

Research Report - December 2018



GREECE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

**Bilateral cooperation between Athens and Skopje in
the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police):
An assessment of the state of play before and after the
adoption of the Confidence Building Measures (2015)**

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CONTENTS

ABOUT THE SOUTH-EAST EUROPE PROGRAMME.....	4
ABOUT THE AUTHORS	5
ABSTRACT.....	6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	10
PART I – INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS	11
PART II – THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN THE AREA OF JUSTICE FROM 1991 TO 2018.....	14
Introduction.....	14
i. Bilateral cooperation.....	15
ii. Multilateral cooperation.....	19
iii. Examples of judicial cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.....	22
Concluding remarks.....	25
PART III - THE EVOLUTION OF POLICE COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.....	27
A. From 1991 until the adoption of the Confidence Building Measures (2015).....	27
Introduction.....	27
i. The 1990s.....	28
The 1998 Agreement for Police Cooperation.....	29
ii. The period between 2000 and the signing of the CBMs in June 2015.....	30
B. Following the signing of the Confidence Building Measures (June 2015 - October 2018).....	32
i. The signing of the CBMs.....	32
ii. The development of bilateral police cooperation under the impact of the refugee crisis (summer 2015 - March 2016).....	33
iii. The evolution of police cooperation following the end of the refugee crisis (April 2016 - October 2018).....	40
iv. The Prespes Agreement.....	45
Concluding remarks.....	46
CONCLUSIONS.....	48
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	50
Scholarly works	50
Newspaper/ media articles.....	51
Other sources and documents.....	55

APPENDIX I.....	59
The 1995 Interim Agreement.....	59
APPENDIX II.....	61
The 1998 Protocol for Police Cooperation.....	61
APPENDIX III.....	66
Greek law 3157/2003 concerning the ratification of the “Agreement of Stabilization and Association of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the EU”	66
APPENDIX IV.....	67
Official data of the Hellenic Police Headquarters concerning the already signed agreements and protocols for cooperation at a bilateral and a multilateral level.....	67
APPENDIX V.....	71
Bilateral agreements for judicial cooperation in civil and criminal law	71
APPENDIX VI.....	73
Chronology of bi- and multilateral related to enhancing police cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.....	73
APPENDIX VII.....	82
The text of the CBMs agreement between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.....	82

ABOUT THE SOUTH EAST – EUROPE PROGRAMME

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Abstract

This report is the result of research conducted in 2018 at the South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). It focuses on the general issue of bilateral cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, in particular, the new context for this cooperation following the adoption of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in 2015. While its main interest relates to the areas of Home Affairs (police) and Justice (CBM 10), this report raises broader questions regarding the evolution of cooperation between the two countries at a bilateral as well as a multilateral level from the beginning of the 1990s to this date.

Executive Summary

General

This report is the fruit of a research conducted in the course of 2018 by the South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), as part of a project funded by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and co-implemented with the Skopje-based think tank Analytika. The main purpose of the report is to provide an analysis of the evolution of the cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the areas of Home Affairs (police) and Justice, two areas that are included in the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) currently implemented between the two countries (since June 2015). This report follows a previous one published by the South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP in December 2017, which focused on cooperation between the two countries in the areas of EU-funded cross-border projects and higher education, which are also included in the CBMs.

Objectives of the report

The objectives of the research are three-fold: a) to examine the evolution of cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the specific areas of Home Affairs (police) and Justice in the period 1991 to October 2018, two areas of bilateral cooperation that have been largely ignored by research; thus b) to advance a better understanding of the state of bilateral relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and finally c) to draw useful conclusions about the future direction of bilateral cooperation. In other words, this research combines a macroscopic view with a focus on the CBMs' process, which has resulted in increasing the contact and discussions between the two countries with a view to enhancing their cooperation in many areas.

Structure of the report

The report is structured in three parts. **Part 1, the Introduction**, emphasizes the importance of the CBMs (adopted in June 2015) for the revitalization of relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, following a long period (mid-2000s – 2015) of stagnant relations. **Part 2, The evolution of the Cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the area of Justice**, provides a comprehensive analysis on the

evolution of the judicial cooperation between the two countries, such as the legal framework determining cooperation until today and examples of judicial cooperation. **Part 3, The evolution**

of Police Cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of bilateral police cooperation, including a detailed description of all CBM meetings and their specific outcomes related to police cooperation. The **Conclusions** contain the key findings of the report and the **Appendices** provide data such as bilateral agreements and protocols and an extensive chronology of the evolution of police cooperation between the two countries from the late 1990s until the end of 2018.

Key Findings

Our study of the evolution of cooperation between the two countries in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (Police) enables the formulation of broader conclusions about bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Bilateral cooperation was not fully functional due to the name dispute and other related factors. The strongest indication confirming this pattern is the non-ratification by the Greek Parliament of any of the Bilateral Protocols or Memoranda of Understanding signed between the two countries from the mid-1990s up until the adoption of the CBMs in 2015.

On Judicial cooperation:

- The absence of bilateral protocols and agreements regarding judicial cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been counterproductive in the sense that there has been an absence of a specified framework for mutual understanding and limited knowledge of judicial practices and legal systems of each country for the other.
- The name dispute has had a lasting effect on the development of bilateral cooperation in the area of justice. Despite the positive effects of the 1995 Interim Agreement, judicial cooperation depended from 1995 onwards almost exclusively on the multilateral frameworks. Needless to say, these frameworks constitute the cornerstone of this type of cooperation at international level; however, bilateral agreements and protocols can expand and enhance possibilities for rendering judicial cooperation more effective.
- Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the general perception among Greek judges and law practitioners who have been involved in judicial cooperation with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is that the level of judicial cooperation has been “satisfactory” following the 1995 Interim Agreement and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s efforts to integrate itself into regional, European and international frameworks.

- There is widespread expectation that once the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia begins its accession negotiations with the EU, bilateral judicial cooperation will be further enhanced.

On Police cooperation:

- The gradual normalization of relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, beginning in September of 1995, allowed attempts for a more systematic development and organization of police cooperation to take place. Unfortunately however, the name dispute and the fact that all diplomatic efforts at its resolution, whether bilateral or under the aegis of the UN, failed to produce a result cast a long shadow over aspects of bilateral cooperation, especially those involving state agencies, like the police.
- It was mainly through multilateral schemes that police contacts and cooperation developed between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the 2000s, with the two countries benefitting from the international community's growing involvement in the Balkans and its efforts for greater intra-regional integration.
- The signing of the CBMs in June 2015, coinciding with the outbreak of the refugee crisis in the second half of 2015, provided an institutional framework and a strong motivation for growing bilateral police cooperation and contacts. Since the second half of 2015, there has been a series of high-level meetings between the police forces of the two countries, part of the CBM negotiation process, and in particular CBM number 10 on Justice and Home Affairs; but also part of growing regional police cooperation involving, besides Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria as well.
- The dialogue that has taken place in the context of the CBM number 10 has provided "possibilities to develop contacts, increased socialization and eventually building trust between the partners". The two police forces have initiated common training activities, while their cooperation is deepening (involving, for example, exchange of operational information) and expanding (beyond such "traditional areas" as smuggling, human trafficking and drugs) into new areas.
- The Prespes Agreement incorporates the CBMs, promotes closer cooperation in police affairs and civil protection, enumerating a whole range of activities where the two sides should have "close cooperation". A ratification of the agreement will certainly provide a further boost to bilateral relations, including closer police cooperation.

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Part I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS

The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that were adopted in 2015 and are currently implemented between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia include eleven areas of interest: political consultations between Ministries of Foreign Affairs; bilateral dialogue for EU Affairs and strengthening bilateral cooperation in the framework of IPA2 programs; cooperation between the National Center for Public Administration in Athens and the Administration Center in Skopje; Cooperation between universities, research centers and institutes; university scholarships; cultural exchange and cooperation; enhancing economic and trade relations; improving energy/connectivity/gas-lines; improving railway connectivity Bitola-Florina; consultations between representatives of the Ministries of the Interior, border police and customs administration; and cooperation on health issues.¹ The very fact that Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia agreed to the adoption of the CBMs in 2015 underlines the problematic state of bilateral relations between the two countries 20 years following the signing of the Interim Agreement of New York, in September 1995; although the agreement allowed for a noticeable development of bilateral relations, in particular in the economic field where the evolution of economic ties was nothing less than spectacular, many areas of bilateral cooperation remained underdeveloped. Bilateral cooperation, especially involving state-to-state agencies and institutions remained limited and hesitant, as the unresolved “name dispute” exercised a decisive, negative influence over bilateral relations. After 2006 bilateral relations stagnated and even deteriorated due to political developments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Athens’ decision not to consent to an invitation by NATO to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the alliance.

In a previous study² we focused on the evolution of cooperation between the two countries in the context of the EU-funded Interreg/IPA programs and the area of higher education. As was shown, the EU framework has been vital for instituting and maintaining channels of contact and communication in both cases despite the non-resolution of the name dispute and the tension that

¹ For the whole list, see “Strengthening Mutual Confidence and Bilateral Relations, Athens-Skopje,” Skopje, 24 June 2015.

² Yorgos Christidis and Panagiotis Paschalidis, “Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The experience of cooperation in the fields of EU-funded Cross-Border Projects and Higher Education and what does it mean for the future,” ELIAMEP Report, December 2017.

characterized the relations between the two countries. Particularly in the area of higher education, Greece's governmental policies for enhancing cooperation could be described as reluctant. With this study, we aim at broadening our understanding of bilateral cooperation by focusing on the areas of police and justice cooperation.

Police and judicial cooperation can be described as specific types of cooperation; they are performed by the police and judicial authorities of different countries in their effort to respond more efficiently to their duties. In the case of police cooperation, special attention is given to the control of borders, the exchange of information, assistance in the context of criminal investigations and more generally the coordination of intelligence and operational capacities in order to combat organized crime and various types of trafficking. Judicial cooperation, on the other hand, includes issues such as extradition, the procurement/exchange/sending of documents and mutual assistance in the context of investigations. There are numerous factors that, in recent times, have made cooperation in the area of police and justice between different countries a priority. Such factors include *globalization* (as the progressive interdependence or interconnection at political, economic, social and cultural levels), *technological developments* (the rapid growth of information and communication technologies around the internet), *the transnational character of organized crime* and *increased mobility* at individual, group and even population levels (migration, emigration, immigration).³ The 2015 European migration and refugee crisis proved to be such an occasion and from many respects, the Greece's difficulties to manage it forced a re-examination of Greece's level of cooperation with its neighbors and in particular the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁴

As early as 1989, the need for more intensive cooperation at an international level was viewed as an inevitable direction by police and justice officials: "The investigation, prosecution and suppression of crime for the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of peace and public order is an important goal of all organized societies. The pursuit of that goal cannot realistically be confined within national boundaries. That has long been the case, but it is increasingly evident today".⁵ From that perspective and before any other reason, the decision of the governments of

³ Anna Nurzynska, "International cooperation in combating organized crime," *World Scientific News*, 2008, http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.psjd-55b05fb6-304e-4909-ae4e-38c4aa5910ec/c/WSN_106_2018_105-116.pdf (last access on 25.11.2018)

⁴ See Part 3 on police cooperation

⁵ the Supreme Court of Canada (statement of the court in the case *United States of America v. Cotroni*) cited in Kimberly Prost, "International cooperation in combating transnational crime," *Information Exchange Network for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition*, 1998, https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/can/en_can_prost.en.html

Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to include the areas of police and justice in the process of CBMs (2015-2018) corresponds to the nature of contemporary developments. Strengthening cooperation in this field will have an immediate and positive impact on security issues, the rule of law and the effectiveness of justice systems in both countries.

Regarding the structure of study, we followed a chronological order. We began by identifying the main features of police/judicial cooperation between Greece and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was a constituent part of the Yugoslav Federation and one that shared land borders with Greece. Then we examined the evolution of police/judicial cooperation following the declaration of independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in September 1991. Unavoidably the wider political context of relations defined the periods upon which we concentrated our research: the first half of the 1990s; following the signing of the Interim Agreement of New York in September 1995; the post-2006 period with the stagnation/deterioration of bilateral relations that took place. One of the major obstacles that we had to deal with was the lack of literature dealing with the areas of justice and police cooperation between the two countries. In effect, the existing literature on relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has concentrated upon historical/identity issues and the political-economic aspects of that relationship,⁶ while it has ignored aspects of bilateral relations like that of police/judicial cooperation. Another difficulty concerned the subject of our research: both justice and police belong to the core of state institutions and, thus, any attempt to examine the work of police/judicial functionaries and in particular their contacts and cooperation with representatives of a state with which Greece had, until very recently, a serious dispute, was met with strong reservations.

⁶ The literature published in Greece on these aspects of bilateral relations over the last 27 years is extensive. For the historiographic work produced see for example Βασίλης Γούναρης, *Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα από το 19^ο έως τον 21^ο Αιώνα. Ιστοριογραφικές Προσεγγίσεις*, Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, 2010. For diplomatic/economic policy analysis see Ευάγγελος Κωφός, Βλάσης Βλασίδης (ed.), *Αθήνα-Σκόπια. Η Επτάχρονη Συμβίωση (1995-2002)*, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήσης, 2003.

Part II

THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF JUSTICE BETWEEN GREECE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (1991-2018)

Introduction

There are essentially two frameworks of cooperation in the field of justice among different countries: **bilateral** (agreements/protocols between two countries) and **multilateral** (conventions/agreements in the context of an international organization like the UN, the Council of Europe or the EU). Furthermore, this cooperation can be divided into two different types according to the distinct branches of law that it concerns: a) **civil** and b) **criminal**. Most commonly, the terms used to describe cooperation between countries in these areas are *judicial cooperation* and *mutual legal assistance*.⁷ The relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the area of justice fit mainly into the category of multilateral cooperation in the context of the Council of Europe. As it will be shown, this framework, along with all the corresponding conventions, has provided the conditions for a rather sufficient cooperation between the judicial authorities of both countries.

Due to the lack of literature on the matter, we tried to obtain a more systematic understanding of the level and the quality of judicial cooperation between the two countries through a series of interviews with people closely connected to this area: a judge, two administrative judicial officials and a lawyer. The two administrative judicial officials evaluated the cooperation between the two countries as “satisfactory” and “without problems”. According to one: “The cooperation with FYROM can be evaluated as satisfactory in general terms. Greece expedites many documents and the requests for mutual legal assistance per year are around ten”.⁸ A similar evaluation was provided by another interviewee: “The judicial cooperation between the two countries can be considered as acceptable, in general terms, if one takes into account the provisions of the

⁷ The EU, for instance, employs the term *judicial cooperation* in order to refer to both the civil and the criminal branches of law. For more information see: European Parliament, “Fact Sheets on the European Union: Citizens,” accessed 22 November 2018, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/section/202/an-area-of-freedom-security-and-justice>

⁸ Interview with an administrative judicial official, Thessaloniki, 9 November 2018.

conventions that have been signed by both countries and the framework which determines this cooperation".⁹

But another interviewee provided a different evaluation:

There are some issues but not of a political character. I believe that the problem relates to a certain lack of knowledge and information about the legal framework applied in FYROM. Greek judges should become more aware of the adjustments that FYROM has made in terms of integrating the international and European legal frameworks. There are some cases where the decisions - while not wrong with regard to the legal substance - failed to refer to the already existing legislation that FYROM has incorporated and [which] should be taken into consideration. The problem is that there are not a lot of cases and not many Court rulings, as it happens with other countries, like Germany or Russia, something which enables a more complete knowledge of the legal framework and jurisprudence from a bilateral aspect.¹⁰

Despite the different ways one can evaluate judicial cooperation between the two countries, there is certainly a lack of bilateral protocols and agreements of cooperation in the area of justice, something which, according to the very limited literature on the matter, can be directly attributed to the long-standing tension that characterized their relations. Moreover, the limited cooperation in the context of the EU framework (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a candidate country can participate only partially to some of its structures) does affect the efficacy of the procedures between the two countries. Undoubtedly, the eventual accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the EU and its extremely comprehensive structures for judicial cooperation will upgrade the level of cooperation. Meanwhile, the inclusion of justice in the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) will likely improve the already functional framework and address various deficiencies.

i. Bilateral cooperation

According to the data provided by the Greek Ministry of Justice, to this day there has been no bilateral Protocol or Agreement signed between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the area of justice.¹¹ This area is by no means an exception in the general framework of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. The 1995 Interim Agreement facilitated the progressive normalization of relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by providing a first framework for mutual understanding. Section E of the Interim

⁹ Interview with a judge, Thessaloniki, 20 November 2018

¹⁰ Interview with a lawyer, Thessaloniki, 16 November 2018

¹¹ For a full listing of international cooperation in which Greece takes part at both bilateral and multilateral level, see the site of the Greek Ministry of Justice:

<http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/site/en/EuropeanInternationalCooperation/InternationalJudicialCooperationinCivilCases.aspx>

Agreement (Art. 20) states that: “The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting”.¹² According to Haralambos Kondonis¹³:

In the sphere of Judicial Co-operation, bilateral relations are based on both bilateral and European conventions and agreements. However, there have been *significant delays* in the implementation, particularly in relation to the Convention on Mutual Legal Relations, Legislative Decree 4009/1959. By contrast, the situation has improved and greater effectiveness has been achieved in criminal matters and extradition of prisoners.

