



Diplomatic scramble: Greek foreign policy towards Libya

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Summary


- Libya became a country of immediate interest to Greece following its 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey.
- Greece engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity in the aftermath of the MoU, both within Libya and the wider region, to counter Turkey's momentum with Tripoli.
- The complex political situation in Libya and its many facets (proxy conflicts between regional and international players, competition for energy resources, and other factors including religion) compound the difficulties confronting Greek efforts to shield Greece's interests.
- European division over Libya has led Greece to seek other bilateral approaches, primarily through cooperation with France and Egypt.
- Turkey's attempts to normalize relations with its regional interlocutors (primarily Egypt, Israel and Greece) following the devastating earthquake that struck the country in February 2023 may yet change conditions on the ground in Libya, though it is still too early to tell.

Introduction

In November 2019, the Tripoli-based Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), one of two competing forces in the country, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey which delimited a proposed maritime boundary between the two countries and set out an agreement over their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Mediterranean.

The agreed boundary, which runs from “Point A (34° 16′ 13.720″N—026° 19′ 11.640″E) to Point B (34° 09′ 07.9″N -026° 39′ 06.3″E)”¹ proved very controversial, since the EEZ resulting from the proposed border included an area to the immediate south of Crete and the Dodecanese, using basepoints on the Turkish and Libyan coasts to determine the median while ignoring the intervening Greek islands.

However, despite the widespread international condemnation of the agreement, it was still a rude wake-up call for Greece.



Map released by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs illustrating the EEZ arising from the 2019 Turkish-Libyan MoU and how it ignores the intervening Greek islands and their territorial waters and thereby violates Greek sovereign rights.

Source: Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²

Greece and the Republic of Cyprus immediately condemned the MoU as a violation of their maritime rights, their sovereignty, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (which Turkey is not party to). Several countries in the region followed suit, and the European

¹https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/Turkey_11122019_%28HC%29_MoU_Libya-Delimitation-areas-Mediterranean.pdf

² Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/maps/en/map13.pdf>

Union stated that: “The 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states”.³

However, despite the widespread international condemnation of the agreement, it was still a rude wake-up call for Greece. Greek diplomatic efforts in Libya had been limited since 2014, when it suspended the operation of its embassy (as did many other countries at the time, including the United States) following a new round of violence between the country’s warring factions.

Greece, viewing the MoU as a direct challenge and threat to its own security and goals, was now forcibly pushed to take an active role in an extremely complex and sensitive region.

In the five years between the evacuation of its embassy and the MoU, Greek efforts in the Mediterranean had focused on cultivating strong bilateral relations with Egypt and Israel to form a counterweight to an increasingly tense situation with Turkey in the Aegean; Greece had identified that both countries’ relations with Turkey were particularly tense throughout this period and utilized that fact.⁴

With Ankara left out of the nascent EastMed Gas Forum in 2019 and thus the wider energy conversations in the region (most notably the proposed EastMed pipeline), it was perhaps to be expected that Turkey would look for an ally in the region and expand beyond the narrow geopolitical definitions and confines of the Eastern Mediterranean, in which it perceived an unfavourable balance of power.

As a result of Turkey’s active diplomacy in Libya and its subsequent military intervention, Greece, viewing the MoU as a direct challenge and threat to its own security and goals, was now forcibly pushed to take an active role in an extremely complex and sensitive region. Navigating the situation in Libya unsurprisingly proved to be no easy task, with Greece scrambling to counter Turkey’s momentum by closely aligning with Egypt.

It is worth noting that this back-and-forth between Athens and eastern Libya occurred while Haftar’s hard-fought push to capture Tripoli was underway.

A brief overview of events

In response to the MoU, Greece expelled the Libyan Ambassador to Athens, Mohamed al-Menfi, on December 6, 2019, a move that was met with outrage by both the GNA and Turkey. Less than a week later, Greece extended an invitation to the Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh Issa, to visit Athens; based in Tobruk in the east of the country, Issa was aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in opposition to the GNA. During his visit, he condemned the MoU and stated that the GNA did not have the legal authority to sign it.

