Multiculturalism Debates in Germany

A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship: Legal Political and Educational Challenges

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Introduction

In contemporary Germany the notion of the failure of multiculturalism seems to be broadly accepted. In the first instance this opinion seems fairly striking as Germany has never implemented a comprehensive multiculturalist policy. Instead, governments over decades negated and ignored the fact that Germany is an immigration country. It was not until the late 1990s that the Social Democratic-Green coalition (1998-2005) as well as the successive coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats declared to acknowledge the commonness of immigration and to accomplish integration policies. Until then according to the concept of an ethnic nation inclusion of migrants was deemed only as an exception of the rule.

Today the debate about integration and multiculturalism is driven by various factors: first, not only immigration but even more the acceptance of migrants as German citizens, which the new citizenship law provides for, raises the question of how to organise a culturally diverse society. Second, evidence of severe social exclusion of migrants demands explanations as well as suggestions for solutions. Third, international debate on the antagonism between the Islam and Western world reflects itself in the German debate on norms and values and in the reduction of the debate on the “Muslim other” (Schiffauer 2006a: 96).

It seems that within the dominant discourse the acceptance of a multicultural reality is equated with a political concept of multiculturalism. This alleged policy of multiculturalism is blamed for current conflicts in a culturally diverse society. Instead the idea of a German Leitkultur (leading culture) and an assimilationist approach to integration are reinforced.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the evolution and arguments of this debate. It starts with an overview of the German conceptualisation of nation and belonging in respect to immigration. Second, the highly controversial debate about a book by the German-Turkish author Necla Kelek is analysed. The debate is particularly interesting because it covers nearly all themes of the discourse on multiculturalism and integration of Muslims in Germany, and because the starting point was the appeal of a migrant woman who accused others from her ethnic group of violating women’s rights and not trying to integrate. Kelek’s position was functionalised by politicians, supported by feminists, as well as opposed by other migrants and women’s organisations. Seemingly clear-cut categories of political confrontation like conservative/left, feminist/non-feminist, migrant/non-migrant blurred within this debate.

In the third part I will analyse the German reception of the Danish Cartoon Affair in 2005/2006. The chapter investigates how various actors use the cartoon affair to implement their agenda and justify certain arguments. Main issues of the debate are the (alleged) incompatibility of Western values and Islam; attempts to contextualise the conflict or the clear-cut assignment of responsibility; integration and multiculturalism in Germany ranging from pleading for respect vs. the demand of assimilation. In the concluding chapter the main aspects of the complex debate are reflected.

1 Nation, Belonging and Citizenship in Germany

In 2005 6.8 million ‘non-German’ residents were registered in Germany, accounting for 8.9% of the total population. The majority of foreign passport holders were Turks with more than 1.7 million residents, followed by Italians with 540,800, and Poles with 326,600 residents. Another 10 % of the total population are Germans ‘with a migrant background’, meaning that

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1 I like to thank Werner Schiffauer for his instructive comments on a previous version of this paper.
either they have at least one migrant parent, are themselves so-called ethnic Germans who immigrated from Eastern Europe countries (Aussiedler) or naturalised immigrants (Federal Bureau of Statistics). German society is shaped by the immigration of individuals who came to the country over years for various reasons and in different phases. In post-war Germany first, the migration of ethnic Germans and second, the recruitment of so-called guest workers as well as the reunion of families were main sources of immigration. In the 1970s, but remarkably in the 1980s and early 1990s, the immigration of refugees and asylum seekers rose due to civil wars, hunger crises and ecological disaster in the so-called ‘Third World’ countries and in continental Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the socioeconomic and political transition in Eastern Europe and the German re-unification the numbers of immigrants – refugees, ethnic Germans and labour migrants – dramatically increased from 860,000 in 1988 up to 1.5 million in 1992. In response, the German government restricted options of legal entry and permanent residency for ethnic Germans and asylum seekers. Simultaneously, a new system of recruiting temporary migrant workers has been implemented. The late 1990s saw another significant change in migration and integration policies. In 1999 the Citizenship Law was amended and in 2005 the new Act Controlling and Restricting Immigration and the Integration of EU-citizens and Foreign Nationals – Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), came into effect. These changes reflect the recognition of already existing immigration and the need for deliberate proactive management. Previous governments had insisted that Germany was ‘not a migrant country’ (‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’). The Immigration Act brought some improvements in terms of the definition of political asylum, but also tightened up controlling and sanctioning measures against asylum seekers and migrants in the name of ‘counter-terrorism’ (Bade et al. 2004; Bundesministerium des Innern 2005; Meier-Braun 2002). Since the end of World War II the concepts of nation, belonging and citizenship in Germany have undergone several changes. The concept of nation has been traditionally determined by the idea of an ethnically homogenous community. The ethnic nation regards common ethnicity, as defined by descent, a common culture and history, as a basis for state organisation. According to this concept in the Federal Republic of Germany legal membership in the political community, i.e. citizenship was based on the principle of descent (ius sanguinis) (Brubaker 1994). Naturalisation procedures of immigrants with foreign citizenship were tedious and discretionary; inclusion into the German nation was defined as an exception of the rule. Only those migrants with German ethnicity (Aussiedler) were fully admitted. The recruitment of so-called ‘guest workers’ in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s did not challenge this concept as these workers were regarded as only staying temporarily in Germany (Bös 2002). The public discourse on migrants and migration in Germany was characterised by the refusal to accept the commonness of immigration. As early as in the 1960s and 1970s a stigmatising “ghetto and dis-integration discourse” (Yildiz 2006: 41) evolved which in part fell back to the nationalist and racist discourse about so-called ‘foreign worker’ (Fremdarbeiter) who were recruited or forced to labour during World War I. But it also drew on forced labourers under National Socialism. Migrants were called ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) or ‘foreigners’ (Ausländer), reflecting the general view that they did not belong to German society, and would once leave the country. For several decades federal Policies focused almost absolutely on control and return of migrants (Schönwälder 2001). Integrative measures or even a debate on how to organise on

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2 This concept also applied to the German Democratic Republic.
3 On continuities in the conception of Fremdarbeiter see Herbert 2001.
the official level a culturally diverse society did not seem necessary. Nevertheless, integration projects and measures were implemented on a local level and mainly on an *ad hoc* basis. Migrant specific integration activities, such as German language courses and social work for foreigners, were predominantly pragmatic responses to existing circumstance rather than the deliberate implementation of any particular long-term strategy. Large parts of the work were delegated to welfare organisations, other parts were accomplished by unions, churches, and migrant associations. Generally, the foreigners policy (*Ausländerpolitik*) was characterised by a patronising, controlling and administrating relationship between the authorities and the migrants (Bade 1994, Schönwälder 2001). One indicator of this patronising attitude is the institution of the Office of the Migrants’ Commissioner (*Ausländerbeauftragte*) on the federal, and the individual state and city levels (Schiffauer 2006a).

Already since the 1970s leftist and liberal activists, social workers, politicians and scholars claimed the importance of comprehensive integration measures. They demanded that the government should accept the fact that Germany was an immigration country respectively a multicultural society (e.g. Bade 1994). In addition, the concept of an ethnic nation was challenged by the reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Heckmann 2003). Leftist intellectuals argued that the traditional concept of the nation state had lost its legitimacy since they regarded National Socialism the extreme form of ethnic nationalism.

Against the background of increasing immigration figures in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Iron Curtain 1989 discourse on nation and integration of migrants changed. In the 1990s a central issue in the public discourse was how to restrict and to channel migration. Even ethnic Germans and refugees were now increasingly described as ‘economic refugees’ by politicians as well as by the media. They were generally suspected of misusing the right of asylum and working illegally, and therefore regarded as a threat to social welfare and ‘German culture’. With the unification of East and West Germany the notion of an ethnic nation state and the conception of ‘Germanness’ as a positive point of reference gained new support. In its extreme forms this development is reflected in the gain in support on the side of right wing parties and increasing xenophobic and racist attacks in the 1990s (Miles/Räthzel 1993).

Not until the late 1990s the official discourse reached a new level with the slow acceptance of immigration reality. The fact of long term settlement of thousands of migrants and their families could not be negated any more. At the same time studies on demographic change and the need of highly qualified labourers shaped the discussion in favour of immigration. In 1998 the new Red-Green government explicitly considered Germany to be an immigration country and took steps to pro-actively frame immigration and integration. In 2000 the government amended the citizenship law. The new law partly implemented the principle of *ius solis*, meaning that children of ‘foreigners’ acquire German citizenship if one parent has been legally living in Germany for at least eight years. Further on, these children are then allowed to hold a double passport until the age of 23, after which they have to choose if they want to give up their other citizenship(s) in order to retain a German passport. Second, the new government facilitated immigration options for high-skilled migrants (*Green Card*). This regulation and the long lasting debate about a new Immigration Law was characterised by a perspective of cost-benefit-calculation and the dividing of migrants into “useful workers” and “not useful foreigners” (Butterwege 2006). The Immigration Act (2005) brought further options for labour migration and even permanent settlement for high-skilled and self-employed migrants. Most significant it also contains measures to promote the integration of legal immigrants in Germany.

The big coalition between Conservatives and Social Democrats, in power since November 2005, declared to give top priority to integration issues. Chancellor Angela Merkel (Christian Democratic Union – CDU) has initiated a dialogue with some representatives of different
Another reason for the implementation of legislation in order to promote disadvantaged social groups were the requirements imposed by the European Union. In August 2006, after much debate the EU-directive to implement an anti-discrimination legislation was finally complied. The General Equal Treatment Law aims to abolish illegitimate discrimination because of race, ethnic background, gender, religion, worldview, disability, age and sexual orientation.