In effect, Greece’s non-recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until 1995 created a very delicate situation in terms of bilateral cooperation in the area of justice. The 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was one of the conventions that regulated judicial cooperation between Greece and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1991) at a multilateral level. After the disintegration of the federation (1991) - according to the data provided by the Greek Ministry of Justice - Greece upheld the cooperation in the framework of this convention for the biggest part of the 1990s only with the successor states that Greece itself had recognized (Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina and Slovenia). It was only in the late 1990s - after the 1995 Interim Agreement and the ratification of the 1959 Convention by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (entry into force: 1999) - that judicial cooperation between the two countries acquired a solid framework.¹⁴

With regard to this question we were provided with similar assessments by all of our interviewees. All of them considered that the name dispute did have a negative impact during earlier periods and that there were issues mostly relating to inconsistencies in the use of the terms “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and the acronym “FYROM”. However, they were all of the opinion that this was mainly a problem in past periods and that it will not be an issue in the future. One of the interviewees specified:

There were issues relating to the name dispute. In some cases, the judicial authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sent back documents sent by the Greek judicial authorities because of the use of the acronym “FYROM” instead of the transcription in full “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Subsequently, they refused to translate or modify our documents and sent them back to us for modification. This caused some delays. As far as I know, according to the 1995 Agreement we are

¹² Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Interim Agreement. The full text of the Agreement can be consulted at the official site of the United Nations:
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the%20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf

¹³ Haralambos Kondonis, “Bilateral Relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” in *Athens-Skopje: An uneasy symbiosis (1995-2002)*, eds. Evangelos Kofos, Vlas Vlasidis, 63-64 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2005)

¹⁴ *ibid*

supposed to use in our requests for mutual legal assistance the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” in full transcription. But I think it is not common these days to have such problems.¹⁵

Another interviewee stated that “there may have been problems in the past but it is not an issue anymore”.¹⁶ Similarly, another interviewee mentioned: “The name dispute had negative effects on the cooperation particularly in the period before the signing of the 1995 Interim Agreement. In the subsequent periods, there were no notable issues”.¹⁷

At a more general level, it seems that bilateral cooperation on the basis of protocols, agreements and memoranda of cooperation between the two countries progressed with great difficulties in the context of the almost 30-year-old name dispute. According to Orestis P. Pitsavas¹⁸: “There are 20 bilateral Agreements and Protocols that have been signed between the two countries, which, however, are yet to be ratified by the Greek Parliament due to the name dispute”. In the context of this research, the effort was made to find as many of these Agreements and Protocols as possible and determine their status in terms of legislative ratification. All in all, we identified 8 out of the 20 bilateral Protocols between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the 1990s and the 2000s: (1) the Protocol Regarding the Practical Aspects of the Interim Agreement (1995),¹⁹ (2) the Protocol for Customs Regulations (1995 Πρωτόκολλο για τη ρύθμιση των τελωνειακών θεμάτων),²⁰ (3) the Memorandum on the mutual establishment of liaison offices (1995), (4) the Protocol for Police Cooperation (1998),²¹ (5) the Protocol for Economic and Border Cooperation (1998), (6) the Protocol of Cooperation between the Central Banks of the Two Countries (1999),²² (7) the Protocol for Military Cooperation (2000 Πρωτόκολλο Στρατιωτικής Συνεργασίας),²³ (8) the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation for Sustainable

¹⁵ Interview with an administrative judicial official, Thessaloniki, 7 November 2018

¹⁶ Interview with a lawyer, Thessaloniki, 16 November 2018

¹⁷ Interview with a judge, Thessaloniki, 20 November 2018

¹⁸ Orestis P. Pitsavas, “Οι διμερείς σχέσεις Ελλάδας – ΠΓΔΜ: Η ανάδειξη της επικρατούσας Θεωρίας Διεθνών Σχέσεων μέσα από την αξιολόγηση και οριοθέτηση του αντίκτυπου των οικονομικών διαδράσεων μεταξύ των δύο χωρών” (*Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας – Τμήμα Διεθνών & Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών*, 2017), 60

¹⁹ Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” <https://www.mfa.gr/blog/dimereis-sheseis-tis-ellados/fyrom/>

²⁰ “Ελλάδα- Σκόπια: Τι ισχύει στις συναλλαγές,” *Μακεδονία*, 26 October 1995. According to the news report of *Makedonia*, this protocol concerned the regulations pertaining to the documentation accompanying the transactions between the two countries and in particular the agreement that Greece’s accepted name for its northern neighbor was “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” or the acronym “ΠΓΔΜ/ FYROM”.

²¹ According to data published in 2015 by the Hellenic Police Headquarters (Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας) this protocol was signed on 8 July 1998 and is still in the process of ratification. For more information see the official site of the Hellenic Police Headquarters: http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories/2015/pinakas_symf_ell.pdf

²² The Bank of Greece stated its reservations regarding use of the term “Macedonia” in the designation of the “National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia”: “This designation constitutes the official designation of the Central Bank of FYROM and the Bank of Greece has expressed its steadfast reservations when it comes to the particular use of the term ‘Macedonia.’” For more information see: *Διμερή Πρωτόκολλα Συνεργασίας μεταξύ της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος και Αρχών της Αλλοδαπής*, the Bank of Greece: <https://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/el/Supervision/cooperation/foreign.aspx>

²³ According to Tziampiris: “In December 2000, Greece signed a military agreement with Skopje, which foresaw intensive cooperation and patrols in border areas, the safe exchange of confidential documents between the Chiefs of Staff as well as the cooperation in the area of [the] arms industry” (Aristotle Tziampiris, “The European Union and the Macedonian

Development and the Environment (2004 Μνημόνιο Κατανόησης και Συνεργασίας για την Βιώσιμη Ανάπτυξη και το Περιβάλλον).²⁴ The extensive research conducted in digital databases available to the public (public sector documents and legislation) was unsuccessful in finding more Protocols, Memoranda or any sort of legislation associated with them. It is very important to stress that, according to Article 28 (Paragraph 1) of the Greek Constitution, any such international agreement enters into force only following its ratification by the Greek Parliament. Therefore, if any bilateral protocol is signed but not accompanied by ratification, it cannot enter into force.

Lastly, a revealing remark can be formulated on the basis of the timeframe that corresponds to the signature of all the above-mentioned agreements. This period (1995-2004) coincides with the one that is commonly referred to in the literature as a period of *increased normalization* of the relations between the two countries.²⁵ On the other hand, the absence of any such Protocols and Agreements between 2005 and 2015 with the initiation of the negotiations on the Confidence Building Measures is the clearest indication of a stalemate and even deterioration of bilateral relations between Athens and Skopje, following the rise to power of Nikola Gruevski's VMRO. Another strong indication of the important impact that the name dispute had on the progress and pace of bilateral cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a comparison of the number of protocols signed between Greece and another neighboring country, Bulgaria, in the field of police cooperation (six), versus the single one that was signed between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The absence of protocols for enhancing judicial cooperation between the two countries appears to have had a negative impact on the application of the existing legal framework. One of our interviewees provided a very elaborate discussion of the matter:

We definitely need a new bilateral protocol between the two countries in order to simplify procedures and make our contact more efficient. The existing legal frameworks and conventions signed by both countries provide all the necessary elements for cooperation. But the Greek judges, due to the limited number of cases, are not fully aware that our neighboring country has integrated most of the legislation required. Subsequently, a bilateral protocol can provide the directives and instructions and update the knowledge that we have for FYROM's legal framework. Another problem is that not all decisions are incorporated into the legal databases available to judges and law practitioners. A more updated legal database for jurisprudence could also help in that respect, because it will become easier for the law

Question," in *The History of Macedonia*, ed. Ioannis Koliopoulos, 357- 374 (Thessaloniki: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 2007)

²⁴ According to the official data of the Greek Ministry for the Environment and Energy, the memorandum was signed in Skopje in 2004 but is not yet ratified by the Greek Parliament. For more information see:

<http://www.ypeka.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=551&language=el-GR>

²⁵ See Kondonis, "Bilateral Relations"; Ritsa A. Panagiotou, "Greece and FYROM: the dynamics of economic relations," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 8, no. 3 (2008): 227-251.

practitioners to avoid misinterpretations of FYROM's legal framework, because, generally speaking, they have advanced in their integration into the EU's legal framework.²⁶

ii. Multilateral Cooperation

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters from the viewpoint of an EU member state or a candidate country can have three legal sources: a) international UN conventions, b) Council of Europe regional conventions and c) the legal framework of the EU, which includes international conventions, harmonization and mutual recognition.²⁷ In the case of the relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Council of Europe conventions are the most prominent. The first Council of Europe convention that regulates cooperation between the two countries is the 1957 European Convention of Extradition (entry into force in Greece in 1961 and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1999): "The European Convention on Extradition provides for the extradition between Parties of persons wanted for criminal proceedings or for the carrying out of a sentence. The Convention does not apply to political or military offenses and any Party may refuse to extradite its own citizens to a foreign country".²⁸

The second is the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (entry into force in Greece in 1962 and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1999): "Under this Convention, Parties agree to afford each other the widest measure of mutual assistance with a view to gathering evidence, hearing witnesses, experts and prosecuted persons etc."²⁹ The Schengen Treaty (ratified by Greece in 1997) acts as a factor that maximizes and amplifies the effectiveness of the procedures related to the 1959 Convention; the Schengen framework helps in speeding up the process of requests because it permits direct communication between the judicial authorities.³⁰ The third relevant Council of Europe convention is the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (entry into force in Greece in 1988 and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2005):

The Convention is designed to facilitate the extradition of persons having committed acts of terrorism. To this end, it lists the offences that Parties undertake not to consider as political offences, or as offences

²⁶ Interview with an anonymous lawyer, Thessaloniki, 16 November 2018

²⁷ Νίκος Πασχάλης, "Διεθνής Δικαστική συνεργασία για την ανάκτηση περιουσιακών στοιχείων από εγκληματικές δραστηριότητες" [International judicial cooperation for the restitution of property related with criminal activity], presentation for the "Educational programme for the methodology of investigation for corruption and economic crimes," Athens, 6-7 November 2017, Department of Criminal Investigation of the Hellenic Police].

²⁸ Council of Europe, 1957 European Convention on Extradition, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/024>

²⁹ Council of Europe, 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/030>

³⁰ OECD, Mutual Judicial Assistance: Directives for the promotion of a more effective application of international cooperation, (Last access on 22.11. 2018)

connected with political offences, or as offences inspired by political motives, namely acts of particular gravity, high jacking of aircraft, kidnapping and taking of hostages, the use of bombs, grenades, rockets, letter or parcel bombs, if their uses endangers persons.³¹

The fourth relevant convention of the Council of Europe is the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (entry into force in Greece in 1999 and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2000). The aim of this Convention “is to facilitate international co-operation and mutual assistance in investigating crime and cracking down, seizing and confiscating the proceeds thereof. The Convention is intended to assist States in attaining a similar degree of efficiency even in the absence of full legislative harmony”.³²

Besides relations via the Council of Europe, Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are contracting parties in the Hague Conference and more specifically in the 1965 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (entry into force in Greece in 1983 and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2009). According to the text of the Convention:

The States signatory to the present Convention, desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time, desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect.³³

As an official candidate country for accession to the EU (negotiations may begin before the end of 2019), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is and will be, for years to come, in a process of adjusting, integrating and harmonizing its legal system with that of the EU. From that perspective, judicial cooperation with Greece via this convention can be regarded as partial (i.e. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a member State of Interpol but not of Europol). However, this has not obstructed a rather functional judicial cooperation with Greece and, moreover, it is very reasonable to expect that the progress of the country’s integration into the EU’s legal framework will only improve the already positive record.

The EU has produced, over time, a very elaborate scheme of legislation, directives and specific tools in order to improve the efficient judicial cooperation among its member states on a series of

³¹ Council of Europe, 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/090>

³² Council of Europe, 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the proceeds from crime,
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/141>

³³ The Hague Conference, 1965 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, <https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=17>

matters including: the mutual recognition of court decisions, the expedition of documents from one country to the other, the free circulation of public documents, the mutual legal assistance and extradition, the taking of evidence in another EU country, the European arrest warrant, the detention and the transfer of prisoners, the confiscation and freezing of assets and the payment of fines.³⁴ Another example of the practical tools put in place by the EU in order to facilitate speedy collaboration between the judicial authorities of its member states is the institution of the “contact points”. A contact point is an existing structure within a member state’s judicial authority (i.e. the office of a Public Prosecutor) that, beyond its normal duties, is assigned to function as a direct link with the judicial authorities of other member states when legal assistance is urgent; contact points may circumvent official channels of communication (i.e. formal correspondence) that could delay the process of addressing a demand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has actively pursued and succeeded in being included in this network despite the fact that it is not yet a member state. It is, therefore, able to cooperate with Greece and all the other EU member states with the goal of speeding up the direct contact of judicial authorities when this need arises.

In general, the EU has praised the efforts of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to harmonize and synchronize its legal framework and capacity when it comes to judicial cooperation:

Although not a member of the EU, it has aligned in most parts its legislation to the EU relevant directives. However, plenty are yet to be aligned as those are linked to the pending membership. On [a] regional level, there is a wide spectre of bilateral agreements signed which specifically target issues of international legal cooperation in criminal matters. At the end of 2008, a cooperation agreement with Eurojust was signed. FYROM has two contact points for Eurojust, one coming from the Ministry of Justice and one from the Prosecution service. Also, a cooperation agreement with EUROPOL has been signed.³⁵

Lastly, one should refer to the regional framework that facilitated the judicial cooperation between the two countries and in particular the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe³⁶ (1999-2008) and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI, 1996-2018). The record of cooperation in the context of these frameworks can be regarded as very positive as it included

³⁴ European Commission, “Types of judicial cooperation”, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation_en

³⁵ European Judicial Network (EJN), “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - country profile.” A description of the organization of the judicial system of the country is available at https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_InfoAbout.aspx?Id=435. Eurojust is an organization within the EU whose mission is to promote judicial cooperation among the EU’s member states when it comes to criminal affairs. It was founded in 2002 in The Hague. The European Judicial Network is the network of “contact points” for EU member states and also candidate countries for enhancing judicial cooperation.

³⁶ The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was succeeded in 2008 by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). More information regarding the mission of the organization can be found at <https://www.rcc.int/>

actions such as the training of judicial officials, the support to anti-corruption initiatives and the promotion of a culture of cooperation and co-ordination at a regional level.³⁷

The judge interviewed in the context of this research stressed that the already applied legal framework - at a multilateral level - is sufficient and it will not be affected by the resolution or non-resolution of the name dispute. In his view, the crucial element is the ratification by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of more Council of Europe and EU conventions and protocols. As he specified:

I do not think that judicial cooperation between the two countries will be affected by an agreement on the name issue in any regard. The effectiveness of judicial cooperation depends on the applied legislation that defines it. The already existing framework for judicial cooperation is rather effective, given that it includes most of the conventions of the Council of Europe and The Hague Conference. Certainly, the ratification of more conventions of the Council of Europe and The Hague by FYROM would improve the situation. However, there is no need to have bilateral agreements; the decisive factor is FYROM's gradual ratification of the already existing conventions of the Council of Europe, The Hague Conference and the EU.³⁸

In this interviewee's view, the emphasis should be on expanding the common legal framework that is applied between the two countries in the context of the EU, the Council of Europe and The Hague Conference. While downplaying the effect of bilateral cooperation, the judge also connects the improvement of cooperation with the progress of the EU accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

iii. Examples of judicial cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The Makis Psomiadis case

In general, it may be observed that the issue of judicial cooperation between the two countries is not covered extensively in the Greek media. In recent times, however, there have been examples of cases that drew the attention of the media due to various reasons (i.e. public figures involved; corruption and political scandals). One such a case was the extradition of Makis Psomiadis (who died in 2016), a well-known Greek businessman who in 2011 escaped to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to evade trial in Greece; he was eventually arrested in his country of refuge. The Greek judicial authorities formulated an extradition request that was eventually satisfied in April 2012. This case can be regarded as an example of successful cooperation between the authorities of the two countries. However, in early 2012 the Greek media referred to

³⁷ Kondonis, "Bilateral Relations"

³⁸ Interview with an anonymous judge, Thessaloniki, 20 November 2018

complications in the judicial cooperation due to issues relating to the Greek authorities' choice not to consistently use - in their correspondence documents - the agreed upon name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"; they also used the acronym "FYROM".

In February 2012, the Greek newspaper *To Ποντίκι* presented a news report that noted the following:

The head of the Greek liaison office in Skopje, Alexandra Papadopoulou, sent an urgent letter from Skopje to the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs on January 18, 2012. In it, she stresses the problems that have arisen with regard to the additional request by the Ministry of Justice. In her letter, the Greek Ambassador indicates that while in every page of the document, Skopje is referred to by the name agreed upon and accepted by both parties (the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", transcribed in full), in some pages of the additional request the name "FYROM" is used, a designation not accepted by Skopje. Thus, they do not give the documents for official translation. Mrs. Papadopoulou notes with emphasis that the services of the Greek Ministries must act with speed, because there is the danger that both the trial and the extradition will be lost in translation and then it will be too late for the Greek officials.³⁹

In March 2013, all problems were resolved and according to the Greek media the direct contact between the judicial authorities of the two countries played an important role in speeding up the procedures. As the news site *iefimerida* noted on 3 March 2013:

One phone call between the Prosecution Services of Greece and Skopje was enough to bring about the extradition of Makis Psomiadis in the case of misappropriation of the 21,195,174 Euro from "AEK F.C." sports club. (...) However, there was a delay of one year and the Greek authorities had to send three times the necessary documentation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in order to validate the additional demand of extradition that will permit the beginning of the trial of Makis Psomiadis (...) This positive development was enabled through the direct communication between the Greek Prosecutor Anna Zairi and Maja Koneska, the Public Prosecutor who is in charge of the prosecution of organized crime and corruption in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁴⁰

In effect, the handling of this case proved, on the one hand, the positive aspect of judicial cooperation between the two countries, but, on the other hand, it brought to light the negative impact of the name dispute, in this case the delays caused by the Greek side's omission to refer to the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" in full transcription as stated in the 1995 Interim Agreement.

³⁹ "Για μια μεταφραστική παράλειψη μπορεί να μην εκδοθεί από τα Σκόπια ο Μάκης... Τυχαίο;" *To Ποντίκι*, 9 February 2012.