The flurry of Greek diplomatic activity aimed at building bridges with the forces in eastern Libya continued when, just weeks after the ambassador’s expulsion, on December 22, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias travelled to Benghazi to meet with Haftar, who would in turn visit Athens in January 2020. Following the meeting, Dendias stated that Haftar had agreed that the MoU was null and void.⁵ It is worth noting that this back-and-forth between Athens and eastern Libya occurred while Haftar’s hard-fought push to capture Tripoli was underway.

Haftar’s visit to Athens took place just days before the Berlin International Conference on Libya. Chancellor Angela Merkel invited the warring factions and several regional and

³ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/t%C3%BCrkiye/libyat%C3%BCrkiye-statement-spokesperson-reported-agreement-hydrocarbons_en

⁴ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/24/turkey-greece-eastern-mediterranean-diplomacy/>

⁵ <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/minister-of-foreign-affairs-nikos-dendias-statement-following-his-meeting-with-the-commander-of-the-libyan-national-army-field-marshal-khalifa-haftar-athens-17-january-2020.html>

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international powers, including Turkey and Egypt, to travel to the German capital to formulate a framework for the cessation of hostilities. Greece had asked to participate in the meeting, but was not invited by the hosts on the ground that Greece was not immediately implicated in the conflict.

Among the outcomes of the first Berlin Conference was the decision to maintain the arms embargo established by the United Nations Security Council in 2011. In March 2020, this was followed by the launch of the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI, with the active participation of the Hellenic Navy, with a view to its enforcing the embargo. The operation has not been without incident: Malta withdrew in May 2020 and there have been several run-ins between IRINI patrols and Turkish vessels bound for Libya. These included a serious incident between a French frigate and Turkish warships, with France stating that the Turkish vessels' behaviour towards the IRINI patrol was "hostile and aggressive".⁶

This revival has once again led to tension between Greece and Libya, with Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias calling the agreement a threat to regional stability.

The collapse of Haftar's offensive in June 2020, the result in no small part of military intervention by Turkish forces, led to a rapid shift in the Libyan landscape. Various peace initiatives followed, with an official ceasefire declared in October 2020 that called for elections to be held in December 2021. In the build-up to December 2021, Greece was left out in the cold once again at the second Berlin Conference, but did participate in a French-led conference in Paris.

Greece also pursued improved bilateral relations with the provisional Government of National Unity of Libya (GNU, set up to guide the country to elections), with Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis visiting Tripoli in April 2021 to re-open the Greek embassy. While in Libya, Mitsotakis met with Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and urged him to scrap the MoU with Turkey.

However, since then, there has been a swift downturn in relations between the countries. The elections scheduled for December 2021 have been postponed, and Dbeibeh's caretaker government remains in power in Tripoli. This has led to a severe political crisis, with Fathi Bashagha appointed by parliament as a parallel prime minister based in Sirte. An attempt by Bashagha to seize Tripoli by force in August 2022 was beaten back by supporters of Dbeibeh.

Then, in October 2022, Dbeibeh revived the Turkish-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding after signing a series of economic agreements with Turkey, including potential energy exploration by Turkish companies in waters claimed by Libya in the agreement. This revival has once again led to tension between Greece and Libya, with Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias calling the agreement a threat to regional stability.

This culminated in Dendias' dramatic departure from Tripoli after he was met by Dbeibeh's foreign minister, Najla Mangoush: Dendias refused to disembark from his plane, stating that he had been taken by surprise at the airport, having made it clear he would only meet with Menfi, the former ambassador to Athens and now chairman of the Libyan Presidential Council. In response, Libya recalled its ambassador from Athens and summoned the Greek chargé d'affaires to protest at Dendias' conduct.