In this situation the debate about nation, inclusion/exclusion and belonging intensified. The term ‘German Leitkultur’ was coined whereas ‘multiculturalism’ was declared to have failed. This shift of the debate has to be analysed as a response to three developments. First, the official acceptance of the immigration reality meant that an increasing number of ‘foreigners’ would obtain German citizenship. This forced all parties to reconsider their concepts of politically organising a culturally diverse country.

Second, evidence of social exclusion of migrants raised the question of causes and consequences of these problems. The publication of the PISA study revealed that children of migrants performed particularly poorly in German schools. The teacher who took her case to the constitutional court insisting on her right to wear a headscarf in class; cases of migrants not integrating in their new surroundings and of violence against (Muslim) women; reports about schools with a very high percentage of migrant pupils and violent conflicts at some of those schools evoked broad public debates. Events in neighbouring countries such as the murder of film-maker Van Gogh in the Netherlands and violent conflicts among migrant youths in France further fuelled a debate about ‘parallel lives’ and the alleged failure of multiculturalism in Germany.

Third, the debate has to be regarded in the context of the increasing conflict between Islam and Western world. Whereas a negative and generalising view of ‘the Islam’ was common before 9/11 (Halm/Liakova/Yetik 2006) the polarisation between Islam and Western culture was reinforced under the impact of the attacks of New York, Madrid and London. The focus of the debate shifted from “foreigners” to “Muslims”. Since 9/11, the connection between Islam and terrorism has been widely spread in public discourse and the picture of the ‘Islamist terrorist’ is constructed.

From the beginning on the concept Leitkultur was used as a political catchword against multiculturalism. Conservatives and protagonists of a Leitkultur regarded German culture, norms and values as threatened by immigration and “arbitrary multiculturalism”. The concept of Leitkultur as framed by the then parliamentary leader of the CDU, Friedrich Merz, should

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5 Programme for International Student Assessment.
6 See http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,2340,en_2649_33723_36701777_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 18.01.07).
7 Merz referred to Bassam Tibi, who refuses against the political instrumentalisation of his idea of a “European Leitkultur”. Already 1998 the chief editor of Die Zeit raised the issue of a Leitkultur, stating that “integration
provide the basis of rules for immigration and integration. Immigration should be controlled and reduced in order to protect the “capability of integration” on the side of the native population. In terms of integration the concept on the one hand focussed on the duties of immigrants: they had to contribute their part to integration. On the other hand it meant a reinforcement of the homogenous nation concept by the implementation of assimilation: immigrants should adapt to cultural values which were “grown in Germany”. The main tangible features of such a **Leitkultur** are, as formulated by their protagonists: the German language, the basic norms and values as formulated in the constitution, equal rights for men and women, human rights, secularism, a “certain knowledge of the history of our country” which would then lead to the rejection of anti-Semitism (see Lofink 2005: 84). These aspects are either explicitly or implicitly directed towards Muslim migrants who are accused of lacking these attributes.

The concept was first broadly refused as giving the rationale to the extreme Right. Especially members of the Red-Green coalition criticised **Leitkultur** for its assimilationist approach and its inherent negation of intercultural reality in Germany. Nevertheless, in the following years the concept was taken up again by several politicians (see ibid). Actually the new integration measures as implemented in the Immigration Act also reflect the priority of assimilation to German language, knowledge of German history and demand most of the integration efforts from migrants themselves. The new citizenship law partly implemented the principle of **ius solis**, but on the whole remained behind its original, more liberal proposal. In fact, loyalty to the German constitution and German language skills are required even stricter than before 2000. The proposal of a citizenship test launched by the Federal State Baden Wurttemberg in 2006 once again reflected the ideas of a **Leitkultur** and the general suspicion against Muslims (Schiffauer 2006b). Nevertheless, the concrete features of **Germanness** still seem to be under debate as the process of developing a common citizenship and the curricula of integration courses show.8

The idea of the necessity of a **Leitkultur** and the rejection of multiculturalism is closely linked with the vision of “national identity” and the conception of German history. According to the protagonists of the **Leitkultur** idea Germans have immense difficulties to stand by their “identity” because of their national socialist past. Particularly in times of globalisation and mass immigration a national identity would become increasingly important. As a consequence German **Leitkultur** is regarded as superior to possible cultures from (Muslim) immigrants. In this respect **Leitkultur** is predominately referred to the universality of human rights.

Bassam Tibi who quite involuntarily invented the term **Leitkultur**, but who refered to a European **Leitkultur**, claims that norms and values should be shared through consensus. However, he does not explain how this consensus may be reached or if there is room for modifications and mutual exchange. It seems that in the end immigrants have to subordinate under the “consensual culture”, they should not only follow the rules but identify mentally with the spirit of the constitution. The “consensus on values” (**Wertekonsens**) again is opposed to multiculturalism which is regarded as arbitrary and “civilising self-abandonment” (Tibi 2001).

Within public debate **Leitkultur** as well as integration measures in general were increasingly opposed to the concept of multiculturalism. Noticeably, the meaning of the notion multiculturalism shifted from the **description of a reality**, namely the fact that numerous

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immigrants from various countries were living in Germany, to a political integration concept. The problem of this debate is that multiculturalism as an integration concept has never been sufficiently debated on the political level, or implemented in concrete integration measures, but only partly on a local level. Instead there are some aspects which are associated with multiculturalism in contrast to Leitkultur or simply in contrast to an integration programme which focuses on the adaptation of migrants. Multiculturalism is identified by its opponents with the acceptance of parallel societies, with tolerance of cultural differences including the “tolerance of intolerance”, meaning the violation of human rights.

Since a few years a new group of actors entered the stage of debate on multiculturalism and inclusion, namely migrants and people with migrant background themselves. This is not to say that migrants did not speak out in the past, however they were mainly not listened to. It is in the new situation when integrative measures are launched and conferences between government and migrants’ representatives take place that a dispute about who is legitimate to speak for “the migrants” arose. The recent foundation of a “Central Council of Former Muslims” (Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime) can be cited as an example. Its members come from a Muslim background but have distanced themselves from Islam. They do not feel represented by the traditional migrant organisations and, moreover, blame these organisations for having hampered integration of migrants in the past. Their argumentation fits quite well into the mainstream assimilationist model respectively the Leitkultur rationale. On the other hand it points to hierarchies in migrant communities which had been silenced for a long time. The debate about Necla Kelek and her book “Die fremde Braut” (The strange/foreign bride) exemplifies this complexity of the current discourse on multiculturalism, nation and belonging in Germany.

2 The debate on the book by Necla Kelek, “Die fremde Braut” (The strange/foreign bride)

In her book “Die fremde Braut. Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Lebens in Deutschland“ (“The strange/foreign bride. A report from within Turkish life in Germany”), 2005, the German-Turkish author Necla Kelek reports on several cases of girls and women who moved from Turkey to Germany as a consequence of forced or arranged marriages with Turkish men. She describes how these women lived in dependency of their relatives without or with only rare contact to German natives. In a populist style Kelek draws a general picture of Turkish migrants in Germany as traditionalist, patriarchal, backward, living “parallel lives” and not willing to integrate.

Kelek was born in Turkey 1957, migrated to Germany in 1968, studied national economics and sociology and wrote her dissertation about “Islamic religiousness and its relevance in the ’lived-in world’ (Lebenswelt) of students of Turkish descent”. In 2006 her third book “Die verlorenen Söhne. Plädoyer für die Befreiung des türkisch-muslimischen Mannes” (“The lost sons. An appeal for the liberation of the Turkish-Muslim man”) was published.

Following its publication in early 2005 the book “Die fremde Braut” gained most publicity. After it had been very positively received by the public, in February 2006 a group of migration researchers as they called themselves initiated a controversial debate with an “open letter” criticising the book itself as well as its positive reception. In this chapter I will first sketch Kelek’s line of argument. After outlining the reception of her book in 2005 I will analyse the arguments of the debate of early 2006. The study draws on articles from major weekly and daily serious newspapers as well as on selected

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9 http://www.ex-muslime.de/ (accessed 19.04.07)
10 In this context the German word fremd implies several meanings like strange, foreign or alien.
11 Published under the title “Islam im Alltag”, Kelek (2002).
internet publications. By this it reflects a section of the discourse on multiculturalism and integration in Germany, namely among intellectuals, and leaves out the far more openly xenophobic and Islam phobic discourse on other events in the tabloid (see Butterwege/Hentges 2006).

2.1 Kelek’s line of argument

Kelek’s main line of argument which she also elaborates in subsequent interviews and publications refers on the one hand to Muslim migrants in Germany and on the other hand to German natives. Drawing from observations and interviews with Turkish migrants and second generation youth, Kelek claims that Turkish migrants are turning more and more towards the Muslim community. Migrants are deliberately isolating themselves from general society, have built “parallel societies” and established an „Islamic-Turkish-Kurdish leading culture“. They are refusing to engage in their own integration into spheres of German society. Integration of Turkish migrants has failed.

One central reason for both the orientation towards Islam as well as the existence of Turkish “parallel lives”, is, according to Kelek, the practice of “importing brides” from Turkey. Through this practice Turkish migrants maintain Islamic and hence traditional and patriarchal community structures. This hypothesis points to the following two arguments, namely that ‘Islam’ subordinates the individual to the principles of the Muslim community and finally, that Muslims act in a violent and oppressive way especially towards Muslim women and violate human rights in the name of Islam.

