

# COUNTRY REPORT ITALY



## Undocumented Migration

Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends  
across Europe

Francesco Fasani

*Researcher (CReAM, University College London)*

November 2008 (revised August 2009)



CLANDESTINO

## **CLANDESTINO**

### **Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable**

#### **Data and Trends across Europe**

This interdisciplinary project is a response to the need for supporting policy makers in designing and implementing appropriate policies regarding undocumented migration. The project aims (a) to provide an inventory of data and estimates on undocumented migration (stocks and flows) in selected EU countries, (b) to analyse these data comparatively, (c) to discuss the ethical and methodological issues involved in the collection of data, the elaboration of estimates and their use, (d) to propose a new method for evaluating and classifying data/estimates on undocumented migration in the EU. Twelve selected EU countries (Greece, Italy, France and Spain in southern Europe; Netherlands, UK, Germany and Austria in Western and Central Europe; Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in Central Eastern Europe) are under study in this project. Three non EU transit migration countries used as key 'stepping stones' by undocumented migrants en route to the EU, notably Turkey, Ukraine and one Maghreb country, are also analysed. Where relevant, the project considers the factors affecting the shift between legal and undocumented status among migrant populations. The project work programme is complemented by two regional workshops with policy makers and academics, 12 fieldvisits each resulting in a series of meetings with key policy actors, NGOs and journalists working on migration in each of the EU countries studied. The CLANDESTINO database on irregular migration in Europe, the Project reports and Policy Briefs are available at: <http://clandestino.eliamep.gr>

Each country report reviews all relevant data sources on irregular migration (e.g. apprehended aliens at the border or in the inland, expulsion orders, people registered through health or other welfare schemes for undocumented immigrants, municipal registers, statistical estimates from national and European statistical services), assesses the validity of the different estimates given and where appropriate produces a new estimate for the year 2008 for the country studied. The country reports cover the period between 2000 and 2007 and the last year for which data or estimates were available when the study was finalised in 2009, notably in some countries 2007 and in other countries 2008. This quantitative analysis is complemented by a critical review of qualitative studies and by interviews with key informants with a view to exploring the pathways into and out of undocumented status in each country. It is noted that the non-registered nature of irregular migration makes any quantification difficult and always produces estimates rather than hard data.

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is the coordinating institution of the CLANDESTINO consortium. CLANDESTINO Partners include the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna, the Hamburg Institute of Economics (HWWI), the Centre for International Relations (CIR) in Warsaw, the COMPAS research centre at the University of Oxford, and the Platform of International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) in Brussels.

**CRaM** (<http://www.econ.ucl.ac.uk/cream>) is an independent and interdisciplinary research centre located in the Department of Economics at University College London. CRaM's research focuses on the causes, patterns and consequences of international population mobility and movements affecting UK, Europe and associated global processes. CRaM aims at informing the public debate on migration in the UK and in Europe by providing new insight, helping to steer the current policy debate in a direction that is based on carefully researched evidence without partisan bias. CRaM contributes to the development of new theories and methodological advances in data analysis, ensuring the ability to contribute and inform on a wide range of issues of policy

concern, and establishing a reputation for analysis that is accepted as open, transparent and reliable. Research conducted within the Centre is both theoretical and empirical. Although emphasis is on quantitative research, CReAM explores new and interdisciplinary approaches in analysis of the migration cycle.

**Francesco Fasani** (<http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpfmf>) is a Research Officer at CreAM and he is finishing his PhD studies in the Department of Economics at University College London. He is specialized in Labor Economics, Economics of Migration, Crime and Microeconometrics. He has conducted quantitative research on undocumented migration, migration control policies, remittances and crime. He is a Research Affiliate at IZA (Institute for the Study of Labor) and fRDB (Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti).

## Table of Contents

Part I: Setting the frame .....	8
I.1 The regular migration framework.....	8
I.2 Irregular migration discourses and policies .....	13
I.2.1 Main types of irregular migration .....	14
I.2.2 Entry routes and final destinations.....	14
I.2.3 Main nationalities.....	15
I.2.4 Migration policies, labour demand and underground economy .....	16
I.2.5 Pathways out of the illegal status.....	19
I.2.6 Public discourse on undocumented migrants.....	21
Part II: Estimates, data and assessment of total size and composition of irregular migrant population .....	25
II.1 Most relevant studies.....	25
II.2 Estimates, data and expert assessments on stocks.....	29
II.2.1 Total stocks .....	29
II.2.1.a Estimates and the ISMU surveys .....	30
II.2.1.b Undocumented migrants reporting themselves: data from amnesties and the quota system.....	34
II.2.1.c Estimates of unrecorded migrant workers .....	40
II.2.1.d Records of migration control policies .....	42
II.2.2 Gender composition .....	44
II.2.3 Age composition .....	47
II.2.4 Nationality composition .....	50
II.2.5 Labour market status and economic sector composition .....	53
II.2.6 Education.....	59
II.3 Estimates, data and expert assessments on flows.....	60
II.3.1 Demographic flows .....	60
II.3.2 Border related flows .....	61
II.3.3 Status-related flows .....	64
II.3.4 Asylum seekers .....	66
Part III: Discussion and policy implications .....	69
III.1 The existence of various sources of information .....	69
III.2 Ignoring the issue or adopting “symbolic” policies? .....	71
III.3 The role of statistical information .....	74
III.4 The Italian debate: shadow employment, incoherence and double standards .....	75
III.5 The worrying legacy of the migration mismanagement .....	78
Appendix.....	83
A1. Italian legislation on migration .....	83
A2. Centre Sampling technique .....	84
Tables .....	86
References .....	115

## Tables index

Table 1 - Resident migrants by region. Minors and gender composition. Years: 2003-2007 .....	86
Table 2 - Number of valid residence permits (1st of January), by region (Years; 1990-2007) .....	86
Table 3 - Total resident population in Italy, by geographical area. Year 1990 and 2007 .....	88
Table 4 - Resident migrants by geographical area of origin and nationality - Year 2005 .....	88
Table 5 - Distribution of residence permits, by area of residence. Years 1990-2007 .....	89
Table 6 - Participation, employment and unemployment rates in Italy, by gender and area. Year 1995, 2006 .....	90
Table 7 - Migrants' share* over total population, by area of residence. Years: 1990-2007 .....	90
Table 8 - Irregularity rate* of full-time equivalent labour units, by geographical area. Years 1995-2003 .....	91
Table 9 - Amnesties in Italy: total number of migrants granted legal status, by area of residence (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002) .....	91
Table 10 - Estimates of total foreign born population (documented and undocumented) in Italy. Years: 1981-1998 .....	92
Table 11 - ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy (thousands). Years 2003-2007 .....	93
Table 12 - ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy, area of residence. 1st July 2005 .....	93
Table 13 - Amnesties in Italy - Documented and undocumented(*) immigrants by region. Years: 1995, 1998, 2002 .....	94
Table 14 - Quotas of foreign born workers allowed by the "Flow Decrees" - Years 1998-2007 .....	95
Table 15 - Number of applications for the "2007 Decree on migrants workers' flows", by region and nationality - February 2008 .....	95
Table 16 - Full-time equivalent labour units: regular and irregular (thousands). Years 2000-2005 .....	97
Table 17 - Irregular (full-time equivalent) labour units, by type (thousands). Years: 2000-2005 .....	97
Table 18 - Employed migrants, by residence and employment status. Years: 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001 .....	98
Table 19 - Undocumented migrants identified by Italian police forces within the Italian territory. Years 1997-2006 .....	98
Table 20 - Undocumented migrants deported from within the Italian territory. Years: 1999-2005 .....	98
Table 21 - ISMU estimates of migrant population living in Lombardy region; by legal status, gender and nationality. Year 2006 .....	98
Table 22 - ISMU estimates of undocumented migrants living in Lombardy region, by gender and nationality. Year 2006 .....	99

Table 23 - Legalized migrants: gender and nationality. Amnesties: 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002.....	100
Table 24 - Amnesty 2002: legalized and documented migrants .....	101
Table 25 - Naga records: gender composition of undocumented migrants in Milan. Years 2000-2006 .....	102
Table 26 - ISMU data: age distribution of migrants in Lombardy, by legal status and origin area. Year 2006 .....	102
Table 27 – Amnesty 2002: age distribution of applicants, by nationality and area of residence.....	103
Table 28 - Naga records: age distribution of undocumented migrants in Milan; by gender. Years 2003-2006 .....	104
Table 29 – ISMU estimates of undocumented migrants living in Italy - by macro area and area of origin (thousands). 1st July 2005 .....	104
Table 30 - ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy; by nationality (thousands). 1st July 2005.....	104
Table 31 - ISMU estimates of undocumented migrants living in Italy; by nationality. 1st July 2005.....	105
Table 32 - ISMU data: : labour market status of migrants in Italy, by legal status (Year 2005) .....	106
Table 33 - ISMU data: detailed labour market status of migrants in Italy, by legal status. Year 2005. ....	107
Table 34 - ISMU data: occupation of migrants, by legal status. Year 2005.....	107
Table 35 - ISMU data: immigrants' monthly wages, by legal status. Year 2005	108
Table 36 - Industry of employment of applicants for the 2002 amnesty, by area of origin and area of residence. Year 2002 .....	108
Table 37 - Industry of employment of applicants for the 2002 amnesty, by area of origin and area of residence. Year 2002 .....	109
Table 38 - Naga records: labour market status of undocumented migrants in Milan, by years of permanence. Year 2006 .....	111
Table 39 - Naga records: a comparison of educational levels of undocumented migrants in Milan (2006) and those of the Italian population (2001).....	111
Table 40 - Undocumented migrants residing in Italy, by entry channel (percentage). Years 2000-2006 .....	111
Table 41. Number of undocumented migrants shore landed in Southern Italian regions (Years 1998-2006) .....	112
Table 42. Immigrants refused entry at the border (Years: 1986-2006) .....	112
Table 43 - ISMU survey 2007: migrants residing in Lombardy, by legal status and year of arrival in Italy.....	113
Table 44 - Stocks of refugees and asylum applications in Europe. Year 2006..	113
Table 45 – Asylum seekers in Italy: number of applications, applications examined and case outcomes. Years 1990-2006.....	114

## Figures index

Figure 1 - Ratio of migrant population over total population – Years 1980-2007	11
Figure 2 - Estimated undocumented migrants in Italy (thousands). Years: 1990-2007 .....	33
Figure 3 - Geographical distribution of documented and undocumented(*) immigrants across Italian regions. Year 2002 .....	36
Figure 4 - Undocumented migrants identified and deported by Italian police forces from within the Italian territory. Years: 1999-2005 .....	43
Figure 5 - Percentage of women among the "legalized migrants" in the amnesties of 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002. By area of origin.....	46
Figure 6 - ISMU survey: age distribution of immigrants living in Lombardy, by legal status. Year 2006.....	48
Figure 7 - Undocumented migrants by area of origin. 1st July 2005 .....	52
Figure 8 - ISMU data: labour market status of immigrants in Italy, by legal status. Year 2005 .....	55
Figure 9. Undocumented immigrants shore landed and refused entry at the border (Years: 1986-2006) .....	64

## **Part I: Setting the frame**

**After almost a century of emigration history, Italy has recently become an immigration country<sup>1</sup>.** The timing of this structural change, which occurred in the mid '70s, can be explained both with the closure of several Northern Europe labour markets to the immigrants flows – following the oil prices shocks and the economic recession of the early '70s – and by the strong economic growth experienced by Italy from the early '60s, when the “Italian economic boom” led the Italian average per capita income to levels analogous to those of the most advanced European countries. As (Einaudi 2007) stresses the incoming flows of migrants started in the late 60's, but it took a few more years of economic development for the Italian outflows to almost completely dry out: the net emigration balance became negative for the first time in 1973

It can be debated if the Italian political class suffered more of a lack of preparation to cope with the immigration phenomenon or of a lack of responsibility in dealing with that, but it is undeniable that the institutional framework (legislation, administrative structure, financial support, etc.) was absolutely inadequate to manage the increasing flows of immigrants. The relevance of the irregular flows and stock of immigrants and their deep involvement in the Italian shadow economy, therefore, can be probably better explained as the result of the lack of a reasonable regulation rather than as the deliberate attempt to circumvent it.

### ***1.1 The regular migration framework***

In Italy there are two main sources of information about stocks, flows, geographical distribution, ethnic composition, personal characteristics, etc. of documented migrants: the records of the currently valid permits of residence (issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the administrative registry of residence (“Anagrafe”). The existing discrepancies between these two measures

---

<sup>1</sup> See Del Boca, D. and A. Venturini (2003). Italian Migration. DP No.938, IZA. for an analysis of both emigration and immigration features in Italy.



are mainly due to three types of reasons. First, the obtainment of a residence permits and the residence registration are two different processes: although the first one is a prerequisite for the second (undocumented migrants cannot register at the “Anagrafe”), the registration is not automatic, is a voluntary act and can be made in a different administrative unit with respect to the one where the residence permit was issued<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, minors can be registered as residents but they do not need to have a residence permit: if the minor is accompanied by at least one of the parents, and if the latter one has a regular residence permit, the minor is registered on the parent’s document for residence and is not counted as an additional permit holder. Finally, these records are kept by two different authorities and the processes of revision and update are carried out autonomously and with different timing<sup>3</sup>.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2007 there were about 2,940 thousand resident migrants in Italy, about half of them were female and around 22% (665 thousands) were minors (see Table 1). Instead, if we look at the number of valid residence permits at the beginning of the same year, we find that there was a stock of around 2,415 thousands of migrants allowed to stay in Italy (Table 2). As we briefly explained above, the difference between these two measures is mainly explained by the absence of minors among the records of the residence permits. Indeed, if we subtract the migrant population under 18 years from the stock of registered resident migrant, we obtain a value of 2,271 adult migrants who were registered at the Anagrafe in 2007. As we should expect, this value is smaller than the stock of valid residence permits for the same year (2,415 thousands): the difference of almost 145 thousand is due to the time lag between the obtainment of the legal documents for residence and the decision to register in the Anagrafe, and to the likely differences in the process of revising and updating their records autonomously carried out by the Anagrafe and the Home Office.

---

<sup>2</sup> The registration in the Anagrafe allows the immigrant to access main administrative services and welfare provisions (such as the registration for the National Health Service).

<sup>3</sup> See p. 2, Istat (2005). Gli stranieri in Italia: gli effetti dell'ultima regolarizzazione. Popolazione - Statistiche in breve, Istat.


**Documented immigrants currently represent a 5% of the total resident population** (that amounts to around 59 million in 2007 – see Table 3) , they contribute for about 70% of the growth of the population residing in Italy, and their babies born in Italy are about one tenth of the newborns. The possibilities of obtaining the Italian citizenship are severely limited by the existing legislation (whose minimum requirement is a continuous residence of at least 10 years) and this has led to a relative small number of naturalized immigrants (about 215 thousand overall, from the early '80 to 2006), the vast majority of which obtained the citizenship by marrying an Italian citizen (Istat 2007).

Table 4 show the nationality composition of resident migrants in 2005. The largest foreign born communities are represented by citizens of **Albania** (13 percent of the total migrant population), **Morocco** (12%), **Romania** (10%), **China** (4.6%), **Ukraine** (3.9%) **Philippines** (3.5%) and **Tunisia** (3.3%). A comparison with the ranking in 1992 – Morocco (13%), Tunisia (6.4%), Philippines (5.6%), Albania (3.8%), Senegal (3.7%), Egypt (2.8%), China (2.4%) (Istat 2005) – shows both the persistence in the presence of some communities and the recent formation of new ones.

The data on residence permits allow us to follow the evolution of the migrants' presence in Italy since 1990 (see Table 2). Their settlement decisions (Table 5) are characterized by a **clear and progressive increase in their concentration in the Northern regions**. Starting from 40% in 1990, North-West and North-East regions accounted for about 63% of the immigrant population in 2007, while hosting less than 45% of the native population (Table 3). The other macro-areas, instead, have seen a reduction in the relative percentage of migrants residing within their territory: Central-Italy moved from almost 40% of regular migrants in 1990 to 25% in 2007, and the Mezzogiorno has fallen from 20% to 12% in the same period. If compared with the concentration of native population – which does not show any particular trend in the period considered (Table 3) – the increasing concentration of migrants in the Northern regions mirrors their high

propensity to settle where the local environment offers better chances of social and economic integration. The historical divide between the economies of North and South Italy, indeed, is still far from being bridged. When looking at the country as a single labour market, Italy has experienced important improvements in its performance in the last decade: with respect to 1995, participation rate in 2006 had grown by more than 4 percentage points (from 58,4 to 62.7), employment rate by almost 7 points (from 51.8 to 58.4) and unemployment rate had dropped by almost 5 points (from 11.2 to 6.8) (Table 6). This growth in employment has clearly being accompanied by a strong and increasing demand for foreign workers, but the performance of the Southern regions has been less brilliant and the initial gap with respect to the rest of Italy is still wide. Unemployment rate for both male and female workers, for instance, is still three times lower in the North than in the South: it was below 4 percent in Northern regions in 2006, while it was still above 12 percent in the Mezzogiorno.