⁴⁰ "Σκόπια- Ελλάδα τα βρήκαν και στέλνουν σε δίκη τον Μάκη Ψωμάδη," *iefimerida*, 13 March 2013, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/94764/σκόπια-ελλάδα-τα-βρήκαν-στέλνουν-σε-δίκη-τον-μάκη-ψωμάδη>

The Nikola Boskovski and Goran Grujevski case

There was another case that drew the attention of Greek media in recent times: the case of two former members of the Secret Service in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Boskovski and Goran Grujevski, who were arrested in Thessaloniki in October 2017 while trying to board a flight to Budapest, Hungary, with false passports. This case was followed closely by the Greek and international media right from the beginning due to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's issuance of an Interpol international search warrant related to their involvement in a 2015 wiretapping scandal. In one of its first news reports the news site *Huffington Post* noted:

Two former employees of the intelligence services of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia tried to travel yesterday from the "Makedonia" airport while using fake passports. They were, subsequently, arrested. According to the police, the two arrested, aged 35 and 51, attempted to travel from Thessaloniki to Budapest and appear to be implicated in the scandal of wiretapping in the neighboring country. According to the police report, an Interpol warrant had been issued, against the two arrested, for the crime of forming a criminal organization and for crimes by means of advanced technology in FYROM. They are expected to be tried for possession of fake documentation and also examined by the Prosecutor for the international warrant issued by Interpol.⁴¹

The next significant development in the case came in January 2018 and concerned the decision of the Court of Appeals of Thessaloniki to approve the extradition of the two suspects in the wiretapping case. As it was reported by *Kathimerini*:

The two citizens of FYROM, who are prosecuted by the judicial authorities of their country for their involvement in the so-called wiretapping scandal during the Nikola Grujevski period, will appeal the decision before Areios Pagos [Supreme Court of Greece]. The prosecuted appealed the decision of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeals that already gave a positive response to the extradition demand submitted by the neighboring country.⁴²

Eventually, in May 2018, the Greek Supreme Court (Άρειος Πάγος) reversed the January ruling and rejected the demand for extradition. In their reports, the Greek media emphasized the reactions of the Greek defense of the accused:

To the two arrested, Goran Grujevski and Nikola Boskovski, a pardon had been awarded by a Court in FYROM. This pardon was revoked. Their defense claimed today in Areios Pagos that this was done in an unlawful manner and this argument was accepted by the Greek judges. "We ought to congratulate the judges of Areios Pagos who upheld the law, since the revocation of their pardon was done in a manner that goes against the international application of law", stated Paraskevas Spyrtatos, the lawyer of the two

⁴¹ "Συνελήφθησαν στη Θεσσαλονίκη με πλαστά έγγραφα δύο Σκοπιανοί πρώην πράκτορες. Είχε εκδοθεί σήμα της Interpol," *Huffington Post*, 19 October 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/2017/10/19/koinonia-skopianoi-praktoresinterpol_n_18318596.html

⁴² "Θεσσαλονίκη: «Ναι» του Συμβουλίου Εφετών στην έκδοση των δύο υπηκόων ΠΓΔΜ," *Καθημερινή*, 5 January 2018, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/941965/article/epikairothta/ellada/8essalonikh-nai-toy-symvoyliony-efetwn-sthn-ekdosh-twn-dyo-yphkown-pgdm> (last access on 22.11.2018)

men, to *Voria.gr*, and noted that “after 11 months of detention, the accused are vindicated and can be set free”. The two men, after their arrest in Thessaloniki, had denied all accusations and claimed that they were the victims of a plot. They had also stated that they feared for their lives.⁴³

The media in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia emphasized in their reports the possibility of overriding the decision of the Greek Supreme Court. For instance, the news agency *Meta* reported after the decision of the Greek Supreme Court in May 2018 that the two accused had submitted an asylum demand in Greece and also that the ruling of the Greek Supreme Court was based on the argument that the two accused would not have a fair trial in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:

The Supreme Court in Athens ruled that the two should not be handed over because there are no conditions for a fair trial. (...) However, according to Greek law, the Greek Minister of Justice has the last word on the extradition of Grujevski and Boskovski, and can have the final decision whether the two will be extradited from Greece. (...) Otherwise, two more proceedings are being conducted before the Greek authorities. One is for the false Bulgarian passports with which the two wanted to flee to Budapest from Thessaloniki. The other procedure is for the application of political asylum, which they have filed in fear that they will not receive a fair trial.⁴⁴

Certainly, it is beyond the scope and the capacity of this study to discuss in legal terms the ruling of the Greek Supreme Court. However, it is interesting that in this case the judicial cooperation, with regard to its procedural aspects, progressed without delays and obstructions related to more technical ones such as the use of the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and the acronym “FYROM” as it was the case in the Psomiadis case.

Conclusions

The three aspects of our study, namely the specification of the existing legal frameworks that define and enable legal cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the information and the analysis found in the coverage of notable cases in the Greek media and the interviews conducted with judicial officials and practitioners, contribute in the formulation of a general assessment of judicial cooperation between the two countries.

The first element of this assessment is the satisfactory level of this cooperation. There are two crucial factors that enabled this development. Firstly, the 1995 Interim Agreement laid the foundation for a process of mutual understanding and cooperation at all levels between the two

⁴³ Βάσια Μπάρμπα, “Δεν εκδίδονται στην ΠΓΔΜ οι δύο Σκοπιανοί ‘πράκτορες’ του Γκρούεφσκι,” *Voria.gr*, 18 May 2018, <https://www.voria.gr/article/den-ekdidonte-stin-pgdm-i-dio-skopiani-praktores-tou-gkrouefski> (last access on 22.11.2018)

⁴⁴ “Supreme Court in Athens rules against the extradition of Grujevski and Boskovski,” *Meta*, 18 May 2018, <https://meta.mk/en/supreme-court-in-athens-rules-against-extradition-of-grujevski-and-boskovski/> (last access 22.11.2018)

countries. Secondly, the significant efforts that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia made to integrate itself into most of the international, regional and European frameworks has supported this level of cooperation. Unfortunately, the limited number of cases where judicial cooperation is required does seem to constitute a problem when it comes to the full knowledge of the updated legal framework of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the Greek side. Moreover, the name dispute did seem to obstruct cooperation particularly with regard to the speed and efficiency of document exchange and treatment of requests for mutual legal assistance. However, there is a general perception that this is not a generalized trend and that it is limited to particular cases.

The second element of this assessment is the positive prospects for judicial cooperation in the context of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's EU accession. As indicated, the EU itself recognizes the important progress that has been made, despite its recommendations for more judicial reforms in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is very likely that once the accession negotiations begin the judicial cooperation will be further enhanced and improved, since the tools put in place by the EU are specifically designed to improve contacts and procedures, to safeguard the exchange and mutual recognition of documents and even override delays relating to more formal procedures of judicial cooperation. It should also be mentioned that the European Commission places top priority to the conditionalities linked to the Rule of Law and, therefore, once the candidate country commences its accession negotiations it is certain that reforms in the justice and home affairs will be prioritised

The third element of our assessment regards the bilateral policies pursued in order to facilitate a more effective judicial cooperation between the two countries. It can be argued that the absence of bilateral protocols and agreements regarding judicial cooperation has been counterproductive in the sense that there was no specified framework for mutual understanding and better knowledge by the judicial authorities of the legal systems of the two countries. As indicated, the limited number of cases where mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperation is required has not been sufficient to raise awareness of the legal framework for judicial cooperation.

Therefore, it is very encouraging that the area of justice is included in the ongoing negotiations on the CBMs. In the context of our research, we made a strenuous effort to obtain a more precise view on the policies and the measures discussed in the context of the CBMs in the area of justice. This has been very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, this area of cooperation is rarely discussed in the Greek media. It is mostly referred to in an indirect manner or in the context of notable cases, like the two presented in our report. On the basis of our findings, we believe that there may be

concrete measures and actions for a more proactive approach to enhance judicial cooperation. Such a development is certainly in the best interest of both countries, as it will improve not only the quality of cooperation, but more importantly, the application of the law.

PART III

THE EVOLUTION OF POLICE COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

A. From 1991 until the adoption of the Confidence Building Measures (2015)

Introduction

Following the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the normalization of bilateral relations between Athens and Belgrade that took place in the beginning of the 1950s, Greece and the SFRY signed twelve bilateral agreements on cooperation in June 1959, “the fruit of the Mixed Commissions on Economic, Cultural and Technical Affairs that had been set up in 1958”.⁴⁵ The cooperation developed between the two states also involved the Socialist Republic of Macedonia that was a constituent part of the Yugoslav Federation, although it was never without problems.⁴⁶ In the 1970s and 1980s the most indicative form of bilateral cross-border cooperation between Greece and the SFRY involving police cooperation were the so-called Border Committees (Μεθοριακές Επιτροπές), which were of joint character and which sought to bring together state officials from both countries - administrative staff from the regional administration and also high ranking security and police officers, such as the police colonels in charge of border regions.⁴⁷ The basic aim of this structure of cooperation was establishing channels of contact between the highest levels of administration and command of security agencies with a view to facilitating a better exchange of information and also the coordination of actions in order to combat criminal activities and when confronting crises. These joint committees survived the collapse of SFRY and continued to exist in the context of relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until the late 1990s/early 2000s.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Spyridon Sfetas, “In the shadow of the Macedonian Issue, International Re-alignments and Balkan Repercussions from the Greek-Yugoslav Agreements of 18 June 1959 to the 1960 Crisis in the Relations between Athens and Belgrade,” *Balkanica* 39 (2008): 191.

⁴⁶ In particular, one problem was an agreement that concerned “cross-border communication” between Greece and the SFRY. See Σωτήρης Βαλντέν, *Ελλάδα-Γιουγκοσλαβία. Γέννηση και εξέλιξη μιας κρίσης και οι ανακατατάξεις στα Βαλκάνια, 1961-1962* (Athens: Themelio, 1991): 11-14, 49, 58, 76, 119, 128.

⁴⁷ Interview with a retired, high-ranking Greek police officer, 1 September 2018. There is a strong likelihood that these committees were result of the 1959 Border Pact between Greece and the SFRY.

⁴⁸ Interview with a retired, high-ranking Greek police officer, 1 September 2018.

i. The 1990s

As is well known, the period following the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's declaration of independence until the signing of the so-called Interim Agreement of New York, in September 1995, is a period of strained relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, due to the former's refusal to recognize the latter under its constitutional name and its efforts also to block its international recognition under the constitutional name. The violent dissolution of the SFRY itself did not create major or alarming security issues in the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since, thankfully for Greece, the latter was the only ex-Yugoslav republic that emerged peacefully from the federation. In addition, unlike the case of the Greek-Albanian border (and to a lesser extent the Greek-Bulgarian border), no mass influx of immigrants to Greece took place, although an important number of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens did use the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a gateway to Greece.⁴⁹ Greece's imposition of a trade embargo against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in February 1994 generated serious security issues with the proliferation of the illegal smuggling of various products (particularly petrol) from Greece towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁵⁰

The September 1995 Interim Agreement opened the way for normalizing bilateral relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, leading to a better control of the borders and also more effective cooperation between the police authorities of the two countries. In particular, two articles in the 1995 Interim Accord concerned police cooperation: Article 19, Paragraph 3d states that "The Parties shall endeavor to improve and modernize existing border crossings as required by the flow of traffic and construct new border crossings as necessary",⁵¹ while according to Article 20, "The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting".⁵² One of the most direct results in terms of enhancing police cooperation between the two countries on the basis of the 1995 Interim Accord was signing the 1998 Agreement for Police Cooperation.⁵³

⁴⁹ *ibid*

⁵⁰ *ibid*

⁵¹ *Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Interim Agreement*, Article 19, Paragraph 3. See Appendix I.

⁵² *Ibid*. Article 20. See Appendix I.

⁵³ Συμφωνία μεταξύ του Υπουργείου Δημόσιας Τάξης του Πρώτου Μέρους της Ενδιάμεσης Συμφωνίας της Νέας Υόρκης της 13^{ης} Σεπτεμβρίου του 1995 και του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών του Δεύτερου Μέρους της Ενδιάμεσης Συμφωνίας της Νέας Υόρκης της 13^{ης} Σεπτεμβρίου του 1995 περί συνεργασίας σε θέματα αρμοδιότητάς τους. The first page of the Agreement and several articles can be consulted in Appendix I.

The 1998 Agreement for Police Cooperation

The Agreement for Police Cooperation was signed in Ohrid on 8 July 1998 by the Greek Minister for Public Order, Georgios Romaos (Γεώργιος Ρωμάος) and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tomislav Cokrevski. According to the information provided by Greek Police Headquarters, this agreement has not yet been ratified by the Greek Parliament.⁵⁴ And it is not the only one: in total, 20 bilateral agreements, protocols or memoranda of understanding have been signed between the two countries but without subsequent ratification by the Greek Parliament, and thus they have never entered into force. The 1998 Agreement entailed a very ambitious framework for police cooperation between the two countries. From that perspective, it merits particular attention.

The agreement is a five-page document containing eleven articles. The first article describes specific areas of cooperation against international terrorism; trafficking illegal narcotics, arms, cultural items and valuables and other goods; money laundering; illegal immigration and human trafficking; circulating false documents and currency; any crime against human life, physical integrity and health, freedom, dignity and property; pursuit of persons prosecuted or indicted for crimes.⁵⁵

The second article of the agreement defines the procedures pertaining to this cooperation: the mutual exchange of information and expertise, the mutual exchange of information with a view to combating all the above mentioned areas of illegal activities and, very importantly, the exchange and sharing of national legal texts and scientific data in the areas covered by the agreement.⁵⁶ Article four of the agreement defines the cases in which one of the contracting parties can exclude cooperation: “Any of the two Parties can deny partially or in general its duties of cooperation in cases that might endanger its national sovereignty, security or national interests or in cases where cooperation is not compatible with its national legislation”.⁵⁷ Articles five to eleven describe in more detail the procedural aspects of police cooperation.

It is interesting to note that in August 1999, the Greek Minister of Public Order, Michalis Chrysochoidis (Μιχάλης Χρυσόχοϊδης) visited the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and discussed with his counterpart, Pavle Trajanov, issues pertaining to the implementation of the 1998 agreement. Reportedly,

⁵⁴ In the Appendices, see the official data provided by the Hellenic Police Headquarters concerning the bilateral agreements and protocols signed between Greece and other countries. Appendix IV

⁵⁵ See Appendix II.

⁵⁶ Appendix II

⁵⁷ Ibid

During the meeting with Pavle Trajanov, a series of issues were discussed including the application of the protocol for police cooperation, mutual cooperation, the common actions against the trafficking of narcotics and arms, actions against organized crime and international terrorism, the prevention of illegal immigration and other security issues related to the Balkans. The talks were conducted in a friendly climate and the two sides agreed that the fight against criminality is a common goal of both countries.⁵⁸

Judging by the above-mentioned example of bilateral discussions, despite the non-ratification of the agreement, there was a noticeable improvement of bilateral police cooperation between Athens and Skopje by the late 1990s.

ii. The period between 2000 and the signing of the CBMs in June 2015

In this period police cooperation between the two countries was not *bilateral* per se, but took place primarily within the framework of regional (Southeast European) and international initiatives, which by their nature were *multilateral*. Three main factors account for this: firstly, the non-ratification of the 1998 Agreement for Police Cooperation which defined a rather comprehensive framework for bilateral cooperation; secondly, the non-resolution of the name dispute which affected bilateral cooperation by delaying the ratification of numerous agreements, protocols and memoranda of understanding between the two countries; and thirdly, the rising tension in relations between the two countries particularly after the rise to power of Nikola Gruevski's VMRO-DPMNE party in 2006.

In our research we were able to determine 19 examples of multilateral cooperation and only one of bilateral cooperation. The one example of bilateral cooperation is the meeting in October 2004 in Thessaloniki between the General Secretary of the Greek Ministry of Public Order, Leonidas Evaggelidis (Λεωνίδας Ευαγγελίδης) and the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hazbi Lika, with the participation of numerous high-ranking police officials from both countries. According to the *Police Review* (Αστυνομική Επισκόπηση), the official journal of the Greek Police Headquarters: "The meeting confirmed the excellent bilateral relations whilst a number of issues were discussed such as illegal immigration, criminality and organized crime, narcotics, arms trafficking and also the participation of police officers from FYROM in educational seminars provided by the Hellenic Police".⁵⁹ At this point it should be noted that in advance of the security preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games hosted by Greece, no consultations took place between the Greek police and the Former Yugoslav

⁵⁸ "Υπηρεσιακές επισκέψεις της πολιτικής και φυσικής ηγεσίας," *Αστυνομική Επισκόπηση*, Αύγουστος 1999, <https://www.policemagazine.gr> (last access 22.11.2018)

⁵⁹ *Αστυνομική Επισκόπηση*, September/October 2004, <https://www.policemagazine.gr> (last access 22.11.2018)

Republic of Macedonia's police, unlike those that took place between the Greek police and its counterparts from Bulgaria and Romania.⁶⁰

Police cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, during the period 2000–2015 took place primarily within two regional schemes: the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). Both organizations called for the creation of task forces with the participation of police officials from all countries in Southeastern Europe and other no-regional countries or even international organizations that were members of the specific initiatives - like Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldavia, Turkey, Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italy, UK, and the Interpol. The task forces conducted frequent meetings aimed at coordinating actions and enhancing cooperation vis-à-vis areas of common interest (illegal immigration and human trafficking, narcotics, arms trafficking).

Lastly, another multilateral form of police cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been the participation of the latter's police officers in educational programs and seminars provided by the Greek Police. We have been able to identify two such programs. The first one (2010) was a "Post-Graduate Programme for the Criminal Investigation Concerning Computers and Web- Related Crimes".⁶¹ The second one (2012) was a seminar in the context of the European Police College (CEPOL) on "Networks dealing with the detection, handling and refoulement of illegal immigrants".⁶²

As shown, police cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the period 2000-2015 evolved mainly in the context of multilateral frameworks of cooperation. Thus, the absence of a ratified bilateral framework was somewhat counterbalanced by regional, European and international frameworks which facilitated the establishment and expansion of networks and also the exchange and transfer of expertise related to combating various criminal activities.