Kelek elaborates this argument by providing a sketch of the history of Islam. Her summary mainly relies on misogynist and patriarchal quotes from the Quran. Secondly, she reports the story of her own family over some generations and describes the tradition of trade in female slaves as the root of current degradation of Turkish women and of forced marriages. Thirdly, the author tells the stories of some women whose marriages were forced or arranged which, in her view, again confirm the general hypothesis of patriarchal and violent relationships in Muslim families.

Kelek explicitly rejects the differentiation between “arranged” and “forced marriages”, as in her view in both cases the young woman was not free to choose her partner and way of living. A woman who rejected her parents’ choice would pay with social exclusion. Kelek points to the powerful position of a son’s mother respectively the mother-in-law within the family. She would choose the wife according to material criteria. The family of the bride would have to give a high dowry, in cases where the bridegroom lived in Germany, the family would depict the migration to Germany as a valid enough prize/ dowry for the young woman’s family. In Germany, in contrast to the promises, the young wife was treated like a domestic servant or even a slave who in the first place had to obey the mother-in-law.

While Kelek generally blames “Islam”, “Turkish migrants” and their practice of “importing brides” for non-integration phenomena, she also argues that native Germans as well as “open-minded migrants’ representatives” have ignored these developments. Moreover, with their political programme, protagonists of a “tolerant” or “multicultural society” would accept and even support the isolation of Muslim migrants and the violation of human rights. Therefore they were responsible for the social exclusion of Turkish migrants and violence against migrant women.

The reasons for this attitude among native Germans were, according to Kelek, to be found in German national socialist history and a resulting guilt complex. Due to their racist past Germans would “panic” to criticise any minority and for the same reason even neglect the norms and values of democracy.

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12 See the chronological list in the appendix.
13 See TAZ 15.11.05; Die Zeit, 17.09.05; FAZ, 24.02.2006. Three weeks after the murder of Hatun Sürücü, one day after her book presentation, the newspaper Die Welt publishes an essay by Kelek entitled “Your tolerance is endangering us” in which Kelek draws a parallel from the cases she had investigated for her book and assumptions about Sürücü’s biography. Die Welt, 26.02.05, Kelek (2006). See also her comment prepared for the hearing of the Commission Family, Seniors, Women and Youth of the Federal Parliament about the applications of measures against forced marriages, 19.6.06; her comment on a citizenship test, TAZ, 16.01.06; Tagesspiegel, 19.01.06.
This would especially apply to the generation of the reformers of 1968, who as Kelek states now held relevant posts in policy and administration.

Finally, Kelek pleads for better support of the weakest, the women; however, her concrete suggestions mainly refer to more restrictive immigration legislation, such as raising the minimum age which is required for family reunion or German language tests prior to immigration. By these regulations it would be more likely that immigrating brides have reached maturity and had language skills to assert themselves in the new country. Further, the German state would at last be true to its constitutional norms and values.

To comment, in her book Kelek quite strongly generalises single cases and depicts a homogenous, universal and static picture of “Islam”. Islam appears to be the single reason for violence, women’s oppression, injustice and, in terms of migration, for social exclusion. She does not take into consideration the broad debate on diverse strands of Islam, regionally and historically specific developments as well as critiques within Islam by religious Muslims. From some single cases she constructs a seemingly generally valid picture of the “import gelin” (translated by Kelek as: import bride/Importbraut). She interprets the life stories of the women interviewed only from the perspective of forced marriage and the suppression of women, neglecting the agency of women and starting points of emancipation, for example of a woman who agreed to her marriage with a stranger because she wanted to leave the rural environment in Turkey.\(^{14}\)

The book contributes to the codification of Turkish migrants as “the Muslim other”. Unintentionally Kelek does not render a service to the migrant women but deepens the gap between the native majority and migrants and their descendants. Nevertheless, it is to Kelek’s credit that she has, like others before,\(^{15}\) pointed to hierarchical and violent relationships within migrant families. Furthermore, the so-called ‘tolerant’ attitude towards migrants in general in the name of ‘multiculturalism’ adopted by many liberals is certainly an important issue to discuss. As it becomes clear in the debate presented here this issue is hardly fleshed out by a comprehensive concept of multiculturalism.

2.2 The reception of the book after its publication in 2005

Kelek’s book was reviewed in the weekly magazine Spiegel, on January 24, 2005, by the then minister of the interior, Otto Schily. On February 25, 2005, Schily recommended the book when it was officially launched. Subsequently, it was reviewed in almost every major newspaper, as well as on radio, TV and on the internet. Several media drew portraits of the author; Kelek was invited to various talk shows and interviews. She was put forward as an expert on nearly every issue within the field of migrants’ integration, Turkish migrants or multiculturalism. The Federal State of Baden Wurttemberg consulted her for its proposal of a citizenship test; the Commission for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth of the Federal Parliament asked her for a comment on forced marriages.\(^{16}\)

On November 14, 2005 Kelek’s book received the Geschwister-Scholl--prize; this prize is awarded every year for a book which proves “intellectual independence” and supports “civil liberty, moral, intellectual and aesthetic courage” and a “sense of responsibility”.\(^{17}\) In 2006 Kelek was appointed to the Mercator professorship at the University of Duisburg for one term. Central criteria for the awarding of this professorship are “cosmopolitanism (Weltoffenheit) and a vision (Weitblick) of the important questions of time”.\(^{18}\) The book quickly became a bestseller; a paperback edition came out in August 2006.\(^{19}\)

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14 See also Bielefeldt (2005) on the debate about forced marriages and multicultural society.
16 Kelek is also an adviser to the Hamburg Justice Authority in connection with Turkish offenders.
17 www.buchhandel-bayern.de, 29.09.2005. The prize is given by an association of the German bookselling trade and the Department of Culture of the city of Munich; it is endowed by 10,000 EUR.
18 FAZ, 06.09.2006, http://www.uni-duisburg-essen.de/mercatorprofessur/ (accessed 27.02.07). Former holders of the professorship were e.g. the former Minister of the Exterior Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the author Siegfried Lenz, and the professor of literature and sociology Jan Philipp Reemtsma.
19 See Lau (2005).
One reason for the immense interest attracted by the book and Necla Kelek herself was the state of general debate on migration and integration issues, but also the discussion about the alleged failure of multiculturalism in recent years (see chapter 1) and in particular in the weeks before the publication of the book, as in Berlin on February 7, 2005 Hatun Sürücü, a young German-Turkish woman, was murdered by her younger brother, allegedly because the family condemned her independent way of living.

Another reason might be seen in the fact that the book provides various arguments in favour of conservative and restrictive migration and integration policies. That these arguments were formulated by a Turkish-German woman seems to bestow on them authenticity and legitimacy. On the other hand the book seems to have touched a nerve among liberals and protagonists of multiculturalism as the debate in 2006 reveals.

**The Book Reviews (2005)**

Most of the reviewers approvingly summarise the various aspects of Kelek’s book and reproduce her depiction of “parallel lives”, the differentiation between “us” and “them” and the necessity of stricter legislation. In addition in their assessments the reviewers emphasise that Kelek qualifies as an expert because of her own personal experiences and her access to “the Muslim world”. They highlight that by presenting the results of interviews she had conducted in a Mosque, Kelek would provide “insights into an area, which otherwise remains hidden to us” (*dradio*, 14.02.05). Schily notes that “The author knows both sides, inside and outside.” Most reviewers share the general view that the ‘world of Islam’ and ‘Western culture’ are clearly separated from each other. They agree with Kelek’s approach that Islam is a historical constant in which “the historical roots of the actual problems” can be identified (ibid, similarly: *Spiegel*, 24.01.05).

Moreover, they credit Kelek for ‘breaking a taboo’ which had existed “on the right wing with its claim that Germany was not an immigration country, on the left with its creed of pure and everlasting multicultural bliss.” (*Spiegel*, 24.01.05; see also *SZ*, 12.04.2005)

The authors reiterate the alleged incompatibility of ‘Islam’ and ‘the Western world’. Kahlweit, a journalist from the liberal and critical newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in her portrayal constructs this separation when she describes Kelek’s apartment. “The living room is her Eastern world” (with Turkish cups, oriental souvenirs, and family photograph), “the office is the Western one” (with paperwork, faxes from London etc.). When standing in the doorway between both rooms Kelek is described as standing “in the no man’s land between both worlds”. Kelek would have to flee from the office “into the living room and slam the door, otherwise the Western world would devour her.” (*SZ*, 12.4.2005) Although Kelek obviously combines the two cultures in her person Kahlweit is not able to recognise this simultaneousness and coexistence but imagines conflict and confrontation between different cultures; or regards the space where they could touch as blank.

Even more explicitly Renée Zucker (*die tageszeitung*) constructs an opposition between ‘them’ and ‘us’ and feels an aggression coming from ‘the Muslim other’ which in her view expresses itself in the Burqa, or the veil:

“...It is the way that suppression and aggression are radiated simultaneously, that makes one so helpless. For the veil does not only cover the person who wears it; at the same time it leaves the person on the other side of the table naked. Naked and sinful. It is a statement, not folklore.” (*TAZ*, 05.03.05)

In his article titled “How Islam conquered the cities” Hans-Peter Raddatz, an orientalist and publicist, prominent for his work critical of Islam, draws a picture of a dangerous Islam which threatens Germany by immigration. At the same time he reproduces the argument that the German government behaved passively and was at the mercy of Islam:

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20 Brief attributes on the papers only reflect a general, but certainly insufficient classification, as the articles presented here illustrate.
“For years Germany has been allowing a sort of immigration, which will turn the country into a new home of Islam, if nothing is done to put it right.” (Die Welt, 12.02.05)

In respect to the term “arranged marriages” some authors agree with Kelek that this was “a euphemism” for “forced marriages” (SZ, 12.04.2005), trivialising not only “arranged marriages” but “Islamic marriage” in general (Die Welt, 12.02.05). The commentators apparently regard “arranged marriages” as an exclusively Muslim phenomenon. Neither they nor Kelek refer to or criticise the tradition of arranged marriages in rural societies, but also in the bourgeoisie and especially in the nobility in Europe until the early 20th century.