**Figure 1 - Ratio of migrant population over total population – Years 1980-2007**



Source: Istat and Ministry of Internal Affairs

Figure 1 shows a crucial feature of the Italian migration history which can contribute to explain the widespread adverse attitudes towards immigration existing in this country. More than by the actual stock of immigrants residing in their country, destination countries citizens often seem to be more concerned by the changes and by their pace. Indeed, as Figure 1 proves, Italy experienced a sharp increase in the foreign born population which has taken place in a relatively short period of time. **Although the share of immigrant population over the native population is still well below the values experienced by other European countries<sup>4</sup>, the increase in the foreign born population has been quite steep in the last two decades, with a migrant population that in 2007 was more than five times the level recorded in 1990**, growing from the 0.8% to 4.1% of the native population<sup>5</sup> (see Table 7). In absolute values, the number of migrants holding a regular residence permit has increased from 450 thousands in 1990 to more than 2 million and 400 thousands in 2007 (see Table 2).

Another important feature of Italian migration can be understood by noticing the consistent jumps in the number of migrants regularly residing in Italy occurred between 1990 and 1992, in 1996-1997, in 1999-2000 and in 2003-2004 (Figure 1). These jumps are the result of the conclusion of the legalization procedures – opened in 1990, in 1995, in 1998 and in 2002 – which will be described in the following section. We can argue, therefore, that the stock of migrants has kept gradually growing during the last decade, although the number of the legally resident ones has increased mainly on occasion of the amnesties. This is a first and important hint at the role played by irregular condition in the Italian case that we will discuss in the following section.

---

<sup>4</sup> In 2006 the share of immigrants over the total population was almost 9% in Germany, 6.2% in Spain, more than 6% in France and 5.2% in UK.

<sup>5</sup> In the time series reported in Table 7 the stock of migrants is measured by the number of valid residence permits in each year and it therefore excludes minors (see above).

## ***1.2 Irregular migration discourses and policies***

There are three main dimensions of the irregularity of immigrants: entry, residence and employment. We focus on the first two aspects. The distinction between documented and undocumented migrants is based on the legal status of the migrants when entering the destination country (irregular entry) and during their permanence (irregular residence). In Italy – as it generally holds for other Western countries – the unauthorized entry implies a subsequent unauthorized permanence, while a legal entry allows for lawful permanence. Moreover, the status of undocumented with respect to residence prevents the migrant from being in lawful and recorded employment.

A peculiar aspect of irregular immigration in Italy is its **relative dimension when compared with flows and stock of regular migrants**. As far as amnesties of undocumented migrants in Europe are concerned, Italy closely competes with Spain<sup>6</sup> for a double record (Levinson 2005): the highest number of general regularization processes (5 programs since 1986) and the largest number (relatively to the resident migrant population) of immigrants who obtained a legal status through one of these programs. **In the last two decades, Italian governments have approved five different amnesties** – in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002 (IDOS and Caritas/Migrantes 2005), (Carfagna 2002) – **which have jointly legalized almost 1.5 million of irregular migrants which were already residing in the country** (Table 9). It is worth noticing that almost 700 thousands of them were regularized just in the last amnesty in 2002. The most recent analysis have provided evidence that more than half of the documented migrant population currently residing in Italy has obtained her legal status through one of these amnesty processes (Blangiardo and Tanturri 2004).

---

<sup>6</sup> Spain has granted legal status to more than 1.2 million of undocumented migrants through six general amnesties granted in the last two decades: in 1985 (23 thousand legalized migrants), 1991 (109 thousand), 1996 (21 thousand), 2000 (153 thousand), 2001 (221 thousand) and 2005 (700 thousand).

### **I.2.1 Main types of irregular migration**

Although Italy is sadly famous for the images of clandestine immigrants shore landing along its Southern shores<sup>7</sup>, recent estimates of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (aa.vv. 2007) pointed out that, in fact, the migrants arrived in that way represent a small fraction of the existing stock of undocumented workers. The majority of them (60-75 percent), indeed, are overstayers, while another significant component entered Italy by avoiding controls at the Northern borders and at international ports and airports (see section II.3.2 Border related flows).

### **I.2.2 Entry routes and final destinations**

In the last two decades, Italy has clearly become a destination country for the international flows of foreign workers – both authorized and unauthorized – who responded to its increasing labour demand and to the opportunities offered by the shadow economy to find a job without having a valid residence permit. At the same time, its geographical position keeps making Italy a fairly accessible intermediate stop along migratory projects which aim at destinations in other European countries. According to a recent survey of undocumented migrants (SIMI survey), almost three quarters of the migrants interviewed considered Italy as the final destination of their migratory project. The other main destinations were Germany (almost 10 percent of the interviewed), Great Britain (about 5 percent) and France (around 4 percent) (Chiuri, Coniglio et al. 2007).

Italy's proximity to unstable and less developed areas, on one side, and to wealthy countries, on the other side, its peninsula conformation and its position in the Mediterranean Sea play (and played) a major role in determining the flows of migrants crossing the Italian border.

As far as the undocumented migrants' routes are concerned, it is fairly easy to identify the critical entry channels. First of all, we have the Italian-Slovenian border which is mainly crossed by Eastern Europe citizens, but also by migrants

---

<sup>7</sup> See the movie "Lamerica" (1994) by the Italian director Gianni Amelio.

who come from Central Asia, Middle East, Indian Subcontinent and Eastern Asia. Then, we have the Italian-French border through which migrants coming from Africa arrive after having travelled along the route which crosses the Strait of Gibraltar and goes through Spain and France. Finally, we have the coasts of the Southern regions, where the migrants can land after relatively short trips by boat. These immigrants used to arrive from both the coasts of former Yugoslavia and Albania and from those of Northern Africa, but in recent years the unauthorized inflows from the Balkan area have substantially fallen – following the gradual stabilization of the area – while those from Africa, and from Libya in particular, have sharply increased. These latter flows are composed of migrants coming from Northern Africa (Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) but also from Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>8</sup> and from the Horn of Africa (see p. 61). The borders with Austria and Switzerland, instead, are generally crossed by outflows of unauthorized immigrants who leaves Italy and try to settle there or in some other European countries such as Germany.

In spite of a widespread rhetoric which claims that unlawfully entering Italy is still an extremely easy task to accomplish, (Caritas/Migrantes 2007) reports some conservative estimates of the number of migrants dead while attempting to reach the Italian shores. According to these estimates<sup>9</sup>, in the last two decades two thousand migrants have died (or went missing) in the area between Sicily, Libya, Tunisia and Malta, and almost 500 hundred drowned in the Adriatic Sea, between Italy, Albania and Montenegro.

### **I.2.3 Main nationalities**

A recent national survey of undocumented migrants (see section II.2.4 Nationality composition) provided a detailed picture of their countries of origin. In 2005 more than half of the undocumented migrants were citizens of some Eastern European

---

<sup>8</sup> A detailed description of the route of undocumented migration travelling from Senegal, through Mali, Niger, Libya, and Tunisia, and finally landing in Sicily, has been recently published by an Italian journalist who travelled undercover pretending to be a clandestine migrant (Gatti, F. (2007). *Bilal. Il mio viaggio da infiltrato nel mercato dei nuovi schiavi*. Milano, Rizzoli.)

<sup>9</sup> These estimates are computed by the organization “Fortress Europe” by counting the number of deaths or missing individuals reported in the international press (<http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/>).

country (in particular, **Albania, Romania, Ukraine** and **Poland**), almost one sixth was originally from Northern-Africa (especially from **Morocco** and **Tunisia**), while Asia and Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America each represented around one tenth of the stock.

A fairly similar picture was drawn by the last amnesty (launched in 2002), and the data from the previous amnesties witnessed the reduction over time of the African component and the sharp increase in the Eastern European one.

The comparison with the main nationalities of the documented migrants currently residing in Italy does not show wide differences in the nationality composition of the two groups (authorized versus unauthorized)

#### **I.2.4 Migration policies, labour demand and underground economy**

We can identify a number of elements and features of the Italian context which can contribute to explain the **crucial role played by unauthorized migration in characterizing the recent Italian migration experience**:

1) Geography: proximity with unstable and low developed areas (former Yugoslavia, Albania, Maghreb) which originated and keep originating important flows of undocumented migrants; length and accessibility of the borders with the Mediterranean Sea due to the Italian peninsula shape; position with respect to other destination countries: gate/transit country for flows of migrant directed towards other European countries.

2) Economy: a large underground economy (Reyneri 2003) and a structural and strong demand for foreign born workers to solve the qualitative and quantitative shortages of workers in the labour market, create an important pull factor for migrants (no matter what their legal status is).

3) Migration policy (interacted with economic factors): there is a widespread consensus among experts and commentators that the lack of adequate possibilities of legally accessing the Italian labour market – *“...the policy of closing the front door of legal entry, while keeping the back door for illegal entry*



*half open*", (Zincone 1998) – has played a major role in increasing undocumented stocks and flows. The late adoption of a quota system to regulate migrant workers' entry (see A1. Italian legislation) and the misuse of this latter policy in order to legalize migrants already residing in Italy (see p. 34), have left few possibilities of authorized access to the country for working reasons.

4) Asylum policy: the absence of a law on asylum, the high level of selectiveness in granting the refugee status and the poor benefits offered, are all factors that contribute to explain the low number of applications for asylum received by the Italian government (100 thousands from 1995 to 2004, by far one of the lowest level in Western Europe (Reyneri 2007)). Given this adverse setting, it is therefore likely that a fraction of potential asylum seekers ends up opting for an unauthorized residence.

5) Welfare state: even the structure of the Italian welfare state may play an important role in attracting inflows of unauthorized workers. But the mechanism does not seem to be the one stressed in the literature on "welfare magnets" (Borjas 1999): the undocumented migrants are attracted to Italy not by the generosity of its welfare provisions – from which they are generally excluded (Boeri, Fasani et al. 2004) – but rather by the growing demand for affordable household workers to compensate for the shortcomings of the Italian welfare state. Indeed, *"(...) the Italian migratory system can hardly be understood without taking into account the structural tension between a welfare system largely designed according to a male-breadwinner logic and Italian women's rising labour participation"* ((Sciortino 2004), p.126)

6) Tourism: the existence of large inflows of tourists which constantly enter in Italy, creates a relatively easy possibility of access to the country for potential migrants which may subsequently decide to over-stay their visas and become undocumented);

Given that the possibility of redefining national borders is generally out of the sphere of influence of XXI century policy-makers – and a more restrictive attitude towards tourism may not be a clever choice for a country where the tourism

industry is a relevant component of the GDP – it is clear that any policy aiming at addressing the issue of migrants irregularity should intervene on all the other points: economy, migration and asylum policy and welfare state design.

In the absence of adequate possibilities of allowing legal inflows of foreign born workers, Italy has actually built up its stock of immigrant by using irregular channels of entry and by then adopting **amnesties** to temporarily legalize the situation of resident migrants. These legalization procedures have been implemented within a short-term and emergency framework rather than as the first step towards the creation of a rationale and effective planning of migratory inflows (Nascimbene 2000). The late adoption of a quota system (1998) and the seemingly excessive prudence in setting the quotas in the following years, have generally failed in maintaining the matching process between demand and offer of immigrant work within a fully legal framework.

The political response to the issue posed by the presence – and by the continuous arrival – of undocumented migrants has been far from clear and straightforward. Being extremely reluctant to open the country to larger inflows of legal migrant workers, Italian governments have usually reacted by adopting short run policies such as the amnesties, in order to *ex post* legalize a situation which could not be further ignored. The concern for irregular immigration has gained increasing relevance in the media and political Italian debate of more recent years. Governments have answered, on the one hand, with the series of amnesties listed above, and, on the other hand, by strengthening the legal framework to face irregular inflows and irregular permanence of immigrants. Following a tendency common to other Western countries, they have chosen to give particular emphasis **to border and interior enforcement** carried out by police officials rather than to labour market controls. The last two legislative interventions especially aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the police enforcement both at the border and within the Italian territory<sup>10</sup>. These legislative

---

<sup>10</sup> The Single Act of 1998, for instance, made it possible to detain undocumented migrants in special “centres of temporary permanence” in order to allow the deportation procedure

changes are clearly recognisable in the jumps in the time series of the number of irregular immigrants deported since 1990. The entry, residence and deportation of foreign born citizens in Italy is currently regulated by the “Turco-Napolitano” Consolidation Act (on immigration regulations and legislation on the condition of foreigners) adopted with the Legislative Decree no. 286/1998, which was subsequently modified by the “Bossi-Fini” Law no. 189/2002 (see A1. Italian legislation)

### **I.2.5 Pathways out of the illegal status**

The poor design of Italian migration policy tends to make the chances of becoming a legal resident migrant higher for an undocumented migrant who is already in Italy, than for a potential migrant who is trying to gain a legal access to the Italian labour market from abroad. Indeed, the frequent launch of amnesty programs – and the misuse of the quota system (see p.34) – have created fairly large, although discontinuous, channel of obtaining the legal status for the unauthorized migrants.

It is hardly questionable that the amnesties fail to address the causes of the presence of large undocumented population and, therefore, they can not be considered as promising policies to address the issue in a long-run perspective. Still, one can try to assess if they at least managed to permanently bring to the surface the immigrants who were involved in the process.

In order to assess to what extent these amnesty processes have managed to permanently move the migrants out of the shadows of the irregularity, we should both analyze the characteristics of the applicants and follow their permanence after the obtainment of the legal status. (Carfagna 2002) has studied the first aspect, showing that the vast majority of the migrants legalized with the 1990,

---

(identification, judge’s approval, trip organization, etc.) to take place avoiding the flight of the immigrants concerned. Depending on the irregularity committed, the undocumented immigrant could be either apprehended (and subsequently deported) or issued an order to leave the country within 15 days (and subsequently released). The new law of 2002 contains more restrictive provisions, establishing the immediate deportation of any immigrant found without the required documents and introducing also the criminal offence of illegal immigration (for those immigrants that reenter Italy after being deported).

1995 and 1998 amnesties, had never been legal before. Indeed, he estimates that in these three amnesties, the percentage of migrant granted legal status which had been legal before – and which had, therefore, fallen back into irregularity – was fairly small and decreasing over time: 18 percent in 1990, 13 percent in 1995 and 9 percent in 1998. Apart from the amnesties, the phenomenon of lapsing into illegal status has been recently analyzed by (Sciortino 2008) who has used survey data for the Lombardy region to estimate the relevance of this risk for the legal migrants in Italy. His findings – according to which only a negligible percentage of interviewees who were undocumented at the moment of the interview had had a valid residence permit before – seem to support the idea that the movement from legal to illegal status is far less likely to take place than the one going in the opposite direction. Lombardy, though, may not be fully representative of the whole Italian reality. Due to its strong economy, lively labour market and relatively limited underground economy, this region may provide migrants with much better opportunities to maintain their legal status over time – and to successfully continue their path towards economic and social integration – than those offered in other areas of the country<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, migrants who failed to maintain their legal status may decide to return to their home countries rather than facing the risks and uncertainty of an illegal residence: by carrying out surveys in the host countries, one would systematically not observe this group of individuals and would end up underestimating the phenomenon.

In order to provide a definite answer, the relationship between legal status and legal employment seems to be the crucial aspect to understand. If legal status is a prerequisite for being in legal employment, the maintenance of the legal status

---

<sup>11</sup> Indeed, as Table 8 shows, there are substantial differentials in both levels and trends of the shadow economy across different Italian areas. During the period 1995-2003, the share of irregular labour units (see footnote 26 for a definition of full-time equivalent labour units) in the South (20-23 percent) is about twice the level estimated in Northern regions (8-11 percent). Moreover, while Northern regions have experienced a sizeable decrease in this share (from around 11 percent in 1995 to 8-9% in 2003), Southern regions showed an increase of about 2 percentage points in the same period (from 21 to almost 23 percent). Central regions have an intermediate share of irregular employment (12-14 percent) and followed the declining trend of the North of Italy.

– i.e. the capability of renewing the residence permits when it expires – is conditional on the permanence in legal employment. Indeed, if legalized migrants do not succeed in finding, or keeping, their legal employment, this will hinder them from successfully obtaining a renewal of their residence documents. (Reyneri 1998) defines this trajectory as an “*underground economy trap*”: analyzing the 1995 amnesty, he shows that a large proportion of the legalized migrants went on taking unregistered jobs and, for this reason, were not able to maintain their legal status over time. Given the magnitude of the shadow economy in Italy, this latter one seems to be an important concern: if migrants lack opportunities of legal employment, this will severely weaken any attempt to permanently “bring them to the surface” through the amnesties.