⁶⁰ Interview with Eleftherios Ikononou (Ελευθέριος Οικονόμου), former Chief of the Hellenic Police, Athens, 26 September 2018

⁶¹ "Μεταπτυχιακό Πρόγραμμα Σπουδών στην Εγκληματολογική Διερεύνηση Ηλεκτρονικών Υπολογιστών και Διαδικτυακών Εγκλημάτων," *Αστυνομική Επισκόπηση*, <https://www.policemagazine.gr> (last access 22.11.2018)

⁶² "Ολοκληρώθηκε το σεμινάριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Αστυνομικής Ακαδημίας," *Αστυνομική Επισκόπηση*, November/December 2012, <https://www.policemagazine.gr> (last access 22.11.2018)

B. Following the signing of the Confidence Building Measures (June 2015-October 2018)

i. The signing of the CBMs

According to press reports, at the beginning of March 2015 the then new Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Kotzias (Νικόλαος Κοτζιάς) was ready to suggest to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the adoption of CBMs that would break the stalemate in bilateral relations while it would concentrate upon such sensitive issues like school textbooks, addressing issues that constituted the “real problem” for Athens in its dispute with Skopje, like irredentism.⁶³ Thus, during his meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Nikola Poposki in Riga, Latvia, on 7 March 2015, Kotzias argued that in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia irredentism “is the problem behind the name-issue” adding that “[in order] to deal with irredentism he intends to propose to the government of the neighboring country the adoption of Confidence Building Measures as another good-will step on the part of Greece”.⁶⁴ The initial response by Poposki was negative; the Foreign Minister accused Greece of obstructing his country’s EU integration and stated that the CBMs should not be a “substitute for the international obligations and the principles of the UN Charter”.⁶⁵ However, in the context of the meeting in Riga, it was later decided “to begin negotiations” on the signing of the CBMs, as reputedly there was pressure by the European Commission and “important countries”⁶⁶ at a difficult period for the incumbent Skopje government, VMRO-DPMNE, following the eruption of the so-called wire-tapping scandal.⁶⁷ More meetings between the two foreign ministers followed in Antalya on 13 May,⁶⁸ while by the beginning of June negotiations had advanced and the signing of the CBMs was discussed during the Athens visit of Fatmir Beshimi, Deputy Prime Minister in the Gruevski government.⁶⁹ Finally, during Kotzias’ visit to Skopje on 24 June 2015, a list of CBMs was signed

⁶³ Τάσος Τσακίρογλου, “Τι σχεδιάζει ο Νίκος Κοτζιάς,” *efsyn.gr*, 6 March 2015, www.efsyn.gr/arthro/ti-shediazei-o-nikos-kotzias (last access 28.09.2018)

⁶⁴ “Τα Μέτρα Οικοδόμησης Εμπιστοσύνης στη συνάντηση Κοτζιά-Πόποσκι,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 7 March 2015, www.kathimerini.gr/806432/article/epikairothta/politikh/ta-metra-oikodomhshs-empistosynhs-sth-synanthsh-kotzia-poposki (last access 28.09.2018)

⁶⁵ For Poposki’s initial reaction see Σωτήρης Σιδέρης, “ΠΓΔΜ: η Ελλάδα παρεμποδίζει την ευρωπαϊκή μας προοπτική,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 7 March 2015, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/806533/article/epikairothta/politikh/pgdm-h-ellada--parempodizei-thn-eyrwpaike-mas-prooptiki> (last access 3.03.2018)

⁶⁶ Σωτήρης Σιδέρης, “Παρασκήνιο και πιέσεις σε Αθήνα και Σκόπια,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 15 March 2015, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/807441/article/epikairothta/politikh/paraskhnio-kai-pieseis-se-a8hna-skopia> (last access 28.09.2018)

⁶⁷ For the scandal see for example Kole Casule, “Macedonia opposition leader says PM ordered ‘massive wire-tapping,’” *Reuters*, 9 February 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-macedonia-opposition-wiretapping-idUSKBN0LD1U120150209> (last access 20.10.2016)

⁶⁸ “Επαφή Κοτζιά για μέτρα οικοδόμησης εμπιστοσύνης με ΠΓΔΜ,” *efsyn.gr*, 13 June 2015, <http://www.efsyn.gr:10080/arthro/epafi-kotzia-gia-metra-oikodomisis-empistosynis-me-pgdm> (last access 29.09.2018)

⁶⁹ Νικόλας Ζηργάνος, “Οικοδόμηση Μέτρων Εμπιστοσύνης με Σκόπια,” *efsyn.gr*, 5 June 2015, <http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/oikodomisi-metron-empistosynis-me-skopia> (last access 28.09.2018)

“aimed at strengthening mutual confidence and advancing overall bilateral relations”.⁷⁰ Among the CBMs agreed upon, number ten was entitled “Justice and Home Affairs”, involving “consultations between representatives of the Ministries of Interior, border police, customs administration, with the aim of exchange information and enhancing the fight against organized crime, corruption, terrorism, illegal migration and narcotics”.⁷¹ According to media reports, Kotzias and Poposki agreed that “cooperation in the fields of internal security, that is cooperation [concerning] the security of borders and justice is very important”.⁷²

ii. The development of bilateral police cooperation under the impact of the refugee crisis (summer 2015 - March 2016)

The migrant crisis, from the summer of 2015 onwards, functioned essentially as a *catalyst* facilitating and encouraging the development of bilateral cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia especially in the field of police cooperation.⁷³ The number of migrant/refugee arrivals in Greece increased considerably during 2015; whereas between 1 January and 30 September 2014 around 31,000 migrants had arrived in Greece, during the same period in 2015 their numbers rose to 393,000, an increase of 850%.⁷⁴ Migrants caught by the police illegally entering the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from Greece were pushed back into Greece. These “push backs”, when they followed diplomatic protocol, were covered by a bilateral agreement from July 1998, “but often they were implemented informally and characterized by extreme violence”.⁷⁵ In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the violent attacks and the public attention they attracted became a turning point for official policy on transit migration: on 18 June 2015 the Parliament passed a law “which introduced a so-called ‘72-hour paper’ a special document which permitted migrants to reside in the Former Yugoslav Republic of

⁷⁰ Άγγελος Αθανασόπουλος, “Τα 11 Μέτρα Οικοδόμησης Εμπιστοσύνης που συμφώνησαν Αθήνα και Σκόπια,” *TO BHMA*, 24 June 2015, <https://www.tovima.gr/2015/06/24/politics/ta-11-metra-oikodomisis-empistosynis-poy-symfwnisan-athina-kai-skopia/>; (last access 20.10.2018) “Strengthening Mutual Confidence and Bilateral Relations. Athens-Skopje”, Skopje, 24 June 2015

⁷¹ *ibid*

⁷² “Εντεκα μέτρα οικοδόμησης εμπιστοσύνης,” *efsyn.gr*, 24 June 2015, <http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/enteka-metra-oikodomisis-empistosynis-metaxy-elladas-kai-pgdm> (last access 28.09.2018)

⁷³ See Ana Chupeska-Stanishkovska and Yorgos Christidis, “Breaking the ‘Hostility Discourse’: Border Security Cooperation Between Athens and Skopje since the Beginning of the Refugee Crisis (2015 - June 2018)”, forthcoming in *Contemporary Macedonian Defense*, Skopje.

⁷⁴ Quoted in Nada Ghandour Demiri, «Η προσφυγική κρίση στην Ελλάδα», Heinrich Böll Stiftung 17 November 2015, <https://gr.boell.org/el/2015/11/17/i-prosfygiki-krisi-stin-ellada> (last access 3.3.2018)

⁷⁵ Marianthi Anastasiadou, Athanasios Marvakis, Panagiota Mezidou, Marc Speer, *From transit hub to dead end. A Chronicle of Idomeni*, Bordermonitoring.eu, Vol 2, January 2018, 19-20. Anastasiadou mentions November 2008 as the date of the agreement although this is a mistake.

Macedonia for up to 72 hours, making it possible to cross the country legally and reach the Serbian border within the given timeframe.⁷⁶

In August 2015 the migration flow towards Greece increased even further when the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced an open-door policy to refugees from Syria⁷⁷: in August alone, more than 100,000 reached the Greek islands.⁷⁸ In late August 2015 (20, 21 and 22 August), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shut its border with Greece for three days, stranding thousands of people who were seeking to enter the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in Greece, in a place called Idomeni⁷⁹, generating dramatic scenes that were captured by the many international journalists present at the time.⁸⁰ The crisis caused by the closure of the border actually activated channels of communication between the two police forces. Following a request by Skopje, a meeting took place between high-ranking Greek police officers from Northern Greece and colleagues from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁸¹ It should be noted, that following Kotzias visit to Skopje on 24 June, there had been a request by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's police to meet with the Greek police, to which there was no response.⁸²

At the same time, growing migrant flows and the establishment of the so-called Balkan corridor – i.e. the route that the migrants were following to reach Central Europe from Greece, passing through a series of Western Balkan states, in the area that once comprised the former S.F.R. of Yugoslavia – generated intensified concerns throughout the region and the European Union and brought about unilateral efforts to deal with the issue,⁸³ as well as attempts at coordinated action.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 30

⁷⁷ “Wir haben so vieles geschafft - Wir schaffen das” [We have managed so many things — we can do this] said the German Chancellor in an interview on the last day of August 2015 Quoted in Janosh Delcker, “The phrase that haunts Merkel,” *Politico*, 19 August 2016, <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-phrase-that-haunts-angela-merkel/> (last access 20.3.2018). For the German response in August 2015 to the refugee crisis see also Mihret Yohannes “Angela Merkel welcomes refugees to Germany despite rising anti-immigrant movement,” *The Washington Times*, 5 September 2015,

www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/10/angela-merkel-welcomes-refugees-to-germany-despite/ (last access 5.3.2018)

⁷⁸ Γεωργία Σπυρόπουλου, Δημήτρης Χριστόπουλος, *Προσφυγικό: “Θα τα καταφέρουμε;” Ένας απολογισμός διαχείρισης και προτάσεις διεξόδου*, Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκού Συνταγματικού Δικαίου, Ίδρυμα Θεμιστοκλή & Δημήτρη Τσάτσου Athens Εκδόσεις Παπαζήσης 2016), 20

⁷⁹ Idomeni (Ειδομένη) is a small village in northern Greece, in the municipality of Paeonia, the Kilis regional unit of Central Macedonia, near the border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

⁸⁰ “... the dramatic scenes that ensued at the border when thousands of people were suddenly stranded in Idomeni were captured by the many international journalists who were present at Idomeni at that time, and widely covered by the international press.” Anastasiadou et al, *From transit hub to dead end, A Chronicle of Idomeni*, Bordermonitoring.eu, Vol 2, January 2018,

<http://bordermonitoring.eu/berichte/2017-idomeni>

⁸¹ Interview with an anonymous police source, Greece, 14 April 2018

⁸² ibid

⁸³ On 17 October 2015, the Hungarian government that treated the migrant flow as a “threat” to its security and identity announced that it had completed the building of a fence along its border with Croatia, thus making impossible the illegal passage of migrants from Croatia to Hungary. A similar move had taken place previously on Hungary's border with Serbia (in the middle of September 2015) where a fence was also built, diverting migrants from Serbia to Croatia. See “Η Ουγγαρία κλείνει τα σύνορα με Κροατία,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 17 October 2015,

Thus, on 25 October 2015, a meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route took place in Brussels, with the participation of 11 countries - Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia - where a 17-point plan of action was agreed upon in order “to improve cooperation and step up consultation between the countries along the route”.⁸⁴ Among the operational measures agreed, was number thirteen stipulating “Strengthening border cooperation between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with increased UNHCR engagement”.⁸⁵

On 30 October 2015, the first CBM meeting took place in Athens.⁸⁶ The overall head of the Greek delegation (exercising supervision of the CBMs) was Ambassador Petros Mavroidis (Πέτρος Μαυροειδής), at the time head of the Political Affairs Directorate at the Greek MFA, who remained in that position until August 2017. During that meeting the tenth CBM was part of the discussion and it was “decided to incorporate all contacts between the two police forces as part of the activities of the tenth CBM”.⁸⁷ The need to develop cooperation further was gaining ground in both capitals. Thus, in an interview given by Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki to Greek journalists in New York at the end of November 2015, Poposki was highly critical of how other European countries were dealing with the refugee crisis: “European countries, not only Greece, are buying time. They are playing the game of passing responsibility to the next country...” Poposki insisted that a Frontex⁸⁸ force should be positioned at Greece’s northern borders, stopping refugees from continuing their journey towards the north. He also claimed that “There is no doubt that many of the ‘fighters’ that are returning from Syria, are taking the Balkan route – maybe one in 100,000”. Poposki admitted that the system of registering refugees entering his country “is not foolproof”, asking for closer cooperation with the Greek security forces. Already the Greek press was reporting that “the Greek police in Kilkis [Polikastro], is closely collaborating with the police in Gevgelja, informing our neighbors about the arrival of new migrant arrivals. FYROM authorities

<http://H%20Ουγγαρία%20κλείνει%20τα%20σύνορα%20με%20Κροατία%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2018). Later, similar fences were also built by Austria along parts of its border with Slovenia, by Slovenia on part of its border with Croatia, by Croatia on part of its border with Serbia and by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on part of its border with Greece.

⁸⁴ “Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route: Leaders Agree on 17-point plan of action,” *European Commission - Press release*, Brussels, 25 October 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5904_en.htm (last access 10.3.2018)

⁸⁵ *ibid*

⁸⁶ “Προχωρούν οι συνομιλίες για ΜΟΕ μεταξύ Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ,” *efsyn.gr*, 2 November 2015, <http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/prohoroy-n-oi-synomilies-gia-moe-metaxy-elladas-pgdm> (last access 29.09.2018)

⁸⁷ Interview with an anonymous police source wishing to remain, Greece, 14 April 2018

⁸⁸ The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, known by its French acronym as Frontex

are satisfied with that cooperation that did not exist earlier; they are asking, however, for cooperation also on the issue of the ‘fighters’ returning from Syria”.⁸⁹

President Ivanov, also talking to Greek journalists in New York, stated that “we asked for access to the data of Frontex and Schengen but were turned down” adding that “We have never received from the EU a euro for the refugees until now. Only the Italian Red Cross has given us 90,000 Euro. What we are missing, however, is information on security issues”. Greek diplomatic and police sources commented that

the statement of FYROM’s President does not reflect the real interest shown by the neighboring country on the issue. Thus, while Greece has an ΕΥΠ [*Greek Intelligence Agency*] officer at the Greek diplomatic representation [Γραφείο Συνδέσμου] in Skopje, the same does apply for FYROM’s diplomatic representation in Athens, possibly for financial reasons. At the same time, the neighboring country does not display a particular interest in sharing or asking for specific information concerning its security beyond general references in its written communication.⁹⁰

On 17 December 2015, a few days after the second round of negotiations on CBMs in Athens (on 11 December) there was another meeting of the two countries’ foreign ministers when Poposki paid an official visit to Athens.⁹¹ In the press conference that followed their meeting, Kotzias said they were both

happy with the initiative we took, the confidence-building measures. We already have five measures on which we are progressing creatively... We are satisfied with the meetings that took place for the political dialogue between our very high-level diplomats, and we want to face the future and all of the issues the two countries are looking at with trust, within the new international environment as well as in the relations between us.⁹²

Kotzias added that “the two sides wanted to cooperate on the refugee issue and contribute to the stability of the wider region”, noting that Poposki had met Alternate Minister for Citizen Protection Nikos Toskas (Νίκος Τόσκας) to discuss ways to develop police cooperation.⁹³

⁸⁹ Τάσος Τέλλογλου, “Επιστροφή «μαχητών» στα Βαλκάνια,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 29 November 2015, <http://Επιστροφή%20«μαχητών»%20στα%20Βαλκάνια%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2018)

⁹⁰ *ibid*

⁹¹ See “Joint statements of Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias and the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, following their meeting (Athens, 17 December 2015),” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint-statements-of-foreign-minister-nikos-kotzias-and-the-foreign-minister-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-nikola...> (last access 10.5.2018)

⁹² *ibid*

⁹³ “Greek, FYROM foreign ministers meet in Athens, discuss confidence-building measures,” *plus.gr*, <http://www.gazzetta.gr/plus/article/848379/greek-fyrom-foreign-ministers-meet-athens-discuss-confidence-building-measures> (last access 22.10.2018)

Growing international criticism at the handling of the refugee crisis by the Greek government⁹⁴ - as the impression prevailing abroad was that Athens was primarily interested in facilitating the transfer of the migrants to the border, neglecting issues such as the proper recording of entries or providing for the migrants' needs - began to affect attitudes in Greece regarding cooperation with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. And this was not only among the leadership of the Greek Police who viewed cooperation with their counterparts from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with growing pragmatism;⁹⁵ high profile Greek politicians like Evangelos Venizelos (Ευάγγελος Βενιζέλος) underlined the fact that the refugee crisis had added "another dimension" to the bilateral relations. Venizelos argued that:

the refugee crisis "is also connected with EU-FYROM relations, and by extension with bilateral Greece-FYROM relations, since that country is part of the land route of refugees who enter and are registered in Greece and then move to other EU member states... The refugee crisis does not alter the parameters of the so-called name issue, the resolutions of the Security Council, and [UN mediator] Nimetz's mission. It is however, an element that we must add to our analysis regarding the parameters of regional stability and security in the Balkans (the problem is getting more acute, is not decreasing) that, together with the respect for the principles and values of NATO, determines the position of our country concerning FYROM's prospect of accession in the context of the "open-doors" policy".⁹⁶

Kotzias and Poposki met again in Brussels in January 2016, on the margins of the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, where they discussed the "latest developments in the refugee crisis".⁹⁷ By the end of January 2016 criticism against the Greek government for its handling of the migrant flow had intensified: on 27 January, the European Commission issued a report, finding "serious deficiencies" in the control of the external borders and accusing Greece of "not fulfilling its obligations": the Greek authorities were blamed for not checking the documents of migrants

⁹⁴ On 1 December 2015 an internal European Commission document, entitled "On the integrity of the Schengen Treaty" called for "more efforts to avoid the illegal crossing of EU borders... the development of rapid development forces... [and] the development of a FRONTEX force at Greece's northern borders". According to the *Associated Press*, by circulating the document the Commission was actually seeking to pressure Greece to exercise better control over its borders. Quoted in 'Μεγκένη' Σένγκεν για να αλλάξει... ρότα," *efsyn.gr*, 3 December 2015, <http://«Μεγκένη»%20Σένγκεν%20για%20να%20αλλάξει...%20ρότα%20%20%20Η%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2018). There was also criticism against Greece by individual EU member states. The Prime Minister of Slovakia was quoted as calling for Greece "to be expelled from the Schengen Zone" (Κώστας Μοσχονάς, "Ευρω-εκβιασμός: 'χωματερή ψυχών' ή εκτός Σένγκεν," *efsyn.gr*, 4 December 2015, <http://Ευρω-εκβιασμός%20%20«χωματερή%20ψυχών»%20ή%20εκτός%20Σένγκεν%20%20%20Η%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2015). On 20 October 2015 the Croatian Minister of the Interior, Ranko Ostojić, accused Greece of "not being in a position to avert the entrance of tens of thousands of people from Turkey". Οι περιορισμοί δημιούργησαν χάος στη "βαλκανική οδό," *Η Καθημερινή*, 20 October 2015, <http://Οι%20περιορισμοί%20δημιούργησαν%20χάος%20στη%20«βαλκανική%20οδό»%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2015)

⁹⁵ Interview with an anonymous police source, Greece, 18 April 2018

⁹⁶ Ευάγγελος Βενιζέλος, "Προσφυγικό και Εθνικά Θέματα," *Η Καθημερινή*, 3 January 2016, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/844380/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/prosfygiko-kai-e8nika-8emata> (last access 03.3.2018)

