-legitimisation of the political process. The perceived failure of the coalition government (of Bülent Ecevit, Devlet Bahceli and Mesut Yılmaz) has led to constant calls for early elections. It has also generated an avalanche of new political parties, which brought their total number to 44 last February, and to almost 50 by June 2002.

In addition, popular frustration at the socio-economic and political failures of the established political formations has resulted in a novel phenomenon. Of all these political parties, only three seem capable of exceeding the 10% minimum required by law for entry into the Grand National Assembly. In February 2002, the percentages of the three parties were as follows: moderate pro-Islamist AKP, under Recep Erdogan, 16,9%; liberal CHP, led by
Denis Baykal, 15.6%; and center-right DYP, under Tansu Ciller, 14.3% (whereas the DSP of Prime Minister Ecevit could only reach 3.8%).46 In a new poll, conducted in late April 2002, the AKP had risen to 18.17%, Baykal's CHP was at 16.84%, and Ciller's DYP was at 14.45%, when Ecevit's DSP, Yilmaz's ANAP and Bahceli's MHP were far below 10%.47

Beyond the political "legitimation crisis", the dramatic increase of social unrest, criminal and deviant behaviour, and of the suicide rates should be noted. A recent report of the Turkish Daily News (TDN) was entitled, "Frustration and Hopelessness Equal to Social Explosion". The subtitle read: "Suicides and riots reveal social explosion".48 A few weeks later (8 March 2002), the main columnist of TDN, Ilnur Cevik, entitled his column, "Robbing a bank...", and wrote: "There are all the indicators of social upheaval and yet we are still told 'all things bright and beautiful'". The article observes, among other things:

...we see with great shock that people in deep financial difficulties are now robbing banks, which turn into terrible tragedies...The culprit? Of course, the notorious economic crisis!!! There is much talk, but no concrete relief, and this is creating growing anger among the masses. We are fed up with writing about this over and over again.

There are all the indicators of a social explosion. Turkey is in no position to borrow more from the international community, and the money that it has already received is simply going to debt servicing...It is providing no relief at all for Citizen Osman.

In early 2002, TDN reported a poll conducted on behalf of ANAP and showing that "79.7 percent of those who were surveyed believe that the current government is not capable of curing the more than one-year-old crisis." Moreover, about 60% replied that they did not trust Kemal Dervis' ability to handle the economic crisis.

In the light of this public opinion poll, it can easily be said that Turkish people have no hope and no confidence. Another public opinion poll revealed that youngsters are more affected by the crisis. According to the survey, the majority of Turkish youngsters have no hope for the future and see no way out from the economic crisis. 'The general stress rate of the society affects youngsters. And adolescents mainly commit suicide when they can see no hope in the future', a psychologist who asked to be unnamed said.49

Five days earlier, Dr. Cuneyt Ulsever, penned a series of emotionally loaded "psychological" remarks pertaining to Turkey's current (quasi-manic-depressive) state of mind and the associated political culture:

I know that we need morale. In order to recover we certainly need to feel that we can recover. But, I am scared that we are exaggerating the need for morale. We are overdoing it. I have a feeling that we do not know how to
handle extraordinary situations. Either we feel down as if there can be nothing done, and then suddenly we feel as if everything has been put into order. We act as if we do not know that there is a convalescence period between being sick and recovery...This feeling of more than deserved optimism worries me. I worry because I am scared that if any slightest thing goes wrong now, we may panic more than ever and lose control now.\textsuperscript{50}

The spirit and tone of such indicative commentaries reveal deep pessimism, intensified by the perceived political, ideological, and psychological cul-de-sac. Structural socio-economic deficits and the notorious corruption add further grounds for the partial de-legitimation of Turkey's "Establishment". According to Dr Ulsever, Turkey's corruption is reflected as follows: first, in the popular conviction that the "Establishment politicians are deceptive", whereas the "religious ones" (including Recep Erdogan) "do not deceive". Second, in Turkey, "the top 20 percent of the population gets 54 percent of the national income, and the lowest 20% shares only a meagre 4.9 percent...". Third, the country holds the third place on the world list of "bribery giving". And fourth, because the goods the Turkish people expect - i.e. "lower inflation, more jobs, better income and a peaceful life" - are not provided by traditional politicians, the people have turned their hopes to the Islamic, but moderate, AKP of Recep Erdogan.\textsuperscript{51}

