



MIGRATION

## Explaining immigration restrictions using a sequential path dependency model

**Emmanuel COMTE**

*Senior Research Fellow, Ariane Condellis*

*European Programme*



July 2022

Working Paper #119/2022

# Explaining immigration restrictions using a sequential path dependency model

Copyright © 2022 | All Rights Reserved  
HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP)  
49, Vasilissis Sofias Ave., 10676, Athens, Greece  
Tel.: +30 210 7257 110 | Fax: +30 210 7257 114 | [www.eliamep.gr](http://www.eliamep.gr) | [eliamep@eliamep.gr](mailto:eliamep@eliamep.gr)

*ELIAMEP encourages open, pluralistic dialogue based on arguments and facts. The views expressed by associates of ELIAMEP are entirely their own and are not binding on the Institution.*

## **Emmanuel COMTE**

*Senior Research Fellow, Ariane Condellis European Programme*

***Acknowledgements:** The author would like to thank the participants in the workshop held at ELIAMEP in February 2022 to discuss recent advances in the field of historical political economy of relevance to immigration restrictions. These were, first and foremost, Vasiliki Fouka, who helped bring together such an outstanding group of scholars, including Ran Abramitzky, Donghyun Danny Choi, Nikhar Gaikwad and Marco Tabellini. Spyros Blavoukos and Loukas Tsoukalis also took part in the workshop. His thanks, too, to Spyros Blavoukos and George Pagoulatos for their comments on the draft, as well as Ariane Condellis, whose generous donation to ELIAMEP has been crucial to this research.*

## Abstract

This paper analyses immigration restrictions by discussing major recent debates of historical political economy and proposing a new explanatory model. The conclusions in recent research on the subject of immigration restrictions converge in highlighting the natives' fear of economic costs as a potent factor in immigration restrictions, despite evidence proving that actual costs are small and circumscribed, while the aggregate impact of immigration is generally positive. This paper develops existing scholarship to explain the magnitude of current immigration restrictions in Europe and North America by proposing a sequential path dependency model based on both historical insights and the insights of institutionalist theories of path dependence. In this model, the fears of adverse economic effects held by specific segments of the national workforce interact with a power structure dominated by the state and with the agency of union leaders and policymakers initiating a series of policy cycles that lead to complete restrictions on low-skilled immigration.

## Introduction

Restricting immigration has been one of the most prominent policy objectives in Europe for several years and it will remain so for the foreseeable future. Even the recent welcome extended to Ukrainian refugees, whom EU states have pledged to support, only took place because the latter perceived a vital security interest in supporting Ukraine (Council of the European Union 2022). EU states had reservations about extending such a welcome, and tensions have emerged in Europe over Ukrainian refugees, who are, like other refugees, still considered a 'problem' (Politico 2022). This paper's contribution lies in its analysis of various instances of immigration restrictions in the twentieth century to offer a theoretical overview of their causes and thus to improve policymaking. It starts by discussing the outcomes of recent scientific debates and then proposes a sequential path dependency model, showing a series of restrictive policy cycles, to explain why restrictions have become the default option in the European policy arena.

Five points are critical for our understanding of immigration restrictions: First, the fear among natives of immigration-related economic costs has been a potent factor underlying restrictions. Second, actual costs are limited, the overall economic impact of immigration is positive, and immigration restrictions do not produce benefits. Third, the right way to get to the heart of the problem is not to look at cultural factors, which are simply a way to justify other concerns. The right way is, fourth, to consider the effects of state intervention; the way politicians, state officials and union leaders orchestrate fears; and the sequential way in which immigrants are rejected by means of a series of inadequate policy responses with a path dependency from one to another. Fifth, solving the immigration predicament in Europe and the United States requires an overhaul of political institutions aimed at reducing state intervention and representing immigrants better.