Nevertheless, several authors criticise Kelek for generalising and drawing a somewhat one-sided picture of Islam. At the same time some interpret this generalisation of Islam and the reduction of social phenomena to cultural ones as “plain-talking”, which was necessary and legitimate in order to reach the public (FAZ, 27.02.05). Kelek’s approach is depicted as resolute and clear in contrast to “policies of generous tolerating of ‘cultural difference’” (ibid.). Differentiations as claimed by protagonists of a multicultural society are regarded as relational; they would lead to an inability to act and to the acceptance of the violation of human rights (e.g. TAZ, 05.03.05; SZ, 28.02.05).

Only two of the German reviews, published in the conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, explicitly criticise Kelek’s “undifferentiated” and “not scientifically accurate” approach. The philosopher Gustav Falke points to some contradictions between Kelek’s empirical findings and her conclusions. In respect to Kelek’s depiction of the principles of Islam he argues that Kelek took tradition as something that had existed “since primeval times” und “affected people like a natural force” (FAZ, 4.02.05). Whereas Falke also criticises the pleading for more restrictive immigration laws and asks for more support for the women affected, Alexandra Senfft agrees with the necessity of legal restrictions but states that by “stigmatising and provoking” a “whole population group” Kelek would “not foster dialogue but deepen the gap” (FAZ, 31.05.05).

As regards the Turkish speaking press I have to rely on two articles in the German language media which report on the “unfair coverage” of the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet distributed in Germany, among others referring to the book by Kelek. Uta Rasche reports on a campaign by Hürriyet against Necla Kelek, Serap Cieli, a German-Turkish author and filmmaker who escaped an arranged marriage, and Seyran Ates, German-Turkish author, lawyer and activist against forced marriages, “honour murder” and the headscarf. In February 2005, under the headline “Two female authors declare Turkey to be a nation of beaters” Kelek und Serap Cileli were accused of betrayal of the Turkish nation and of “fowling their own nest” (FAZ, 13.04.05).

The German-Turkish politician Cem Özdemir (Greens, Member of the European Parliament) cites another article in Hürriyet. On the occasion of international women’s day and in reaction to the murder of Hatun Sürücü (see above), the article stated that “the participation of some of our women in the propaganda of the German media and of specific persons has caused concern” (Die Zeit, 09.06.05). In the aftermath of these articles Kelek and others had been severely threatened.

The harsh reactions of the populist, conservative newspaper Hürriyet give evidence to the assumption that Kelek was right stating that there was an unwillingness to speak about violence and patriarchy among many Turkish migrants. The reluctance on the side of liberal and left representatives to face up to their own responsibilities in integration issues was one main issue in the subsequent debate in early 2006.

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21 Hürriyet in Germany is judged as a “conservative-nationalist tabloid” in contrast to the more liberal edition produced in Turkey, but to have slightly changed since a new chief editor has been in charge. In April 2005 the Hürriyet launched a campaign against domestic violence but failed in gaining support both from the women’s organisation Terre des femmes and by the Federal Minister of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth Renate Schmidt (Social Democratic Party), as they doubted the credibility because of the former defamation of Kelek, Ates and Cileli, Die Zeit, 09.06.05.
2.3 The debate in 2006

On February 2, 2006 the weekly newspaper Die Zeit published an open letter titled “Gerechtigkeit für die Muslime. Ein Weckruf” (“Justice for Muslims. A wake-up call”) which was signed by nearly 60 “migration researchers”. The authors of the letter criticise a campaign against forced marriages as it would imply that the reasons for forced marriages were solely to be found in the Islamic religion and culture. The campaign was launched by the local administration of the Berlin borough of Neukölln; it provides information, brief reports of biographical experiences, addresses of consultancies, and posters, flyers etc. prepared by the organisation for human rights for women Terre des femmes.

Kelek’s book is recommended on the website of the campaign for further reading among other (autobiographical) reports about forced or arranged marriages, and “honour murder”, many written in a popular style; the migration researchers especially take offence at the reading list and Kelek’s book. Kelek formulated a response in the same issue of Die Zeit, which was published in several media. Subsequently a fierce debate continued among the critical left, feminists, advocates of a multicultural policy and those who blamed multiculturalism for current social problems. Most contributions are formulated in a fairly harsh and polemical style. The debate was about two main themes, namely the subject who was entitled to raise issues and define relevant questions in the field of migration and how was the social reality of migrants to be described, explained and changed.

2.3.1 Who is entitled to speak about migrants and integration issues and how? Which are the central issues in integration matters and who defines them?

‘Kelek pumps up single cases to a social problem’

The authors of the open letter Mark Terkessidis and Yasemin Karakasoglu blame Kelek for not having worked scientifically accurately. Her book as well as the (autobiographical) works by other Turkish-German female authors were, as they call them, “lurid pamphlets in which people’s own experiences and single cases were pumped up to a social problem” (Die Zeit, 02.02.06, Terkessidis/Karakasoglu). Kelek had taken material from her dissertation research which she had now reinterpreted. Whereas in her dissertation she came to the conclusion that “for young people Islam was mainly a means of social identification – rather than an unchallenged religious tradition” she had now completely reinterpreted her empirical data, saying that Muslim youths were trapped by traditional Islamic rules imposed on them by their families. Single cases were presented as universally valid. In their view Kelek’s “‘analysis’ was not more than the dissemination of cheap clichés about ‘Islam’ and ‘the Turks’, enriched by florid episodes from the story of Kelek’s family” (ibid.). Moreover, they allege that Kelek had dishonest and calculating motives and wrote her book only in order to be successful on the book market.

In contrast the addressors of the open letter present themselves as representing high-quality migration studies. Terkessidis/Karakasoglu complain that their – in their view – far more serious, legitimate and differentiated research on, for instance discrimination of migrants or the emergence of complex identities, was ignored by the public. Instead public attention was directed to “Muslim minorities”. This focus was demonstrated by the fact that Kelek was awarded prizes and asked for official consultancy whereas “the differentiated scientific research has scarcely been recognised” (ibid.).

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23 TAZ, 03.02.06, for the extended version see website of the Giordano-Bruno foundation and Die Zeit, 09.02.06; see also SZ, 03.02.06.
A further aspect of the debate about who determines the agenda is the question as to whether Kelek, as her reviewers underlined, broke a taboo. Daniel Bax (die tageszeitung) states that the issue of forced marriages was not new, Kelek did not break a taboo. “For nearly 30 years the theme of the oppressed Turkish woman” has been strongly present “in German and Turkish movies”, and “tragic first hand accounts by Turkish women have long been piling up in German bookshops”; “such stories time and again hit the front page of the Spiegel.” (TAZ, 11.02.06)

The tone as well as the argumentative focus of the open letter leave the impression that the authors in fact begrudged Kelek her success.

‘The critics are multiculturalists. They are not legitimate but even dangerous as they are powerful and follow outdated ideologies’

Kelek and her supporters, journalists, scholars and political activists or other prominent individuals, countered these accusations first of all by repudiating the accusations as “disrespectful and abasing” (giordano-bruno-stiftung, 02.02.06) and further by pointing to a standard work in German-language ethnographic research which relied on the life stories of only eight individuals. As in the book reviews Kelek is again depicted as an expert and a legitimate, honest representative who broke a taboo. She qualifies by her own experience, knowledge and courage. The feminist publicist Alice Schwarzer writes that Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a prominent film maker, author and critic of Islam from Somalia who obtained political asylum in the Netherlands – Kelek and Ates were “three women of many who at last – after decades of silence – speak” (FAZ, 11.02.06).

In turn, several authors denounce the addressees of the open letter as non scientific, non serious, not having a sense of responsibility, and, even of being dangerous. Within this debate the addressors are on the whole identified as representatives of ‘multiculturalism’. It is their (alleged) ideological conviction of ‘multiculturalism’ which has led to a one-sided research in the past and excluded any critique on migrants or Islam. The concept of ‘multiculturalism’ is used as a general catchword for various ideas, policies and allegations; the concept itself is not systematically explained by the commentators.

Without any evidence it is assumed that the “migration researchers” would “seldom leave their offices and know Berlin-Kreuzberg, Cologne-Mühlheim” – districts with a high percentage of Turkish migrants – “and Anatolia predominately from paperwork” (FAZ, 11.02.06).

Hartmut Krauss, social scientist and initiator of a working group of critical Marxists, formulated a response to the open letter entitled “Justice for democratic female critics of Islam. A warning cry“ which was signed by 53 people and published on the website of the Giordano-Bruno-Foundation. The foundation aims to “support evolutionary humanism”; Kelek is a member of its academic advisory board. Krauss contrasts the work of Kelek and others with the assumed research of those who signed the open letter. “Life stories”, a “’thick description’” were often more meaningful and authentic than

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“those superficial-empirical studies in which the interviewees – by means of specifically prepared requirements – were asked questions intrudingly in a way that ‘smoothed out’, ‘toned down’ and fragmented real experience, and reproduced clichés about the ‘bad’ (overall racist) host society” (giordano-bruno-stiftung, 02.02.06, Krauss).