⁹⁷ "Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Foreign Minister of FYROM, Nikola Poposki, on the margins of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Brussels, 18 January 2016)," Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/news-announcements/foreign-minister-kotzias-meets-with-the-foreign-minister-of-fyrom-nikola-poposki-on-the-margins-of-the-eu> (last access 10.05.2018)

passing through and of not taking fingerprints.⁹⁸ In addition, Central European states like Austria and Hungary were in particular critical towards Greece, seeking in effect to block the Balkan corridor by stopping inflows into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At the end of January Hungary announced that it was sending 31 policemen to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to provide assistance in more effectively controlling the border with Greece.⁹⁹

On 25 February 2016 the heads of the police forces of the two countries, Konstantinos Tsouvalas (Κωνσταντίνος Τσουβάλας) and Goranco Savovski met in Thessaloniki. During the meeting, the two sides talked about the refugee crisis as well as about issues concerning the “establishment of communication channels between the two countries in the field of police cooperation in the fight against organized crime and in particular against human trafficking, drugs and cross-border crime”.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the possibility of the Greek police providing knowhow and training to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s police was also discussed.¹⁰¹ “The very good level of cooperation between the two sides was confirmed, as well as the mutual desire for the further development of bilateral relations at the level of police cooperation”,¹⁰² while it was also underlined that “bilateral cooperation had improved considerably since August 2015”.¹⁰³

At the same time, on 24 February 2016, nine states - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro and Bulgaria - met in Vienna, following an Austrian initiative in order “to coordinate their positions over the migrant crisis”. During the meeting a 19-point communique was issued that, among other things, called for stricter control of the borders and for the countries involved to decide for themselves whom they would allow to enter. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Sebastian Kurz, did not miss the opportunity to once more accuse the Greek government of “lacking the will and the desire” to reduce the migrant flow, being interested “until now only on the fastest possible transfer of refugees to

⁹⁸ Άννα Φαλτάιτς, “Stratfor: Η Ελλάδα αποδιοπομπαίος τράγος της προσφυγικής κρίσης,” 29 January 2016, <http://www.euro2day.gr/specials/topics/article/1394866/stratfor-h-ellada-apodiopompaioi-tragos-ths-profy.html> (last access 3.3.2018)

⁹⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰⁰ “ΕΠΙΣΗΜΗ ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ, ΑΝΤΙΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΥ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΥ ΤΙΟΥΒΑΛΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΟΜΟΛΟΓΟ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΧΗΓΟ ΤΗΣ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ Π.Γ.Δ.Μ. GORANCO SAVOVSKI, ΣΤΗ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ,” *Αστυνομική Ανασκόπηση* (March/April 2016): 73-74, https://www.policemagazine.gr/sites/default/files/pdf/%CE%95%CE%91_2016-04-0295.pdf (last access 1.11.2018)

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

¹⁰² “25-02-2016: Επίσημη συνάντηση του Αρχηγού της Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, Αντιστρατήγου Κωνσταντίνου Τσουβάλα με τον ομόλογό του Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Goranco Savovski, στη Θεσσαλονίκη,” *Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας*, 25 February 2016, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27 (last access 15.4.2018)

¹⁰³ Ν. Φραγκόπουλος, “ΠΓΔΜ: Ανακοίνωση του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών για τη συνάντηση των Αρχηγών της Αστυνομίας Ελλάδας και ΠΓΔΜ,” *ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ*, 25 Φεβρουαρίου 2016, <http://subscriber.amna.gr/anaweb/subscriber/showitem?service=17&listid=NewsList6> (last access 14.11.2018)

Central Europe”.¹⁰⁴ At the beginning of March 2016, Greek Foreign Minister Kotzias made the following commentary regarding the way Central European states were exploiting the refugee crisis:

FYROM’s government was initially delighted with the role assigned to it by Austria, Hungary and others, believing that it could solve its own problem. Our assessment is that they have begun realizing that they are being taken advantage of... What have we done with FYROM is to make them understand that there is a cost if they continue – and they do gradually understand this – and secondly that they are being taken advantage of [and that] is not in their best interest.¹⁰⁵

The Balkan corridor did, however, close on 8 March 2016. At the time the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s Defense Minister Zoran Jolevski was quoted as saying that “The Republic of Macedonia hopes that the termination of the inflow of refugees through its territory, an act that effectively sealed the Balkan route towards Northern Europe, will facilitate its access to NATO... and that Macedonia will get its place at NATO’s table. We showed that we are a responsible member of the international community”.¹⁰⁶ The closure of the border was followed by protests on the part of migrants who had gathered at Idomeni. At the same time many who attempted to enter the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia illegally were arrested by the authorities and sent back to Greece.¹⁰⁷ President Ivanov criticized Greece for not “collaborating in the refugee crisis”, adding that Greece “should stop allowing the migrants to approach the border with Macedonia”. However, within less than a month the mood had clearly changed: at the beginning of April, Defense Minister Zoran Jolevski, in an interview with an Austrian newspaper, declared that “The good [element] of the crisis is that we have strengthened our relations with Greece. Now we are cooperating better. We are neighbors and we are facing similar challenges.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Βικυ Καπετανοπούλου, “Η συμμορία των Δυτικών Βαλκανίων,” *efsyn.gr*, 25 February 2016, <http://H%20συμμορία%20των%20Δυτικών%20Βαλκανίων%20%20%20H%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2018)

¹⁰⁵ Γιάννης Κολεσιδης, “Ν. Κοτζιάς: Διαχείρισιμη η προσφυγική κρίση,” *Αθηναϊκό – Μακεδονικό Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων*, in *Greece-Russia*, 2 March 2016, <http://greece-russia2016.gr/politics/20160302/250108.html> (last access 3.3.2018)

¹⁰⁶ “Η ΠΓΔΜ ελπίζει ότι η προσφυγική κρίση θα τη φέρει πιο κοντά στο ΝΑΤΟ,” *Αθήνα 9.84 FM*, 10 March 2016, <http://www.athina984.gr/2016/03/10/i-pgdm-elpizi-oti-i-prosfygiki-krisi-tha-ti-feri-pio-konta-sto-nato/> (last access 3/3/2018); “Јолевски повика за прием на Македонија во НАТО за да се зацврсти стабилноста на Балканот”, *Vesnik*, 11 March 2016, <https://vesnik.com/makedonija/jolevski-povika-za-priem-na-makedonija-vo-nato-za-da-se-zacvrsti-stabilnosta-na-balkanot> (last access 20.05.2018). This position was repeated by Jolevski on 15 April in “Јолевски:Македонија ќе продолжи да делува конструктивно во бегалската криза,” *SITEL*, 15 April 2016, <https://sitel.com.mk/jolevskimakedonija-kje-prodolzhi-da-deluva-konstruktivno-vo-begalskata-kriza> (last access 20.05.2018)

¹⁰⁷ Thus, on 15 March it was reported by the Greek media that the police in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had arrested and sent back to Greece around 1,500 migrants who had entered illegally, while it had stopped around 600 others from doing the same. “Θρίλερ με τους πρόσφυγες που πέρασαν στην ΠΓΔΜ,” *ANTI News*, 15 March 2016, <http://www.ant1news.gr/news/Society/article/438630/thriller-me-toys-prosfyges-poy-perasan-stin-pgdm> (last access 3.03.2018)

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in “Јолевски очекува покана за членство во НАТО на наредниот самит,” *DW.com*, 2 April 2016, <http://www.dw.com/mk/јолевски-очекува-покана-за-членство-во-нато-на-наредниот-самит/a-19160224> (last access 20.05.2018)

iii. The evolution of police cooperation following the end of the refugee crisis (April 2016 – October 2018)

The refugee crisis of 2015-2016 clearly opened up a ‘new chapter’ of bilateral contacts and cooperation between Athens and Skopje that was underpinned by a mutual political desire of the two capitals. Thus, Kotzias and Poposki held another bilateral meeting in Thessaloniki on 21-22 April 2016 on the margins of the “First Ministerial Meeting of Albania – Bulgaria – Greece – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”,¹⁰⁹ with the participation of the foreign ministers and the ministers of the interior. Then on 25 April 2016 there was a new round of negotiations on CBMs in Skopje, involving a variety of issues, including energy, immigration, cooperation in the context of IPA II and TaieX EU programs, health, public administration and civil protection.¹¹⁰ A memorandum of understanding between the University of Piraeus and the University of “St Paul the Apostle” in Ohrid was also signed.¹¹¹ The two foreign ministers met again in Brussels on 20 May 2016, where

the discussion focused on the confidence-building measures (CBMs) launched in 2015... and in particular on the results of the latest round of negotiations, which was held in Skopje last month, as well as on the operational follow-up necessary ahead of the upcoming round of negotiations, which is to be held next month in Athens. Mr. Kotzias expressed his satisfaction at the first positive results of the process.¹¹²

On 27 May 2016 the Heads of the Internal Affairs Bureaus of the two police forces met in Thessaloniki while common training activities of the two police forces also began to take place.¹¹³ Between 6 and 11 June 2016, six policemen from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia participated in a training seminar in Athens, organized by the Greek police, where they attended

20.05.2018), “Η προσφυγική κρίση ενίσχυσε τις σχέσεις της ΠΓΔΜ με την Ελλάδα,” *Naftemporiki.gr*, 3 April 2016, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1088752/i-prosfugiki-krisi-enisxuse-tis-sxeseis-tis-pgdm-me-tin-ellada> (last access 3.03.2018).

¹⁰⁹ “Quadrilateral Meeting between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM on cross-border cooperation (Thessaloniki, 21-22 April 2016),” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/quadrilateral-conference-between-greece-albania-bulgaria-and-fyrom-on-cross-border-cooperation-thessaloniki... (last access 10.05.2018)

¹¹⁰ “Συνομιλίες Ελλάδας - ΠΓΔΜ για τα Μέτρα Οικοδόμησης Εμπιστοσύνης,” *naftemporiki.gr*, 26 April 2016, <https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1097433/sunomilies-elladas-pgdm-gia-ta-metra-oikodomisis-empistosunis> (last access 31.10.2018)

¹¹¹ *ibid*

¹¹² “Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, with the framework of the proceedings of the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Brussels, 20 May 2016),” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/fyrom-en/news/foreign-minister-kotzias-meets-with-the-foreign-minister-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-nikola-poposki-with-the...> (last access 10.05.2018)

¹¹³ “Διασυνοριακή Συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ,” Ενημερωτικό Σημείωμα, *ΑΕΑ/Διεύθυνση Διεθνούς Αστυνομικής Συνεργασίας* (Athens, 15 November 2018), 3

lectures on border management and migration,¹¹⁴ while police officers of the two countries began participating in common training activities under the aegis of the US concerning drugs, information analysis and border management.¹¹⁵

On 13 June 2016 the fourth meeting on the CBMs took place in Athens with the two sides discussing “connectivity projects, police cooperation, EU programs, culture, education, civil protection, public administration, health, business initiatives and cooperation of Diplomatic Academies of both sides”.¹¹⁶ In August 2016 Athens responded positively to a request for help by the government in Skopje, in order to deal with extensive flooding caused by torrential rain in Skopje and Tetovo: on 12 and 13 August two consignments with material assistance arrived in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the supervision of the Greek General Secretariat of Civil Protection.¹¹⁷ In fact, Greece was among the first countries that responded to the request by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for the provision of assistance via the European Civil Protection Mechanism.¹¹⁸

Kotzias visited Skopje on 25 August 2016, where the implementation of the CBMs was part of the talks with his hosts. Following their meeting, Kotzias and Poposki, underlined that the CBMs “had boosted bilateral relations”, while they also “clarified that the CBMs are in no way connected to the name issue”, noting at the same time that they “contribute significantly in improving relations and creating a sense of mutual trust”.¹¹⁹ Kotzias added that

when I first spoke about the CBMs many abroad thought that it is something exotic, something that would never materialize. It was even more exotic for my colleagues at the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU when I vetoed the imposition of sanctions at the expense of the country that provides me with hospitality today. I would like to say that in more than a year that has passed we have had many meetings; the relations of Greece and the friendly northern neighbor have changed. Relations have been developed between our ministries, between other ministries, our societies. Our economic relations grow, and we have agreed in the context of the CBM [to initiate] contacts between universities. We have

¹¹⁴ “13-06-2016: Με επιτυχία ολοκληρώθηκε εκπαίδευση στελεχών της Αστυνομίας της πΓΔΜ, σε θέματα προστασίας συνόρων,” *Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας*,

http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform (last access 15.04.2018)

¹¹⁵ “Διασυνοριακή Συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ,” 3

¹¹⁶ Marry Harris, “Greece-FYROM Friendship Blossoms With Confidence Building Measures,” *Greek Reporter*, 15 June 2016, <https://greece.greekreporter.com/2016/06/15/greece-fyrom-friendship-blossoms-with-confidence-building-measures/>

¹¹⁷ “17-08-2016: Δελτίο Τύπου σχετικά με τη ελληνική προσφορά βοήθειας στα Σκόπια για τις καταστροφικές πλημμύρες,” *Γενική Γραμματεία Πολιτικής Προστασίας*, Αθήνα, 17 August 2017,

http://www.mopocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=5894&Itemid=633&lang (last access

29.09.2018), also Σταύρος Τζίμας, “Και διπλωματία των πλημμυρών,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 19 August 2016, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/871540/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/kai-diplwmatia-twn-plhmmyrwn> (last access 29.09.2018)

¹¹⁸ The European Civil Protection Mechanism was established in 2001 providing for the coordination of civil protection interventions in cases of disasters. Member states of the EU and other European states participate. See

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en

¹¹⁹ “N. Κοτζιάς: Σημαντική πρόοδος στις διμερείς σχέσεις Ελλάδας – πΓΔΜ,” *stokkino.gr*, 25 August 2016, <http://www.stokkino.gr/article/1000000000041135/N-Kotzias-Simantiki-proodos-stis-dimereis-sxeseis-Elladas---pGDM> (last access 3.03.2018), “Στενότερη συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ συμφώνησαν Κοτζιάς και Πόποσκι,” *tvxs.gr*, 25 August 2016, <http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/stenoteri-synergasia-elladas-pgdm-symfonisan-kotzias-kai-poposki> (last access 3.03.2018)

an effective cooperation, despite the initial problems in coping with the refugee [issue] and each provides the other with whatever assistance it can.¹²⁰

On 23 November 2016, the fifth meeting on CBMs took place in Skopje with an agenda that included transportation (the operation of the train line Florina-Bitola), energy (constructing a new gas pipeline between Thessaloniki and Skopje) and police cooperation.¹²¹

Despite the adverse political conditions prevailing in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia following the December 2016 parliamentary elections and the tensions surrounding the formation of the new government, bilateral consultations concerning the progress of the CBMs took place in Skopje on 10 April 2017. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's delegation was led by Elena Kuzmanovska, State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, and on the Greek side her counterpart was Ambassador Petros Mavroidis.¹²² Following the formation of the new government in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia led by Zoran Zaev in May 2017, there was noticeable renewed diplomatic activity in bilateral relations since the new government put the improvement of bilateral relations with its neighbors (and in particular with Bulgaria and Greece) high on its agenda in order to advance the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's Euroatlantic integration. By the beginning of September 2017, Kotzias had met with the new foreign ministers in Zaev's government, Nikola Dimitrov, four times in three months, while new CBM meetings took place. Thus, on 29 August 2017, the sixth meeting on CBMs took place in Athens where among the topics discussed were transportation (the operation of the train line Florina-Bitola), energy (the Thessaloniki – Skopje gas pipeline construction), cooperation between universities and cultural cooperation and the implementation of the memorandum signed for cooperation between the two countries diplomatic academies.¹²³ Police cooperation and civil protection were also part of the agenda.¹²⁴ It was a continuation “of the friendly and constructive dialogue on mutually agreed topics, including connectivity projects in the field of transport and energy, police cooperation, European programs, culture, education, civil protection, public administration, health, diplomatic academies' cooperation and launching business initiatives,” the

¹²⁰ *ibid*

¹²¹ Βασιλης Νέδος, “Συνάντηση για MOE με Σκόπια,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 26 November 2016, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/885316/article/epikairothta/politikh/synanthsh-gia-moe-me-skopia> (last access 29.09.2018)

¹²² “Macedonia and Greece complete new round of confidence building talks”, *Kurir*, 11 April 2017, <http://kurir.mk/en/?p=57733> (last access 25.10.2018)

¹²³ Βασιλης Νέδος, “Κινητικότητα με ΠΓΔΜ με επίκεντρο τα MOE,” *Η Καθημερινή*, 30 September 2017, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/928846/article/epikairothta/politikh/kinhtikothta-me-pgdm-me-epikentro-ta-moe> (last access 29.09.2018)

¹²⁴ “Εκτη συνάντηση για τα MOE Ελλάδας-πΓΔΜ στην Αθήνα,” *NOOZ*, 29 August 2017, <http://www.nooz.gr/greece/ekti-sunantisi-gia-ta-moe-elladas-pgdm-stin-a8ina> (last access 5.03.2018)

Greek Foreign Ministry said in a press release.¹²⁵ Two days later, there was another meeting in Skopje between Kotzias and Nikola Dimitrov, where the work of the CBMs was also on the agenda. Kotzias stated that:

We are discussing the major issues we are facing, the common future of our two states. I am pleased at the very positive results we had on the Confidence-Building Measures at the meeting the day before yesterday, between the large delegations from both sides – 17 members in our delegation and 25 in yours – which shows that the relations between our two countries are developing more intensively than with almost any other neighbor. We will implement all the measures. New railway lines, new pipelines for natural gas; Cooperation between universities; Cooperation between Diplomatic Academies. We talked about the issues of energy, transport, research, police cooperation, and the security of the whole region.¹²⁶

On 6 September 2017 the General Police Inspector of Borders and Border Protection met with the Head of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's Police in the context of a Summit Meeting of Heads of Police Forces of EU member states.¹²⁷ On 4 October 2017 during the "Second Ministerial Meeting of Albania – Bulgaria – Greece – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" in Thessaloniki, where Ministers of the Interior were again present, the four countries agreed "to strengthen cross-border cooperation in a series of issues [including] security and energy",¹²⁸ and also to organize meetings between the heads of the police and fire brigade.¹²⁹ On 9 October 2017 the Head of the Greek Police, Konstatinos Tsouvalas met with his counterpart Lazo Velkovski in Thessaloniki where a whole range of new cooperation measures was agreed upon. Thus, it was announced that "in order to lay new foundations for an enhanced police cooperation, both sides agreed on the need for deepening cooperation" and on the following measures: exchanging operational information "in real time", in order to cope with "serious cross-border crime"; arranging for operational meetings among experts on issues concerning drugs, migration, border