### **I.2.6 Public discourse on undocumented migrants**

Undocumented migrants have recently been at the very core of the media and political debate. Indeed, during the electoral campaign that preceded the general elections held in April 2008, migration and its management was one of the main issue in the platforms and statements of many parties and politicians. Apparently, the concern for migration among the electorate has significantly contributed to the victory of the right-wing coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi: among its first interventions, the newly elected government has immediately started to work on a new set of norms to fight undocumented migration. In particular, part of the ruling coalition aimed at introducing an important novelty in the current legislation on entry and residence: **classifying the lack of legal status as a criminal offence** (Cottone 21 May, 2008) rather than as a simple administrative irregularity (see p.78). The introduction of this measure has currently been postponed and will have to be approved by the Parliament. But government’s intentions seem to have been mitigated more by feasibility reasons – enforcing such a measure would have implied unbearable costs for both the judicial and the prison system – than by the concern raised among NGOs, trade unions,

Catholic Church, representatives of the opposition, or by the criticism expressed by members of the European Institutions<sup>12</sup>.

Still, the political will to transform all the undocumented migrants in criminal offenders – and the apparent support this measure seemed to have found in the general public – probably stems from the deep-rooted and widespread conviction that there exists a strong connection between undocumented status and propensity to commit crimes.

Indeed, **the debate about crime and undocumented migrants in the media is generally heated and often unfair**. Episodes of (irregular) migrants being responsible of serious crimes always trigger an escalation of anti-immigrant feelings and generally lead to the invocation of a definite closure of the borders and of a mass deportations of all the remaining undocumented migrants. At the end of October 2007 an Italian woman died after being attacked and raped by a Romanian immigrant. After this horrendous crime, the Prodi government immediately approved a Law Decree to ease the deportation of European citizens who could not prove to have adequate means of subsistence to reside in Italy (Sarzanini 2 November 2007). The press called this measure the “anti-Romanians Decree” and, in those days, the whole Italian society freely expressed all its prejudices and xenophobic resentment against the Romanian community and all the immigrants. The Romanian government strongly protested against this patently unfair generalization – where single criminal episodes were used to blame a whole nation – but those events showed how strong is the belief among the Italian society that migrants have a worrying propensity to be involved in criminal activities. And those events also reinforced the stereotype of the migrant – and the undocumented migrant in particular – as a threatening individual who disregards any law and value. Against this stereotype, one of the general director of Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics) presented the

---

<sup>12</sup> The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg noted that “(...) despite a widespread opposite trend, international law has clearly established the principle that aliens whose only offence is the violation of immigration law should not be treated by transit or host states as criminals or potential criminals” (Hammarberg, T. (2008). Memorandum - Commissioner for Human Rights - Following his visit to Italy on 19-20 Jne 2008 CommDH(2008)18. Strasbourg, Council of Europe.; p.15)

results of a recent survey on sexual offences in Italy. According to this survey, Italian women should probably fear more their husbands and partners than Romanian immigrants: almost 70 percent of the rapes in Italy are committed by the partner of the victims and at least 90 percent of all the rapes are attributable to Italian citizens (corriere.it 10 December 2007).

Although the empirical evidence is far from clear, the **association between criminality and migrants – and unauthorized migrants in particular – is widespread and deep-rooted**. Drawing from the results of a survey on Italians' attitudes toward migration, (Valtolina 2006) describes the evolution over time of the concern for migrants' involvement in criminal activities. This concern is fairly high in all years but it shows a clear decreasing trend: if almost half of the interviewees agreed with the sentence "*Up to now immigrants have only brought criminality*" in 1998, the fraction dropped to about 30 percent in 2005. A similar survey carried out in 2007 by Transcrime ([www.transcrime.unitn.it](http://www.transcrime.unitn.it)), shows that the alarm among Italians is still very high: around 60 percent of the sample thinks that "*immigrants increase crime rates*", and this concern is stronger among males than females, it decreases with the level of education and it is particularly high (around 70%) for pensioners and housewives. If these values reflect the real discomfort of Italians towards migrants in general, the level of concern for unauthorized migrants is due to be even higher.

A quick look at the statistics on recorded crime shows that these worries are not sufficiently grounded in fact for documented migrants, while they seem to be more reasonable for the undocumented ones. The 2007 Report on crime in Italy published by the Italian Minister of Interior Affairs concludes that there does not seem to be a particular overrepresentation of regular migrants among the total of individuals accused of any criminal offence: in 2006, 6 percent of the offenders were immigrants, a value only slightly higher than migrant share over total population in Italy in the same year (5 %) ((aa.vv. 2007) p.359). The same statistics, though, (Istat 2008) show a clear overrepresentation of migrants – and

undocumented migrants – among the individuals charged with committing certain types of crime. In 2006 around 100 thousand migrants have been charged of some criminal offence and the majority of them was undocumented. Depending on the crime, there is a wide variation in the fraction of migrants over the total number of charges – which goes from 3-6 percent for bank robberies to almost 70 percent for pickpocketing – and in the undocumented component among the migrants charged – reaching 80 percent for pickpocketing and burglary. It is important to notice, though, that immigrants are also overrepresented among the victims of crime: in 2006, for instance, non-Italian citizens represented 32 percent of the individuals charged for homicide, but they also represented 21.4 percent of the victims.



## **Part II: Estimates, data and assessment of total size and composition of irregular migrant population**

In this section we survey the existing estimates and the most recent research carried out on the undocumented migrants phenomenon in Italy.

### ***II.1 Most relevant studies***

An increasing body of research and evidence on migration in Italy has been built in recent years and is gradually filling the almost complete vacuum of knowledge and information that characterized the first period of the Italian immigration experience. When dealing with migration phenomena, the process of measurement and collection of precise statistical evidence assumes a crucial political role both by shaping political debate contents and by providing clear elements to judge the results and effects of the policies implemented. The persistent refusal of the Italian political class to recognize the inflows of immigrants as a structural feature of their country's future, and the widespread perception of immigration as a temporary happenstance due to vanish in the early future<sup>13</sup>, have probably played a major role in slowing down the pace of development of the official statistics on migration. The National Institute of Statistics (Istat – [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it)) started to pay some attention to the immigrant presence only in the '90s and the first comprehensive publication on the characteristics of the foreign born population residing in Italy was published only in 1998 (Bonifazi 2007). After this date, the Istat production of statistical documentation on immigrants has significantly increased in quality, detail and

---

<sup>13</sup> See Einaudi, L. (2007). *Le politiche dell'immigrazione in Italia dall'Unità a oggi*. Bari, Laterza. (p.110) and Sciortino, G. and A. Colombo (2004). "The flows and the flood: the public discourse on immigration in Italy, 1969-2001." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9(1): 94-113.(p. 101) for a 1977 quotation of Romano Prodi where the future president of the European Commission and future Italian Prime Minister foresees an economic development for the Italian society which should not rely on the inflows of foreign workforce: "...I believe that, at this point, it would be foolish to take the same rote of other European countries, thus adding to our current problems those of a difficult multi-racial cohabitation...".

frequency, although some delays are still evident<sup>14</sup>. This delay in collecting and diffusing official information on the phenomenon characterized also all the government bodies, and in particular the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour: the “First Report on Immigrants in Italy” was published by the Italian Home Office only in 2007 (Barbaglio 2007).

Given the reluctance showed by the Italian governments and its various bodies in dealing timely and seriously with the issue, the predictable outcome was that private research centres gained – and played – a central role in producing statistical information on the immigrant population.

Indeed, one of the most detailed and comprehensive publication currently available in Italy is the yearly “Dossier on Immigration Statistics” (Caritas/Migrantes 2007) compiled by the research team of the **Caritas-Migrantes** catholic organization based in Rome<sup>15</sup>. Each year, since the early '90, the Dossier collects all the available data on immigration, placing it in its national, regional and local context and discussing its various aspects and issues. The publication contains analysis of the statistical data carried out by major experts in the field and tables summarizing and illustrating the data. The Caritas-Migrantes team produces also publications on specific migration issues and on particular nationalities of immigrants. Of particular interest for this report is the publication “Irregular migration to Italy”<sup>16</sup> realized for the EMN – European Migration Network, an initiative promoted by the European Commission in the Member States (Caritas/Migrantes 2005). This publication focuses on immigration law, issues of data gathering, measures to control immigration, social and welfare issues, existing field research on the characteristics of undocumented migrants, opportunities to interact with the local population, costs and benefits, and finally, possible solutions for escaping irregularity. It also includes a bibliography and numerous statistical tables.

---

<sup>14</sup> For instance, only in the last four years migrant workers have finally been included in the Labour Force Survey carried out by Istat.

<sup>15</sup> See <http://www.dossierimmigrazione.it/index.html>

<sup>16</sup> The report is freely available for download at : <http://www.emnitaly.it/pilotstudy2.htm>

Another private centre of research which has given an increasingly important contribution in producing high quality research and information on the migratory phenomena in Italy is the **Fondazione ISMU** (formerly Fondazione Cariplo–ISMU; <http://www.ismu.org/english/>): founded in 1991 and located in Milan, it is an autonomous and independent organization promoting studies, research and projects on multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, and focusing in particular on the phenomenon of international migrations. Starting from the analysis of the Lombardia context, the research team of Fondazione ISMU – composed by scholars of demography, sociology, statistics and political sciences – has gradually extended its attention to the whole national reality, maintaining, at the same time, a strong regional focus. Since 1995, they have been publishing an annual report on migration in Italy that is now arrived to the 13<sup>th</sup> edition<sup>17</sup>. Apart from collecting existing data and information and commenting on their evolution, the Fondazione ISMU has started in the late '90s to directly carry out detailed surveys on representative samples of immigrants. These surveys are now conducted on a regular basis and provide a extremely valuable source of information about the evolution of migration phenomenon. Moreover, since these surveys are specifically designed to include unauthorized immigrants, they currently represent a crucial input for estimating irregular stocks and for analyzing their characteristics. We will discuss these surveys in more detail in the following section.

The main reference for a thorough analysis of the critical relationship between underground economy and undocumented migration in Italy is the research produced by **Emilio Reyneri**, from the University of Milan ((Reyneri 1998), (Reyneri 2003)). Another important reference are series of volumes on immigrants published by the **Istituto Cattaneo** (<http://www.cattaneo.org>) that collect different contributions of research on migration in Italy and often include

---

<sup>17</sup> Some editions of the ISMU Annual Reports are freely downloadable at: <http://www.ismu.org/default.php?url=http%3A/www.ismu.org/index.php%3Fpage%3D82>

broad sections on undocumented migration (Colombo and Sciortino 2002; Barbagli, Colombo et al. 2004). The **CeSPI – Centro Studi Politica Internazionale** ([www.cespi.it](http://www.cespi.it)) has also produced interesting research about irregular migration (Coslovi 2007), deportation of migrants (Coslovi, Pastore et al. 2005) and human smuggling (Pastore, Monzini et al. 2006). The **FIERI – International and European Forum of Immigration Research** ([www.fieri.it](http://www.fieri.it)) includes several academics working on migration in different fields and focuses on the analysis of policies and policy making, on citizenship legislation, interventions for social integration of migrants, etc.

It is also worth mentioning a fairly recent attempt made by Italian economist to contribute with quantitative work to the research on undocumented migration in Italy. This attempt has been made independently by two distinct groups of researchers. One group is based between the Bocconi University (Milan) and the University College of London and works on a unique dataset provided by an Italian NGO – called **Naga** ([www.naga.it](http://www.naga.it)) – which offers free health care to undocumented migrants in Milan. The dataset contains records of each unauthorized immigrants who was visited by one of the Naga doctors. The nature of this data collection shows the two main limitations of this source of information: first, it only concerns immigrants living in Milan and in the surrounding area, and second, the immigrants interviewed are self-selected as they will enter the sample only if they decide to go to the Naga hospital and ask for medical care. On the other hand, at least two aspects make of this dataset a very interesting resource: the size of the sample, and its nature of permanent survey. Indeed, the sample currently contains information on more than 40 thousands undocumented immigrants, interviewed between 2000 and 2007, the largest sample of this kind in Italy (and probably among the largest in the world). Moreover, the interviews are carried out on a daily basis and this allows to follow in great detail the evolution of the phenomenon over time. This dataset has allowed to produce some descriptive evidence ((Devillanova and Frattini 2006)), (Devillanova,

Fasani et al. 2007) ) and also a more specific analysis of the role of networks in influencing undocumented migrants' behaviour (see, (Devillanova forthcoming)). The second group of economists working on the irregularity issue is based in the University of Bari. They designed and ran a field survey in 2003 (**SIMI survey**), interviewing a sample of almost a 1000 undocumented migrants. Their sample is an extremely selected one – as the immigrants were interviewed after they had been arrested for being undocumented and while being detained, pending the decision on their possible deportation – but they produced interesting descriptive material on the results of their research ((Chiuri, Coniglio et al. 2007; Chiuri, De Arcangelis et al. 2007) and investigated some important aspects of the undocumented migrants' behaviour, such as their return intention (Coniglio, De Arcangelis et al. 2006) and their remittance behaviour (Chiuri, Coniglio et al. 2006).

## ***II.2 Estimates, data and expert assessments on stocks***

### **II.2.1 Total stocks**

Different sources of information can be combined and compared to obtain a sufficiently clear and updated picture of the current stock of unauthorized immigrants which is likely to currently reside in Italy. We start by looking at direct estimates of this stock, especially those produced by the **Fondazione ISMU**. Then, we analyze data originated by particular policies – namely, by the amnesties and by (the malfunctioning of) the Italian migration quota system - where undocumented migrants directly report themselves to the authorities. We subsequently consider the existing estimates of the unrecorded immigrants workers: this is a different set from the undocumented migrants, since legal migrants (with respect to their residence) may work in the underground economy, and not all the unauthorized immigrants are actually employed. Finally, we look at the official records regarding the enforcement of the migration control policies within the Italian territory.

### II.2.1.a Estimates and the ISMU surveys

The first set of estimates of the total foreign born population – documented and undocumented – residing in Italy was produced in the **early '80s**, and a detailed survey of all the estimates and of their techniques can be found in Natale and Strozza (1997) and Strozza (2004). Strozza (2004) classifies these estimation attempts in five different classes according to the method used: a) *juxtaposition and comparison of data from different source*: it allows to obtain an estimate which usually corresponds to the difference in the stocks measured by different sources; b) *Indirect methods*: based on the hypothesis that the foreign born population surveyed by official sources is underestimated, since the illegal share is not recorded, whereas events and actions related to undocumented immigrants (births, hospitalizations, convictions, etc.) are well-recorded; c) *Methods based on results of specific legalization procedures*: they provide estimates of the number of illegal foreigners for the years preceding and following the amnesty; d) *Rational estimates*: based on experience and on the author's knowledge of the phenomenon and of its size (Delphi method); e) *Illegality ratio determined from sample surveys*: based on specific questions regarding the legal status of the interviewees.

The results of the application of these different techniques in the period between 1981 and 1998 are presented in Table 10: the estimates provide an assessment of the overall foreign born population and of the ratio of undocumented migrants among it. The evolution over time shows a clear increasing trend in the size of the unauthorized presence of migrants (accompanied by the growth in the total migrant population), but the effect of the amnesties induces consistent variation over time and estimates for the same year appear significantly different one from the other. According to (Bonifazi 2007)), the estimates of the '80s are likely to have overestimated the real scale of the phenomenon while those produced in the first half of the '90 have probably suffered from the opposite drawback.

The recent, and current, panorama of estimates of unauthorized stocks looks definitely less mixed and composite. Expert and commentators seem to have

gradually converged in considering the estimates produced by the **ISMU Foundation** as the most accurate and reliable ones. Indeed, the introduction and implementation of the “*Centre Sampling Technique*” (Baio, Blangiardo et al. 2008) implemented by the research team of the ISMU Foundation, has produced a valuable, detailed and continuous monitoring of the undocumented migrant population in Italy. Survey techniques can hardly be applied to undocumented migrants because the (obvious) absence of information about the population of interest prevents the researcher from extracting a sample which is sufficiently representative of the whole unauthorized population: if representativeness of the sample is not ensured, any conclusion obtained from interviewing a certain group of undocumented migrants may suffer of strong biases due to the selection and self-selection of that specific group of interviewees. The Centre Sample procedure overcomes this obstacle by exploiting the social interactions of the unauthorized population: although undocumented migrants are not recorded anywhere and are hardly identifiable for the researcher, they usually attend a number of “aggregation centres” (institutions, places of worship or entertainment, care centres, meeting points, shops, telephone centres, etc.) which, instead, can be fairly easily mapped by an informed researcher. Once the whole set of these “centres” has been identified, a random sample of “centres” can be chosen among them, and a sample of undocumented migrants can be obtained from their regular attendees. Finally, a weighting procedure ensures representativeness to the sample (for more details, see: A2. Centre Sampling technique)<sup>18</sup>.