The work of those who signed the letter is alleged to be driven by ideology which only looks for evidence of racism in society. According to Kelek her critics could have dealt for years with the topics she had now raised, but had not done so for ideological reasons; these questions “did not fit into their ideological concept of multiculturalism” (Die Zeit, 02.02.06, Kelek).

Kelek and other authors draw a picture of a powerful, well equipped scientific discipline of migration studies, which was supported by the former Red-Green government, had built a restrictive dominant discourse over the years and had the power to define the relevant and legitimate issues and questions in respect to migration and integration (e.g. Spiegel online, 16.03.06). The critics had reacted now only because they feared to lose their funding and their monopoly in defining the relevant research questions. Behind the “whole gesture of ‘scientificness’ an ideological defence mechanism was hiding” (giordano-bruno-stiftung, 02.02.06, Krauss). In so far, their critique is not to be taken seriously (see also FAZ, 03.02.06; FAZ, 09.02.06).

The features of this discourse were, according to Kelek and her supporters, not to criticise the behaviour of migrants. “Negative attributes of migrants had to be explainable by the ‘hyper-theorem’ ‘racism of the host society’; never was the normative influencing force of Islam allowed to appear” (giordano-bruno-stiftung, 02.02.06, Krauss).

According to Kelek migration research tended to cling to modernisation theory. The addressee of the open letter still believed in the conclusions of out-dated scholars that migrants in Western countries fulfilled their individual projects of governing their own life at the cost of losing their cultural identity. Therefore critical migration researchers called for support of migrants’ language acquirement. There existed a “tacit agreement” according to which “every truth about failed integration projects (…) was relative and would get settled by itself in the multicultural process” (FAZ, 03.02.06). Mariam Lau even calls the discourse in migration studies a “master narrative”, a concept from literary criticism and post-colonial theory which points to a hegemonic discourse (FAZ, 08.02.06).

Kelek states that she emancipated herself from the dominant ‘multikulti’-discourse because she realised the changes among Turkish migrants in Germany and their tendencies to turn to traditional Islam. Her former colleagues, however, would still rather stick to findings which were no longer relevant.

This view certainly neglects the variety of structuralist, essentialist, post-structuralist and post-colonial approaches in migration studies. Moreover, multiculturalism is more a phrase in Germany than a scientifically or politically defined position; it certainly never has gained a dominant status in the country. Nevertheless, the discussion about paternalism and ignorance in the name of multiculturalism or political correctness is overdue.

‘Dialogue = friendship with Islamists’

The most severe accusations against single addressors of the open letter are uttered by the well known journalist, editor of the feminist journal Emma and critic of Islam, Alice Schwarzer. In her essay she constructs a homogenous and powerful group of protagonists of multiculturalism and fundamentalist Islamists. She often uses associations and insinuations in order to complete this picture, for instance she calls the addressors of the letter “these friends of Islamists”. In sum, she implies that even a willingness to communicate with Islamic representatives means to support fundamentalist and anti-democratic positions.

Schwarzer states that the biographies of the authors Terkessidis/Karakasoglu proved that their accusation of “non-scientificness” was “completely grotesque”. She finds it “interesting” that “both have binational parents”, an attribute which would surely qualify Kelek as an expert of two concurring worlds whereas in the case of the critics the fact that one of their parents is German is treated as somehow suspect. Further on Schwarzer states, “She (Karakasoglu) comes from the militant pro-
headscarf-scene, of which she is the outstanding voice; he (Terkessidis) comes from the radical left” (FAZ, 11.02.06).

Subsequently, Schwarzer constructs a close link between Karakasoglu and radical Islamists. Karakasoglu was “very far away from academic neutrality and very, very closely linked with the Islamist scene in Germany” (ibid.). One indicator for this, according to Schwarzer, is the expertise that Karakasoglu wrote for the Federal Constitutional Court regarding the case of a teacher who was prohibited to wear the headscarf in a state school (Karakasoglu 2003). According to Schwarzer this expertise tipped the balance towards the “half-hearted decision” of the court to delegate the question if teachers at German schools should be allowed to wear the scarf to the federal states (ibid.).

Schwarzer goes on with further insults and accusations about Karakasoglu’s alleged non-willingness to accept empirical findings about violence-prone Muslim youth which later Karakasoglu herself is able to rebut (FAZ, 23.2.06). Her professorship for intercultural education is put into quotation marks as if this discipline was to be dismissed.

She states Karakasoglu would “love to give ‘long-drawn-out’ interviews about this ‘racist discourse’, for example in the ‘Islamische Zeitung’ (‘Islamic newspaper’)” (FAZ, 11.02.06). Schwarzer does not explain the profile of the paper, in her view the attribute “Islamic” is obviously sufficient to disqualify it. However, the online version of the newspaper presents itself as quite moderate, differentiated and is published in the German language.

In a similar style Schwarzer accuses Karakasoglu of having taken part in a panel together with alleged fundamentalists, or “the friends of the bearded brothers”. Schwarzer concludes, “In short, they were all sitting together there once again. And Karakasoglu right in the middle” (ibid.). The symposium was hosted by the German Protestant church; what Schwarzer did not mention is that it was supported by the public service radio station Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), the Robert-Bosch foundation which realises non-profit and social projects, and the German Islamrat (Islamic Council); other participants were prominent scholars of Islam a dissident philosopher from Iran and the former vice president of the Federal Constitutional Court.

Schwarzer states that other addressees of the open letter also belong to the “hard core of these circles”. By “these circles” she seems to mean those who partake in activities which aim at dialogue with migrants and Muslims. Schwarzer names, for instance “Barbara John, former Berlin Commissioner for Foreigners and initiator (…) of the ‘Muslim Academy’ (‘Muslimische Akademie’)”. Again, the academy is addressed as something that automatically disqualifies itself. The institution of a Commission for Foreigners is treated as intrinsically suspect, and even more the person of Barbara John (CDU), who is prominent for her active engagement in establishing dialogue between local authorities and migrant communities in Berlin in the period between 1981 and 2003.

Finally, the feminist journalist assumes that all signatories belong into this apparently “Islamist” category, when she says, “And so on and so forth. It is just always the same people” (ibid.).

The second author of the open letter, Mark Terkessidis, seems to disqualify himself because he is a journalist working on topics like popular culture, identity and racism. According to Schwarzer he is one of “those post-modern, self-referential, pseudo-radical intellectuals” (ibid.).

Similarly, Mariam Lau, who worked for the leftist paper die tageszeitung until 2004 and is now chief correspondent of the conservative Die Welt, implies that the policy of some scholars and politicians to get into dialogue with Muslim protagonists implies agreement with all of their thinking. She describes one of the aforementioned addressees, Ursula Neumann, who was “considered as a friend” of the former chief of the Green fraction (Krista Sager) and the former Federal Commissioner for Integration (Marieluise Beck), as if this speculation gave evidence for her undemocratic standpoints. Neumann would “plead for dialogue with the Bündnis Islamischer Gemeinden (Alliance of Islamic Communities), a subgroup of the Islamist Milli Görüs, which is considered extremely suspect by the

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26 On research by Karakasoglu on “resources of young female migrants beyond forced marriages and honour murders”, see Boos-Nünning/Karakasoglu 2005; Karakasoglu 2006. The findings were also criticised by Schwarzer and Kelek.


Hamburg Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Hamburger Verfassungsschutz)” (Die Welt, 08.02.06). Lau does not expound the problem that the fact of being kept under state surveillance does not necessarily mean that the respective group is in fact anti-democratic. She accuses Karakasoglu in a similar way to Schwarzer and points to the fact that she is a member of the directorate of the Muslimische Akademie.

Both authors do not explain that the Muslim Academy was initiated by, among others, the president of the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education), who is assigned by the Federal Minister of the Interior. The Academy focuses on the organisation of social discourse on the basis of the principles of democratic adult education.  

In order to underline her argument Lau cites another scholar who states that research has “disregarded the danger of the Islamisation of the Muslim milieu. These do-gooders are a serious danger” (Die Welt, 08.02.06).

To sum up, the commentators share the opinion that Islam and the Western world are incompatible. Islam is equated with fundamentalism, oppression, anti-democratic agitation and violence. Protagonists of multiculturalism are regarded as standing on the side of Islamists or at least tolerating their ideology and practice.

### 2.3.2 Are there parallel lives? Is Islam connected with social exclusion of migrants? How is social exclusion of migrants to be solved?

‘There are no parallel lives but complex identities. The reason for discrimination lies in exclusion and the German assimilation model’

In respect to the main subject matter of Kelek’s book – violence against women in Muslim families especially forced and arranged marriages and the alleged existence of Turkish-Muslim parallel lives in Germany - Terkessidis/Karakasoglu and other critics plead for a differentiated analysis of Islam and of the integration of migrants and ethnic minorities. They criticise the monolithic picture of ‘Islam’ which is said to shape the immigrants’ community. In fact there were no such ‘Muslim parallel lives’. Instead T/K point to the variety of interpretations of Islam in the migrant community. The second generation of Muslim migrants would reinterpret Islam in a complicated way, „interacting both with the family environment and the reactions of the majority society” (Die Zeit, 02.02.06, T/K). The identification with Islam was according to Terkessidis/Karakasoglu often “very subjective” and not simply explainable with being “patriarchal” or “backward” (ibid.).