## The formation of economic preferences on immigration

Individuals form their preferences on immigration, as they do for trade, by following their perceived individual economic self-interest rather than country-level economic considerations; in the jargon of political economy, they take egocentric rather than sociotropic considerations into account. As Lena Maria Schaffer and Gabriele Spilker have concluded: their 'results ... cannot support the conclusion that individuals are sociotropic in their ... preference formation, but rather show that models regarding individual preference formation based on egocentric benefits and (especially) costs may provide a more accurate picture' (Shaffer and Spilker 2019, 1286).

Following their economic self-interest on immigration, natives are reluctant to integrate poor immigrants into income redistribution schemes, as they fear that they will themselves receive lower benefits or pay higher costs as a result. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the United States received 30 million immigrants from Europe. The research conducted by Marco Tabellini has found that, during this period: 'cities cut public goods provision and taxes in response to immigration'. Natives were less ready to pay taxes to fund public spending, especially where 'poorer immigrants would get larger implicit transfers' (Tabellini 2019, 457).

Likewise, lower-skilled native workers fear competition for jobs and wages, or other negative effects on their professional prospects, and support immigration restrictions (Goldin 1994). Numerous studies have tried to measure the effects of immigration on employment or wages. What they have shown is that, while immigration may have a negative impact on some natives' employment levels and earnings, this impact is hard to measure. This is because care is needed to disentangle the downward impact immigration may have for highly substitutable lower-skill groups from immigration's generally positive impact on the economy overall. When George Borjas conducted the main study that identified a downward effect on lower-skill groups' wages nearly twenty years ago, he constructed skill categories and isolated variations in wages for each of them (Borjas 2003). Approaches considering entire economic sectors or cities generally show no negative effect on wages stemming from immigration (Card 1990).

In the same vein, there is some evidence that those native workers who are most exposed to immigration may not benefit from immigration restrictions in terms of better employment opportunities or higher earnings. In 1921 and 1924, the United States implemented national origins quotas to restrict immigration from Europe. The system resulted in a sharp decline in the number of immigrants admitted to the country. Recent research has compared the evolution of wages after the quotas came into force in the areas that had been most exposed to immigration beforehand with the evolution of wages in other areas; it has found no distinct increase in the former relative to the latter (Abramitzky et al. 2022). This is because, in urban areas, internal migrants and immigrants from Mexico and Canada replaced European immigrants, while, in the countryside, farmers shifted to capital-intensive agriculture through mechanisation and the immigrant-intensive mining industry contracted. In more recent decades, the off-shoring of low-skilled tasks to lower-income countries has similarly prevented immigration restrictions from increasing natives' wages in higher-income countries.

To sum up, natives' perceived economic self-interest regarding labour market competition, taxation and public spending has supported immigration restrictions, and this despite wage or employment costs being small and restricted to lower-skill groups, the overall economic impact being positive, and restrictions to immigration not leading to higher wages.

## The status of stances that reject immigrants on cultural or phenotypical grounds

If the actual economic costs are limited and there are no tangible economic benefits to restricting immigration for those workers who are most likely to experience costs because of immigration, should it not be assumed that immigration restrictions have other causes than egocentric economic considerations? First, costs are more powerful than benefits in shaping individual preferences (Schaffer and Spilker 2019). Circumscribed costs create strong anti-immigration feelings, while the beneficiaries of immigration in the economy do not develop clear policy preferences. A small but determined anti-immigration lobby can thus influence policies. Second, fears alone are powerful drivers: it is not necessary for a threat to translate into actual costs for serious reactions against it to be observed. Costs simply need to have a degree of likelihood to trigger fears; they do not need to come into effect.

In a series of strikes against the hiring of foreigners in the French merchant navy in the early 1970s, there was a serious discrepancy between the fears of French sailors and the reality of the threat (Comte 2018). Even though the number of foreign sailors who were likely to be hired was negligible, and the downward pressure on wages proved to be non-existent, French sailors' powerful fears led to several strikes and the French Parliament supporting legislation restricting the hiring of foreign sailors. Even though actual economic costs are circumscribed and small, egocentric economic factors still underpin support for immigration restrictions through fears.