Starting from a focus geographically limited to the area of Milan, the scope of the ISMU survey has gradually involved the whole Lombardia region, and, finally, the

---

<sup>18</sup> The application of this technique to the Italian case has produced extremely valuable information on the undocumented population residing in this country. As any other method aiming at measuring the undocumented migrants phenomena, its validity can not be tested against the (unknown) reality. Nevertheless, some reasons of concern can be briefly summarized before presenting the empirical evidence obtained through this technique. The method strongly relies on the researcher capability of identifying the whole set of relevant “centres” located in the area of interest: if some of these are systematically ignored, the sample of individuals obtained may be not fully representative of the whole population of interest. Moreover, this method seems to be more suited to be applied to urban contexts than to rural ones, where the “aggregation centres” are probably more sparse and harder to identify. Finally, the common issues in interviewing undocumented migrants arise: they may be less willing to be interviewed, they may misreport their legal status, etc.

whole Italian country. Since 2001, the ISMU foundation has carried out a yearly survey of 8-9 thousand migrants residing in the Lombardia region, managing to always include in the sample a significant fraction of undocumented migrants. In 2005, the Centre Sampling technique was applied to a large fraction of the Italian territory: the survey was conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and interviewed a representative sample of about 30 thousand immigrants<sup>19</sup>.

Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of the stock of undocumented immigrants as it has been estimated by the researchers at the ISMU foundation. The cyclical trend of this stock reflects the repeated regularization processes that were adopted in the last two decades. Indeed, (Blangiardo 2008)) explains this “roller-coaster” trend with two different effects: 1) “amnesty effect”: the reduction in the number of undocumented migrants caused by the regularization process; 2) “recall effect”: the increase in unauthorized inflows in the periods preceding the amnesties, since more potential illegal migrants may be attracted by the opportunity of obtaining legal status through the amnesty.

The estimates for the most recent years value the stock of **undocumented immigrants** to be around **541 thousand in 2005, 650 thousand in 2006 and 349 thousand in 2007**<sup>20</sup> (Table 11). With respect to the total foreign born population living in Italy in those years, these estimates imply that the fraction of undocumented migrants was about 16 percent in 2005, 18 percent in 2006 and 9 percent in 2007.


---

<sup>19</sup> For materials and statistics from this latter survey see the website: <http://www.ismu.org/integrazionesud>

<sup>20</sup> The estimated drop in the unauthorized presence in 2007 (with respect to 2006) is largely due to the effect of the “quasi- amnesty” occurred in 2006 and discussed in the following section.



**Figure 2 - Estimated undocumented migrants in Italy (thousands). Years: 1990-2007**



Source: (Blangiardo 2008)

The national survey carried out in 2005 – when a sample of 30 thousand immigrant was interviewed in different Italian regions – provides more details underlying these estimates. Table 12 shows that **75 percent of the estimated 540 thousands undocumented migrants were settled in Northern and Central regions of Italy** and the remaining 25 percent was residing in the South: when comparing this distribution with that of authorized migrants – 85 percent of which are leaving in Northern-Central Italy – we can observe that undocumented migrants are relatively more likely to reside in the South than documented ones (although both groups clearly prefer to settle in Northern-Central Italy). Table 12 also shows that there seems to be a *higher concentration of undocumented migrants in the South than in the rest of Italy*: more than a quarter (27%) of the migrants residing in the Southern area are undocumented, while the mean value in Italy is 16 percent (and 14 percent in Northern-Central Italy).

### **II.2.1.b Undocumented migrants reporting themselves: data from amnesties and the quota system**

An important peculiarity of the Italian setting is the availability of data and information on undocumented migrants which have been collected directly by the self-reporting of the immigrants themselves. This has been made possible by the frequent implementation of general legalization procedures and by the peculiar functioning of the Italian quota system.

**Amnesties.** Different methodologies have been developed and applied to various developed countries in order to seize the undocumented population ((Tapinos and Delaunay 1998) and, for a more recent review (Pinkerton, McLaughlan et al. 2004)). Among these techniques, data from regularisation programmes can be used to obtain a fairly detailed and comprehensive picture of the situation. And this is particularly true for the Italian case, where the amnesties have been procedures with a relatively low level of selectivity, which have involved large numbers of migrants and which have been often repeated over time.

Using the number of applicants (or individuals legalized at the end of the process) for an amnesty to measure the stock of undocumented migrants has many strengths: all the applicants are undoubtedly undocumented immigrants; since applications are usually collected by local authorities, geographically detailed data can be obtained and used for research; with repeated amnesties (in reasonably short spans of time), the changes in stocks within single areas can be assessed and some inference about net flows can be made. The number of applications should provide a minimum assessment of the illegals stock existing in the period before the amnesty, given that a portion of the residing illegals may decide not to apply (or may fail to do so, for instance because they do not fulfil the program requirements). According to this reasoning, **the amnesty of 2002 showed that Italy was hosting a stock of more than 700 thousand undocumented migrants** (Table 9).

The process of "selection-into-amnesty" process - i.e. the reasons why an undocumented migrant decides to apply or not - may strongly hinder the representativeness of the data obtained during the amnesties and this potential limitation need to be kept in mind when commenting this type of data<sup>21</sup>.


Detailed data are available for the last four amnesties (1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002) launched in Italy. The geographical distribution of the applications for the amnesties shows that the settlement decisions of the irregular migrants tend to mirror those of the regular ones. For instance, in 2002 the distribution by macro area of the documented migrants (32 percent in North-Western regions, 25% in North-East, 29% in Central Italy and 13% in the South and Islands) was almost identical to that of the applicants for legal status (whose values were, respectively, 33%, 19%, 29% and 19%) (Table 13). Figure 3 shows how similar looked the distribution across regions in the same year. This symmetry in the residential choices can be explained with both network-effects arguments and with the fact that irregular migrants are probably attracted by the same elements

---

<sup>21</sup> Obtaining the legal status should represent a clear improvement for the migrant: it reduces the uncertainty of her future (i.e. no deportation risk), it allows to legally travel from the destination to the home country and back, and it is likely to improve her employment opportunities and her wage (Kossoudji, S. A. and D. A. Cobb-Clark (2002). "Coming out of the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population." *Journal of Labor Economics* 20(3): pp. 598-628.). Still, there are migrants who decide – or are forced to decide – not to apply for an amnesty. The process of "selection into amnesty" primarily depends on the minimum legal requirements for the application and on the (real or feared) consequences of a possible rejection. As far as the latter are concerned, migrants may not be willing to self-report themselves to the government authorities if they think that a negative outcome (e.g. a deportation) of the application process is more likely than a positive one. The legal requirements, instead, usually discriminate potential applicants on the basis of previous permanence in the country and on the employment status. In theory this should leave out an important component of the undocumented population (those recently arrived and those unemployed). In practice, there may be migrants who do not fulfil the legal requirements but who nevertheless decide to apply: this can happen if they can rely on forged documents to pass the application assessment and/or if they hope to use the span of time elapsing between the application and the actual assessment to find a job. Moreover, the application can be made even if the likelihood of being granted legal status is low: if the application assessment takes place after a long period of time – in Italy it took up to two years in the 2002 amnesty – and if the status of applicants prevents the authorities from deporting the migrant, there may be a direct gain from being an applicant. On the other hand, there may be immigrants who would fulfil all the requirements but who decide not to apply. This can often happen if being in employment is one of the requirement and if the employer is involved in the process: if the employer is not willing to regularize the position of her employee and if the labour market conditions in the area makes it hard to find any other employment apart from those offered by the underground economy, the incentives to apply may be very weak.

that attract regular ones: stronger labour demand and better employment opportunities in the Northern regions (Table 6) are clearly playing a major role in shaping the settlement decisions of all migrants. Indeed, comparing the data for the five amnesties, it's worth noticing the increase in concentration in the northern regions (from 33% in 1986 to 51% of total irregular migrants in 2002), the constant share of migrants residing in central regions (from 31% in 1986 to 29% in 2002) and the fall in South Italy share (from 34% in 1986 to 19% in 2002). Seven regions were hosting the majority of the immigrants that applied for the last three amnesties: four regions in Northern Italy (Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna), two in Central Italy (Lazio, Toscana) and only one in the South (Campania).

**Figure 3 - Geographical distribution of documented and undocumented(\*) immigrants across Italian regions. Year 2002**



(\*) Undocumented migrants are measured as the number of applicants for the 2002 amnesty.  
Source: Istat and Italian Minister of Internal Affairs

Finally, Table 13 reports the regional ratio of undocumented migrants over resident legal migrants and allows to appreciate the scale of the unauthorized residence phenomenon: in all the three amnesties, the stock of undocumented migrants (who applied for legal status) represented about 30-50 percent of the foreign born population lawfully residing in Italy, and this ratio varies from fairly low levels (5-15 percent) in Northern regions such as Trentino Alto Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia) to more than 100 percent (in 2002) in Southern regions (Campania and Calabria).

**Quota system.** Throughout the '90s, Italy has gradually attempted to set up a quota system to manage the legal inflows of migrant workers. This system has finally started to function only in 1998 with the Turco-Napolitano law and has been confirmed in 2002 by the following Bossi-Fini law<sup>22</sup>. According to the design of the system, the government establishes every year – through the so called “Flow decree” – the number of immigrants which will be allowed to enter the country for working reasons. At this stage, potential employers can apply for hiring immigrant workers until the number established by the quota is reached. According to the law, these immigrant workers should not be already residing in the country, and, given the almost absolute absence of legal entry channels for job searching reasons<sup>23</sup>, the match between employers and employees should theoretically occur without any previous meeting between the two parts. Indeed, when applying for an immigrant employee within the quota system, the employer can either request a specific individual or hire the first person in the lists of job-seekers that are compiled by Italian embassies and consulates in the origin countries.

---

<sup>22</sup> For a brief summary of the Italian migration policy see the appendix “A1. Italian legislation” (p. 83) and the list of references included there.

<sup>23</sup> The 1998 Turco-Napolitano Law introduced the possibilities of allowing the entry of migrants for job-searching reasons if they were backed by a “sponsor” in Italy. The sponsor could be an institution, an Italian citizen or a legal migrant already settled in Italy and was responsible for the maintenance in Italy and for the possible return of the migrant to her origin country (in case she had not found a job). This possibility was severely limited by the high rate of rejection of the applications and was abolished by the 2002 Bossi-Fini law.

It is obvious that hardly any employer would be willing to hire workers that they have never met before, therefore the legislation provisions are completely at odds with the reality of the labour markets. As it often happens in Italy, economy and society react to inadequate institutions and legislations by devising shortcuts which better fits their needs. In this case, the outcome of this ill-designed system is that the immigrants first enter the Italian labour market without any formal authorization (or with a tourist visa) and then, if they find a job and an employer who wants to legalize their situation and working contract, they wait for the “Flow decree”, apply for a place<sup>24</sup>, and, finally, if the application is accepted, they move back to their origin countries and then return to Italy, entering officially and pretending not to have been in Italy before. Basically, migrants undergo an indeterminate probation period as undocumented ones, and if the working relationship consolidates they may obtain the legal status and emerge from the underground economy. Evidence of this malfunctioning is provided by the 2006 ISMU survey in Lombardia: 34 percent of the undocumented migrants interviewed – and therefore already physically settled in Italy – had applied for the 2006 “Flow decree”, pretending to be still residing in their origin countries (Sciortino 2007).

The bottom line of this procedure is that the difference between an amnesty and the “Flow decree” tends to be more nominal than substantial, although the latter procedure usually establishes a cap to the number of legalized individuals (no matter how many applications were received by the government). Indeed, the quotas set by the government were around 60 thousand workers per year in the period 1998-2000, then the number increased to about 80 thousand from 2001 to 2004, and it reached 100 thousand in 2005 (Table 14). In 2006 the initial decree provided for 170 thousand new immigrant workers, but after receiving more than 500 thousand applications, the government decided to expand the quota to 550 thousand workers: the new quota basically created enough space to potentially

---

<sup>24</sup> In recent years applications have to be submitted to any Post Office and with the last Decree (2007) one could apply through internet: the application can be made by the migrants on behalf of their employers.

accept all the applications and it was substantially equivalent to an amnesty (Codini 2007).

The last “Flow decree”, in 2007, set again the quota at 170 thousands, and by the end of February 2008 more than 700 thousands applications were handed over in the Italian post offices. Although a relevant fraction of these applications may concern immigrants which are not already residing in Italy, politicians and commentators seem to take it for granted that the majority of these 700 thousands applicants are undocumented migrants who are already settled and working in Italy. Indeed, the current political debate concerns the possible options – increasing the quota, deporting, etc. – for dealing with the over 500 thousands immigrants that will be left out by the previously established quota.

For our purposes, these applications represent the **most recent and detailed picture of the current stock of undocumented migrants residing and working in Italy**. Nevertheless, a major problem with these data is represented by the difficulty in assessing how large is the component of truly potential new immigrants – with respect to that of undocumented migrants already in Italy – among the pool of applicants. This seriously limits the scope to use them as a precise measure of the overall stock of undocumented migrants – in the absence of specific studies on this issue – but they can still be regarded as a valuable source of information on the characteristics of the undocumented population.

The Italian Home Office has recently published some data on these requests, presenting breakdowns by region and country of origin (Table 15). According to these data, the **geographical distribution** of the undocumented migrants is similar to that observed in the last amnesties<sup>25</sup>, with the Northern regions playing a major role (36 percent in North-West area and 28 percent in North-East) while Central Italy and Southern regions accounted for, respectively, 19 and 16

---

<sup>25</sup> As these data on applications include genuine potential immigrants (who are still in their origin countries) the geographical distribution of the applicants may not reflect that of the undocumented population, if the fraction of potential immigrants is systematically higher in certain regions than in others.

percents of the total applications. As usual, Lombardia received the largest number of application (almost 28%).

### **II.2.1.c Estimates of unrecorded migrant workers**

In order to understand Italian migration flows – the undocumented ones in particular – and its migration policy, one needs to recognize the persistent and significant role played by the underground economy in characterizing the economic structure of the Italian setting (Reyneri 1998). The most recent estimates – produced by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat – [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it)) – show that the shadow economy represented about 17 percent of the GDP in 2004 (Istat 2006). It is worth mentioning that this estimate does appears fairly stable in recent years and that it does not include the illegal and criminal activities. In terms of employment, this implies that about 12% of the full-time equivalent labour units<sup>26</sup> were not regular in 2005, and this correspond to about 2.5 million of workers (out of 24 million employed workers) whose position was not fully regular – or entirely irregular – in the same year (Table 16). Within the category of the irregular labour input, Istat (Istat 2008) estimates allow to distinguish three types of status: 1) residents: individuals who are lawfully resident in Italy (both Italians and immigrants) but are irregularly employed; 2) non-resident migrants: foreign born individuals who are not registered as resident (see p.8) or who are undocumented; 3) multiple activities: mainly self-employed who carry out undeclared and secondary (with respect to their main one) activities.

---

<sup>26</sup> According to the OECD/Eurostat definition, full-time equivalent employment – or full-time equivalent labour units – is the number of full-time equivalent jobs, defined as total hours worked divided by average annual hours worked in full-time jobs. The differences between this standardized measure and the number of employed workers arise from the type of employment (employee, self-employed, temporary, permanent, seasonal, etc.) and number of hours worked (full-time, part-time) by each worker employed. For instance, if one country has twice the number of employed workers than the other, but they are all part-time – while in the other they are all full-time workers – the level of full-time equivalent employment is the same in both countries (although the actual level of employment in the first country is twice the level in the second one).



In Table 17, the category of “non resident migrants” – which is likely to include mainly undocumented migrants<sup>27</sup> – show a considerable variation over time, and the timing of these fluctuations mirrors that of the large amnesty granted in 2002. Indeed, in 2001 there were an estimated 720 thousands irregular labour units provided by non resident migrants, and this represented almost 22 percent of the total irregular labour input. Their contribution dropped to 4 percent in 2003-2004 (about 110-120 thousands labour units) in the aftermath of the amnesty program, but it seems to be again “on the rise”, reaching the 9 percent of the irregular labour input in 2005. Istat does not translate these estimates in number of actual immigrant workers, nevertheless we can gain useful insights by noticing that the two measures – labour units and number of employed – have roughly the same magnitude (see Table 16), and by looking at the share on total irregular labour input which shows how overrepresented migrant workers are among the pool of unregistered workers in the Italian labour market.