On the same day, Ilnur Cevik was highly irritated and, in view of Turkey's Press laws, especially bold. He spoke of the "suffering of the masses". He wrote that "the Turkish people are fed up with contradictions, inconsistencies and...[the] insincerity and aloofness of the people who are running them". He added that "The incompetence of the government has created more havoc than finding solutions..." And referring to former Istanbul mayor Erdogan's, AK Party, Ilnur Cevik concluded his column (TDN, 30 Απριλίου 2002) as follows:

They may "finish off" Erdogan, but it seems they will not kill the resolve of the masses to vote for change and the AK Party. Those who are trying to engineer the current situation do not realize that the masses will punish this government with a landslide and bring whoever challenges them to power...

Among those who called for early elections was Economics Minister, Kemal Dervis. The apparent incapacitation of PM Ecevit (reportedly suffering from 11 ailments) deepened the multidimensional crisis in June-July 2002. And yet, the current pessimism, low national self-esteem, and general disorientation are features that co-exist with Ankara's established attributes of narcissism and self-satisfaction. Inevitably, the emerging composite picture of Turkey's political culture can largely account for the making of a confused foreign policy.

\textit{Self-doubts and Confusion}

During her recent Ankara visit, Swedish Deputy PM, Ms Lena Hjelm-Wallen, commented that Turkish politicians violate their promises. She stated that "it
is impossible to understand their reactions. They contradict themselves and their behaviour is the opposite to what they declare." Except for the intentional emission of conflicting signals for "political" purposes, genuine confusion is manifested by numerous Turkish statements, actions and omissions. One of confusion's sources is that various decision-making "circles" seem to act without prior agreement with other decision-making "centres". Intensified after Helsinki, central is the conflict between "Europhiles" and "Euroskeptics", expected to deepen as we approach the forthcoming decisions on the new EU members. In addition, the coalition government's problems are not confined to Bulent Ecevit's maladies. The authentically pro-EU stance of Mesut Yilmaz is undermined by the improvisations of the extreme nationalists under Devlet Bahceli. The two leaders' conflict is by now common knowledge, especially since Bahceli recently identified nearly 20% of the population, who entertain reservations about the EU, as a potential pool of votes for presently unpopular MHP.

Furthermore, the ranks of "Kemalist" generals include europhiles, euroskeptics, and even improvisers. For instance, only a short while ago General Ilhan Kilic declared that the European Union is certainly not Turkey's only strategic choice, for there are also Russia and Iran! It seems to follow that Helsinki has caused a different kind of confusion among Turkey's elites. Just as they might not have expected the diplomatic success at Helsinki, they underestimated the metamorphosis - political, economic, social, legal, cultural and educational - demanded by the Copenhagen criteria. However, about two years after Helsinki, most influential Turkish elites started realising that their EU candidacy could not materialize exclusively through power politics or aggressive narcissism. Major stimuli for this realisation seem to include, first, the success of the Republic of Cyprus' membership negotiations as declared by countless EU officials; second, the forthcoming - by all indications, in the Spring of 2003 - accession of the Republic in the EU; and third, the failure of Mr. Denktash's antics to undermine the principles for the fair and workable solution of the Cyprus problem.

To be sure, Turkey's political culture - as shown - is convoluted, contradictory, and fluid. Time is needed for radical adjustments in this landscape. Hence it is salutary that a serious and often sophisticated debate is taking place in the country since Ismael Cem's initiative of 2 November 2001. Having begun his parliamentary speech with the sentence, "Our national cause, Cyprus, maintains its priority in our foreign policy", Turkey's charismatic Foreign Minister ended as follows:

Unfortunately, the Cyprus issue is not progressing well. The European Union is totally disregarding Turkey's interests when it comes to the issue of the Greek Cypriot administration's EU membership. In the event of such membership, Turkey has to make a decision. It will either say 'well, this is all we can do' which no one wants, or it will be forced to say, 'I do not recognise this decision.' In such an event, Turkey may have to make a very clear decision. We must know that Turkey will have to pay a price for such a decision. Yet, it is our duty to do so."
Conclusions
If the post-Helsinki realities of Cyprus provided the rational catalyst for the probable victory of Turkey's Europhiles, it is also arguable that rationality has dominated Ankara's recent National Security Council meetings. Vote-catching rhetoric notwithstanding, military and political leaders must have concluded that the question "EU or Cyprus?" constitutes a pseudo-dilemma. For it is absurd to suppose that –once liberated from nationalistic hyperbole- Turkey could even compare the benefits of EU accession to the illegal withholding of 37% of Cyprus. Nor could Turkey afford to antagonize the Union's 15 member-states, which have insisted, in various formulations, that the 28-year-long occupation of Cyprus must end. Similarly, rationality must have also convinced Turkish decision-makers that the over-ambitious Eurasian experiments were rather misplaced, both in terms of time and because other major actors can assert effectively their interests and influence in Central Asia. Finally, Turkey's same elites perhaps recognize that the Simitis doctrine offers them a wonderful opportunity to abandon progressively the "kara'dae" pose vis-à-vis Cyprus and the Aegean.

If so, what may explain Ankara's current intransigence in Cyprus and intensified challenge to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean? I submit that, once again, the answer relates to another attribute of Turkey's political culture. Asked by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, in early December 2001, how he accounted for recent Cypriot developments, Mehmet Ali Birand replied: "It is a great pazarlık [i.e. oriental bargaining]". And when his interlocutor observed that, thanks to Mr Denktash, no intercommunal negotiations had been held for 13 whole months, he smiled: "But this, too, is part of pazarlık!"

Despite the aforementioned socio-economic deficits and psychological drawbacks, modern Turkey's most hopeful period may be dawning. It could well lead to genuine democratisation, rational domestic development, solid regional peace, and manifold co-operation, all of which are demanded or entailed by the Copenhagen criteria. In this way, the EU, with Washington's constant urging, will become convinced that Ankara means what it recently says or implies: that it has, after all, chosen "Europe" as its new vocation.

Needless to say, if this account is correct even in part, it follows that Turkey's allies and friends should discourage its Euroskeptics and expose its chauvinists. For it would be more than a pity to miss such a monumental opportunity for the satisfaction of interests, values and needs of Turks, Greeks, Cypriots, the UN, NATO and the EU, an opportunity provided, in the final analysis, by the European Union at Helsinki in association with the Simitis doctrine.
NOTES

1 See European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession (Brussels: November 1998), for a series of EU expectations and demands related to Turkey's eligibility for EU candidacy status.

2 This threat has been voiced repeatedly, since the middle of 2001, first by Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismael Cem and, subsequently, by PM Bulent Ecevit.

3 "National dignity" is employed sophistically by Turkey's opponents of the EU. They claim that the EU's principles and rules (as represented by the Copenhagen criteria) are either threatening Turkey's national security or "humiliating" the country.

4 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, December 1999, Paragraph 9(b).


6 The bilateral proposal was submitted in late June 2002. The visits by Ministers N. Christodoulaakis and A. Tsokhatzopoulos took place in May-June 2002 and were greeted positively by the media of the two countries.

7 The "Aegean Dispute", I assume, is all too familiar to my readers. And since my aim is to "transcend", and not to dwell on, the Greco-Turkish conflicts, I confine this account to the most schematic account possible.


9 This term was introduced in Costas Melakopides, "On the Mediterranean 'Fuzzy Edge' of the EU: the Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey", Journal of European Integration, Vol.22, no 3, 2000, pp. 299-234.

10 This policy was premised on the notion that, unless Turkey removed its occupation troops from Cyprus (as demanded, inter alia, by the UN and the European Community), Athens could not begin a rapprochement with Ankara or address any other dispute.

11 I am referring to the brilliant compromise of 6 March 1995 in Brussels, whereby, in exchange for endorsing Turkey's Customs Union with the EU and withdrawing its veto to a substantial financial protocol providing aid to Turkey, Greece attained the EU commitment to set the date for negotiations with Cyprus. Architects of this "Europeanization" of the Cyprus problem and of the implied EU-Turkey relations were Alain Jupe', the late Yiannos Kranidiotis, and Theodoros Pangalos.

12 The falsehood of this claim was revealed, inter alia, by Turkish journalist and author, Mehmet Ali Birand, in reports from Nicosia, in late 2001 and early 2002. See his column in the Turkish Daily News, esp. mid-November 2001.