What then is the status of the frequent rejections of immigrants on cultural or phenotypical grounds? There is ample evidence that a variety of fears tend to be expressed in cultural terms even though the fundamental driver of rejection is economic. The reason is certainly the obvious immorality of rejecting poor people because of their poverty. Instead, pretending to want to preserve cultural superiority or at least to want to respect cultural incompatibility exposes to fewer criticisms and represents a safer rhetorical way to achieve restrictions (Comte 2021). In the strikes mentioned above, French sailors were keen on claiming that the different habits and ways of living of foreign sailors made cohabitating with them on boats difficult. Such considerations simply helped express positions that were driven, fundamentally, by the fear of downward economic effects. There is little evidence that the rejection of immigrants came from strictly cultural or phenotypical considerations – i.e., those not related to economic fears stemming from the economic profile of immigrants, and not related to problems emerging because of policy restrictions induced by economic fears.

A recent discussion has analysed the cultural dimension in the origins of the quota system in the United States, from the 1917 literacy tests through to the *Immigration Act* of 1924. The Dillingham Commission – whose reports influenced the restrictive turn in US immigration policy – focused on assimilability. There were distinctly anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish discourses, along with openly racist stances against southern Europeans and Jews, even though the aggregate economic impact of this

immigration was positive both overall and in the sectors that were most exposed to immigration (Tabellini 2019, 458, 462).

First, as we saw above, measuring the downward pressure on wages triggered by immigration is a difficult enterprise requiring a particular statistical setup, while overall assessments, including those for specific sectors, are generally positive. Second, the pertinent context of the claims favouring Protestant over Catholic immigration in the early-twentieth-century United States was not simply that Protestants formed the majority in the country. A more relevant context relates to the pattern Max Weber was trying to explain at the time: that Protestant countries were richer (Weber 2005 [1905]). Immigrants from Catholic southern and eastern European countries were poorer than immigrants from Protestant countries including Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden. They came with less capital and were less skilled on average. Accordingly, anti-Catholic slogans were a classic case of economic fears being expressed in cultural terms.

Another recent discussion relates to whether, faced with similar levels of economic fear, variations in cultural or phenotypical distance affect the ways in which natives behave towards immigrants (Fouka, Mazumder and Tabellini 2021). The discussion has looked at the inflows of Black Americans from southern states into northern urban centres – the so-called ‘Great Migration’ – and their effects on southern and eastern European immigrants between 1910 and 1930. Both groups of migrants were low-skilled. Here, it could seem that the inflow of Black internal migrants helped white immigrants from Europe integrate better. Indeed, in urban areas with an inflow of Black migrants, such as Detroit, there was an increase in intermarriages and a decrease in residential segregation between immigrants and natives. Immigrants were also more likely to leave the manufacturing sector in those areas and experience upward occupational mobility. These results seem to imply that white immigrants fared better than Black internal migrants when both waves coincided, suggesting that phenotypical considerations could favour certain immigrants over others, given that both groups could represent a similar level of economic threat.

However, from 1914 onwards, the war in Europe triggered a sharp decline in the inflow of southern and eastern Europeans into the United States. The inflow resumed after the war, but only for a few years; by 1924, the quotas had led to a dramatic decline in the number of southern and eastern Europeans who could enter the United States. Thus, the inflow was falling between 1910 and 1930, resulting in the average time spent in the country by the stock of immigrants being high and increasing. In contrast, the inflow of Black internal migrants only began around 1910, which meant that the average time present in northern urban centres remained low for those migrants until 1930. Given that social, residential and occupational mobility correlates positively with the time spent in a destination, one could expect higher levels of mobility among more established European immigrants than recent Black migrants.

Also, as a result both of the war and – still more – the national origins system, immigrants came increasingly from the UK and northern Europe. With more capital and skills, these immigrants integrated better in the United States. This effect compounded that of the time spent in the destination for social, residential, and occupational integration. In addition, Black Americans were internal migrants and US natives. Therefore, statistical results measuring the mix between natives and immigrant foreigners in neighbourhoods were bound to show a lower level of residential segregation in immigrant working-class neighbourhoods, since Black Americans were settling there.