⁶ <https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-security-france-turkey-idAFP6N2D207G>


Looking beyond the Greek-Turkish prism in an internationalized proxy conflict

Turkey's policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in particular its pursuit of the "Mavi Vatan" maritime doctrine, is perceived in Athens as an existential threat. Turkey's repeated dispute of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean, both in regard to the longstanding *casus belli* on the expansion of Greek territorial waters as well as the frequent challenging of Greek sovereignty over the islands of the Dodecanese, in tandem with the bellicose rhetoric employed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who threatened war against Greece on numerous occasions until the disastrous earthquake of February 2023 led to a softening of his stance, are not taken lightly and are at the forefront of most Greek officials' thinking.

As a result, most Greek foreign policy is primarily determined through the prism of how it will affect the balance of power in the Aegean. This same criterion also largely guides Greek interpretations of regional developments; this is exemplified by Greece's response to the recent rapprochement between Israel and Turkey. This has even led to claims that Greece is a "self-obsessed" ally,⁷ colouring how foreign analysts receive Greek intentions. Additionally, this narrow, and often binary, interpretation of events can also significantly constrain Greece's response to complex regional situations.

This could be detrimental to Greece's efforts in Libya, which is now at the epicentre of several different and overlapping international rivalries and conflicts as a result of the civil strife and domestic instability in the country.

Most Greek foreign policy is primarily determined through the prism of how it will affect the balance of power in the Aegean.



Map depicting the balance of power between the competing factions in Libya following the LNA's failed push towards Tripoli in 2020, but before Bashagha's push in the summer of 2022 that shored up GNU control of the capital.

Source: War On the Rocks⁸

⁷ <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/82643>

⁸ <https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/a-dysfunctional-peace-how-libyas-fault-lines-were-redrawn/>

Control of Libya's bountiful energy resources by Yevgeny Prigozhin's forces is a source of consternation for many in Europe and the United States.

The most important of these is the continued presence of units belonging to the Russian Wagner Group private military company within Haftar's forces in eastern Libya. Wagner Group fighters were an integral part of Haftar's push towards Tripoli, and they maintained an active presence after his retreat along the Sirte to Al Jufrah line that largely divides the country.⁹

Within the framework of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis, control of Libya's bountiful energy resources by Yevgeny Prigozhin's forces is a source of consternation for many in Europe and the United States.¹⁰ Through its support of Haftar, Russia has gained the ability to limit the supply of Libyan oil to Europe at a time when it was wrestling with an emerging energy crisis as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. In an attempt to further pressure European economies ahead of the winter, Russia played an important role during the Libyan oil blockade in 2022.¹¹

To a large extent, this was the issue that prompted the surprise visit to Libya of CIA Director William Burns, who sought to achieve a full pull-out of Russian forces from the country's oil-producing facilities.¹² The failure of the US to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in Libya is indicative of the fact that, irrespective of the situation on the ground in Ukraine, which could be seen as a hindrance to Russia's control over Libya, a broader diplomatic consensus between regional players is required to change the status quo that has held since Haftar's failed Tripoli offensive.¹³

A second facet of the situation in Libya is the rivalry between Italy and France over control of Libya's energy resources. The fierce competition between Italy's ENI and France's Total, and their control over energy resources, mirrors the political support provided by their respective nations to Libya's domestic players, with ENI maintaining a strong presence in the west of the country and Italy supporting the Tripoli government, and Total controlling the east of Libya with French providing political and military support to Haftar.¹⁴

This has exacerbated tensions between the French and Italian governments, with Libya souring relations on several occasions.¹⁵ Italian officials have regularly pointed to France's policy towards Libya as a significant factor in the country's instability,¹⁶ while a French-led conference in 2017 was seen in Rome as an attempt to impose a French agenda and sidestep Italy's diplomatic efforts.