A closer look at the estimation of migrants employment in Italy is given by (Reyneri 2003). Combining different sources of data (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Internal Affairs, INPS and Istat) he produces an expert assessment of the stock of employed migrants disaggregated by different types of residence (documented and undocumented) and of employment (declared and undeclared) status. According to his estimates, in 2001 there were about a million and 160 thousands migrants employed in Italy: 25 percent of them (300 thousands) were undocumented migrants (and therefore were doing some unregistered job) while

---

<sup>27</sup> The estimates of the irregular employment are obtained by the comparison of different sources of information about employment levels by type of occupation, industry, region, etc. In particular, Istat compares data obtained by surveying workers (e.g. Population Census and Labour Force Surveys) with data from employers' surveys (e.g. firms census, firms surveys, etc.), and with administrative records (e.g. National Insurance registrations, etc.). In absence of any irregularity, these measures should provide a fairly similar picture, while any statistical significant discrepancy can be used to estimate the extent of the shadow employment in a particular industry, region, occupation, etc. A detailed description of the procedure followed by Istat in estimating the irregular labour inputs of non resident migrants can be found in Baldassarini, A. (2001). "Foreign labour and non-regular occupation in the new estimates of Italian national accounts." Studi Emigrazione 141.

almost 14 percent were working in the underground economy despite having a valid residence permit (Table 18).


#### **II.2.1.d Records of migration control policies**

The data about the irregular migrants that were apprehended and identified during the controls carried out by the Italian police forces can contribute to draw a picture of the undocumented presence in Italy. When looking at data on undocumented immigrants apprehended, identified, detained, deported, etc. one needs to bear in mind that these numbers are the result of the application of a certain level of enforcement to the unauthorized flows and stocks. This implies two limitations for the interpretation of this type of data. First, there is no clear way of discovering which proportion of the overall flow/stock is represented by the number of migrants who incurred some of the police checks. Second, when looking at the evolution over time of these data, it is hard to establish whether the observed changes from one period to the other were caused by fluctuations in the flows/stocks or rather by changes in the enforcement intensity. And the same issue arises when attempting to make comparisons across different areas of the country. As a matter of fact, there is no reason for considering the level of enforcement as a fairly uniform – across periods and areas – variable: empirical studies on migration control policies (Hanson and Spilimbergo 2001; Fasani 2008) tend to find that the enforcement is highly responsive to political and economical variables.

Table 19 reports the total number of unauthorized migrants who incurred in one of these police controls (excluding those refused entry at the border) during the last decade: in 2006 there were more than 100 thousands undocumented migrants uncovered by the police controls, and a similar number was observed in 2002 (before the last amnesty). We can observe important fluctuations over time which mirror the reduction in the stock of illegals induced by the two amnesties in 1998 and 2002 Figure 4 - Undocumented migrants identified and deported by

Italian police forces from within the Italian territory. Years: 1999-2005 (Figure 4): in the periods immediately following the regularization there are very small or negative changes in the number of migrants involved, although the number rapidly returns to its previous levels. The amnesties produces a short period effect which seems to last no more than two years (aa.vv. 2007).

**Figure 4 - Undocumented migrants identified and deported by Italian police forces from within the Italian territory. Years: 1999-2005**



Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs

**Deportations.** The Italian Minister of Internal Affairs provides yearly data on the number of undocumented migrants who were effectively deported back to their origin countries after being apprehended by the police. The number of immigrants deported increased dramatically in 1999 – with respect to the whole previous decade – as a consequence of the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law which aimed at making the deportation policy really effective. Table 20 reports the total number of individuals deported – and the values disaggregated by macro area –

in the period 1999-2005. The deportations show a significant oscillation over time, starting from almost 24 thousand in 1999, peaking with over 44 thousand in 2002, and decreasing to almost 27 thousand in 2006. The trend seems to follow the one observed for the number of undocumented migrants “identified” (Figure 4), with a clear drop after the amnesty in 2002.

There is significant variation over time in the geographical distribution of deportations. In 2006, 37 percent of them were carried out in North-Western regions, 21.5 percent in the North-East, 21 percent in Central Italy and 20.5 percent in the South.

## **II.2.2 Gender composition**

### **a) ISMU estimates**

The most recent data on gender composition of undocumented migrants are provided in (Barbagli 2007) drawing from the ISMU regional survey carried out in 2006 in Lombardia. Although these data are not fully representative of the national situation, Lombardia is the region which hosts the largest migrant population – both documented and undocumented – and it can give us a fairly accurate picture of the situation existing in the rest of the country. Moreover, if we assume that a dimension such as gender composition within national group is not very likely to vary across Italian regions, we can look at data from Lombardia with enough confidence in being reasonably close to the national values. Nevertheless, different areas of Italy host different national groups, and each of them is characterized by a peculiar gender ratio: as a result, each area will have a specific gender ratio of its undocumented population and the national value is given by the weighted mean of these regional values.


Indeed, the ranking of overall presence of the major national groups (Table 21) is similar but not equal to the national one which has been discussed above, and the same remark applies for the ranking of nationalities among the unauthorized stock (Table 22) which will be discussed in section 2.4. According to Table 22 **male migrants account for slightly more than half (54%) of the**

**undocumented population residing in Lombardia in 2006**, but this mean value hides a **huge variation across different national groups**. The within-group gender composition of unauthorized migrants allows to identify the “traditional men-led migratory systems” from those “women-led” and those more “gender balanced”. In the first group, where the fraction of men is above 60 percent, we find Egypt and Senegal (both at 85 percent of men), Tunisia (72%), Bangladesh (71%), Morocco (68%), Sri Lanka (66%), Pakistan (65%) and Albania (64%). On the opposite side, we find two Eastern European countries with an overwhelming majority of women – Ukraine (85 percent of female) and Moldova (82%) – and a second group of countries where women represent around 60% of the population: Peru and Brazil (both at 60%), Serbia and Montenegro (58%) and Ecuador (57%).

b) Amnesties and quota system

Detailed data are available for the last four amnesties granted in Italy (1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002). Table 23 allows also to briefly analyze the gender composition of the undocumented migrants and its evolution over time. Overall, the percentage **of women has increased by 20 percentage points from 26 percent in 1990 to 46.2 in 2002**, and this increase is mainly explained by the growing fraction of females among the Eastern European group (from 41.5 percent in 1990 to 56.9 in 2002) and by the prominence of these nationalities in the last two amnesties. Indeed, in the other geographical areas gender composition remains fairly constant over time, but it shows **striking differences across origin areas**: women represents only 14.3 percent of the legalized migrants from Africa, 25.3 percent of those from Asia and almost 65 percent of those arriving from Latin America (Figure 5). A closer look at the different nationalities shows the diversity of the migration trajectories of the different countries: in 2002 the female component varied from more than 85 percent among Ukrainians to 0.7 percent of Bangladesh and Pakistan.

**Figure 5 - Percentage of women among the "legalized migrants" in the amnesties of 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002. By area of origin**



Source: Istat and Italian Home Office

For the 2002 amnesty we can compare gender and civil status of two groups of migrants: those who obtained the legal status with that particular amnesty ("legalized migrants") and those who were already legal in 2002 ("documented migrants"). Although the "legalized" population is likely to differ to a certain extent from the overall undocumented one – given the process of "selection into amnesty" which has been discussed above – their average characteristics should be closer to those of the undocumented migrants than to those of the migrants who were already legally residing in Italy. Therefore, by looking at the "legalized migrants" we can infer substantial information regarding the undocumented population.

Overall, the **percentage of female is slightly smaller in the "legalized" population (46.2) than in the documented one (49.2)**, while the proportion of

married individuals is much lower (40.2 percent versus 57.4) among the “legalized migrants” (Table 24)<sup>28</sup>.

c) Other sources

Information about gender composition of undocumented migrants can be obtained through the analysis of the data collected by the NGO **Naga** during its activities. As previously discussed, the level of representativeness of these record may be questioned, and they are only informative on the reality of Milan. Still, the picture depicted in Table 25 seems to fully confirm the values presented above. During the period 2000-2006, women constituted 44 – 47 percent of the undocumented migrants recorded by Naga volunteers and this fraction was fairly constant over time.

### II.2.3 Age composition<sup>29</sup>

a) ISMU estimates

The regional ISMU survey run in Lombardy in 2006 provides detailed information about the age distribution of the migrants and allows to compare documented and undocumented migrants. With respect to this last point, Figure 6 shows remarkable differences in the age distribution between the two groups: **undocumented migrants are significantly younger than their documented counterpart**. More than half (52 percent) of the irregular immigrants are within the age range 15- 29 years old, 30 percent are in the cohort 30-39 and the remaining 18 percent are older than 40. For the regular migrants, instead, we


---

<sup>28</sup> As the 2002 amnesty was intensively advertised as amnesty for migrants working in the personal care sector – where female workers are prevalent – we may think that the percentage of females in this amnesty was higher than in the total population without residence status (see p. 53).

<sup>29</sup> All the sources of information included in this section generally fail to capture the component of undocumented minors, who are not interviewed and who do not apply for amnesties. The real age structure, therefore, is probably even younger than the one presented below, but there are no estimates of the stock of irregular minors currently residing in Italy.

have less than a third (32 percent) in the younger range, 40 percent in the central one, and 20 percent above 40 (Table 26).

**Figure 6 - ISMU survey: age distribution of immigrants living in Lombardy, by legal status.  
Year 2006**



Source: author's elaboration from (Barbagli 2007)

The comparison across different areas of origin shows the existence of relevant differences: **undocumented migrants from Eastern Europe and Latin America are substantially older than the rest of the unauthorized population.** If we consider the younger cohort (15-29), for instance, the fraction of migrants within this range varies from 44-45% in Latin America and Eastern Europe, to almost 60 percent in Asia and Oceania, and to more than 65 percent in Northern Africa. Similarly, the fraction of individuals “over 40” in the Eastern European group is more than three times (28 percent), and in the Latin America group more than twice (18 percent), that of migrants coming from Africa (8 percent).



b) Amnesties and quota system

Looking at the records of the applicants for the 2002 amnesty, we can learn something about the age distribution of undocumented migrants in Italy and we can analyze breakdowns by nationality, gender and area of residence.

According to Table 27 the **average age was 32.4**, with male undocumented migrants being 5-6 year younger in average than their female counterpart. Moreover, Table 24 allow to compare the age of legalized and legal migrants: **male undocumented immigrants are younger than their regular counterpart** (average age is 30.9 years versus 35), **while the opposite is true for female migrants** (mean age for undocumented migrants is 36.6 while it s 34.4 for documented ones). Instead, if we compare different areas of residence (Table 27) we discover that undocumented migrants residing in the Northern and Central areas of Italy were slightly younger that those settled in the South: the average age was 32.2 year in the North-Central Italy versus 33.5 in the South.

When looking at the **age distribution**, we can appreciate how young the unauthorized migrants are: almost half of the applicants (46 percent) were within the range 15-29 years, while 41 percent were in the range 30-44 years, and only 13 percent were more than 45 years old. The variation in age distribution across different origin areas and nationalities is consistent, but the average age is clearly centred around 30 and it never exceeds 40. The “oldest” group is clearly composed by Eastern European citizens: with an average age of almost 38 years, they had almost a third (30 percent) of individuals above 45, and 43 percent in the central cohort of age (30-44). On the contrary, Africans and migrants from the Middle East had an average age well below the average (28-29 years) and rather negligible fractions of individuals above 45.

c) Other sources

As for the gender dimension, the evidence on age distribution based on **Naga** records supports the patterns presented in the two previous section. In 2006, indeed, the undocumented migrants registered at Naga had an average age of almost 33 years, and the women were, in average, two years older than the men:

34 years old versus 32 (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007). The largest fraction of individual lies in the range 25-34 years - both for women (39 percent) and for men (45 percent) – and the majority of them – 59 percent of the women and 68% of the men – are younger than 35 (Table 28).

## **II.2.4 Nationality composition**

When reporting the national composition of the estimated stock of irregular migrants we need to bear in mind that the gradual process of **enlargement of the European Union** has caused major transformations to this composition. Indeed, for the nationalities involved by this political change, the distinction between documented and undocumented immigrants lost its significance, as all the migrants gradually became EU citizens. After the accession of their countries of origin to the EU, immigrants could not be considered as illegally residents anymore, nevertheless they could be forbidden to work in the other “old” member countries. Indeed, according to the Accession Treaties<sup>30</sup>, national governments of countries which were already members of the EU could choose to maintain some temporary limitations (“transitional periods”) to the access to their labour markets by citizens of new member states. As the majority of the other EU members, Italy chose to postpone the liberalization of its labour market in both the Enlargement of the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004 and in that of the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2007. In the first case, the Italian government opted for maintaining the transitional period with no access to the Italian labour market – unless the migrant obtained a work permit through the quota system – for eight (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) out of ten new member states. This period expired on the 27<sup>th</sup> of July 2006 and, since then, citizens from the EU8 can freely work in Italy (as in all the other EU25 countries). For the enlargement which involved Romania and Bulgaria, instead, Italy decided to

---

<sup>30</sup> The accession Treaties of 16 April 2003 regarding the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, and that of 25 April 2005 regarding the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.

liberalize the access only to certain sectors (agriculture, hotel and tourism, domestic work, care services, construction, engineering, managerial and highly skilled work, seasonal work). The first phase of the transitional period will end on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2008, and after this date the government has the faculty to reiterate the period or, rather, to allow for the free movement of workers<sup>31</sup>.

a) ISMU estimates

Using the data from the ISMU national survey carried out in 2005, Table 29 reports the breakdown by macro area of origin and area of residence in Italy of the estimated 540 thousands undocumented migrants. Figure 7 shows that, at the national level, the **majority of the unauthorized population is composed by Eastern European citizens** (53 percent). The second largest group are the **North-Africans** (17.1 percent), followed by immigrants from **Asia and Oceania** (12.5 percent), **Sub-Saharan Africa** (8.7 percent) and **Latin America** (8.7 percent). There do not seem to be significant differences in the nationality composition of the unauthorized stock between the two Italian macro-areas (North-Central Italy Vs. South Italy).

Table 30 and Table 31 allow us to look at specific nationalities. Table 30 reports the list of the 20 major nationalities for overall presence (both documented and undocumented) and in the first ten positions we have: **Albania, Romania, Morocco, Ukraine, China, Philippines, Tunisia, Ecuador, Macedonia and Poland**. The percentage of undocumented migrants among each national group varies considerably across nationalities, but it is clearly bounded within the range 10-22 percent, while the national average is 16.1 percent. The communities with the largest shares of unauthorized migrants - around 20 percent – are Ukraine (22.4), Romania (21.6), Poland (21.3), Nigeria (19.6), Moldova (19.1), Macedonia (18.2) and Senegal (18.0).


If we consider only the undocumented immigrants (Table 31) the nationality ranking changes slightly, but the largest community are generally also those with

---

<sup>31</sup> See [http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/free\\_movement/enlargement\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/free_movement/enlargement_en.htm) for more details on other EU countries.

the largest number of unauthorized migrants. Indeed, the ranking for the main nationalities is the following: 95 thousand from Romania (17.4%), 66 thousands from Albania (12.1%), 58 thousand from Morocco (10.7%), 40 thousand from Ukraine (7.4%), 19 thousand from China (3.6%), 18 thousand from Tunisia (3.3%) and 18 thousand from Poland (3.3%).

**Figure 7 - Undocumented migrants by area of origin. 1st July 2005**



Source:(Blangiardo and Tanturri 2006)

#### b) Amnesties and quota system

Detailed data are available for the last four amnesties granted in Italy (1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002). Table 23 reports the **nationality composition of the undocumented migrants who were granted legal status** in each amnesty. We can immediately notice important changes that occurred over time in the areas of origin of the undocumented population residing in Italy: while immigrants from Europe represented only 12.7 percent in 1990, their proportion kept

increasing in the following processes and they became the majority in 2002 (59.2 percent of the legalized migrants). Within this geographical area is it possible to follow the hump shaped evolution of the irregular presence of Albanian citizens – who represented the main group in both the 1995 and 1998 amnesties – and the sharp increase of Romania and Ukraine, which started from a negligible number in the early '90 and in 2002 they became the two largest national groups, representing, respectively, 20.9 and 15.7 of the legalized population. An opposite trend is recognizable for the African immigrants: while they represented 58.4 percent of the total in 1990, they accounted for only 16.8 percent in 2002. The irregular presence of Asian and South American immigrants, instead, appears more stable: the fraction of Asian citizens declines from 21.6 in 1990 to 13.6 in 2002, while the Latin-Americans slightly increased from 7.1 percent to 10.4 in the same period.

Table 15, instead, reports the number of applications for the **2007 Flow Decree**. The main nationalities forming the pool of 700 thousand applicants are Morocco (17.1%), China (10.2%), Bangladesh (9.9%), India (7%), Ukraine (6.4%), Moldova, Albania and Pakistan (all around 5%).