For these different reasons, it is difficult to capture a phenotypical impact on integration that is not related to immigrants' economic profile, in particular to how long they have been in the country.

Furthermore, if the inflow of Black migrants after 1910 had, at least partly, normalised the immigration of white Europeans, why did US lawmakers increasingly move against southern and eastern European immigration in the fifteen years following the onset of the Great Migration, until southern and eastern European immigration was virtually banned? The most striking fact is that they did so despite the serious reduction the war in Europe had already caused for such immigration. Not only did US lawmakers vote for the quotas in a time of declining white inflows, but they also maintained them throughout the period in which Black Americans migrated north. It is only when the Great Migration was almost over, in the mid-1960s, that the national origins system came to an end. That the pressure to restrict European immigration continued well past the start and throughout the duration of the Great Migration suggests that the whiteness of European immigrants did little to normalise their inflow after Black Americans had started moving north in increasing numbers.

Besides the difficulties inherent in finding compelling cases, attempts to highlight fundamentally cultural or phenotypical causes for the rejection of immigrants face another, more general problem: the lack of any stable measure for describing, explaining, and predicting cases of rejections made on cultural or phenotypical grounds. Measuring the cultural or phenotypical distance between groups requires the proposal of a metric for this distance: e.g., skin pigmentation. In the United States in the twentieth century, rejections affected – successively – southern and eastern European immigrants, Black Americans from southern states, and, more recently, Mexican immigrants. As shown above, the arrival of Black Americans did not lead US lawmakers to become more welcoming to white southern or eastern Europeans; indeed, they enacted against the latter the harshest set of restrictive policies in the country's history fourteen years after the onset of the Great Migration. More recently, the pigmentation of Mexicans' skin is no further from the US average than that of East Asians, who have faced fewer restrictions.

Likewise, in the UK in recent decades, the rejection of Christian Poles followed the rejection of Muslim South Asians. In Switzerland, rejections have successively affected Italians and nationals of the former Yugoslavia, without either of the two groups being any further from the Swiss cultural or phenotypical average (Fouka, Mazumder and Tabellini 2021, 28–9). Across time and space, there are no stable pairs of incompatibilities between cultures or phenotypes, and no clear metric for cultural or phenotypical distance that comes with the power to explain and/or predict. As attested to by a range of cases around the world, the capacity to reject migrants based on the most subtle phenotypical or cultural differences is nearly infinite and takes on chaotic forms from a strictly cultural perspective (Fouka, Mazumder and Tabellini 2021, 8, Gaikwad and Nellis, 1129).

If there is no permanent and relevant rule to predict the incompatibility or distance between phenotypes or cultures, it means that such incompatibilities are social constructs aiming to mask other drivers. In contrast, all the cases mentioned above, in which prejudice and rejection moved from one group to another, can be explained by relative economic fears: each time, the newly targeted group had inspired more economic fear than its predecessor. This primary driver associates negative characteristics with phenotypes or cultures. In the case of Black Americans and the national origins system, an additional factor was the state's lower willingness to enact restrictive legislation

against its own nationals, leading to harsh regulations against foreigners specifically. This additional factor leads us to consider a broader set of explanations which include state policies.

## A sequential path dependency model

Even though the relative economic fear generated by different groups remains the best variable to describe, explain, and predict across time and space how, why and whether groups suffer rejections, this single factor still needs to be embedded into a broader model which integrates state policies to explain extensive restrictions imposed on immigrants, such as those in force today at the southern borders of both Europe and the US. This paper's unique contribution lies in its proposal of a sequential path dependency model to explain immigration restrictions. The model relies both on historical insights and on the insights of institutionalist theories of path dependence, according to which a decision creates a lock-in effect and limits the options available in the cycles that follow (Apter 1991, Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992, Orren and Skowronek 1994, Stinchcombe 1997, Immergut 1998, Schwartz 2004, Scharpf 2018, Peters 2019).