The recent eight-billion-dollar gas deal signed in the presence of Italy's Georgia Meloni and Dbeibeh is a direct result of Italy's competition with France and was seen in Greece as a troubling development, since it legitimizes the Tripoli government and its right to sign international agreements.¹⁷ Both Greece and Dbeibeh's rivals within Libya claimed, in the aftermath of the revival of the Turkish MoU in October, that the Tripoli government lacked the authority to sign international agreements; however, the ENI deal was widely seen to have scuppered this argument. This was certainly the view taken by the Turkish media following the announcement of the deal.

⁹ <https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/the-pendulum-how-russia-sways-its-way-to-more-influence-in-libya/>

¹⁰ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/wagner-group-libya-oil-russia-war/>

¹¹ <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/bargains-and-blackmail-economic-side-libyas-political-crisis-35663>

¹² <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/takeaways-william-burns-surprise-visit-libya>

¹³ <https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/libyas-fragile-deadlock/>

¹⁴ <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/italy-france/>

¹⁵ <https://insidearabia.com/libya-battleground-for-french-italian-conflicts-of-interest/>

¹⁶ <https://www.france24.com/en/20180904-libya-elections-italy-france-salvini-macron-sarkozy-diplomacy>

¹⁷ <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562254253/provlima-oi-symfonies-romis-tripolis/>

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A third important dimension of the current situation in Libya is religion, with both Islamist militants and political Islam important factors to consider. Religion explains why Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has long been one of the main benefactors of Haftar's forces in the east: Sisi sees them as a bulwark against the Islamist fundamentalist groups, including Islamic State, which have targeted him since the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and the violent crackdown that followed. Sisi and Haftar are also united in their opposition to political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, which in turn had strong links to the GNA Tripoli government.¹⁸ This clash has also drawn in other important regional players, including Turkey, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁹

Additionally, Libya is increasingly becoming an important factor in Europe's security architecture. Apart from the possibility of Russian influence in yet another Mediterranean country (following its intervention in Syria), both Turkey and Russia have relied on Syrian fighters to bolster their ranks in the country. Even if a peaceful solution is found, their presence could serve as a destabilizing factor for both Europe and the Sahel, since Libya could become a hub for terrorist activity.²⁰

Finally, Libya is also an important stop en route for migrants and refugees looking to move from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. This is of particular concern to Italy, where most of the vessels which disembark from Libya sail to. Italy has thus reaffirmed a controversial deal with Dbeibeh's government to limit the flow of migrants to Europe, thereby officially recognizing his government as the best guarantor of its border security.²¹ This is particularly important to Meloni's right-wing government, which campaigned heavily on an anti-immigration platform.

For Greece, the Turkish-Libyan MoU may form an existential threat, but for the international community it is only one chapter in a much larger problem.

This is yet another serious bone of contention between France and Italy, best exemplified by the political spat that followed Italy's preventing the "Ocean Viking" from disembarking 230 migrants in November 2022.²²

All the above illustrate the political and diplomatic minefield which faces any actor which involves itself in Libya. For Greece, the Turkish-Libyan MoU may form an existential threat, but for the international community it is only one chapter in a much larger problem.

Greece, which is primarily seeking to counter Turkish unilateral actions in the Mediterranean by appealing to the international community (primarily the United States and the European Union), may therefore face difficulties in presenting its problems as part of the wider conflict in Libya. Consequently, it will most likely be unable to cherry-pick an approach or proposed solution that will further Greek interests without fully engaging in the broader regional and global issues and disputes that have come to dominate Libyan affairs.