## **II.2.5 Labour market status and economic sector composition**


### **a) ISMU estimates**

The 2005 national ISMU survey provided detailed data on employment status, occupation and monthly wage of the migrants and it makes it possible to compare the labour market performance of different groups of migrants: documented migrants (who were already legal before the 2002 amnesty), legalized migrants (in 2002) and undocumented migrants. This comparison contributes to the understanding of the migrants' trajectory from illegal status towards a regular and more stable integration in the Italian economy and society.

Table 32 reports the **labour market status (employed, unemployed, inactive)** of the three categories of migrants mentioned above. At first glance (Figure 8) the labour market integration of the legalized migrants looks different from both that of the documented migrants and that of the undocumented ones. Indeed, the fraction of **unemployed** individuals is almost 8 percent among the legalized and documented migrants, while it grows to more than **20 percent for the unauthorized immigrants**. On the other hand, the proportion of **inactive immigrants** (students or individuals looking after family/home) is fairly negligible in both undocumented (2.5 percent) and legalized migrants (1 percent), while it is around 14 percent for the legal migrants. This higher value is due to the higher proportion of students (4.1 percent) and to the fact that around one fifth (21.2 percent) of the female documented immigrants take care of the family and of the house as their main occupation.

Table 33 provides more detail. The proportion of working individuals among the documented migrants is around 75 percent, with 13 percent **self-employed** and 62 percent **employed**. Among those employed, 54 percent of the migrants have a recorded job (full-time, part-time or temporary) while almost 8 percent are employed in the underground economy in spite of having a valid residence permit. For the legalized group, instead, the proportion of employed individuals increases up to 85 percent – with 72.2 percent of them working regularly and 10. percent having an unrecorded job – and the fraction of self-employed is around 4 percent. Finally, around **73 percent of the undocumented migrants are working** – 63 percent are employed and 11 percent self-employed - and all of them are working in the underground labour market: the lack of a residence permit prevents them from lawfully holding any job position.

Figure 8 - ISMU data: labour market status of immigrants in Italy, by legal status. Year 2005



Source: author's elaboration from (Bragato 2006)

It is interesting to notice how the traditional **gender gaps** in participation, employment and unemployment rates tend to vanish among the two groups of legalized and undocumented immigrants were almost all individuals – no matter which gender they are – participate in the labour market and face a similar level of risk of remaining unemployed. For the documented migrants, instead, the participation rates follow a more traditional pattern, with 27 percent of the women being inactive versus 2.6 percent of men. Indeed, when the migrants succeed to settle down (fairly) permanently and to bring in Italy their closer relatives through the family reunification, they seem to return to a more conventional organization of the household.

Some insight on migrants' **occupations and industry employment** can be gained by looking at Table 34. The ISMU survey contains detailed questions about the occupations of the migrants interviewed, but, unfortunately, the

classification adopted in the questionnaire does not allow to easily allocate each type of occupation to a particular industry: we will discuss this issue in the following paragraphs. In Table 34 we can analyze the occupations of migrants and the breakdowns by legal status and macro area of residence. In Italy migrant workers are clearly concentrated in low-skilled job, independently from their legal status and their level of education and skills. If we consider the subset of occupations for which we can clearly identify the industry of employment, around half of the sample is employed in the service sector (considering unskilled workers in services, transports, retail trade and services, hotels and restaurant; household staff; care workers and babysitters) while 20-25 percent work in manufacture (unskilled workers in manufacture and construction). The proportion of migrants working in the agriculture and fishing industry shows clear geographical variation: it is quite low in Northern and Central Italy (2-3 percent) while it increases to 12-19 percent (depending on the legal status) in the South, where this industry is larger in terms of employment share.

At this level of detail it is worth noticing that the occupational pattern of the undocumented migrants does not look particularly dissimilar from that shown by the documented and legalized group. One important difference arises if we distinguish the construction sector from the rest of manufacture. Although the overall fraction of employment in the manufacture industry is similar across groups, only 8 percent of the documented migrants work in the construction sector and 13 percent in the manufacture (other from construction), while the values for the undocumented migrants show that 23 percent (26 percent of men) work as builders and less than 2 percent in manufacture (other than construction). A second important difference can be noticed by looking at jobs where the employers are Italian families (household staff, care workers and babysitter): this account for 17 percent of the employment of documented migrants and for more than 32 percent of that of undocumented migrants (and about 30 percent of legalized migrants).



We can finally have a brief look at **monthly wages** of migrants workers (Table 35). Two main conclusions can be quickly drawn. First, the mean level of wages for all categories of migrants is significantly lower in the South than in the rest of Italy: 621 euros (median is 600 euros) versus 930 euros (median is 900 euros). Second, the mean level of wages seems to “increase with legal status”: documented migrants earn in average 965 euros, the legalized ones earn 851 euros and the undocumented ones earn 690 euros. **Undocumented migrants earn in average 30 percent less of the documented migrants:** this difference is likely to be partially explained by different characteristics of the two groups (undocumented migrants are generally shorter permanence in Italy, they have less experience in the Italian labour market, they are probably less fluent in Italian, etc.), but the legal status is probably playing a role in influencing the relative bargaining power of employers and employees when they agree on the wage.

b) Amnesties and quota system

A valuable amount of information about the industry employment of undocumented migrants is provided by the records of the over 700 thousands applications for the 2002 amnesty. These data are likely to over represent the migrants employed by Italian families (as cleaners, care workers, babysitters, etc.) given that the legalization process had initially been conceived – and advertised to the general public – to explicitly address this category of workers, and only subsequently extended to include any type of employee. Nevertheless, bearing this caveat in mind, we can be fairly confident that, apart from that particular industry, the ranking and relative importance of the other industries is representative of the real patterns of employment of undocumented migrants.

We start by looking at national shares of employment in each industry (Table 36). Almost half of the applicants (47 percent) are working for Italian families, providing cleaning and care services. Manufacture comes second, with 27 percent of migrant workers: 17 percent in construction sector and 10 percent in

other types of manufacture. Only 5 percent of the applicants are employed in agriculture, while the remaining 16 percent works in different types of services (retail trade, restaurant and hotel, other). According to these data, therefore, the **service sector employs the vast majority of migrant workers** (63 percent).

The geographical differences in the industry composition of migrants' employment between Northern-Central Italy and Southern Italy mirrors the different industrial specialization of these macro-areas. Indeed, the agriculture sector of the South accounts for 15 percent of the migrants' employment in this area, while it falls to 3 percent in the rest of Italy. The opposite is true for the manufacture share: it is almost 30 percent in Northern-Central Italy and only 14 percent in the South. Finally, the fraction of immigrants providing services to the families is higher in the South (53 percent) than in other areas of the country (46 percent).

The breakdown by geographical area of origin (Table 36) points out the existence of important variation in employment composition across different groups of nationalities. Eastern European and Latin Americans, for instance, seem to be "specialized" in the services for the families, with a fraction of employment that reaches, respectively, 77 and 69 percent. This value, instead, falls to 26 percent for Middle East and to 13 percent for Northern Africa. In agriculture, there are two groups of nationalities – Northern Africa and Middle East – which have relatively large shares of employment (around 12 percent at the national level, but, respectively, up to 38 percent and 20 percent in the South) and areas with shares close to zero (Eastern Asia and Latin America). Migrants from the Balkan area and from Northern Africa have a large fraction of employed (29-30 percent) in construction sector, while citizens from Eastern Asia shows the largest shares of employment in "other manufacture" (38 percent).

Different nationalities, therefore, seems to specialize in different industries of the Italian economy: different characteristics (gender, age, qualifications, skills, etc.) of the national groups of migrants and the role played by network effects in finding a job are likely to play a major role in explaining these disparities.

If there seems to be a certain degree of ethnic specialization in particular industries, a quick glance at Table 37 makes it evident the extent of gender specialization in economic sector employment. In all Italian areas, the female employment is basically confined within the “services to the families” sector: 40-48 percent of women migrants are working as cleaners, and 34-43 percent as care workers for Italian families. These values are much lower for male migrants, who, instead, have large share of employment in the construction sector (30 percent) and in “other manufacture” (16 percent).

c) Other sources

Some interesting insight on the labour market integration of undocumented migrants are provided by (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007) drawing from **Naga records**. The **likelihood of being employed seems to increase dramatically with the length of permanence in Italy**: if the percentage of employed among those arrived less than one year before the interview is below 40 percent, the percentage of those working among the migrants with 3-4 years of permanence grows to more than 75% (Table 38). This latter value is really close to the employment rate registered in 2006 from the Italian population in the cohorts 25-34 years (70%) and 35-44 years (77%).

## II.2.6 Education

Naga records make it possible to shed some light on the level of education of the undocumented migrants. In spite of the unfounded political and media discourse on irregular migration in Italy – which tends to depict undocumented migrants as unskilled, marginal and “desperate” individuals – a comparison between the educational levels of the migrants recorded by Naga and that of the Italian population tells a completely different story (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007). Leaving aside a number of caveats regarding the full comparability of the data, Table 39 shows that the percentages of undocumented migrants having received a secondary and university education are absolutely similar to those of Italian

citizens in the relevant age cohort (25-34 years), and higher of those of the whole Italian population. Undocumented migrants, though, have also a larger percentage of illiterates (3-4 percent versus 0.4-0.7 percent in the Italian population).

## ***II.3 Estimates, data and expert assessments on flows***

### **II.3.1 Demographic flows**

Almost no studies have used the existing administrative sources which record events independently from the legal status of the migrant (i.e. births, deaths, hospitalizations, incarcerations, etc.). The limitation of these dataset relies in the fact that they generally allow to distinguish only between resident and non-resident migrants: this latter category includes both irregular migrant and immigrants that are fully legal but that have not registered their residence yet (see p. 8). Nevertheless, given that an estimated 90% of the legal migrants are registered as resident migrants, we can look at the non-resident category assuming that a good proportion of them does not have a legal status.

One recent study that has tried to use these datasets to draw some inference on the undocumented population is represented by the analysis of death rates between 1992 and 2002 in (Colombo 2007). He finds a similar age structure of deaths for the two groups, although the distribution for the non-resident migrants is skewed towards younger ages and their mean age at death is smaller. The fact that the non-resident migrants tend to die younger than the resident migrants can be explained with the younger age of this first group – in line with the finding that undocumented migrants tend to be younger than documented ones (see p. 47) – but also with their higher exposure to risks and higher vulnerability.

### II.3.2 Border related flows

The migrants who are irregular from the point of view of the residence may have irregularly entered the country, but they may also have entered legally and then overstayed their visas. Moreover, they may have been fully “regular” in the past, with valid residence documents which failed to renew at a certain stage of their permanence in the host country.

According to official records, the illegal inflows of clandestine immigrants – in spite of the hostile attention they receive from media and from certain political actors in Italy – do not play a major role in creating the stock of undocumented migrants, and they rather represent a limited and marginal component of its growth. Indeed, in 2005 the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated that **around 70% of the undocumented migrants currently residing in Italy are “overstayers”**. The Italian Home Office (aa.vv. 2007) provides estimates that allow to classify the undocumented population according to their entry in Italy. Table 40 shows that in the period 2000-2006 the vast majority (60-75 percent) of the unauthorized migrants stock was constituted by *overstayers*, that is, by migrants that had lawfully entered Italy with a valid visa and had failed to leave the country after the visa expired. The remaining 25-40 percent, instead, managed to avoid controls at the borders (20-30 percent) or to shore land in the Southern regions (5-15 percent) without being apprehended by the Italian police. This finding is crucial to assess the possible effectiveness of increased border enforcement in arresting, or slowing, the creation of a population of undocumented migrants in Italy: a high level of border controls would probably reduce the unauthorized entries, but it would hardly prevent migrants from entering Italy with a visa and from “over-staying” it once it has expired.

We can get an idea about the **unauthorized inflows**, their magnitude and their trend over time by analyzing the official data on migration control policies implemented by the Italian government.

The Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs regularly provides aggregate statistics concerning two aspects - undocumented migrants that shore landed in Italy and those refused entry at the border – that allows us to assess the level of “pressure” exerted on the Italian borders by unauthorized flows of immigrants. Before describing these data, it is crucial to stress how both these statistic jointly measure the magnitude of undocumented inflows and the level of police enforcement: any change in their values, therefore, may be due to a change in enforcement rather than in flows. Moreover, it is hardly impossible to establish which percentage of the overall incoming flows is represented by those that fail their attempt to illegally enter Italy (and are, therefore, recorded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Table 41 reports the number of **undocumented migrants** who **shore landed** in Southern Italian regions between 1998 and 2006. The inflows during the first two year considered were dramatically altered by the crisis in Kosovo and the subsequent war in 1999: the total number of landings was almost 40 thousand in 1998, and reached a peak of 50 thousand in 1999. In both years, the vast majority of landings – 74% in 1998 and 92% in 1999 – occurred in Puglia, the region that is geographically closer to the Balkan area. In the following years, instead, the situation of the unauthorized landings seems to have fluctuated around a fairly stable level of 20 thousand per year, and shows the increasing importance of the region of Sicily as arrival location (that, from 2003 onwards, received more than 90% of the total landings). Detailed data on the nationality of the landed migrants are not available, but the available information show that, after the relative stabilization of the Balkan area, there has been a significant change in the national composition of the unauthorized inflows that are currently originated from North Africa – Libya in particular – and involve people coming from Africa and Middle East. Official records provide some information on gender and age composition of these unauthorized inflows: in 2006, about 5% of the migrants were female and 6% were minors.


Table 42 reports the annual number of **migrants who were refused entry at the border**. The data show a clear downward trend, after the peaks caused by the

former Yugoslavia war ('92-'95), the two Albanian political crisis ('90 and '97) and the Kosovo war ('99). Indeed, from a peak of about 70 thousands refusals in 1993, recent years have seen the number stabilizing around 25 thousands per year.

Although the last amnesty of 2002 has pointed out a large presence of undocumented migrants, there is not clear evidence of an increase in the illegal crossings of the Italian borders in the last years. If we look at the trend of these two variables (Figure 9) – and we take into account the overall increase in the strictness of the migration control policy that has taken place after the adoption of new legislation in 1998 and in 2002 – we could conclude that there seems to be a considerable reduction of the usage made by immigrants of these types of entry channels. Nevertheless, it is hard to establish whether this trend is due to a higher effectiveness of the Italian government in tackling the flows at their origin (through police cooperation agreements with the origin and transit countries), to an autonomous fall in the inflows, or rather to a change in the preferred ways of entering Italy for potential undocumented migrants.

On the other hand, the reduction in the number of migrants who were refused entry at the border in recent years can be partially explained by the opening of the borders within the Schengen area ((aa.vv. 2007), p 335). Moreover, the fall in the number of migrants detected at the border may also be due to their increased ability to cross the border without being apprehended: the evidence provided by the Ministry of interior ((aa.vv. 2007), p 335) points out an increase in the number of people involved in smuggling migrants into Italy (see (Pastore, Monzini et al. 2006) for an analysis of human smuggling in Italy). Indeed, the number of individuals arrested and charged of smuggling migrants has almost tripled in the period 2002-2007 (33,526 individuals arrested) with respect to the previous five years (12,246 arrested).

**Figure 9. Undocumented immigrants shore landed and refused entry at the border (Years: 1986-2006)**



Source: author's elaboration on Ministry Of Internal Affairs data

The **Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs** ((aa.vv. 2007) p.337) proposes a tentative estimate of the average **yearly inflow of undocumented migrants** – which adds to the existing stock – that is around **175 thousand individuals per year** in the period 1998 – 2002. But this value is simply obtained by dividing the number of applications for the 2002 amnesty (705 thousands) by the number of years passed between the last two amnesties (4 years, between the 1998 amnesty and the 2002 one), under the assumption that the stock after the 1998 amnesty was zero.

### **II.3.3 Status-related flows**

#### a) From legal entry to unauthorized residence



The Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (aa.vv. 2007) provides estimates that allow to distinguish the undocumented population according to their entry in Italy (Table 40). According to their figures, in the period 2000-2006 the vast majority (60-75 percent) of the unauthorized migrants stock was constituted by *overstayers*, that is, by migrants who had lawfully entered Italy with a valid visa but who failed to leave the country after the visa had expired.

#### b) From legal residence to unauthorized residence

According to the Ismu surveys in Lombardy region, the percentage of individuals who “fall back” to irregularity after having been regular – that is, those who had a valid residence permit but who failed to renew their residence permit – is negligible: in 2006 it was only around 2 percent of the interviewees (Sciortino 2008).

#### c) From illegal residence to legal residence

In Italy the opportunities to shift from unauthorized to fully legal status (as far as residence is concerned) have been far from rare. There are two main channels which allow the undocumented migrants to obtain a legal status: amnesties and the current quota system. As it has already been described, amnesties have been granted in average every four-five years during the last two decades. The quota system, instead, opens a restricted channel of legalization every year: according to Ismu estimates (Sciortino 2007) around a third of the undocumented migrants interviewed during the 2006 regional survey had applied for the 2006 “Flow Decree”.