Eric Rouleau, "Turkey's Dream of Democracy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, no. 6, November/December 2000, pp. 100-114. Rouleau's pessimistic argument - that the generals are Euroskeptics par excellence - is premised primarily on their economic self-interest, including the calculation that they own about 30% of the Turkish economy.

A most promising development of Turkey's post-Helsinki era is the increase in prestige and influence of a group of forward-looking and sophisticated journalists and academics and of the mushrooming non-governmental organizations. Most of these are placed squarely in the modernizing and pro-EU camp.


To be sure, press reports suggest that, in mid-2002, secret negotiations have taken place between Turkish and Armenian officials, with a view to putting their relations on a new footing.


Bahri Yilmaz, in Aussenpolitik, op. cit, p. 90.

The "turkish model", we may recall, consisted of democratic governance, a free-market economy, and a secular state despite the Muslim religion of the overwhelming majority of the people.

"In the medium term" is the refrain used repeatedly in the 1998 Report by the European Commission about the anticipated future strengthening of EU-Turkey relations. See Regular Report, op.cit., passim.

The early 2002 scandal surrounding the leaking to the press of the private electronic mail of EU Representative to Ankara, Ambassador Karen Fogg, is typical of some of the tactics of "the opposition".

The latest figures bring the citizens' support as high as 82.2%. See Macedonian Press Agency (www.mpa.gr), Balkans-Turkey, 26 May 2002, (in Greek), quoting Turkish paper Sabah.

This, for instance, is Selim Deringil's main thesis in "Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk", op. cit. The same concern permeates the analysis of Bahri Yilmaz in Aussenpolitik, op. cit. And Hercule Millas' work (see below) demonstrates the centrality of the deep anxieties of the Turkish intelligentsia concerning the self-images of the Turkish people.

On this point too, see Deringil, op.cit.


The statement was underlined repeatedly by the Turkish Press in mid-December 1999.

31 Turkish Daily News, 7 January 2002

32 Such laudable self-criticism characterizes most recent articles and columns of such distinguished opinion-makers as Mehmet Ali Birand, Ilfur Cevik, Cuneyt Ulsever, Sami Kohen, et al.

33 Oktay Eksi, "Have We Been Singled Out?", Hurriyet, 12 March 2002, emphasis added.


35 Well-known is the example of the threat issued against Syria when, in early 1999, Turkey amassed troops at the Syrian border, in connection with the arrest of PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

36 In late June 2002, the Head of Cyprus Section in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ertugrul Apakan, stated that "Greece, using the EU, aims to dominate the Mediterranean and to threaten the security of Turkey." He added that, in case of Cyprus' EU accession, "The negative consequences to be created will be reflected in Greek-Turkish relations and the Aegean". Macedonian Press Agency, Balkans-Turkey, 21 June 2002 (in Greek).

37 Such as the aforementioned agreements on "low politics" and the transport of Iranian gas to Europe, and the common proposal for the 2008 European Football Championship.

38 For instance, one week before the European Council at Nice, a spokesperson for the French Foreign Ministry stated regarding Turkey's stance: "Turkey has presented unacceptable demands and has threatened NATO with a veto. This is diplomacy by blackmail". Kyra Adam, Sunday Eleftherotypia, Athens, 3 December 2000 (in Greek).

39 Selim Deringil, op. cit., p. 2, emphasis added.

40 It will be recalled that, following the Kemalist principle, the Kurds are described by the Turkish state as "mountain Turks".

41 Chris Morris, "Turkey: Angry Man of Europe", BBC Online, 2 February 2001, emphasis added.

42 Millas, op.cit. pp. 31-41.


44 Millas, op. cit., p. 39 (my translation of Millas' Greek translation from Belge's Turkiye Dunyanin Neresinde?)


47 Turkish Daily News, 27 April 2002.


50 Ibid., 22 January 2002, emphasis mine.


52 Macedonian Press Agency, Balkans-Turkey, 1 February 2002 (in Greek).


54 "Turkish Foreign Minister Cem Says Turkey is Ready to Pay the Price for Cyprus", *Kibris, Northern Cyprus Monthly*, Vol. IX, no. 11, November 2001, p. 2.