A divided Europe fuels Greece's search for allies

The lack of a strong American presence in Libya, and the disunity displayed within the European Union, has led Greece to look elsewhere in the region for allies. Whether it is due to the aforementioned tension between France and Italy, or more generally to the unilateral initiatives of EU states that make a consensus hard to achieve, or to the EU's aversion to fully

¹⁸ <https://www.iemed.org/publication/libya-a-failed-state-in-the-middle-of-the-mediterranean/>

¹⁹ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-uae-is-making-a-precarious-shift-in-its-libya-policy-heres-why/>

²⁰ <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/82240>

²¹ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italy-forges-pact-on-gas-migrants-with-libya/>

²² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63582122>

committing to a hard power approach, which could also be due to the tremendous economic cost this would entail, the European Union has primarily followed a soft power approach to Libya.²³

In a conflict dominated by actors who do not share the EU's reluctance, or inability, to fully pursue a hard power approach, this has significantly impeded the European Union's ability to affect developments.

The EU may no longer be only the “virtuous soft power” which High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell and Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton said was no more, and it may no longer be “conciliatory, if not naïve”,²⁴ but the many difficulties faced while enforcing the mandate of the IRINI mission show that the EU's hard power evolution is still facing some teething problems.²⁵ In a conflict dominated by actors who do not share the EU's reluctance, or inability, to fully pursue a hard power approach, this has significantly impeded the European Union's ability to affect developments.

In addition to diplomatic efforts within the framework of the EU and to safeguard its security, Greece's recent diplomatic efforts in Europe have focused on strengthening its alliance with President Emmanuel Macron's France. The signing of a bilateral Franco-Greek defence agreement in 2021, which includes a mutual defence clause, as well as the procurement of French Rafale fighter jets and FDI frigates, has brought the two countries much closer in recent years. Even before the agreement was ratified, in the summer of 2020 when relations between Greece and Turkey were close to breaking point, France dispatched its “Tonnerre” helicopter carrier to the Aegean and strengthened its military presence in the region in moves which were perceived to be part of a wider showdown between France and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The military and diplomatic alliance with France, the backbone of Europe's hard power, has been vital for Greece, but this close relationship has affected Greece's diplomatic standing with factions in Libya.

The interests of Greece and France also align in one other area: their choice of regional partners— specifically Egypt and the UAE. This allowed for the formation of a loose bloc, specifically before Turkish efforts to affect a rapprochement with the two countries. This was most evident in the support provided by all four (France, UAE, Egypt, and Greece) to Haftar in his push to capture Tripoli in 2020.

The military and diplomatic alliance with France, the backbone of Europe's hard power, has been vital for Greece, but this close relationship has affected Greece's diplomatic standing with factions in Libya and some countries in the European Union. Most obviously, it means that Greece is now firmly seen as part of the French ‘camp’ in Europe; this may explain why Germany repeatedly snubbed Greece at the Berlin Conferences. It also may explain why Italy disregarded Greece's position in relation to diplomatic recognition of Dbeibeh's government in Tripoli.

Egypt is another of Greece's strategic partners in the region. In the summer of 2020, Greece signed a maritime treaty with Egypt which delimited their respective EEZs and was widely seen as a rebuff of the Turkey-Libya MoU; the two nations subsequently expanded on the treaty with a second MoU on aeronautic and maritime search and rescue in November 2022. Additionally, in December 2022, Cairo decided to unilaterally demarcate its maritime border with Libya in a move which Greece celebrated as an additional condemnation of the Turkish-Libyan MoU.²⁶

Egypt's moves to diplomatically delegitimize the Dbeibeh government in international fora, most notably by withdrawing from a session of the Arab League chaired by Mangoush in

²³ <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eu-insignificant-player-libya>

²⁴ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/united-resilient-and-sovereign-europe-thierry-breton_en

²⁵ <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/operation-irini-can-no-longer-naive-eu-tame-libyan-conflict-27128>

²⁶ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-just-seized-part-of-libyas-maritime-zone-whats-the-story-behind-the-egyptian-decree-no-one-is-talking-about/>

September 2022, along with its public condemnation of the MoU and efforts to revive it in the autumn of 2022, were also seen as positive developments in Greece. In many ways, Egypt has been Greece's most effective regional partner in countering the Turkish-Libyan MoU, which has also led to a strengthening of ties between the two countries' militaries by means of several bilateral agreements.