The existence of these frequent and fairly large channels of *ex-post* legalization of migrants’ status is clearly recognizable in the relation existing between years of permanence and legal status. Indeed, the likelihood of being undocumented decreases with the years of permanence in Italy<sup>32</sup>. Table 43 reports the

---

<sup>32</sup> The negative relationship between the probability of being illegal and the length of permanence in Italy is also showed by estimating a probabilistic model in Dustmann, C., F. Fasani, et al. (mimeo). Remittance behaviour of undocumented migrants, CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration - University College of London.

composition by legal status of the migrants residing in the Lombardy region in 2007 (drawing from the 2007 regional ISMU survey) and it breaks it down by year of arrival in Italy. We can immediately notice that the percentage of migrants arrived before 2002 – and therefore before the last amnesty – and still undocumented in 2007 is very small, around 5 percent. This fraction jumps up by 20 percentage points for those arrived in 2003 and who, therefore, could not enjoy the opportunity of obtaining the legal status, and then it keeps increasing in the following years, reaching 44% in 2006. The small reduction registered in 2007 is probably explained by the unusually large “Flow Decree” set in 2006 (see 34). In other words, if almost one out of two immigrants, with a permanence in Italy equal or shorter than 1 year, is undocumented, only one out of twenty of those arrived five years before is still undocumented.

#### **II.3.4 Asylum seekers**

Despite a very generous provision contained in the Italian Republican Constitution of 1948<sup>33</sup>, and the ratification of the Geneva Convention (1951) in 1954, Italy is the only EU member state which has not adopted an organic legislation on asylum yet. This is probably one of the main factors which can explain its limited generosity – with respect to other European countries – in receiving and hosting refugees. Table 44 shows that the stock of refugees residing in Italy in 2006 was around 26.8 thousand, which corresponded to 0.4 refugees per 1000 population. These values appear really modest when compared with the EU25 ones (almost 1.4 million refugees; 2.9 refugees per 1000 population) and with those of other European countries such as Germany (600 thousand refugees; 7.3 refugees per 1000 population), United Kingdom (300 thousand; 4.9 refugees per 1000 population) or France (145 thousand; 2.3 refugees per 1000 population). The number of applications received by Italy is also smaller than the average in the EU25, but the gap is far less wide than with

---

<sup>33</sup> Art. 10: *"A foreigner to whom the practical exercise in her own country of democratic freedoms, guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, is precluded, is entitled to the right of asylum within the territory of the Republic, under conditions laid down by law".*

the refugees stock. In 2006, Italy received about 10.3 thousand applications<sup>34</sup>, which correspond to 0.2 applications per 1000 population with respect to an EU25 average of 0.4 (and a total of almost 199 thousands asylum applicants).

The Bossi-Fini law of 2002 contained two articles which aimed at reforming the asylum system in Italy which came into force in 2005. The legislator had two main targets. One was reducing the time required to assess the application and to reach a decision upon the refugees status (according to UNHCR-Italy, 1.5-2 years was the average waiting time to obtain a definite pronouncement). And the second was avoiding the “disappearance” of the asylum seekers after their applications were refused (Table 45 shows that the fraction of applicants becoming “irrecoverable” was oscillating between 20 and 60 percent in the period 2001-2005). In particular, these new legal provisions have decentralized the process of application assessment (creating seven local decision committees to cooperate with the existing national one), have introduced the possibility of holding the applicants while deciding upon their cases, and have opened detention centers for this latter aim. As a consequence, both the average waiting periods and the fraction of asylum seekers “disappearing” during the process have substantially dropped after 2005.

Table 45 reports the number of applications filed and examined between 1990 and 2007, and the different outcomes of this process (refused; refused but granted temporary Humanitarian Protection; granted refugee status; “irrecoverable”). We can look at these data to get an idea of the magnitude of the potential **inflow from the asylum seeker condition into that of irregular migrant**. Given that asylum seekers were not detained before 2005, a large fraction of failed asylum seekers and of those who become “irrecoverable” during the process is likely to have opted for an unauthorized residence in Italy (or in

---

<sup>34</sup> In 2006, the vast majority of the application was filed by foreign nationals coming from Africa, but consistent numbers arrived also from Asia and other European countries. In 2006, the first five national groups among the applicants were: Eritrea (20%), Nigeria (8%), Togo (5%), Kosovo (5%) and Ghana (5%).

some other European countries). During the period considered the number of refused application varies enormously both in levels (ranging from less than 1 thousand to almost 20 thousand per year) and as a share of applications examined (from 15 to 95 percent). The number of “irrecoverable” applicants shows substantial variation too (between 2 and 10 thousand per year in the period 2001-2005).

After 2005, instead, the situation seems to have significantly changed. In 2006, almost 70 percent of the over 10 thousand applicants were detained while a decision was made upon their case. Although data on removals of failed asylum seekers are not available<sup>35</sup>, current legislation seems to have made the government sizably more effective in preventing the immigrants from using the asylum seeking path as an entry channel into undocumented permanence.

---

<sup>35</sup> According to Caritas/Migrantes (2007). *Immigrazione - Dossier Statistico 2007 - XVII Rapporto*. Roma, Idos., only around 800 failed asylum seekers were repatriated within an “assisted return” scheme during the period 2001-2006.

## **Part III: Discussion and policy implications**

This report has clearly proved the existence of a number of different sources of information about undocumented migration in Italy and the developing of a growing body of interdisciplinary research on this particular issue.

The relevance of unauthorized migration in the Italian migratory experience is a well established fact. What still needs to be understood, instead, is that we know about this phenomenon probably more than one would expect from its very nature of hidden and unrecorded process.

### ***III.1 The existence of various sources of information***

Thanks to the frequent amnesties and the peculiar functioning of the Italian quota system we have a series of pictures of the stock of undocumented migrants, of its geographical distribution, employment conditions, nationality and gender composition, etc. These sources of information have some important drawbacks – which have been extensively discussed throughout the report – stemming from the process of selection-into-amnesty (which may make the set of applicants not fully representative of the entire undocumented population) and from the presence of genuine potential migrants amongst the applicants for the annual Flow Decree. Among the strengths, instead, the fact that these pictures are taken every few years allows to infer the evolution of the stock over time without relying on heroic and hardly testable assumptions on its trend. Indeed, no matter how carefully the number of applicants measures the stock of undocumented, in the period immediately following the amnesty this stock is due to significantly drop, and, after that, it will start growing again until it will reach the level seized up by the number of applicants for the following amnesty. A similar reasoning applies to the undocumented migrants who are granted legal status through the annual “Flow Decree”, although, in this case, the limit posed by the quota on the number of migrants who can be legalized will prevent the process from completely drying out the pool of unauthorized migrants residing in the country.

Moreover, there are plenty of data collected by the different government bodies which are involved in the Italian migration policy and which directly deal with the migrants and the unauthorized migrants in particular. As it often happens with data of this kind, the mere existence of the records does not necessarily ensure that this information will be effectively diffused and made available for research, political debate and media. Italian public sector is still very far from a culture which considers transparency and clear statistical information as a crucial prerequisite to create accountability for its acting. Or, one could argue, given the lack of efficiency characterizing its intervention – leaving aside the frequent wrongdoings, abuses and “opaque” practices– the reticence in providing detailed, systematic and comparable information can be seen more as a deliberate decision to prevent any evidence-based assessment than as one more expression of its general backwardness. As far as the migration management is concerned, the issue of transparency becomes even more problematic: as any official data can create ground for critics in the extremely heated political debate on migration, the option of classifying these data as confidential – for fairly unclear public order and national security reasons - becomes a really attractive one. The recent trend, nevertheless, seems to move towards an increasing disclosure and diffusion of existing official data on migration and towards larger investments in analyzing these data and in attempting to map the phenomenon.

Finally, we have data and estimates produced by official bodies such as the Istat (the Italian National Office for Statistics), by private research centres like the Fondazione ISMU or collected by trade unions, NGOs and volunteer organisations. The information produced by these latter categories of organisations usually tend to suffer from a local bias, as these types of agencies can not generally afford the development of survey studies at the national level. This often implies that it is far from easy to acknowledge the existence of this information for the general public and even for the specialized and motivated researcher. Still, this local focus implies a higher level of detail, which can be

hardly reached by any national-level analysis. These studies clearly complement those with a broader geographical horizon, and could play an important role in improving the general level of knowledge about the undocumented migration phenomenon.

### **III.2 Ignoring the issue or adopting “symbolic” policies?**

The availability of information, nevertheless, does not necessarily nor does it automatically inform and guide the political and media debate and the decision of the Italian governments on their migration policy. As a matter of fact, the availability of numerous, different and complementary sources of information has not been fully used yet in order to obtain a clear picture of a phenomenon which is still debated – at the highest levels of political and media discussion – on the basis of anecdotal evidence, unfounded rumours and subjective perceptions.

As already pointed out in this report, creating and diffusing information on migration phenomena is a political act (Bonifazi 2007) and, for this very reason, it requires clear political will to be produced. And this is even more the case when undocumented migration is concerned. Indeed, as long as there is no consensus on the degree of knowledge regarding the unauthorized presence of migrants, two convenient policy options can still be chosen by the host countries governments.

The first one is simply *ignoring and understating the relevance of the issue*: the absence of official estimates of the undocumented migrants population may allow the government to turn a blind eye on the phenomenon. Indeed, if the government lacks autonomous incentive to take action in tackling irregular migrants – as it would happens if their impact on public finances is estimated to be negligible or non negative<sup>36</sup> – the option of formally condemning but substantially ignoring them can become extremely attractive. The reluctance of

---

<sup>36</sup> For a recent survey of estimated net costs caused by unauthorized immigrants for state and local governments in the US, see CBO (2007). The impact of unauthorized immigrants on the budgets of state and local governments. Technical report, Congress of the United States - Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

European governments in financing and producing official estimates of the irregular population residing within their territories seem to go exactly in this direction. The Italian government, for instance, commissioned an official estimate of the undocumented population only in 1998; the UK Home Office provided its first estimate in 2004; France and Germany have never attempted to officially size their illegal population (Pinkerton, McLaughlan et al. 2004). In US, the situation looks much better than in Europe, but, given its magnitude - the last estimate is around 11 million unauthorized migrants - the problem could hardly be ignored: the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) released detailed estimates by state of residence and country of origin in 1996 (and an unpublished paper in 1994), and in more recent years (2003, 2005, 2006) several estimates were produced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (see (Passel 2007) for a survey of these estimates).

The *second option that the absence of official data leaves open* are “symbolic policies”, policies with a strong impact on public perceptions - at least in the short run – but which are very unlikely to produce any concrete impact on the declared object of the policy. The lack of accurate measures of this object – in our case the undocumented migrants – make it impossible to carry out any serious evaluation of the effectiveness, and efficiency, of the policy in fulfilling its publicly advertised targets. Therefore, if it is hardly possible to establish whether the policy was successful or a complete failure, the government has very few incentives to take action in the direction of making its intervention effective (at least as long as an effective policy is more costly and challenging than a useless one). And the incentives can become even weaker if the political return – in terms of electoral support – is more responsive to the initial declarations than to the delivered results. The case of undocumented migration is emblematic to this respect. Governments – if they can not ignore the existence of the problem any longer – generally declare very harsh intentions to definitely curb unauthorized migration, making often use of the “zero undocumented migration” rhetorical arguments. On the other hand, they are perfectly aware of how difficult it would



be for the electorate to assess whether government intervention induced any real reduction in stock and inflows of unauthorized immigrants. And governments are also fully aware of how expensive are migration control policies which aim at arresting and deporting substantial numbers of immigrants<sup>37</sup>, and how politically costly it would be to directly tackle the employers of unauthorized foreign born workers.

The predictable outcome of this setting is that there will be governments whose intervention will not go much further than their tough declarations. Other governments, instead, will choose to take some real action, basing their decisions more on the short-run political return they may obtain from doing so, rather than on the long-run effectiveness and efficiency of the policy. Therefore, they will embark on large-scale (and well advertised) investments and operations (deploying the army at the borders, building border fences, launching coordinated anti-illegals raids in the cities, etc.). Or they will set performance targets which they can prove to have fulfilled, no matter whether these targets are actually influential in affecting the outcome of interest (stock and inflows of undocumented migrants, in this case). Indeed, increases in the number of undocumented migrants apprehended are generally used by governments to prove their true commitment to tackle the unauthorized population issue ((Davila, Pagan et al. 1999), (Fasani 2008)). It seems that “deportation targets” are also growing popular in recent years: in 2005 former UK prime minister Tony Blair introduced a “tipping point” target (target to remove more failed asylum seekers than the new anticipated unfounded applications) that soon became one of the top priorities of the UK Home Office, while the recently elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy set a quota of 25 thousands illegal migrants to be deported by the end of 2007. Boasting about the number of unauthorized migrants who the government managed to arrest and deport seems to have a strong appeal on the electorate in the short run. But establishing whether – and to which extent – these thousands of repatriated individuals will translate into a significant

---

<sup>37</sup> The average cost of deporting one undocumented migrant, for instance, is estimated around 11 thousand pounds in UK, 6 thousand dollar in US and 4-6 thousand euros in Italy.

reduction of inflows and stock of irregular migrant is far from obvious, given the absence of official and systematic assessments of these phenomena. If they are not informed about the magnitude of stock and inflows of irregular migrants in France, how could the French citizens assess if Sarkozy's 25 thousand deportation target was a meaningful one? It did sound tough, this is hardly questionable, but will it really secure French borders from unwanted inflows of foreign workers?

### ***III.3 The role of statistical information***

The crucial role of statistical information in shaping the political debate on undocumented migration has been recently made clear by the current American debate on the policies to deal with the enormous stock of undocumented migrants who are currently residing in the United States. Although populist and inconsistent positions will always be expressed by some fraction of the political class, the decision made by the US government of providing official and systematic estimates of the phenomenon (see above) has significantly forced the debate within the boundaries of realism and rationality. If the consensus on the policy intervention is far from being reached – general amnesty? amnesty with severe fines? targeted deportations? mass deportations? – the terms of the problem are at least sufficiently clear to everyone. There are currently 11-12 million of undocumented migrants in the US – and geographical breakdowns of these estimates are available – and there is an estimated inflow of 500 thousand unauthorized immigrants entering the country every single year. And this inflow takes place in spite of the massive investment of resources – whose amount is publicly declared and reported by the US government – made in border enforcement by the federal government in the last couple of decades<sup>38</sup>. This information makes it possible to ground the debate on facts and to constraint it to

---

<sup>38</sup> The Immigration and Naturalization Service and its Border Patrol Unit became the fastest growing federal agency in the '90s: their budgets increased, respectively, threefold and sixfold, and the hours spent patrolling the border have almost tripled Gathman, C. (2004). The effects of enforcement on illegal markets: evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border. Discussion Paper 1004, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor.

discuss feasible policies, rather than symbolic and populist ones. It even allows attempts to establish which policies could be feasible, and at which price: according to a recent study (Jaeger and Goyle 2005), opting for a mass deportation of 10 million of undocumented migrants within a five years time span would imply an estimated direct cost (excluding administrative costs) of about \$206 billion (\$41.2 billion annually), and it could be as high as \$230 billion or more. This would be equivalent to exceed the current entire budget of the Department of Homeland Security for fiscal year 2006 (\$34.2 billion) or to more than double the annual cost of military operations in Afghanistan (\$16.8 billion). On the basis of these, and of similar figures one can then start the discussion on the feasibility of the policy of mass deportation and on how worth this investment would be for the country. And the existence of these detailed estimates force any politicians incline towards tough proclaim and radical approaches, to either worry about the feasibility and financial coverage of similar policies, or to start looking for some more reasonable alternatives.

### **III.4 The Italian debate: shadow employment, incoherence and double standards**

Although information is not a sufficient condition for triggering a serious and coherent debate on migration policy, its absence guarantees the chaos and a widespread lack of consistency in the political stances and in the policies adopted. Italy is a clear example of this latter situation.

Among the analysts of the Italian migration policy and of its migratory experience in the last two decades, there seems to be a general consensus on the fact that the widespread presence of undocumented migrants – both today and in the past – has to be explained more by the lack of a coherent and adequate migration policy than by blaming the immigrants for their violations of the existing rules. The main element of incoherence has to be recognized in the sharp contrast between

a formally restrictive migration policy and an economy where the demand for foreign workers is strong and growing, and where there is a widespread tendency to indulge in unrecorded and unregistered practices. Given the relative easiness for an undocumented migrant to find irregular employment in the Italian labour market, any announced toughness against irregular migrants sounds at least hypocritical.