¹²⁵ Quoted in "Sixth Greek-fYROM meeting on CBMs makes progress on several topics," ANA - MPA, 29 August 2017, <http://www.ana.gr/en/article/182273/Sixth-Greek-fYROM-meeting-on-CBMs-makes-progress-on-several-topics> (last access 5.03.2018)

¹²⁶ "Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Kotzias' statements following his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, N. Dimitrov (Skopje, 31 August 2017)," Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/minister-of-foreign-affairs-kotzias-statements-following-his-meeting-with-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-dimitrov> (last access 10.05.2018)

¹²⁷ "Διασυννοριακή Συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ," 1

¹²⁸ "Διήμερη υπουργική συνάντηση Ελλάδας, Αλβανίας, Βουλγαρίας, πΓΔΜ στη Θεσσαλονίκη," *Η Καθημερινή*, 4 October 2017, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/929210/article/epikairothta/politikh/dihmerh-ypourgikh-synanthsh-elladas-alvanias-voylgarias-pgdm-sth-8essalonikh> (last access 29.09.2018)

¹²⁹ "Συνέντευξη του Αναπληρωτή Υπουργού Προστασίας του Πολίτη Νίκου Τόσκα στο ραδιοσταθμό 'Πρακτορείο 104,9 FM,'" *Υπουργείο Προστασίας του Πολίτη*, Αθήνα, 6 October 2017, http://www.mopocp.gov.gr/index.php?Itemid=649&id=6238&lang=&option=ozo_content&perform=view (last access 14.11.2018)

management and terrorism; “defining” a Contact Point¹³⁰, in order to materialize the above mentioned decisions and establishing “direct communication”; having regular contacts, centrally, as well as a regional and local levels, between the relevant authorities; making good use of the existing channels of communications; and capitalizing on all the possibilities provided by the multilateral, European and international frameworks of cooperation (Europol, Frontex and Interpol).¹³¹ On 1 December 2017, the heads of the Fire Brigade and Rescue Forces from Albania (Alfred Kristuli), Bulgaria (Georgi Parmakov), Greece (Vasileios Kapelios/Βασίλειος Καπέλιος) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Adnan Dzaferoski) met in the Greek city of Ptolemaida (Πτολεμαΐδα), where “they exchanged views and proposals concerning the existing situation and the prospects of cross-border cooperation, seeking to increase the capacity of the services of the four countries for a timely and effective response, in emergencies relating to natural and man-made disasters”.¹³² A few days later, on 18 December 2017, there was a meeting in Thessaloniki between the heads of the police forces of Albania (Rebani Jaupi), Bulgaria (Mladen Marinov), Greece (Konstantinos Tsouvalas) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Lazo Velkovski), where they discussed ways of strengthening police cooperation.¹³³ In the meeting it was decided to strengthen multilateral cooperation on the following four areas: “establishing contact points for prompt cooperation in urgent cases... in issues concerning serious, cross-border crime”; “ensuring the exchange of information, experience and know-how concerning crimes... with a cross-border dimension”; “establishing training needs and co-organizing common training and seminars...”; and “carrying out more follow up meetings... in order to implement what has been agreed upon...”¹³⁴

On 9 February 2018, the seventh meeting on CBMs took place in Skopje, where it was agreed to push forward cooperation in various fields like public administration, health, and police cooperation, seismology research; in addition, a Memorandum of Understanding in cooperating in

¹³⁰ Contact Points or Single Points of Contact (SPOC) are official points of cooperation established by national authorities concerning cross-border police cooperation and information exchange. Such contact points have already been established in the region (for example between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, or between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia) however the name dispute blocked any efforts made in the past to establish such a contact point between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

¹³¹ “09-10-2017: Επίσημη συνάντηση του Αρχηγού της Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, Αντιστρατήγου Κωνσταντίνου Τσουβάλα με τον ομόλογό του Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Lazo Velkovski, στη Θεσσαλονίκη,” *Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας*, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform, (last access 15.4.2018)

¹³² “Τετραμερής συνάντηση των Επικεφαλής των Πυροσβεστικών και Διασωστικών Υπηρεσιών Ελλάδας-Αλβανίας-Βουλγαρίας και ΠΓΔΜ στην Πτολεμαΐδα,” *Ελληνική Πυροσβεστική*, 1 December 2017, https://www.fireservice.gr/el_GR/-/tetrameres-synantese-ton-epikephales-ton-pyrosbestikon-kai-diasostikon-yperesion-elladas-albanias-boulgarias-kai-pgd (last access 15.04.2018)

¹³³ “18-12-2017: Ολοκληρώθηκαν οι εργασίες της τετραμερούς συνάντησης Αρχηγών των Αστυνομιών της Ελλάδας, της Αλβανίας, της Βουλγαρίας και της π.Γ.Δ.Μ., στη Θεσσαλονίκη,” *Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας*, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=(last access 15.4.2018)

¹³⁴ *ibid*

civil protection was signed.¹³⁵ The Greek Foreign Minister described the talks as “constructive and productive... the continuation of the ongoing friendly and constructive dialogue... for the establishment of a positive political atmosphere in bilateral relations”.¹³⁶

On 3-4 May 2018 the “Third Ministerial Meeting Albania – Bulgaria – Greece – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” took place in Thessaloniki.¹³⁷ During the meeting of the four Ministers of the Interior, the importance of exchanging information in “real time” to deal with cross-border crime was underlined. It was also announced that there was also “implementation of the agreements reached during the meeting of the Heads of the four Police Forces in Thessaloniki on 18 December 2017”.¹³⁸

iv. The Prespes Agreement

On 17 June 2018, negotiations between Athens and Skopje led to the signing of a comprehensive agreement seeking to solve the so-called name-dispute, allowing for bilateral relations to develop further, “unblocking” at the same time the Euroatlantic integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The so-called Prespes Agreement incorporates the CBMs and in fact enhances bilateral cooperation on sensitive areas like police and defense cooperation. Thus, Article nine, Paragraph two stipulates that “The existing CBMs shall be incorporated”.¹³⁹ Article 16 is dedicated to Police and Civil Protection Cooperation:

1. The Parties shall cooperate closely in the fight against organized and trans-border crime, terrorism, [and] economic crimes, having regard in particular to crime related to the illicit trafficking and/or exploitation of human beings; to crimes related to the production, trafficking and/or trade of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; to the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; to the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property; to offences against civil air transport; and to crime related to counterfeiting and/or smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol or fuels. 2. The Parties shall cooperate closely in the civil protection sector, placing particular emphasis on preventing and dealing with natural and man-made disasters and on disaster relief. Each Party may utilize the special education and expertise of the other Party, and whenever needed and possible each Party shall provide to the other its special infrastructure, particularly in fire-fighting...¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ “Εβδομη συνάντηση για τα ΜΟΕ μεταξύ Ελλάδας και ΠΓΔΜ,” *Naftemporiki.gr*, 9 February 2018, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1319621/ebdomi-sunantisi-gia-ta-moe-metaksu-elladas-kai-pgdm> (last access 3.03.2018)

¹³⁶ “Παραγωγικός» ο νέος γύρος επαφών με την ΠΓΔΜ για οικοδόμηση εμπιστοσύνης,” *skai.gr*, 9 February 2018, <http://www.skai.gr/news/greece/article/366544/paragogikos-o-neos-gyros-epafon-me-tin-pgdm-gia-oikodomisi-ebistosunis1/#ixzz5VXEK1Yzs> (last access 31.10.2018); “Παραγωγικός ο 7^{ος} Γύρος Συνομιλιών με την ΠΓΔΜ,” *ert.gr*, 9 February 2018, www.ert.gr/eidiseis/ellada/politiki/paragogikos-o-7os-gyros-synomilion-me-tin-pgdm/ (last access 31.10.2018)

¹³⁷ “03-05-2018: Συμμετοχή Αναπληρωτή Υπουργού Προστασίας του Πολίτη Νίκου Τόσκα στην 3η Υπουργική Συνάντηση Ελλάδας, Αλβανίας, Βουλγαρίας και ΠΓΔΜ,” *Υπουργείο Προστασίας του Πολίτη*, Αθήνα, 3 May 2018, http://www.mopocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=6371&Itemid=657&lang

¹³⁸ “Διασυνοριακή Συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ,” 1

¹³⁹ Full text of the agreement, 11, <http://www.pappaspost.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Athens-Skopje-English.pdf>

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*, 16

Article 17 addresses defense cooperation:

The Parties shall reinforce and expand their cooperation in the area of defense, including through frequent visits and contacts between the political and military leadership of their armed forces, the appropriate transfer of know-how and capacity-building, the cooperation in the areas of production, information and joint military exercises. Special emphasis shall be placed on personnel training which the Parties could provide to each other.¹⁴¹

Conclusions

Geography itself and the fact that the countries are adjacent, sharing a land border, has meant that even in “difficult times” - like the first half of the 1990s when their bilateral relations were strained - Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia maintained a limited level of police cooperation in the form of the “Border Committees”. The gradual normalization of their relations, beginning in September of 1995, allowed for attempts at a more systematic development and organization of police cooperation in the form of legal agreements like the 1998 Agreement for Police Cooperation. Unfortunately however, the so-called name dispute and the fact that all diplomatic efforts at its resolution, whether bilateral or under the aegis of the UN, failed to produce a result cast a long shadow over aspects of bilateral cooperation, especially those involving state agencies, like the police. Thus, it is characteristic that the 1998 Agreement has still to be ratified by the Greek Parliament. It was mainly through multilateral schemes that police contacts and cooperation developed between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the 2000s, with the two countries benefitting from the international community’s growing involvement in the Balkans and its efforts for greater intra-regional integration. An additional factor that could not but affect bilateral police cooperation was the wider deterioration of Athens – Skopje relations following the rise to power of Nikola Gruevski and his VMRO-DPMNE party in 2006.

The signing of the CBMs in June 2015, coinciding with the outbreak of the refugee crisis in the second half of 2015, provided an institutional framework and a strong motivation for growing police cooperation and contact. Since the second half of 2015, there have been a series of high-level meetings between the police forces of the two countries, as part of the CBM process, and in particular CBM number 10 on Justice and Home Affairs; but also as part of growing regional police

¹⁴¹ *ibid*

cooperation additionally involving Albania and Bulgaria. At the same time, the two police forces have initiated common training activities, while their cooperation is deepening (involving, for example, exchange of operational information) and expanding (beyond such “traditional areas” as smuggling, human trafficking and drugs) into new areas. On 9 October 2018 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s police sent a proposal to sign a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of cooperation in the fight against financial crime.¹⁴²

The research clearly shows that political will from the government in favor of improved bilateral relations, which existed since the June 2015 establishment of the CBMs, created the necessary political conditions that freed the two countries’ police leadership to develop relations with their counterparts. Pragmatism has always been a basic trait of people serving in the police forces. Their main mission is to fight crime effectively and, as pointed out by one of them “criminals and other organizations do not respect borders, nor do they have ethnic, religious or national differences”.¹⁴³ The dialogue that has taken place under the aegis of CBM number 10 has provided “possibilities to develop contacts, increased socialization and eventually building trust between the partners”.¹⁴⁴ And it is certainly the same pragmatism and the emphasis on advancing cooperation that, apparently, did not allow for issues like the name-dispute to obstruct the dialogue. As it was underlined by Greek police officers that participated in the official contacts after August 2015, “During our meetings we didn’t have any problem with the name... They were very careful [on the use of the name Macedonia]. They didn’t wish to undermine the process”.¹⁴⁵

The Prespes Agreement of June 2018 confirms the same political will for the further advancement of police cooperation. The agreement incorporates the CBMs, while Article 16, dedicated to police and civil protection, enumerates a whole range of activities where the two sides should have “close cooperation”. A ratification of the agreement will certainly provide a further boost to bilateral relations, including closer police cooperation.

¹⁴² “Διασυνοριακή Συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ,” 1

¹⁴³ Chupeska-Stanishkovska and Christidis, “Breaking the ‘Hostility Discourse’”, iii. Expert Survey

¹⁴⁴ *ibid*

¹⁴⁵ *ibid*

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Our study of the evolution of cooperation between the two countries in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (Police) enables the formulation of broader conclusions about bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Bilateral cooperation was not fully functional due to the name dispute and other related factors. The strongest indication confirming this pattern is the non-ratification by the Greek Parliament of any of the Bilateral Protocols or Memoranda of Understanding signed between the two countries from the mid-1990s up until the adoption of the CBMs in 2015.

Judicial cooperation

- The absence of bilateral protocols and agreements regarding judicial cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been counterproductive in the sense that there has been an absence of a specified framework for mutual understanding and limited knowledge of judicial practices and legal systems of each country for the other.
- The name dispute has had a lasting effect on the development of bilateral cooperation in the area of justice. Despite the positive effects of the 1995 Interim Agreement, judicial cooperation depended from 1995 onwards almost exclusively on the multilateral frameworks. Needless to say, these frameworks constitute the cornerstone of this type of cooperation at international level; however, bilateral agreements and protocols can expand and enhance possibilities for rendering judicial cooperation more effective.
- Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the general perception among Greek judges and law practitioners who have been involved in judicial cooperation with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is that the level of judicial cooperation has been “satisfactory” following the 1995 Interim Agreement and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s efforts to integrate itself into regional, European and international frameworks.
- There is widespread expectation that once the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia begins its accession negotiations with the EU, bilateral judicial cooperation will be further enhanced.

Police cooperation

- The gradual normalization of relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, beginning in September of 1995, allowed attempts for a more systematic development and organization of police cooperation to take place. Unfortunately however, the name dispute and the fact that all diplomatic efforts at its resolution, whether bilateral or

under the aegis of the UN, failed to produce a result cast a long shadow over aspects of bilateral cooperation, especially those involving state agencies, like the police.

- It was mainly through multilateral schemes that police contacts and cooperation developed between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the 2000s, with the two countries benefitting from the international community's growing involvement in the Balkans and its efforts for greater intra-regional integration.
- The signing of the CBMs in June 2015, coinciding with the outbreak of the refugee crisis in the second half of 2015, provided an institutional framework and a strong motivation for growing bilateral police cooperation and contacts. Since the second half of 2015, there has been a series of high-level meetings between the police forces of the two countries, part of the CBM negotiation process, and in particular CBM number 10 on Justice and Home Affairs; but also part of growing regional police cooperation involving, besides Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria as well.
- The dialogue that has taken place in the context of the CBM number 10 has provided "possibilities to develop contacts, increased socialization and eventually building trust between the partners". The two police forces have initiated common training activities, while their cooperation is deepening (involving, for example, exchange of operational information) and expanding (beyond such "traditional areas" as smuggling, human trafficking and drugs) into new areas.
- The Prespes Agreement incorporates the CBMs, promotes closer cooperation in police affairs and civil protection, enumerating a whole range of activities where the two sides should have "close cooperation". A ratification of the agreement will certainly provide a further boost to bilateral relations, including closer police cooperation.

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[%CF%83%CF%84%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BD-%CF%83%CE%B5-%CE%B4%CE%AF%CE%BA%CE%B7-%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD-%CE%BC%CE%AC%CE%BA%CE%B7-%CF%88%CF%89%CE%BC%CE%B9%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B7](#) (last access 22.11.2018)

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Appendix I

The 1995 Interim Agreement

Figure 1. Interim Agreement between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

No. 32193
—
GREECE
and
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC
OF MACEDONIA
Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the
Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Par-
ties). Signed at New York on 13 September 1995

Authentic text: English.

Registered by Greece on 13 October 1995.

—
GRÈCE
et
L'EX-RÉPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE
DE MACÉDOINE
Accord intérimaire (avec lettres connexes et traductions de
l'Accord intérimaire dans les langues des Parties con-
tractantes). Signé à New York le 13 septembre 1995

Texte authentique : anglais.

Enregistré par la Grèce le 13 octobre 1995.

Figure 2. Article 12 of the Interim Agreement which defines the legal framework for the judicial cooperation between the two countries

D. TREATY RELATIONS

Article 12

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Parties shall in their relations be directed by the provisions of the following bilateral agreements that had been concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part on 18 June 1959:

- (a) The convention concerning mutual legal relations,¹
- (b) The agreement concerning the reciprocal recognition and the enforcement of judicial decisions,² and
- (c) The agreement concerning hydro-economic questions.³

The Parties shall promptly consult with a view to entering into new agreements substantially similar to those referred to above.

2. The Parties shall consult with each other in order to identify other agreements concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part that will be deemed suitable for application in their mutual relations.

3. The Parties may conclude additional bilateral agreements in areas of mutual interest.

Figure 3. Articles 19 and 20 of the Interim Agreement which describe police and judicial cooperation

Article 19

1. The Parties shall cooperate in improving and promoting business and tourist travel.

2. Consistent with the obligations of the Party of the First Part arising from its membership in the European Union and from relevant instruments of the Union, the Parties shall make joint efforts to improve and accelerate customs and border formalities, including simplification in the issuance of visas to each other's citizens, taking into account Article 5, paragraph 2, of this Interim Accord.

3. The Parties shall endeavor to improve and modernize existing border crossings as required by the flow of traffic, and construct new border crossings as necessary.

Article 20

The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting.