Tribal politics, Islamist militias and energy resources are all defining features of the situation in Libya; of course, they are also the trifecta of issues the United States and Europe have been trying to solve since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Conclusion

Greece's actions in Libya constitute a diplomatic scramble to find friends and influence results in a treacherous part of the world in order to counter the momentum Turkey have achieved by developing a close relationship with successive Tripoli governments. Tribal politics, Islamist militias and energy resources are all defining features of the situation in Libya; of course, they are also the trifecta of issues the United States and Europe have been trying to solve since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Expecting Greek officials to find an optimal solution to a problem that has stumped so many other governments would be unrealistic.

The recent thaw in Turkey's relations with its regional neighbours following the disastrous earthquakes of February 2023 may yet change the situation on the ground. The apparent détente between Greece and Turkey after years of tension brought about by the former's response to the disaster has even led to their agreeing to support each other's candidacies for positions in international organizations.

At the same time, Egypt and Turkey are also on a normalization trajectory. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu travelled to Cairo, the first visit by a Turkish FM to the Egyptian capital in more than a decade, to meet with his counterpart Sameh Shoukry, who in the aftermath of the earthquake had made the first visit by an Egyptian foreign minister to Turkey since the fall of Morsi. The two men even discussed and hinted at the restoration of bilateral ties at the ambassadorial level.²⁷ A rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey would undoubtedly have important ramifications for the situation on the ground in Libya.

However, considering the upcoming elections in Turkey as well as the volatility of its current government, it is still too early to decisively declare an end to the tense situation in Libya. To this end, it is crucial that the European Union takes advantage of the situation and seeks to play a more active role in ensuring the interests of its member-states in the region.

The root of Greece's problem in pursuing a Libyan policy that seeks to secure its sovereign rights and ensure a stable partnership with the country, lies in the European Union's ineffectiveness at finding a minimum consensus in the foreign policy goals of its member states, and in projecting a united front that can impact on its neighbourhood in a constructive way. The EU has been outmanoeuvred by Turkey and Russia, which have forged a modus vivendi in the country which is similar to their arrangements in Syria and the Caucasus;²⁸ the bloc has also found itself playing a supporting role to the security concerns of Egypt and the UAE, rather than setting its own security agenda.

Overall, the European Union was mostly unable to react as the situation in Libya spiralled out of control. It is therefore natural that Greece should also look beyond the confines of the

Overall, the European Union was mostly unable to react as the situation in Libya spiralled out of control. It is therefore natural that Greece should also look beyond the confines of the European Union to address its concerns.

²⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/top-egyptian-turkish-diplomats-hold-talks-cairo-amid-improving-ties-2023-03-18/>

²⁸ <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/%CF%80%CF%8E%CF%82-%CE%B7-%CE%B5%CE%B5-%CE%B7%CF%84%CF%84%CE%AE%CE%B8%CE%B7%CE%BA%CE%B5-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7-%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%B2%CF%8D%CE%B7/>

European Union to address its concerns, relying on its bilateral relations with Egypt, the UAE and France to form a countermovement to Turkey's successes in western Libya.

Unless the European Union can establish a consensus in formulaing a policy towards Libya, and by extension towards the activities of Turkey and Russia in the country, or unless the United States decides to actively engage in the country once more, it is likely that Greece's foreign policy vis-a-vis Libya will remain reactive. With little scope for action and heavily reliant on its strategic partners, Greece will likely continue to focus on its immediate security concerns.

While it should be borne in mind that Greece is a small player in a volatile region, with little to offer in terms of expeditionary hard power or economic assistance to a country that has been struggling for more than a decade, it can still leverage its diplomatic standing with its partners—primarily France, Egypt, and potentially the United States—should it choose to actively engage in Libya with a view to affecting change.

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