The fear of adverse economic effects on natives has connected with a political structure dominated by state power – including the state's instruments of migration-control, taxation, spending, and claim-representation – and the agency of politicians, state officials, and union leaders to initiate a series of immigration-related policy cycles made up of successive problems and responses. This series fed into a sequential process of marginalisation, which ultimately led to magnify the cultural otherness of selected immigrants as the series neared the point of complete rejection.

The first policy problem which starts the series (Problem 1) is the fear of economic costs among highly substitutable lower-skilled national workers. Those workers fear downwards pressure on their wages or prospects when they see destitute outsiders entering their ranks. What national workers want when they support restrictions is not for their income to go up; they do not want their income to go down. For this reason, they may still support restrictions, even if they become aware that these restrictions will not increase their income. The existence of an actor – the state – that claims to have the capacity to restrict immigration on a wide scale and to control employment relationships changes their options when it comes to tackling their fear. In the conflicts surrounding posted workers in the European Union, native workers and their unions called for the state to impose the same wages on posted workers as those paid to local workers – on the implicit assumption that those conditions would render negligible the inflow of posted workers (Comte 2019). The response to Problem 1 which the government adopts is for foreigners (only) to require work permits with set wages, or even national citizenship for certain trades, and to implement border restrictions, including quotas. For citizens and foreigners already in the country or with free movement rights (as is the case for EU posted workers), responses intended to protect the wages of the national workforce consist of increasing minimum wages or regulating wage scales.


In parallel with Problem 1, Problem 2 is the natives' fear that poorer immigrants could become the net beneficiaries of taxation and public spending. This fear is proportional to the level of taxation and public spending. Accordingly, the greater the legitimacy of state economic intervention – as shaped by state institutions of representation – the louder the calls to restrict immigration will be. The response the government adopts to tackle Problem 2 lies in reducing benefits for immigrants,

preventing the immigration of immigrant workers' family members, and reinforcing border restrictions.

The governmental responses to Problems 1 and 2 thus reinforce immigrants' relative poverty and increase the number of immigrants in irregular employment or making irregular stays. In turn, this problem (Problem 3) reinforces Problems 1 and 2: the more immigrants there are in irregular employment or making irregular stays, the more likely they are both to threaten local wages and working conditions and to avoid taxes and generate public spending. Higher statutory wages in response to Problem 1 may also lead firms to offshore low-skilled, labour-intensive production and reinforce the government's resolve to restrict immigration as immigrants' jobs become scarcer. The response the government adopts to Problem 3 is to hunt down immigrants on irregular stays or in irregular employment, deport them, sanction their employers and landlords, strengthen migration controls at borders, and externalise migration controls into transit countries.

As a result of the response to Problem 3, immigrants hide their economic activity or their very presence in the country and live even more marginally to avoid deportation or to keep their irregular jobs. As immigrants avoid the police, they increasingly rely on alternative security organisations. This situation fosters higher rates of criminality among them. As a corollary, this problem (Problem 4) combined with Problem 3 encourages the rise of xenophobic political parties, intensifies racism against immigrants, their social marginalisation, and the discrimination they face when trying to access employment and housing. Problem 4 – criminality among immigrants – and its corollary – xenophobia and racism – reinforce Problem 3: immigrants' irregular existence. The government response to Problem 4 is a policy of complete restrictions on low-skilled immigrants from lower-income countries (a 'zero-immigration' policy) and the widespread use of force to dismantle criminal networks and the irregular economy in immigrant neighbourhoods.