The German-Turkish Member of Parliament Lale Akgün (Social Democratic Party – SPD) adds that the vision of a closed Muslim society in Germany contradicts with reality, as migrant children pass through every level of socialisation and internalise the values of German society (Die Zeit, 12.02.06).

Besides the rejection of the concept of ‘parallel societies’ the critics of Kelek argue that social exclusion was the result of discriminating structures and the assimilationist model of the host society. Lale Akgün asks the rhetorical question “if it was actually true that Muslim immigrants were distancing themselves more and more the values of Germany” and suggests that it was rather the case “that more immigrants want to integrate, but their chances to take part in society were being denied.” In fact, the “prevalent conservative idea of society” as being “held together by a tradition grown over centuries, a common religion and a uniform language” would exclude migrants speaking a foreign first language and stigmatise them as not belonging to it (ibid.).

Similarly, Dilek Zaptcioglu, a German-Turkish author of youth literature, sees the main reason for the failure of integration in the predominant discourse which divides between “them” and “us”. Even Necla Kelek, who “movingly” tries hard to be accepted by the German “we”-part, does not change but instead “reproduces this conservative and racist discourse”, and “remains on ‘our’ side, the ‘wog-side’” (TAZ, 04.02.06).

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The critics regard Kelek’s book and her public statements as a contribution to a discursive strategy in which individual migrants are blamed for their social exclusion: “Principal witnesses who report about forced marriages, honour murders and other forms of suppression, would suit quite well to such a discourse strategy” (Die Zeit, 12.02.06). Kelek would support conservative politicians in their aim “to distract from their own failures in respect to integration measures” (TAZ, 11.02.06).³⁰

In respect to forced marriages the critics underline that these were single cases which had to be distinguished from arranged marriages. In their view arranged marriages are the result of restrictive European immigration policies.³¹ Because of the lack of a transparent immigration option migrants would choose family reunion as a “loophole”. This was a political, not a moral problem and “not to be ascribed to ‘Islam’” (Die Zeit, 02.02.06, T/K). Forced marriages were in fact a problem, but could also be dealt with through the legal process. In so approaching the issue the authors in fact seem to play it down, as in the end the legal path is often not easy to access by women in positions of dependency. The phrase used by Akgün, referring to “one-off migration-specific negative phenomena” also seems to seek to avoid confronting the issue (Die Zeit, 12.02.06).

Dilek Zaptcioglu emphasises that ‘honour murders’ and forced marriages have a “specific quality (…). Nevertheless, violence against women is not a specifically Muslim, but also a German problem.” She argues that Kelek “denounces the ’essence of Islam’, which would push every male follower of this religion to primitivism and misogyny.” Thereby Kelek is „depoliticing the problem” (TAZ, 04.02.06).

According to their structuralist approach the critics reject the allegation that the protagonists of multiculturalism were responsible for social exclusion of and violence among migrants. Zaptcioglu underlines that it is the people who are now being called “naïve ‘do-gooders’” who “had fought for equal rights between men and women and between Germans and migrants” in the past (ibid.). In the 1970s and 1980s the only ones who were interested in autobiographical books about violence experienced by migrant women were the so-called “Multikulti-fanatics”. Without them the situation in Germany would have been simply unbearable for immigrants.³² Zaptcioglu regards the social acceptance of violence among migrants as a result of their exclusion and the indifference of native Germans. “The majority did not care if the Turkish neighbour beat his wife (…). This was not (…) a result of ‘wrongly conceived tolerance’ but rather of the rejection” (ibid.). The permanent exclusion had induced more and more migrants to mentally distance themselves from Germany.

‘Islam is violent against women, it violates human rights’

Hartmut Krauss (see above) refers, as does Kelek in her book, to a survey about violence experienced by Turkish women, without mentioning if the context of the survey was in Germany or Turkey. He suggests a homogenous picture of Turkish women as victims of violence and slave trade, captured in silence. Again arranged marriages and the fact that dowries are paid are in his view distinct indicators of forced marriages. The reason for violence was to be found in the Islamic religion and culture. Comparisons with women from other cultures or nations are not drawn.

In his depiction of Muslim migrants in Germany Krauss implies that even if migrants did adapt to the requirements of the host society, this could only be superficially or a form of deception. In fact, Islam would quasi-mechanically, namely through “socialisation”, impose conservative-Islamic convictions on migrants. These convictions would “act as serious barriers to the integration of many young migrants” and would “give the culture medium for Islamist and nationalist-rightist extremist opinions” (giordano-bruno-stiftung, 02.02.06).

³⁰ See also Terkessidis in his supplement statement, FR 17.02.06.
³¹ The cultural anthropologist Werner Schiffauer contributed to a more differentiated view on arranged marriages drawing from his field research in Turkey, SZ, 09.02.06.
³² See also Sidar Demirdögen from Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland (Federal Council of Female Migrants in Germany) who claims that Kelek is not legitimate to speak for all migrants, www.migrantinnen.org, 17.02.06.
Both men and women seem to be helplessly at the mercy of Islam, although still in a gender specific way. According to Krauss, young women “usually suffer passively from the normative moral corset of the Islamic family (…) sometimes they subordinate their rationalisation to it”. In contrast, many young males had “hammered out for themselves a crude Macho-Islam” which they would “adapt according to their needs”. Towards their female relatives they would act as repressive guardians of morality, whereas native women in “western clothing” were regarded as “fair game” of “lesser moral value” (ibid.). As a proof he cites cases of young migrant boys who insinuated native German social workers or teachers. Social (mis)behaviour of young people is explained by Islamic culture. Comparable verbal and physical aggression by (male) German youngsters against mentors or teachers is not considered.

Krauss accuses Kelek’s critics of not allowing any critique of Islam, they were “Islamophile” and followed “a relativistic and in terms of religion absolutely naïve approach”. In turn he condemns Islam almost universally as not compatible with democracy and freedom. He speaks of the “manifold anti-emancipation, undemocratic and hostile-to-freedom aspects of the orthodox majority Islam” (ibid.).

**Which solutions?**

While Kelek and her supporters blame on the one hand Muslim migrants and on the other hand the protagonists of multiculturalism for failed integration, her critics point to the impact of exclusionary structures and discrimination. Nevertheless, both opposing strands of the debate refer to the democratic constitution when it comes to the question of how to solve current problems which they obviously depict differently.

Lale Akgün claims that taking into account the increasing number of migrants in Germany, the “concept of majority-minority is anachronistic” and a “new social model” is necessary (*Die Zeit*, 12.02.06). The author pleads for a model in which migrants and their children could combine “tradition and modernity”. A new model would be “a society, which is ethnically heterogeneous, religiously pluralistic and which does not need a nationalist base for identity.” At the centre of this model would be constitution patriotism as defined by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. A new identity or sense of belonging would not rely on descent, but on a common will and history. A “common citizenship” which would “embrace diversity instead of excluding it” would be the “link which would unite all.” Only such a model would free migrants from their “inferiority complex” (ibid.).

Akgün seems to stick to the concept of conflict between tradition and modernity which migrants experience. Moreover, the author does not get into the debate of individual responsibility but regards the state as having the prime obligation to act. As she does not further elaborate the implementation of this new sense of belonging, her vision of a pluralistic society and how to deal with cultural difference remains quite abstract.

On the other hand, as illustrated above, Kelek and others strongly rely on the norms and values of democracy when they argue in favour of the necessity for migrants to adapt to the host society. Krauss states that the “precondition for successful integration is not self denying compliancy, but the consequent demand for respect of the secular-democratic basic order” (*giordano-bruno-stiftung*, 02.02.06).

The authors legitimise quite restrictive and assimilationist policies by referring to Western values. It is the individual migrant who has to change his/her behaviour, while the state should reinforce its principles. This approach does not envisage an equal dialogue in a diverse society but the one-sided subordination of Muslims to ‘German norms and values’. It even seems that Kelek wishes to prove to be a ‘better democrat’ than her critics, who, she suggests, act irrationally due to their historical heritage. In addition, the proposed measures are depicted as new in the German debate. By denouncing the ‘multiculturalists’ in the way analysed above, the protagonists of an assimilation model condemn any of the previous integration projects and proposals suggested or implemented by them.

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33 On this critique see also Faist (2006).
3 The German Reception of the Danish Cartoon Affair

The so-called Danish cartoon affair was given huge coverage in the German media and political discourse. In the period from January until March 2006 the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung alone published 267 articles including the key words “Mohammed” and “cartoons”. The cartoons were published by the conservative newspaper Die Welt (01.02.06). The liberal weekly journal ZEIT, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the leftist die tageszeitung (TAZ), and two Berlin liberal newspapers, Tagesspiegel and the Berliner Zeitung, published a selection. The online-magazine Perlentaucher, published a link to a website showing the cartoons. Also the weekly magazines Spiegel and Focus presented some of the cartoons, subsequently these issues were banned in Egypt, whereas Spiegel online did not present them on the internet. In cooperation with the Turkish high-circulation liberal-conservative Hürriyet the conservative tabloid BILD, which rejected the publication of the cartoons, appealed for “respect for the feelings of others” in order to “avoid insinuations, indignities or perfidy”.

In a common declaration, on February 8, 2006, leading Islamic associations in Germany pleaded for a rejection of violence in the name of religion. The peaceful protest of Muslims in Europe was in their view also a consequence of the work of Muslim organisations and the “maturity of Muslims in Europe”. At the same time they demanded of German society and politicians to take the concerns of Muslims in the country more seriously and especially referred to the so-called citizenship test for Muslims, which the Baden Wurttemberg government had just proposed. In Germany only a few relatively calm demonstrations against the cartoons took place.