F. FINAL CLAUSES

Appendix II

The 1998 Protocol for Police Cooperation signed on 8 July 1998 in Ohrid

Figure 4. Protocol for Police Cooperation, page 1

ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ
ΜΕΤΑΞΥ
ΤΟΥ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΥ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑΣ ΤΑΞΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ
ΕΝΔΙΑΜΕΣΗΣ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΥΟΡΚΗΣ
ΤΗΣ 13ΗΣ ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ 1995
ΚΑΙ
ΤΟΥ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΥ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ
ΕΝΔΙΑΜΕΣΗΣ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΥΟΡΚΗΣ
ΤΗΣ 13ΗΣ ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ 1995
ΠΕΡΙ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ ΣΕ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΑΡΜΟΔΙΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΤΟΥΣ

Το Υπουργείο Δημόσιας Τάξης του Πρώτου Μέρους της Ενδιάμεσης Συμφωνίας της Νέας Υόρκης της 13ης Σεπτεμβρίου του 1995 και του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών του Δευτέρου Μέρους, της Ενδιάμεσης Συμφωνίας της Νέας Υόρκης της 13ης Σεπτεμβρίου του 1995, καλούμενα εφεξής "Μέρη",

ανησυχώντας για τον κίνδυνο εξάπλωσης του διεθνούς οργανωμένου εγκλήματος, της διεθνούς παράνομης διακίνησης ναρκωτικών και ψυχοτρόπων ουσιών καθώς και της διεθνούς τρομοκρατίας,

εκφράζοντας την επιθυμία τους να συνεργασθούν στην καταπολέμηση της εγκληματικότητας,

σεβόμενα τις αρχές της ισότητας, τις διεθνείς συμφωνίες και νομοθεσίες που ισχύουν σε αμφότερα τα Κράτη και υπό την επιφύλαξη ανειλημμένων υποχρεώσεών τους, βάσει διμερών και πολυμερών συμφωνιών με τρίτα κράτη, τα Μέρη συμφωνούν τα ακόλουθα:

ΑΡΘΡΟ 1

1. Τα Μέρη θα συνεργάζονται και θα παρέχουν αμοιβαία βοήθεια στους εξής τομείς:
 - α) Καταπολέμηση της διεθνούς τρομοκρατίας,
 - β) Καταπολέμηση του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος,
 - γ) Καταπολέμηση της παράνομης παραγωγής, κατανάλωσης και διακίνησης ναρκωτικών και ψυχοτρόπων ουσιών,
 - δ) Καταπολέμηση των παράνομων δραστηριοτήτων σχετικά με τα όπλα,

Article 1 defines the areas concerned with police cooperation: international terrorism, organized crime, narcotics trafficking, arms trafficking, economic crimes, illegal immigration, forged documents and currency, crimes against human life, physical integrity and health, individual liberties, dignity and copyright, search for prosecuted persons, illegal trade of cultural items and valuables.

Figure 5. Protocol for Police Cooperation, page 2

συμπεριλαμβανομένων των βιολογικών, χημικών και ραδιολογικών όπλων, τα πυρομαχικά, τις εκρηκτικές ύλες, τα πυρηνικά υλικά, τις ραδιενεργές και δηλητηριώδεις ουσίες.

- ε) Καταπολέμηση του λαθρεμπορίου και των διεθνών παράνομων οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων, της νομιμοποίησης εσόδων (ξέπλυμα χρήματος) από εγκληματικές δραστηριότητες καθώς και την εξακρίβωση, την πρόληψη, την καταστολή και τη διερεύνηση των ύποπτων οικονομικών ανταλλαγών.
- στ) Καταπολέμηση της παράνομης μετανάστευσης, της παράνομης διέλευσης των συνόρων και της παράνομης διακίνησης ανθρώπων.
- ζ) Καταπολέμηση της πλαστογραφίας παντός είδους εγγράφου αποδεικτικού της ταυτότητας.
- η) Καταπολέμηση της παραχάραξης χαρτονομισμάτων και της πλαστογραφίας πιστωτικών καρτών, εγγράφων, μετοχών και λοιπών αξιών.
- θ) Καταπολέμηση των εγκλημάτων κατά της ανθρώπινης ζωής, σωματικής ακεραιότητας και υγείας, προσωπικής ελευθερίας και αξιοπρέπειας, ηθών καθώς και κατά της ιδιοκτησίας και περιουσιακών δικαιών.
- ι) Αναζήτηση εξαφανισθέντων προσώπων που έχουν διαπράξει εγκλήματα στην επικράτεια του άλλου Μέρους, καθώς και η αναγνώριση πτωμάτων.
- ια) Καταπολέμηση της παράνομης διακίνησης έργων ιστορικής και καλλιτεχνικής αξίας, πολύτιμων λίθων και μετάλλων καθώς και άλλων πολύτιμων αντικειμένων.
- 2. Τα Μέρη θα συνεργάζονται και σε άλλους τομείς, που αφορούν γενικά τον έλεγχο της εγκληματικότητας, την πρόληψη του εγκλήματος και τη διατήρηση της δημόσιας τάξης, εφ' όσον υπάρχει αμοιβαίο ενδιαφέρον.

ΑΡΘΡΟ 2

Η συνεργασία μεταξύ των δύο Μερών, στους προαναφερόμενους στο άρθρο 1 τομείς θα επιτυγχάνεται με:

- α) Ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών και εμπειριών σε τομείς κοινού ενδιαφέροντος.
- β) Ανταλλαγή εμπειριών, σχετικά με τη χρήση εγκληματολογικής τεχνολογίας καθώς και μεθόδων και μέσων για την εγκληματολογική έρευνα.
- γ) Ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών για την πρόληψη και καταστολή κάθε μορφής οργανωμένης εγκληματικότητας καθώς και για άτομα και οργανώσεις που ενέχονται σ' αυτήν.

Article 2 describes the procedural aspects of cooperation: exchange of information and expertise in areas of common interest, exchange of experience when it comes to the use of forensic technology and the means for criminal investigation, exchange of legal texts.

Figure 6. Protocol for Police Cooperation, page 3

- δ) Ανταλλαγή εθνικών νομικών κειμένων και διατάξεων, έντυπου υλικού, δημοσιευμάτων και αποτελεσμάτων επιστημονικών ερευνών σε τομείς που καλύπτονται από την παρούσα Συμφωνία.

ΑΡΘΡΟ 3

Τα Μέρη αναλαμβάνουν την υποχρέωση να συνεργαστούν στην καταπολέμηση της παράνομης μετανάστευσης.
Στα πλαίσια αυτά θα δέχονται τα πρόσωπα, που διέρχονται παράνομα τα σύνορα ενός των Μερών, προερχόμενα από την επικράτεια του άλλου Μέρους.
Μέχρι τη σύναψη μιας συμφωνίας Επανεισδοχής, τα Μέρη θα δέχονται τα πρόσωπα που διαμένουν παράνομα στο έδαφος του άλλου Μέρους, με βάση παραστατικά στοιχεία που θεμελιώνουν την παράνομη μετανάστευση ή την υπέρβαση της νόμιμης παραμονής.
Για την επανεισδοχή των ανωτέρω προσώπων, οι οικείες Διπλωματικές Αποστολές των Μερών, θα εκδίδουν πάραυτα, μετά από αίτηση ενός των Μερών, τα απαραίτητα για την Επανεισδοχή τους ταξιδιωτικά έγγραφα, αφού ενημερωθούν για το σκοπό αυτό τουλάχιστον πέντε (5) ημέρες νωρίτερα.

ΑΡΘΡΟ 4

1. Κάθε Μέρος, μπορεί εξ'ολοκλήρου ή εν μέρει να αρνηθεί τη συνεργασία στις περιπτώσεις που θα μπορούσαν να θέσουν σε κίνδυνο την εθνική του κυριαρχία, την ασφάλεια ή τα εθνικά του συμφέροντα ή αντίκεινται στην εθνική του νομοθεσία. Η άρνηση συνεργασίας κοινοποιείται εγγράφως στο άλλο Μέρος χωρίς καθυστέρηση.
2. Η εφαρμογή της παρούσας Συμφωνίας υπόκειται στην εθνική νομοθεσία κάθε Μέρους.

ΑΡΘΡΟ 5


1. Έκαστο των Μερών δεν θα δημοσιεύει ή γνωστοποιεί εμπιστευτικές πληροφορίες σε τρίτη χώρα, εκτός εάν εξασφαλίσει προηγουμένως τη συγκατάθεση του άλλου Μέρους.
2. Οι πληροφορίες προσωπικού χαρακτήρα, θα χρησιμοποιούνται μόνο για τους σκοπούς που παραστέθηκαν, σύμφωνα με την εθνική νομοθεσία των Μερών.

Article 3 describes in more detail the common actions against illegal immigration.

Article 4 defines the cases in which the two parties may refuse to cooperate completely or partially (cases that might endanger national sovereignty, security and national interests, cases which are not covered by national legislation).

Article 5 states that the two parties cannot share confidential information with third countries without reciprocal approval.

Figure 7. Protocol for Police Cooperation, page 4



Article 6 defines the authorities responsible for police cooperation, namely the Ministry for Public Order of Greece and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (In the original text the ministries are described in the following manner: the “Ministry for Public Order of the First Party of the Interim Agreement of New York of 13 September 1995 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Second Party of the Interim Agreement of New York of 13 September 1995”)

Article 7 states that the two parties will form a Coordinating Committee which will supervise the implementation of the agreement and advocate the signing of more bilateral agreements if necessary for the improvement of police cooperation.

Article 8 states that English will be the main language used in the context of police cooperation and that other international languages could be used by both parties.

Article 9 states that this agreement will not affect the rights or the obligations of the two Parties related to other international agreements.

5

APΘΡΟ 10

- APGPO 11

Ο ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ


DOI: 10.1002/for

Article 11 states that the agreement will be valid starting 90 days after the two parties sign it.


Appendix III

Greek law 3157/2003 concerning the ratification of the “Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”

Figure 9. Greek law 3157/2003, page 1



0100162/000000000000



2451

ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΕΩΣ

ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ

ΤΕΥΧΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟ

Αρ. Φύλλου 162
26 Ιουνίου 2003

ΝΟΜΟΣ ΥΠ' ΑΡΙΘ. 3157

Κύρωση της Συμφωνίας σταθεροποίησης και σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των Κρατών - Μελών τους αφ' ενός, και της πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας, αφ' ετέρου, μετά των συνημμένων δηλώσεων και της Τελικής Πράξης αυτής.

**Ο ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΣ
ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ**

Εκδίδομε τον ακόλουθο νόμο που ψήφισε η Βουλή:

Άρθρο πρώτο

Κυρώνεται και έχει την ισχύ, που ορίζει το άρθρο 28 παρ. 1 του Συντάγματος, η Συμφωνία σταθεροποίησης και σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των Κρατών - Μελών τους, αφ' ενός και της πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας, αφ' ετέρου, μετά των συνημμένων δηλώσεων και της Τελικής Πράξης αυτής, που υπογράφηκε στο Λουξεμβούργο στις 9 Απριλίου 2001, της οποίας το κείμενο σε πρωτότυπο στην ελληνική γλώσσα έχει ως εξής:

ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ

για τη σύναψη συμφωνίας σταθεροποίησης και σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους, αφενός, και της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας, αφετέρου.

ΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ,

Η ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΩΝ,

Έχοντας υπόψη,

τη συνθήκη για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και ιδίως το άρθρο 310 σε συνδυασμό με το άρθρο 300 παράγραφος 2 πρώτο εδάφιο τελευταία φράση και το άρθρο 300 παράγραφος 3, δεύτερο εδάφιο,

τη συνθήκη για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας Άνθρακα και Χάλυβα και, ιδίως, το άρθρο 95,

τη συνθήκη για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας

Ατομικής Ενέργειας, και ιδίως το άρθρο 101 δεύτερο εδάφιο,

την πρόταση της Επιτροπής, τη σύμφωνη γνώμη του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου,

Μετά από διαβουλεύσεις με τη συμβουλευτική επιτροπή και με τη σύμφωνη γνώμη του Συμβουλίου σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 95 της συνθήκης για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας Άνθρακα και Χάλυβα,

Έχοντας υπόψη την έγκριση του Συμβουλίου σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 101 της συνθήκης για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας Άνθρακα και Χάλυβα,

Εκτιμώντας τα εξής:

(1) Η συμφωνία σταθεροποίησης και σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους, αφενός, και της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας, αφετέρου, υπεγράφη εξ ονόματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας στο Λουξεμβούργο στις 2001, σύμφωνα με την απόφαση αριθ./ΕΚ¹ του Συμβουλίου με την επιφύλαξη της σύναψής της σε μεταγενέστερη ημερομηνία,

(2) Οι εμπορικές διατάξεις που περιέχονται στην συμφωνία έχουν εξαιρετικό χαρακτήρα που έχει σχέση με την πολιτική που εφαρμόζεται στο πλαίσιο της διαδικασίας σταθεροποίησης και σύνδεσης και δεν θα αποτελέσουν, για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, προηγούμενο όσον αφορά την εμπορική πολιτική της Κοινότητας έναντι τρίτων χωρών εκτός εκείνων των Δυτικών Βαλκανίων.

(3) Η συμφωνία θα πρέπει να εγκριθεί.

ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΖΟΥΝ:

Άρθρο 1

Η συμφωνία σταθεροποίησης και σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους,

¹ ΕΕΚ [...], [...], σ. [...]

Appendix IV

Official data provided by Greek Police Headquarters concerning already signed agreements and protocols for cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels

(http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories/2015/pinakas_symf_ell.pdf)

Figure 10. Bilateral agreements on police cooperation signed by Greece

ΠΙΝΑΚΕΣ ΣΥΝΑΦΘΕΙΣΩΝ ΔΙΜΕΡΩΝ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΩΝ

ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ & ΕΠΑΝΕΙΣΔΟΧΗΣ

ΔΙΜΕΡΕΙΣ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΕΣ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ

α/α	Χώρα	Τόπος / ημ-νία υπογραφής	Κύρωση
1.	Αίγυπτος	Κάιρο, 21/02/1998	N.2754/1999 (ΦΕΚ Α' 251 /19-11-1999)
2.	Αλβανία	Αθήνα, 17/07/1992	N.2147/1993 (ΦΕΚ Α' 96 /16-6-1993)
		Τίρανα, 12/03/2010 (Πρωτόκολλο Εφαρμογής)	N. 3962/2011 (ΦΕΚ 98 Α' /29-4-2011)
3.	Αρμενία	Αθήνα, 18/06/1996	N.2499/1997 (ΦΕΚ 100 Α' /28-5-1997)
4.	Βοσνία & Ερζεγοβίνη	Αθήνα, 09/02/2006	N. 3725/2008 (ΦΕΚ 255 Α' /17-12-08)
5.	Βουλγαρία	Αθήνα, 08/07/1991	N. 2096/1992 (ΦΕΚ 188 Α' /30-11-92)
		Σόφια, 22/02/1996 (Πρωτόκολλο Εφαρμογής)	Εγκρίθηκε με τη υπ' αριθμ. ΦΟ544/3/ΑΣ4559/10-04-96 Απόφαση (ΦΕΚ Α' 68/23-04-96)
		Σόφια, 29/04/2008 (Συμφωνία για την ίδρυση και τη λειτουργία Κέντρου Επαφής)	N.3779/2009 (ΦΕΚ 132 Α' /7-8-2009)
		Σόφια, 29/04/2008 (Συμφωνία για κοινό έλεγχο σε σχέση με τη διέλευση των συνόρων [one-stop control])	N.3780/2009 (ΦΕΚ 133 Α' /7-8-2009)
		Σόφια, 09/06/2010 (Αναθεωρημένη Συμφωνία)	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)
6.	Γαλλία	Παρίσι, 19/05/2008	N. 3901/2010 (ΦΕΚ 215 Α' /23-12-2010)
7.	Η.Π.Α.	Κέρκυρα, 28/06/2009 (Συμφωνία σχετικά με την ενίσχυση της συνεργασίας για την πρόληψη και καταπολέμηση του σοβαρού εγκλήματος.)	N.3800/2009 (ΦΕΚ 162 Α' /4-9-2009)
8.	Ιράν	Τεχεράνη, 16/03/1995	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)
9.	Ισραήλ	Αθήνα, 05/04/1995	N.2383/1996 (ΦΕΚ 40 Α' /7-3-1996)
		Ιερουσαλήμ, 08/10/2013 (Αναθεώρηση Συμφωνίας)	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)
10.	Ιταλία	Ρώμη, 10/01/2000	N.3159/2003 (ΦΕΚ 64 Α' /26-06-2003)
11.	Κίνα	Πεκίνο, 05/06/2007	N.3963/2011 (ΦΕΚ 99 Α' /29-04-11)

12.	Κροατία	Αθήνα, 23/11/1998	N.2756/1999 (ΦΕΚ 253Α' /19-11-99) (δεν έχει τεθεί σε ισχύ)
13.	Κύπρος	Λευκωσία, 03/12/2007	N.3936/2011 (ΦΕΚ 56 Α' /21-03-11)
14.	Λιθουανία	Αθήνα, 26/06/1995	N. 2426/1996 (ΦΕΚ Α' 149/ 04-07-96) (δεν έχει τεθεί σε ισχύ)
15.	Μάλτα	Βαλέτα, 24/05/2001	N.3125/2003 (ΦΕΚ 63 Α' /14-03-2003)
16.	Ουγγαρία	Βουδαπέστη, 17/02/1993	N.2222/1994 (ΦΕΚ 111 Α' /06-07-94)
17.	Ουκρανία	Αθήνα, 24/04/2001	N.3158/2003 (ΦΕΚ 163 Α' 163/26-6-2003) (δεν έχει τεθεί σε ισχύ)
18.	Πακιστάν	Ισλαμαμπάντ, 12/05/2005	N.3571/2007 (ΦΕΚ 124 Α' /08-06-2007)
19.	Π.Γ.Δ.Μ.	Αχρίδα, 08/07/1998	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)
20.	Πολωνία	Βαρσοβία, 18/06/1993	N.2221/1994 (ΦΕΚ 110 Α' /6-7-1994)
21.	Ρουμανία	Αθήνα, 06/06/1992	N.2138/1993 (ΦΕΚ 84 Α' /28-5-1993)
22.	Ρωσία	Αθήνα, 06/12/2001	N.3215/2003 (ΦΕΚ Α' -311/31-12-2003)
23.	Σερβία	Αθήνα, 17/10/2008	N.3935/2011 (ΦΕΚ 55 Α' /21-03-11)
24.	Σλοβενία	Λουμπλιάνα, 27/09/2002	N.3269/2004 (ΦΕΚ 186 Α' /11-10-2004)
25.	Τουρκία	Άγκυρα, 21/01/2000	N.2926/2001 (ΦΕΚ 139 Α' /27-06-2001)

Figure 11. Bilateral Agreements and protocols for readmission

ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ ΔΙΜΕΡΩΝ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΩΤΟΚΟΛΛΩΝ ΕΠΑΝΕΙΣΔΟΧΗΣ