This response to Problem 4 leads to increased politicisation among immigrants as a result of their marginalisation, leading some to radicalism or even terrorism (Problem 5) – e.g., radical Islamism and Islamist terrorism – which reinforce the corollary to Problem 4. The government response to Problem 5 includes affirmative action (which reinforces Problem 2), the militarisation of police forces, and possibly domestic and external military interventions. In Europe, France illustrates the complete series of policy cycles best, starting with lower-skilled workers' movements to protest lower wages in the late 1960s, with some strikes against foreigners specifically, followed by the generalisation of work permits for immigrant foreigners and forced wage increases by the early 1970s, a rise in irregular employment among immigrants coupled with increasingly restrictive immigration policies throughout the 1970s, the growth in immigrant criminality from the late 1970s, a tide of xenophobia and racism with the success of far-right anti-immigration parties in the 1980s, the externalisation of migration controls and the goal of reducing immigration from poor countries to near zero in the 1990s, an unprecedented wave of terrorism in the 2010s, followed by affirmative action policies and an increasing number of military operations in the Sahel to destroy possible external bases for home-grown terrorists over the last decade (Comte 2021b).



In this model, favourable economic conditions can alleviate the original problems and prevent the policy process from moving down through the series of policy cycles. For instance, the fact there was a robust demand for immigrant workers in West Germany in the post-war decades meant that the fear of downward economic effects (Problem 1) was never as strong as it was in France. As a result, the immigration problem in Germany never acquired the dimensions which it has in France. Furthermore, the state's capacity to stop immigration at borders effectively can also preserve political actors from moving down through the series of policy cycles. This was the case in the United States in relation to European immigration in the early twentieth century: because the US is separated from Europe by an ocean, US border authorities could enforce quotas effectively.

In those cases where the series runs through to the end, the model explains the disjunction between the limited effects of the first impetus (i.e., the limited observable downward effects on wages) and the harshness of the final policies. The series also explains by-products in the form of racism or widespread cultural intolerance which, though they do not have the consistency of fundamental drivers, nonetheless display a high degree of correlation with the rejection of immigrants. In this model, the association of negative characteristics with phenotypes or cultural signs is the result not only of initial economic fears, but also of security concerns that emerge as the sequence of restrictive policy cycles is enacted (see also Choi, Poertner and Sambanis 2019).<sup>1</sup>

## Conclusions

To conclude, a series of policy cycles offers a better basis for understanding immigration restrictions than individual factors. In particular, stances expressed in cultural or phenotypical terms are more rhetorical instruments to justify restrictions than fundamental drivers explaining them. They also

<sup>1</sup> In this study of lower interaction levels with women wearing a black hijab – and, therefore, of negative characteristics being associated with the black hijab, which is typical among certain immigrant groups – there is also the question of whether a black hijab is not in itself a signal of religious retreat, meant to limit social interactions.

grow larger across restriction cycles. For instance, when US voters support restrictions on Mexican immigration today, they do not fundamentally reject Mexicans' different culture or phenotype, even though numerous stances suggest this. Rather, they associate this culture or phenotype with a marginality that is itself shaped by restrictions – leading to irregular employment, irregular stays, and increasing the risk of criminality.

That the immigration problem has so often been framed as an issue primarily of cultural intolerance may not be unrelated to the distinct advantages this framing offers the state: It can absolve immigration restrictions of the charge of rejecting the poor because they are poor, which all religions and moral codes consider unethical. It can conceal the responsibility of state policies that have transformed a minor problem into a major predicament. And last but not least, it can justify further state intervention not only to restrict immigration to avoid ethnic conflicts, but also to educate the public about cultural diversity. In practice, state policies have led to rising coercion and to an apparatus of immigration control which dehumanises migrants, parking them in camps in a manner reminiscent of dangerous episodes in recent history (Arendt 2017 [1951], ch. 12, Comte 2021a). As such, these policies represent a danger not only for migrants but also for EU and US natives.

Admittedly, rejections of immigrants and forms of restrictions would still exist without extensive government intervention. Immigrants' relative poverty could trigger racism, and gaps in living standards criminality. There could be spectacular violence against immigrants and local forms of repression. However, those problems would probably not be as serious as they are today. For instance, the spectacular massacre of Italian immigrant workers at Aigues-Mortes in southern France in August 1893 claimed the lives of probably fewer than 20 Italians, compared with the 6,000 who died in the Mediterranean during the recent 2015–2016 migration crisis (Noiriel 2010). Rejections would also be short-lived. As free migration is a powerful instrument for reducing income inequality across countries, the gaps in living standards and immigrants' relative poverty would gradually decline over time.