On February 10, 2006 a topical debate on the affair took place in the Federal Parliament which was characterised by a general appeal for moderation (see below).

Newspaper coverage mainly focused on the mass protests and events in Arab and some European countries. In the subsequent analysis I will focus on comments, features and essays in the major print media. In addition I will include the parliamentary debate into the analyses. These encompass various topics and within each topic a broad range of opinions:

- the question of the antagonism between Western values and Islam vs. possibilities of overcoming the conflict;
- attempts to contextualise the conflict vs. the clear-cut assignment of responsibility;
- the debate on integration and multiculturalism in Germany ranging from pleading for respect vs. the demand of assimilation

What seems to be most important in terms of the debate in Germany is

- a general vision or hope that “German Muslims” were moderate and German society, in civic and political terms, mature enough to avoid such a conflict arising in the country.

Numerous protagonists within the debate obviously used the Danish cartoon affair to justify their respective arguments.

The issue was given further attention because at the same time an artist for the Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel was accused by the regime in Iran of having insulted Islam by a cartoon which showed a team of Iran football players wearing explosive waist belts and a

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34 On the background and course of the affair see the Danish country report of the EMILIE-project, Public and political debates on multicultural crises in Denmark by Sine Lex, Lasse Lindekelde and Per Mouritsen (2007), see also FR, 27.10.05.
35 Quotation according to www.netzeitung.de, 09.02.06.
36 http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/karikaturenstreit/060208.jhtml, 01.02.06.
team of armed German soldiers.\textsuperscript{37} According to the artist his aim was to ridicule the appointment of the German army at the World Cup. Michael Hanfeld, head of the editorial department of media of the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} and prominent Islam critic, regards the harsh reaction by the Iranian government which was followed by demonstrations of outraged Muslims, as evidence that the cartoon – as in the Danish case – was purposefully used as an instrument in the ‘clash of cultures’ in order to stir up hatred (\textit{FAZ}, 15.02.06). Generally, the commentators avoided reacting to provocations that referred to the Holocaust, uttered in particular by representatives from Iran. In February 2006 as a response to the Mohammed cartoons an Iranian newspaper had launched a competition to find the twelve ‘best’ cartoons about the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{38}

In what follows I will analyse some articles and statements exemplifying the variety of standpoints in the German debate. In the first part I will present the most explicit views in favour of tolerance and understanding towards the Muslim protesters as well as positions which try to display Germany as particularly capable of dealing with the conflict. In the second part I will investigate arguments which emphasise the antagonism between Islam and the West.

\section*{3.1 Acceptance of religious taboos, the responsibility of the West, and the specific role of Germany}

In an interview with Spanish \textit{El Pais} published by \textit{Die Welt} the prominent author and Nobel Prize laureate Günther Grass regards “the West” as exclusively responsible for the conflict. He recommends respect for Islamic taboos in Western societies and questions the “arrogance (of the West) and its wish to determine what is legitimate and what is not.” Pointing to the market mechanisms of the media he states that “we have lost the right to seek protection under the right to free expression.” The protests were to be interpreted in the context of violent acts, of which the invasion in Iraq was the initial one.\textsuperscript{39} Subsequently, he draws a parallel between the cartoons and the anti-Semitic cartoons published by the propaganda newspaper \textit{Stürmer} during National Socialism. Grass suggests Germans should be specifically aware and act responsibly due to their national socialist past (\textit{Die Welt}, 10.02.06).

Arguing from a less moral but judicial viewpoint the judge of the Federal Constitutional Court, Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt, discusses the role of the state in regulating conflicts of culture and religion and insists on the neutrality of the state towards religion. Referring to the debate on \textit{Leitkultur} and the headscarf affair in Germany she criticises the “right to absoluteness” claimed by protagonists of a German \textit{Leitkultur} and a ban on the headscarf in public space; instead she pleads for a “culture of argument” (\textit{FR}, 17.02.06).

The well known author Botho Strauß (\textit{Spiegel}) explains that satire could not be an appropriate means to solve the argument between Islam and the Western world. He draws attention to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Another case attracted the attention of the public in the context of the Danish cartoon affair. A pensioner had inscribed toilet paper roles with the label “Koran, der heilige Qur’an” (Quran, the holy Qur’an) and sent them to Muslim communities and some media. A lawsuit was conducted during February 2006, he was given a one-year conditional sentence for disrespecting religious conviction, “Ein Jahr Bewährung für Koran auf Klopapier”, http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,402647,00.html, 23.02.06 (accessed 13.03.06).
\item “Ausstellung im Iran zeigt Holocaust-Karikaturen”, http://www.netzeitung.de/ausland/432544.html, 14.08.06 (accessed 13.03.06). On the debate as to whether the Mohammed cartoons can be compared to cartoons about the denial of the Holocaust see, www.perlentaucher.de, 03.03.06.
\item Similarly, Dilek Zaptcioglu refers to the escalation of violence between the West and Islam and states that “in Muslim countries” the “threat of an invasion of Iran” was very present (TAZ, 06.02.06).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
positive values of Islamic culture which “we” had lost. These were “non-dissolution, non-indifference, (...) hierarchies of social responsibility, cohesion in times of misery.” Moreover, he states that the reasons why Christians were losing their values were not to be found in an Islamic threat but in specifics of Western industrial societies, like the “pressure to conform, the attitude to seek one’s own advantage and to make one’s career.” (Spiegel, 13.02.2006)

These contributions explicitly or implicitly refer to the relationship between broader German society and Muslim migrants. They signal respect and understanding towards Muslim migrants in Germany and insofar attempt to prevent escalation of the conflict in the country. Even more directly a report about the calm reactions among Turks in Berlin contributes to this placatory approach (FR, 16.02.06).

The debate in Parliament, which was initiated by the Green Party, was also characterised by a strong appeal for mitigation. However, the fact that many representatives demonstrated their arguments regarding the issue of integration and multiculturalism in Germany, revealed that they used the cartoon affair to implement their own agenda. Many deputies, especially from a Christian point of view, called the cartoons disrespectful. Kristina Köhler (CDU) even pleaded for respect and responsibility beyond the constitution. Nevertheless most representatives insisted on the freedom of the press and condemned the violent demonstrations in Muslim countries. Among others Niels Annen (SPD) pointed to the instrumentalisation of the cartoons by Islamic fundamentalists and warned of the danger of “falling victim to the calculations of the instigators” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006: 1254). Regarding the national context many of the deputies demonstrated respect for the conciliatory attitude of Muslims in Germany and appreciated the common declaration of BILD and Hürriyet (see above). Referring to the debate on integration of migrants and Muslims in Germany Trittin (Greens) and Norman Paech (Left Party) underlined that the recently proposed citizenship test was not capable of contributing to de-escalation. The integration of Muslims was also regarded as a contribution to a safer Europe. Lale Akgün (SPD) underlined that there was not an unyielding contradiction between democracy and Islam and pleaded for a policy of reconciliation and respect for Muslims. In contrast the CDU-deputy Reinhard Grindel insisted that “Muslims in Germany had a right that we declare more clearly which steps towards integration we expect from them”. He demanded that migrants learn the German language and respect the constitutional principles, because “Integration just does not mean Multikulti” (ibid. 1259).

Two articles explicitly point to the responsibility of Danish policy makers and media. Hannes Gamillscheg, commentator of the Frankfurter Rundschau, accuses Danish society of xenophobia. It was not by accident that the conflict arose in Denmark in particular because the debate about migrants had been “so insidious” and immigration law “tightened up more brutally than anywhere else in Europe”. (FR, 02.02.2006) Similarly, the German-Iranian writer Navid Kermani states that the editorial staff of Jyllants Posten had deliberately “provoked a minority in its own country to react.” This reaction in turn was intended to “serve as a justification for further marginalising this minority.” (SZ, 08.02.2006)

### 3.2 Freedom of the press and the threat of Islam

Numerous articles underline the priority of the freedom of press over the Islamic ban on images of the Prophet Mohammed. Beyond it many authors regard the violent protests of Muslims as evidence for the incompatibility of Islam and Western values. Some authors codify the events according a general image of Islam as threatening the West. A more
moderate position discusses the concept of a Euro-Islam but still builds on an antagonism in which Muslims would have to subordinate into the Western framework.

As early as November 3, 2005 the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published one of the cartoons to illustrate a report about the conflict. On February 2, 2006, Christian Geyer claimed that the decision of more and more newspapers to publish the cartoons was “an act of mitigation, not of intensification”. Only if Europe could show “solidarity” and “stick to the practices of a democratic public”, would it “become clear” that “religious fundamentalists have a problem (…) with the whole Western world.” (FAZ, 02.02.06)

The author insists that in a secular and liberal polity Muslim believers were allowed to follow the ban on images of the Prophet Mohammed, but they could not expect and even less enforce, that everyone had to follow their rules. The constitutional state had to protect the rights of minorities as well of the majority if it was challenged by a minority. In his view the only reason for the conflict lay in the behaviour of Muslims: “They (the Muslims) only have to renounce violence, which they now still display as their religious imperative.” (ibd.)

In her leading article Mariam Lau (Die Welt) assumes that the conflict was not in fact about religion but about “the new, self-confident, disputable role of Europe within the world.” Since, for instance, “the French, British and Germans (…) are determined to curb Teheran’s nuclear ambitions (…) the period of good-natured indifference is over”. The fact that even the Germans now followed a strict line towards Iran, after they had “always so bravely offered ‘critical dialogue’” would “warm the heart”.