α/α	Χώρα	Τόπος / ημ-νία υπογραφής	Κύρωση
1.	Βοσνία & Ερζεγοβίνη	Αθήνα, 09/02/2006 (<i>Συμφωνία και Εφαρμοστικό Πρωτόκολλο</i>)	N. 3547/2007 (ΦΕΚ 67 Α' /20-03-07)
2.	Βουλγαρία	Αθήνα, 15/12/1995 (<i>Συμφωνία και Εφαρμοστικό Πρωτόκολλο</i>)	Με το Ν2406/96 (ΦΕΚ Α' 102/04-06-96). Το Πρωτόκολλο Εφαρμογής εγκρίθηκε και τέθηκε σε ισχύ με τη νηπ' αριθμ. Α3/ΑΣ 1711/13-05-96 Ρηματική Διακοίνωση του ΥΠ.ΕΞ.
3.	Γαλλία	Αθήνα, 15/12/1999	N.2917/2001 (ΦΕΚ 115 Α' /11-6-2001) (δεν έχει τεθεί σε ισχύ)
4.	Ελβετία	Βέρνη, 28/08/2006	N.3726/2008 (ΦΕΚ 256 Α' /17-12-2008) (δεν έχει τεθεί σε ισχύ)
5.	Ιταλία	Ρώμη, 30/04/1999	N.2857/00 (ΦΕΚ 246 Α' /7-11-00)
6.	Κροατία	Αθήνα, 10/03/1995	N.2350/1995 (ΦΕΚ 225 Α' /1-11-1995)
7.	Λιθουανία	Βίλνιους, 01/07/1999	N.2911/2001 (ΦΕΚ 93 Α' /9-5-2001)
8.	Λετονία	Αθήνα, 17/03/1999	N.2861/2000 (ΦΕΚ 255 Α' / 16-11-00)

9.	Ουγγαρία	Αθήνα, 29/01/2003 (Συμφωνία και Πρωτόκολλο Εφαρμογής)	N.3321/2005 (ΦΕΚ 53 Α' /1-3-2005)
10.	Πολωνία	Βαρσοβία, 21/11/1994 (Συμφωνία)	N.2384/1996 (ΦΕΚ 41 Α' /7-3-1996)

11.	Ρουμανία	Αθήνα, 06/06/1994	N.2301/1995 (ΦΕΚ 70 Α' /12-4-1995)
		Βουκουρέστι, 06/10/1994	Εγκρίθηκε και τέθηκε σε ισχύ με την υπ' αριθμ.Φ0544/4386/27-10-94 Απόφαση ΥΔΤ.
12.	Ρωσία	Μόσχα, 18/12/2012 (Πρωτόκολλο Εφαρμογής Συμφωνίας Επανεισδοχής Ε.Ε. - Ρωσίας)	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)
13.	Σερβία	Βελιγράδι, 11/09/2013 (Πρωτόκολλο Εφαρμογής Συμφωνίας Επανεισδοχής ΕΕ- Σερβίας)	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)
14.	Σλοβενία	Αθήνα, 06/04/1994	N.2353/1995 (ΦΕΚ 229 Α' /6-11-1995)
15.	Τουρκία	Αθήνα, 08/11/2001 (Πρωτόκολλο για την εφαρμογή της ρήτρας επανεισδοχής [άρθρο 8] Συμφωνίας Αστυνομικής Συνεργασίας)	N.3030/2002 (ΦΕΚ 163 Α' /15-07-2002)

Figure 12. Multilateral agreements signed by Greece

ΣΥΝΑΦΘΕΙΣΕΣ ΠΟΛΥΜΕΡΕΙΣ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΕΣ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ

α/α	Χώρα	Τόπος / ημ-νία υπογραφής	Κύρωση
1.	Οργανισμός Οικονομικής Συνεργασίας Ευξείνου Πόντου (ΟΣΕΠ)	Κέρκυρα, 02/10/1998 (<i>Συμφωνία</i>)	N.2933/2001 (Φ.Ε.Κ. 150 Α' /10-7-2001)
		1° Πρωτόκολλο: Τιφλίδα, 30/04/1999	N.3334/2005 (Φ.Ε.Κ. 92 Α' /12.04.05)
		2° Πρωτόκολλο: Κίεβο, 15/03/2002	N.3452/2006 (Φ.Ε.Κ. 70 Α' /03.04.06)
		3° Πρωτόκολλο: Αθήνα, 03/12/2004	N.2933/2001 (Φ.Ε.Κ. 150 Α' /10-7-2001)
2.	Σύμβαση του Κέντρου Επιβολής του Νόμου Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης (SELEC)	Βουκουρέστι, 09/12/2009	N.4054/2012 (ΦΕΚ 45 Α' /7-3-12)
		Πρόσθετο Πρωτόκολλο περί προνομίων και ασυλιών: Βουκουρέστι, 24/11/2010	N.4245/14 (ΦΕΚ 62 Α' /11-3-14)
3.	Τριμερές Πρωτόκολλο Συνεργασίας Ελλάδας – Βουλγαρίας -Ρουμανίας	Σόφια, 08/09/1998	N.2814/2000 (Φ.Ε.Κ. 69 Α' /10-3-2000)
4.	Συμφωνία Ελλάδας- Βουλγαρίας-Τουρκίας για την ίδρυση Κοινού Κέντρου Επαφής με σκοπό την αστυνομική και τελωνειακή συνεργασία	Σόφια, 25/05/2015	(διαδικασία κύρωσης)

Greece has signed and ratified five protocols for police cooperation with Bulgaria, two with Romania, two with Bosnia- Herzegovina, two with Slovenia, two with Croatia, two with Albania, two with Serbia (one of which is in the process of ratification) and two with Turkey. The Protocol for Police Cooperation with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, signed in 1998, has not yet been ratified.

Appendix V

Bilateral agreements for judicial cooperation in civil and criminal law

(Data provided by the Greek Ministry of Justice: <http://www.ministryofjustice.gr>)

Figure 13. Bilateral agreements on judicial cooperation signed by Greece

ΔΙΜΕΡΕΙΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΕΙΣ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΙΚΗΣ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ & ΑΛΛΩΝ ΧΩΡΩΝ		
ΣΥΜΒΑΛΛΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ	ΝΟΜΟΣ	ΦΕΚ :
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΓΙΟΥΓΚΟΣΛΑΒΙΑ	N.Δ.4009/1959	238 Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΡΟΥΜΑΝΙΑ	N.Δ.429/1974	178 Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΕΣΣΔ	N.Δ.1242/1982	44Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΛΙΒΑΝΟΣ	N.1099/1980	87Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΣ	N.1769/1988	53Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΣΥΡΙΑ	N.1450/1984	87Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΑΥΣΤΡΑΛΙΑ	N.3277/2004	200Α
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΜΕΞΙΚΟ	N.3350/2005	146Α
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΤΥΝΗΣΙΑ	N.2312/1994	120Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΚΥΠΡΟΣ	N.1548/1985	95Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΚΙΝΑ	N.2358/1995	239Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΑΛΒΑΝΙΑ	N.2311/1995	119 Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ – ΚΑΝΑΔΑΣ	2746/1999	225 τ.Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ-ΑΡΜΕΝΙΑ	3007/2002	85 τ.Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - Η.Π.Α.	2804/2000 N. 3771/2009	49 τ.Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑ	2813/2000	68 Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΒΟΥΛΓΑΡΙΑ	N.841/78	228 τ.Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ – ΟΥΓΓΑΡΙΑ	N. 1149/1981	117/1981 Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ – ΠΟΛΩΝΙΑ	N. 1184/1981	198/81 Α΄
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ – ΤΣΕΧΟΣΛΟΒΑΚΙΑ	N. 1323/1983	8/83 Α΄

In cases applying to post-1991 Yugoslav successor states, the Greek Ministry of Justice provides the following clarification:

“6. ΓΙΟΥΓΚΟΣΛΑΒΙΑ: Ν. Δ 4009/59 – ΦΕΚ Α΄ ΑΡΙΘΜ. ΦΥΛΛ. 238/1959. Η οποία ισχύει και με τα κράτη που προέκυψαν μετά την διάλυσή της : ΣΕΡΒΙΑ - ΜΑΥΡΟΒΟΥΝΙΟ - ΚΡΟΑΤΙΑ – ΣΛΟΒΕΝΙΑ” [Yugoslavia: law 4009/1959 – Government Gazette, issue 238/1959. The law applies to the countries that succeeded it after its dissolution, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia]

Figure 14. Bilateral protocols for the extradition of criminals, signed by Greece

ΔΙΜΕΡΕΙΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΕΙΣ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΙΚΗΣ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ & ΑΛΛΩΝ ΧΩΡΩΝ		
ΣΥΜΒΑΛΛΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ	ΝΟΜΟΣ	ΦΕΚ :
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΓΙΟΥΓΚΟΣΛΑΒΙΑ	N.Δ.4009/1959	238 Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΡΟΥΜΑΝΙΑ	N.Δ.429/1974	178 Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΕΣΣΔ	N.Δ.1242/1982	44Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΛΙΒΑΝΟΣ	N.1099/1980	87Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΣ	N.1769/1988	53Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΣΥΡΙΑ	N.1450/1984	87Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΑΥΣΤΡΑΛΙΑ	N.3277/2004	200Α
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΜΕΞΙΚΟ	N.3350/2005	146Α
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΤΥΝΗΣΙΑ	N.2312/1994	120Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΚΥΠΡΟΣ	N.1548/1985	95Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΚΙΝΑ	N.2358/1995	239Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΑΛΒΑΝΙΑ	N.2311/1995	119 Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΚΑΝΑΔΑΣ	2746/1999	225 τ.Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ-ARMENIA	3007/2002	85 τ.Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - Η.Π.Α.	2804/2000 N. 3771/2009	49 τ.Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑ	2813/2000	68 Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΒΟΥΛΓΑΡΙΑ	N.841/78	228 τ.Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΟΥΓΓΑΡΙΑ	N. 1149/1981	117/1981 Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΠΟΛΩΝΙΑ	N. 1184/1981	198/81 Α'
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ - ΤΣΕΧΟΣΛΟΒΑΚΙΑ	N. 1323/1983	8/83 Α'

APPENDIX VI

Chronology of bi- and multilateral meetings related to enhancing police cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(compiled from data found in the official police review *Αστυνομική Επισκόπηση* and the research on the evolution of discussions on the CBMs)

23/6/1998: Signing of a bilateral protocol for border cooperation in Skopje by Ministers for Foreign Relations: Theodoros Pangalos (Θεόδωρος Πάγκαλος) for Greece and Blagoj Hadjinski for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

8/7/1998: Signing of the Bilateral Protocol for Police Cooperation in Ohrid (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) by Greek Minister for Public Order Georgios Romaos (Γεώργιος Ρωμαίος) and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tomislav Cokrevski.

29/7/1999: Meeting between the Prime Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ljubco Georgievski, and the Greek Minister for Public Order, Michalis Chrysochoidis (Μιχάλης Χρυσοχοΐδης).

22-26/5/2000: Completion of the third Meeting on Security in the Context of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe on the following issue: “Combating Organized Crime and Corruption”, held in Athens with police officials from Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Bosnia- Herzegovina.

9-10/2001: Completion of the third meeting of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) taskforce concerning human trafficking, sex trafficking and exploitation of women. The meeting was held in Thessaloniki.

2/2002: Meeting between police officials from Balkan countries on ways and means to combat cross-border criminal activities, held in Thessaloniki.

11-12/2002: The Greek Undersecretary of Public Order participated in the meeting of Ministers for Public Order and Internal Affairs in the context of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII), which took place in Italy.

25/11/2002: Completion of the International Ministerial Meeting on Organized Crime in Southeastern Europe and the Western Balkans, held in London.

1-2/2003: Meeting between police officials from the countries of Southeastern Europe. The meeting was held in Thessaloniki and organized by the Greek police.

3-4/2003: Seminar on “Balkan Heroin Routes”, organized by the Greek Ministry for Public Order and held in Thessaloniki.

5-6/2003: Seminar on the issue of car theft, held in Athens.

5-6/2004: International conference on security issues related to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, held in Athens.

9-10/2004: Bilateral meeting between the Greek General Secretary of the Ministry for Public Order, Leonidas Evaggelidis (Λεωνίδας Ευαγγελίδης), and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hazbi Lika. The meeting was held in Thessaloniki.

28/10/2005: Completion of the fifth Ministerial Meeting on organized crime and illegal immigration summoned by Slovenia and Austria, held in Slovenia.

9-10-2010: Completion of a post-graduate programme organized by the Greek police and specialized on the “Criminal Investigation of personal computers and web-related crimes”. The seminars took place in the city of Veroia in Greece.

11-12/2012: Completion of a seminar of the European Police College (CEPOL) about the management and the expatriation of illegal immigrants. The courses took place in the city of Veroia in Greece.

7/3/2015: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, discussed CBMs in Riga, Latvia.

13/5/2015: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, met in the context of a NATO Conference in Antalya, in Turkey.

24/6/2015: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, announced the 11 CBMs in a joint press conference. (CBM number ten deals with Justice and Home Affairs). Nikos Kotzias also met with Prime Minister Gruevski of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.



(photo credit: *republika*)

25/10/2015: Under the auspices of the EU in Brussels, a meeting was held on the issue of migration (“Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route”) with the participation of Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. One of the measures proposed in the meeting was the “strengthening of border cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.

30/10/2015: First CBM meeting held in Athens. Decision to incorporate all contacts between the two police forces as part of the activities of the tenth CBM.

11/12/2015: Second CBM meeting held in Athens.

17/12/2015: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, held a meeting on the issue of strengthening relations between the two countries.



(photo credit: flickr)

25/2/2016: Meeting in Thessaloniki between the two countries' heads of police forces: Konstantinos Tsouvalas (Κωνσταντίνος Τσουβάλας) for Greece and Gorančo Savovski for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The talks focused on improving communication channels and the common fight against organized crime.



(photo credit: karfitsa)



(photo credit: karfitsa)

20/4/2016: First meeting on cross-border cooperation between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, held in Thessaloniki.

25/4/2016: Third CBM meeting, held in Skopje.

20/5/2016: The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, met in Brussels and discussed the progress of the CBMs.

27/5/2016: The two countries' Heads of the Internal Affairs Bureaus met in Thessaloniki while common training activities between the two police forces began.

13/6/2016: Fourth CBM meeting, held in Athens covering connectivity projects, police cooperation, EU programs, culture, education, civil protection, public administration, health, business initiatives and cooperation of diplomatic academies.

25/8/2016: Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), visited the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, met with his counterpart, Nikola Poposki and discussed the progress of the CBMs.



(photo credit: flickr)

23/11/2016: Fifth CBM meeting, held in Skopje.

10/4/2017: Meeting on the progress of the CBMs, held in Skopje.

29/8/2017: Sixth CBM meeting, held in Athens. Police cooperation and civil protection were part of the agenda.

31/8/2017: Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Dimitrov, on the progress of the CBMs, in Skopje.



(photo credit: flickr)

6/9/2017: Meeting between General Police Inspector of Borders and Border Protection and Head of Police of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in Brussels at a Summit meeting of the Heads of Police Forces of EU member states.

4/10/2017: Second Ministerial Meeting in Thessaloniki between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.



(photo credit: flickr)

9/10/2017: Meeting between the Head of Greek Police, Konstantinos Tsouvalas (Κωνσταντίνος Τσουβάλας), and his counterpart from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Lazo Velkovski. Specification of measures to enhance police cooperation.

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BUILDING MEASURES (2015) | Research Report_December 17, 2018



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18/12/2017: Meeting of the Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia heads of police on strengthening police cooperation.



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20/12/2017: Meeting on the issue of military cooperation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

11/1/2018: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias (Νίκος Κοτζιάς), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Dimitrov, discussed the progress of the CBMs in Athens.

9/2/2018: Seventh CBM meeting.

3/5/2018: Third Ministerial Meeting on the issue of cross-border cooperation between Greece, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria.

17/6/2018: Signing of the Prespes Agreement, which incorporates the CBMs and enhances bilateral cooperation on police and security.



(photo credit: enikonomia)



(photo credit: in.gr)

11/9/2018: Meeting between officials from Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the issue of better border control with a view to combating the illegal trafficking of radioactive substances.

9/10/2018: Proposition sent by the police of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Greece for a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in the fight against financial crime.

APPENDIX VII

The text of the CBMs agreement between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (June 2015)

Strengthening Mutual Confidence and Bilateral Relations Athens – Skopje

Skopje, 24 June 2015

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Nikos Kotzias visited the Republic of Macedonia on 24 June 2015. The visit was the first bilateral one in almost 11 years.

A non exhaustive list of practical cooperation measures was agreed and endorsed by Foreign Ministers Poposki and Kotzias today in Skopje, aimed at strengthening mutual confidence and advancing overall bilateral relations, thereby contributing to creating a favourable climate for settling the name difference in the spirit of European values and our common interests.

This approach for strengthening mutual confidence through practical cooperation is in line with the letter and the spirit of 1995 Interim Accord.

The non exhaustive list includes 11 measures for practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as: Political and EU Affairs, Education and Culture, Trade and Economic Cooperation, Connectivity, Justice and Home Affairs (as presented below).

The identified areas and forms of cooperation are both diversified and substantial. In the process of strengthening mutual trust and confidence, they can both be deepened and widened.

Joint Task Force of the Foreign Ministries was established on 19 June 2015 to be in charge of the implementation of the bilateral confidence building measures. The Task Force is planned to have its second meeting in Athens within the next two months.

Cooperation is the best confidence building measure. Today we made a step forward together, by committing to jointly pursue an active approach to advancing bilateral cooperation and strengthening mutual confidence. Bilateral high level political dialogue will continue.

A. Political & E.U. Affairs

1. Political consultations of the Foreign Ministries on international, multilateral, regional, horizontal, security and consular issues, as well as on regional cooperation initiatives / Plan for annual consultations.
2. Bilateral dialogue on EU Affairs and strengthening bilateral cooperation in the IPA II Programs, having in mind the priority areas as determined by the Strategy Paper and the annual programs. Cooperation in cross-border programs, twinning and TAIEX.
3. Cooperation of the National Center for Public Administration in Athens with the Agency for Administration in Skopje.

B. Education & Culture

4. Cooperation between Universities, Research Centers and Institutes.

5. Exchange university students' scholarships.

6. Encourage measures for cultural cooperation and exchange.

C. Trade & Economic cooperation

7. Strengthen economic, trade and commercial ties – Business Forums.

D. Connectivity

8. Improve Energy connectivity/ gas – line.

9. Improve Bitola – Florina railway connection.

E. Justice and Home Affairs

10. Consultations between representatives of the competent Ministries on internal affairs, border police and customs administration with a view to exchanging information and enhancing the fight against organized crime, corruption, terrorism, illegal migration and drug trafficking.

F. Miscellaneous

11. Cooperation in Health sector.

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