If the model this paper proposes is correct, and a major part of our current predicament stems from the policy process itself, then any long-term solution will require the reform of political institutions. As the interests of immigrants are routinely suppressed in the policy process of destination countries, one interesting field of research lies in exploring ways in which to integrate immigrants into the process. This lack of integration holds for domestic as well as foreign migrants. A recent study by Nikhar Gaikwad and Gareth Nellis concludes that effective voting rights for immigrants can lead politicians to take up immigrants' interests better (Gaikwad and Nellis 2021, 1144). Over and above moves in this direction, a more complete overhaul of political institutions may be the key to stop any further movement along the path of restrictive policy cycles.

## References

- Abramitzky, Ran, Philipp Ager, Leah Boustan, Elior Cohen, and Casper Worm Hansen. 2022. 'The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets: Lessons from the 1920s Border Closure.' *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.
- Apter, D.A. 1991. 'Institutionalism reconsidered.' *International Social Science Journal* 43: 463–81.
- Arendt, Hannah. 2017 [1951]. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Modern Classics. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Borjas, George J. 2003. 'The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Re-examining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.' *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118: 1335–1374.
- Card, David. 1990. 'The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market.' *ILR Review* 43 (2): 245–257.
- Choi, Donghyun Danny, Mathias Poertner, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2019. 'Parochialism, social norms, and discrimination against immigrants.' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 116 (33): 16274–16279.
- Comte, Emmanuel. 2018. 'Xénophobie en mer: Marins français contre étrangers dans la Communauté européenne, 1971-1975.' *Le Mouvement social* 264(3) (July–September): 41–59.
- Comte, Emmanuel. 2019. 'Promising More to Give Less: International Disputes between Core and Periphery around European Posted Labor, 1955–2018.' *Labor History* 60(6): 749–764.
- Comte, Emmanuel. 2021a. 'The European asylum regime's pre-pandemic coercive trajectory is consolidated.' *Afers internacionals* 129 (December): 131–54.
- Comte, Emmanuel. 2021. 'British-French narratives to restrict immigration from the Global South, 1960s-mid-1980s.' *BRIDGES Working Papers* 1 (November).
- Council of the European Union. Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government, 10 and 11 March 2022, Versailles Declaration. Versailles, 11 March 2022.
- Fouka, Vasiliki, Soumyajit Mazumder, and Marco Tabellini. 2021. 'From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation during the Great Migration.' *The Review of Economic Studies*.
- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. 2021. 'Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India.' *American Political Science Review* 115(4): 1129–1146.
- Goldin, Claudia. 1994. 'The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 1921', in *The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Immergut, E.M. 1998. 'The theoretical core of the new institutionalism.' *Politics & Society* 26: 5–34.
- Noiriel, Gérard. 2010. *Le massacre des Italiens: Aigues-Mortes, 17 août 1893*. Paris: Fayard.

Orren, K., and S. Skowronek. 1994. 'Beyond the iconography of order: notes for a "new" institutionalism.' In L. Dodd and C. Jilson (eds). *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 311–30.

Peters, B.G. 2019. *Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Politico, 'The EU's real refugee policy: Division and delay', 12 May 2022.

Schaffer, Lena Maria, and Gabriele Spilker. 2019. 'Self-interest versus sociotropic considerations: an information-based perspective to understanding individuals' trade preferences.' *Review of International Political Economy* 26 (6): 1266-1292.

Scharpf, F.W. 2018. *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. London: Routledge.

Schwartz, H. 2004. 'Down the Wrong Path: Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and Historical Institutionalism.' Unpublished Manuscript. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Department of Politics.

Steinmo, S., K. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (eds). 1992. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stinchcombe, A.L. 1997. 'On the virtues of the old institutionalism.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 23: 1–18.

Tabellini, Marco. 2019. 'Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from the Age of Mass Migration.' *The Review of Economic Studies* 87 (1):454-486.

Weber, Max. 2005 [1905]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Routledge.