A second reason for the conflict according to Lau was the awareness among the “regimes of the despots” of a “Euro-Islam”, meaning “the insistence that Islam and democracy were not irredeemably antagonistic or at least did not have to be”. For an increasing number of Muslims “individual freedom, personal integrity, and political legitimacy had been the standard for a long time.” The cartoons had been so offensive because they pictured the (non Western) Muslims as they were: “the dull reality (…) of Muslims as gregarious animals, prepared to do anything in the name of religion (…) gloomy, dumb hillbillies, trapped in their own hate, envy and revengefulness”. After having constructed a clear-cut concept of the enemy by these defamations, Lau refers to the immigration discourse in Germany. Integration policies could influence which camp would prevail in the emergence of a Euro-Islam. In the past the strategy of migrants’ organisations would have been to keep their clientele politically dependent. With her general conclusion “Compliancy in these questions is not a gesture of international understanding but an acceptance of dependence” she suggests strict policies of demanding adaptation by migrants to ‘German society, norms and values’ (Die Welt, 17.02.06).

The theologian Walter Schmithals (Die Zeit) disagrees with the idea of a „Euro-Islam“. Because of different historical experiences and theological principles it would be impossible to integrate “certain principles of occidental culture”, in particular the division of religion and politics and the acceptance of individual human rights. He elaborates fairly static images of Christianity and Islam and concludes by referring to actual debates in Germany. In his view German Muslims were not able to organise themselves in a representative body because such an organisation was not in the logic of Islam as a state religion. However, he does not take into account barriers and reluctances within German society as well as competition among the various Muslim associations. These factors certainly complicate such a process of organising a Muslim body. In his view “Islamic monotheism” excluded the combination of open
The sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky, in his essay for Die Welt, does not accept any possible explanation of the conflict for it would only trivialise the violent attacks by Muslims. He denies the view that the public was only mobilised by dictators but claims that “the population itself is prepared to attack.” Sofsky quotes an estimation according to which the “army of militant Jihadists” accounted for “seven million”. The “pious mass” aims to “get hold of their disbelieving deadly enemies”. They “want to halal slaughter them and burn them.” Sofsky also rejects the argument that religious feelings and the Islamic ban on images of Prophet Mohammed had been violated by the cartoons. In his view demonstrating Muslims in Arab countries were not real believers, as someone who truly believed would deem it arrogant to imagine that humans could protect their god: “Bigotry and violence have their inception not in religious fervour but in unsoundness of belief.” He goes on in radical and insulting language to draw a picture of an angry, bloodthirsty mass waiting for an opportunity to kill a representative of the western world. The burning of flags and dolls symbolising e.g. the Danish president was in his diction “the continuation of terror by means of the mob, which – so far – cannot get its hands on the real prey.” (Die Welt, 15.02.2006) Sofsky’s text reflects the broad view of Islam as a threat to the West which in times of terrorism appears to be easily evoked by images of outraged protesting Muslims. Modern communication technologies eased the dissemination and de-contextualisation of these images.

On March 1, twelve prominent intellectuals, politicians, authors and journalists, among them Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Salman Rushdie, released a manifesto in the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which was re-published by Die Welt on the following day. The addressors appeal for “resistance against religious totalitarianism” and “support for freedom, equal opportunity and secularism”. Against the background of the conflict about the Mohammed cartoons they see the “necessity to fight for universal values.” They refuse the rationale that the conflict was caused by opposing cultures but one had to face a “worldwide fight of democrats against (Islamic) theocrats.” In a fairly declamatory style they “reject ‘cultural relativism’” and “refuse to subordinate a critical spirit to the fear of supporting Islamophobia” (Die Welt, 02.03.06). The authors use a line of argument similar to that of Necla Kelek, as it was presented in the previous chapter.

In response Robert Misik (die tageszeitung) criticises the manifesto, arguing that the concept of totalitarianism or totalitarian rule defined by the philosopher Hannah Arendt could not be applied to Islamism; one might only observe “totalitarian movements” of “a minority of Jihadists and their followers”; those under the influence of these “hardliners” who felt threatened by “the West”, “the Jews” and “the commercial system” were to be regarded critically but in no way to be accounted as a “totalitarian’ mass movement”. Secondly, the author accused the writers of the manifesto that by insisting on “universal values” they failed to realise that this “militant liberalism is perceived to be exactly what it aims not to be: a commanding ideology” (TAZ, 04.03.06). In his view the conflict is predominately about respect and acceptance, which, he considers, is not achievable by manifestos.

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40 In the same issue the paper presents a Norwegian-Pakistani cabaret artist who in her TV-shows quite drastically makes Islamic fundamentalists the subject of her satires; she also fights for equal rights for women in migrant communities. As the artist is from a Muslim background the paper is in a way implying that the claim that the cartoon violated religious feelings was not legitimate, Die Zeit, 09.02.06.
4 Conclusion

Germany traditionally has followed the concept of an ethnic nation for decades and has negated its immigration reality. Since the end of the 1990s official migration policies changed as they now aimed to include immigrants and to proactively frame immigration and integration. The amendment of the Citizenship Law and the implementation of the Immigration Act reflect this new stance in migration policies and the concept of belonging. Nevertheless, they may not be interpreted as a comprehensive policy of multiculturalism as they are mainly based on the model of assimilation, meaning that the individual migrant has to adapt to ‘German norms and values’. Following this shift towards an acceptance of multicultural reality public discourse on integration and multiculturalism seems to suffer a setback. The fact that an increasing number of foreigners may gain German citizenship apparently results in a fear of loss of control and evokes a new debate about the criteria of ‘Germanness’ and how to enforce them. Second, evidence of social exclusion of migrants and members of ethnic minorities induced a debate about who is responsible for these phenomena. Third, the conflict between Islam and the Western world contributes to the construction of the “Muslim other” also within German society. Against this background the concept of Leitkultur and ‘Germanness’ as opposed to ‘multiculturalism’ has gained an immense attention.

The analysis of the debate on Necla Kelek’s book revealed the following main issues. First of all, a central question is who is entitled to speak out and who sets the agenda about integration matters. The fact that Necla Kelek and other Islam critics from a migrant and Muslim background gain huge publicity indicate their instrumentalisation by mainstream politics, the more so as they agree with the criticism. Protagonists of a multicultural society seem to be forced onto the defensive. Likewise the question of who is responsible for social exclusion of migrants is predominately answered by blaming the individual Muslim migrants and the alleged multiculturalist actors. Protagonists of a multicultural society are depicted as both powerful and dangerous as they would accept the violation of human rights by Muslims. In the analysed discourse the critics of multiculturalism even regarded the approach to get into dialogue with Islamists as fully supporting their viewpoints. The only solution to deal with cultural diversity is seen in formulating a fixed framework of conditions that migrants have to fulfil. This framework refers to the constitutional norms and values and the German language. On the other hand in the case of Kelek’s book her critics seem to not admit any questioning of arguments which were stated in the past in the name of multiculturalism. The responsibility for social exclusion is almost exclusively assigned to discriminatory structures respectively German society and the state.

The debate about Kelek’s book, multiculturalism and Muslim migrants reflects a shift of formerly marginal standpoints into the centre of the discourse. Culturalist and generalising arguments had been assigned to a subaltern or even right-wing discourse in the past. Today, uttering similar arguments is regarded as ‘plain-talking’ and ‘taboo breaking’. 41 Expressed by ‘authentic’ migrants, feminists and liberals these standpoints have reached the dominant discourse and do not need further explanation whereas claims for differentiated reflection are viewed as illegitimate, dangerous and assigned to the subaltern discourse.

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41 See also the book by Henryk M. Broder, prominent Islam critic, journalist and author of books about Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. Broder claims that Germans were “delighted to capitulate” to the demands of Muslims and quotes – indirectly approving – a very aggressive text directed against Muslims in Denmark which was published in the internet during the Danish cartoon affair (Broder 2006: 35/36).
The reception of the Danish cartoon affair reflected on the one side the conviction of the incompatibility of Islam and Western values and even the threat of Islam, on the other side the attempt to contextualise the conflict. In most cases German newspapers identify themselves with ‘European and Western values of freedom and individualism’, constructing a seemingly homogenous entity which is opposed to ‘Islamic tradition, suppression and fanaticism’. In terms of the reference on ‘Muslims in the own society’ the notion of internal harmony is noticeable, especially seen against the background of the findings on the Kelek debate. Apparently, in the context of an international debate many protagonists deemed it necessary to express a general vision or hope that ‘German Muslims’ were moderate and German society, in civic and political terms, mature enough to avoid such a conflict arising in the country. Nevertheless, also in the discussion on the cartoon affair the aforementioned standpoints on multiculturalism and integration were reiterated by some authors.

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Appendix: List of analysed articles

Abbreviations:

FAZ  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FR  Frankfurter Rundschau
TAZ  die tageszeitung
SZ  Süddeutsche Zeitung

Chapter 2, The debate on the book by Necla Kelek, “Die fremde Braut” (The strange/foreign bride)

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<td>2006-02-01</td>
<td>Die Welt</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/karikaturenstreit/060208.jhtml">http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/karikaturenstreit/060208.jhtml</a> (accessed 17.01.07)</td>
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<td>Islamische Verbände verurteilen Gewalt. Mehr Bemühungen für Integration angemahnt</td>
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