It should be fairly clear to everyone that the most effective way of reducing the number of unauthorized immigrants living and moving to Italy would be for the Italian citizens to stop employing them. As a matter of fact, even in presence of strong wage differential between source countries and Italy, if the chances of finding a job in the shadow economy were very low, the option of migrating to Italy would rapidly lose its attractiveness for the potential unauthorized migrants and for those already settled in Italy. However, this would require a deep social and cultural change. It would also imply the recognition that the past (and current) substantial absence of rules in the migration management partially mirrors the backwardness of the Italian economy and of its society. It is hardly deniable, indeed, that a restrictive migration policy requires a seemingly strict social and economical background, an environment where all the actors are used to abide by existing laws and regulations.

Within the ongoing debate about the possible ways of dealing with the excess number of applications received for the 2007 “Flow Decree” (with respect to the quota set by the government; see p. 49), some declarations of the recently appointed Minister of Internal Affairs Roberto Maroni (Northern League party) reveals the degree of inconsistency of the Italian migration policy and the level of passive acknowledgement and acceptance of its malfunctioning. Indeed, on the one hand, the minister has clearly excluded any possibility of granting an amnesty to the undocumented workers who will exceed the quota, because *“it is not possible to grant legal status to those that unlawfully entered Italy”* (www.corriere.it 18th of May, 2008). But, on the other hand, he has declared that the applications of baby-sitters, care workers and family helpers will receive

some “special attention” from the authorities (Fontana 18 May 2008). The Minister of Internal Affairs has recently denied any intention to launch a specific amnesty for care workers and house cleaners, but, at the same time the Welfare minister and the minister for Equal Opportunities have proposed to legalize only those workers who take care of disabled people or of elderly people over-70 (Sarzanini 25 June 2008). There are at least two interesting elements of this debate internal to the ruling coalition.

First, the government is fully aware of the fact that its quota system is being used in a complete different way with respect to the ideal functioning the policy was conceived for. Rather than allowing new and legal inflows of migrant workers, the Italian quota system is mainly utilised to *ex-post* legalize the situation of undocumented migrants already settled in Italy. The problem is that this awareness does not seem to induce any political will to correct the poor design of the current migration policy. The impression one can get out of the politicians’ declarations is that the only problematic point with the current system is represented by the fact that the number of applications systematically exceeds the quotas set by the governments.

The second interesting point concerns the idea of according a special treatment to particular categories of undocumented workers<sup>39</sup>. From a legal point of view, given that all the applicants who are already resident in Italy have violated in the same way the existing legislation on entry and residence, it is difficult to understand why the subsequent occupation in Italy should determine the strictness of the Italian authorities in enforcing the rule of law. And, from an economic point of view, it is hard to explain why the government should consider the employment of certain categories of workers more important than that of others: why should an (employed) care worker or (employed) babysitter be more valuable to the Italian economy than an (employed) builder, cleaner or waiter? The justifications given by the government for the rationale of such a decision

---

<sup>39</sup> The idea of a special treatment for undocumented migrants employed by Italian families as care workers is not new to this coalition. During the decisional process that led to the amnesty in 2002, the previous Berlusconi government (2001-2006) had first decided to grant legal status only to care workers, and only later expanded the procedure to workers of any industry.

point towards the existence of a “social emergency” – in terms of shortages of workers to provide care services to the Italian families – that would explode in absence of the inflow of undocumented workers. Again, we find the explicit recognition of the need and of the demand for undocumented workers – and an implicit legitimization of the illegal practice of hiring irregular migrants<sup>40</sup> - but the argument could be equally applied to any industry where foreign born workers currently represent a relevant fraction of the new hirings. One possible interpretation of this attitude, instead, looks at the fact that the demand – and pressure on the government – for legalizing their employees is likely to be stronger for the families rather than for the firms: employing an undocumented migrant is probably more “disturbing” if she works in the employer’s house rather than in her plant, office, restaurant or hotel.

It is important to emphasise that these type of inconsistencies and double standards are widespread across different parties and opposite coalitions, and they seem to perfectly mirror the perceptions of Italian citizens, at least as they are reported by surveys and media. Italians are clearly worried about migration and even more about undocumented migrants, but the real core of the concern regards the “irregular migrants who are unemployed and who commit crime” and not those “who work and behave well”. Clearly, the lack of legal status *per se* is less of a problem if the migrant is working hard.

### **III.5 The worrying legacy of the migration mismanagement**

The adoption of an inadequate migration policy – and the delays in attempting to adopt one at all – leads to a dramatic “self-fulfilling prophecy”. Restrictive policies are generally chosen to prevent migration from becoming an uncontrolled phenomenon. But, if similar policies are implemented within an inappropriate

---

<sup>40</sup> It is worth stressing that, according to the Italian legislation, hiring undocumented migrants is a criminal offence punishable with fines and possibly detention (art. 22, law 286/1998). Therefore, one could expect to hear also some government’s declaration on how they intend to prosecute the thousands of Italian and foreign nationals employers who are currently employing part of the applicants for the last Flow Decree.

setting (as it happened in the Italian case) a perverse system of individual incentives is likely to develop. A system where those who infringe the rules – by ignoring the legislation regulating entry and residence in Italy and by working as unregistered employees – are clearly better off than those who try to follow the regulations – and end up waiting forever the possibility of a legal entry to Italy. Such a system will obviously lead to the diffusion of undocumented migration. This, in turn, will create uneasiness and alarm among the citizens which will imply a call for even more restrictive policies.

By mismanaging migration from the first phase of inflows in the late '70s, Italian politicians have succeeded in creating and consolidating the perception in the electorate that there is not such a thing as a “well managed migration”. And they also convinced a good fraction of the Italian population that the choice is basically between the unsettling *status quo* and a radical curb on migration (both documented and undocumented).

In the recent Italian political elections – which were held in April 2008 and brought back Berlusconi and his right wing coalition into power – the Northern League party chose immigration as one of the major issues of their campaign platform. Their main electoral poster showed the image of a thoughtful native American and the slogan went: “*Hanno subito l’immigrazione, e adesso vivono nelle riserve*” (“*They endured immigration, and now they live on reservations*” (Jones May 2, 2008)). The comparison between Italian citizens and native Americans on the one side, and that between the immigrants currently living in Italy and the English and French colonists of the XVII-XIX centuries on the other side, may sound bizarre and silly, but this did not prevent the Northern League party from getting about eight percent of the votes and becoming a major actor in the current ruling coalition. This event confirmed that the discomfort of Italian voters with immigration is evident, and that the demand for a tougher approach is growing even more popular.

The government response to the electorate mandate for the undocumented migration issue has arrived very soon. Indeed, one month after the elections, the

government declared its intention to classify the lack of legal status as a criminal offence which could be punished with up to 4 years of detention<sup>41</sup> (Cottone 21 May, 2008) (Ludovico and Stasio 21 May 2008). According to the government, this new norm would have sent a clear signal that Italy had finally changed its unclear attitude towards undocumented immigrants and would have deterred the migrants from infringing the legislation on entry and residence.

The possibility of this policy change sparked a lively debate. Apart from the concern for human rights violations expressed by NGOs, trade unions, the catholic church and some representatives of the opposition, issues of feasibility and affordability of such a policy were raised from many different directions, including major figures within the judicial system. In a country where prison population is already (and permanently) above prison capacity, where immigrants already represent about a third of the prison population and almost half of the new entries in prison (in 2007), and where the judicial system is already overwhelmed by the number of trials (whose length is reaching record levels among the developed countries), the idea of criminalizing the irregular status may appear rather questionable. Indeed, such a policy would have implied an automatic transformation of the current stock of undocumented migrants into an enormous pool of hundred of thousands of potential defendants and inmates.

It is worth mentioning that classifying the irregular migration as a criminal offence is not a complete novelty for the Italian legislation: a milder version of it was introduced in 2002 and – this should not be too surprising – it has never been really applied. According to the current legislation, when an undocumented migrant is apprehended, she can be either detained and deported or she can be ordered to leave the country (within a certain period of time) and subsequently released. As the number of immigrants abiding by this order has always been negligible, the law 189/2002 (see A1. Italian legislation) introduced the criminal offence of not respecting the official order to leave the country. Therefore, with respect to the policy currently discussed, not all the undocumented migrants, but

---

<sup>41</sup> The fact of being undocumented is currently considered an administrative irregularity: the migrant can not be imprisoned for this, but she is subject to deportation and to a period of detention while the decision on the deportation and its organization takes place.



only those who had been given a formal invitation to leave the country and were still residing in Italy, were to be considered as criminal offenders. The 2007 Annual Report on Crime in Italy produced by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (aa.vv. 2007) allows to draw a telling balance on the enforcement of that piece of legislation. Since 2002, about 230 thousand undocumented migrants have been ordered to leave the country and only 4 percent of them (less than 10 thousands) have actually obeyed to that injunction. The official report interestingly concludes “(...) *This behaviour of the immigrants ordered to leave the country seems to be fully rational, especially if we look at the likelihood they had to be arrested for ignoring the injunction(...)*” (p.354). Indeed, the fraction of migrants arrested among the pool of over 200 hundred thousand offenders has been around 3.5 percent, a value that is hardly likely to deter anyone. The report does not provide any kind of explanation for this lack of effectiveness in enforcing the policy. Was it due to a lack of commitment and resources, or rather to some intrinsic difficulties in dealing with the undocumented migrants through the criminal law?

The internal debate within the ruling coalition led to the approval of a mitigated intervention on undocumented migration within a set of legislative measures (called “Security package”; law no. 125, 24 July 2008) which were approved in July 2008. Instead of classifying the lack of legal status as a criminal offence it has now to be considered as an “aggravating circumstance” when the migrant is under trial for any criminal offence. And the new legislation included also more restrictive measures regarding detention and deportation of undocumented migrants. In the same days, the government declared “state of national emergency” for the allegedly exceptional inflows of undocumented immigrants recorded in the last months (Cottone 25 July 2008). One interesting aspect of this latter decision is that it extended to the whole national territory a “state of emergency” which concerned only some Southern regions and which has been reiterated since 2002 by both Berlusconi’s and Prodi’s governments.

The Italian government attitude towards the management of migration – in particular, its peculiar mix of toughness and emergency-based approach – has been recently strongly criticized by Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (Hammarberg 2008) who expressed serious concern for the lack of human rights and humanitarian principles in the legislative measures which the government aims at introducing and implementing. Moreover he stressed how *“...The repeated adoption of emergency measures (...) in order to control migratory movements seems to indicate that the state mechanism is unable to deal effectively with a phenomenon that is not novel and thus should have been dealt with through ordinary legislative or other measures.”* (p. 14).

As far as migration policy is concerned, the Italian scenario appears to be stuck with its ancient vices (if not moving backward): harsh proclaims, continuous legislative interventions, ambiguous enforcement, emergency-based approach, etc. It is hard to predict how lasting will be the reassuring effect on the Italian electorate of this new wave of declared government activism in dealing with undocumented migration. And how long will it take for these policies to reveal their truly “symbolic” nature, that is, to show their inability to improve the situation within the existing framework of an ill-designed migration policy.

Unfortunately, if these kind of policies are generally ineffective in inducing any improvement in the situation they theoretically aim to address, they are effectively causing dramatic and unjustified costs for the migrants who happen to be directly involved. And for all the foreign born workers who would largely benefit from an adequate and responsible legislation.

## **Appendix**

### ***A1. Italian legislation on migration***

The first attempt of defining an extensive framework to regulate migration and to shape Italian migration policy is made only in 1990, after more than a decade of migrants' inflows. A marginal intervention, and the first legalisation process, were decided in 1986, applying an ILO convention (no. 143, 1975) aimed at establishing the principle of equality of treatment between foreign and native workers. The legislation of entrance and residence permits for foreigners, instead, was regulated by the so called "Codice Rocco", a royal decree dated 1931, until the "Law Martelli" (39/1990) established new rules and tried to introduce a "planned number" of new entrants each year. As a matter of fact, this number was never fixed and it remained equal to zero, while the immigrants kept entering the country from the "back door", either by passing the borders irregularly or by overstaying their tourist visas. In 1990 the second amnesty was held.

The following years were dominated by the political crisis of Albania (1990 and 1997) and former Yugoslavia (1995, Bosnian war, and 1997, Kosovo war) that produced huge flows of refugees reaching the near Italian coasts. The government response was that of emergency legislation and "ad hoc" interventions, with a new amnesty process opened in 1995.

In 1998, under the pressure of the commitment to the Schengen Convention, a left-wing government passed the "Turco-Napolitano Law" no. 40/1998 (later confirmed by the Single Act no. 286 of July 25, 1998), in which the Italian migration policy was extensively defined in every single aspect, from the discipline of entry, residence and working conditions, to that of deportations and control of the illegal phenomenon. Apart from a new emphasis on the need to curb undocumented immigration, the main innovation was an effective introduction of a "programmed entries" system of foreign workers via quotas to be established yearly. At the same time the fourth amnesty was approved.

In 2002 the previous legislation was modified by the “Bossi-Fini Law” (no.189/2002). Passed by the current right-wing government coalition, its main declared target was increasing the effectiveness of the irregular immigration contrast. The same intervention opened the fifth, and last, legalisation process.

A detailed description of the Italian migration policy and of its implementation can be found in (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2001). (Zincone 1998) and (Zincone 2006) present also important insights on the process of decision making which has led to past and current policies in Italy. (Caritas/Migrantes 2005) provides good details on legislation and regularization procedures.

More documents are available in Italian. Among these, (Barbagli 2007) provides a clear summary of the evolution of the recent migration legislation in the first chapter of the report. While a comprehensive description of all the historical phases which have influenced and shaped the Italian migration policy is given by (Einaudi 2007) and, to a minor extent, by (Bonifazi 2007).

## ***A2. Centre Sampling technique***

The main limitation of using survey techniques in studying undocumented migrants is the obvious absence of a list of the population of interest: this prevents the researchers from being able to extract a representative sample of individuals from the population and to contact and interview them. The main idea of the Centre Sampling method (CS) relies on the fact that all (undocumented) migrants residing in one area visit some of the local “centres of aggregation” for migrants which exist in the area. Once a sufficiently wide and heterogeneous set of ‘centres’ is identified, instead of randomly sampling  $n$  individuals from the unknown population of  $N$  (undocumented) migrants, it is possible to select  $m$  centres (among the whole set of  $M$  “gathering centres”) and then to randomly choose the interviews among those that visit the “centre”. Therefore, the preliminary step of this procedure is the identification of all the “centres” regularly attended by migrant population of interest. After having defined the set  $M$  of “centres of aggregation” in the area under study and after drawing a sample  $m$

out of them, the interviews can start. In each of the selected “centres”, a sample of the regular attendees are interviewed and they asked questions about their personal and household characteristics, their labour market performance, their migration project, etc.. They are also asked to list all the “centres” that they usually visit. This latter set of questions is used to construct the individual weights which ensure representativeness to the CS procedure. Indeed, the individual probability of inclusion in the sample depends: 1) positively on the number of selected centres the person usually visits; and 2) negatively on the number of individuals from the population who visit that same “centre”. Therefore each individuals is assigned a weight that reflect her inclusion probability: the more centres each individual visits, the larger the inclusion probability and the lower the weight, on the other hand, the larger and more visited the centre, the smaller the inclusion probability, and the higher the weight.

A formal illustration of the CS technique is provided in (Baio, Blangiardo et al. 2008).

## Tables

**Table 1 - Resident migrants by region. Minors and gender composition. Years: 2003-2007**

Region	2004			2005			2006			2007		
	Total	% minors	% female	Total	% minors	% female	Total	% minors	% female	Total	% minors	% female
Piemonte	174,144	21	50	208,538	21	49	231,611	23	50	252,302	23	50
Valle D'Aosta	3,636	21	51	4,258	21	51	4,976	21	52	5,534	22	52
Lombardia	476,690	23	47	594,279	22	46	665,884	23	47	728,647	24	48
Trentino Alto Adige	42,674	22	49	49,608	22	49	55,747	23	49	61,674	23	50
Veneto	240,434	22	46	287,732	23	46	320,793	24	47	350,215	25	47
Friuli Venezia Giulia	51,889	19	49	58,915	20	48	65,185	21	48	72,462	21	49
Liguria	53,194	18	54	65,994	19	53	74,416	20	52	80,735	21	53
Emilia Romagna	210,397	23	48	257,161	23	48	288,844	23	48	317,888	24	49
Toscana	164,800	20	50	193,608	21	50	215,490	21	50	234,398	22	50
Umbria	43,151	21	53	53,470	21	52	59,278	23	52	63,861	23	52
Marche	70,557	22	49	81,890	23	49	91,325	24	50	99,285	24	50
Lazio	204,725	18	56	247,847	18	55	275,065	19	55	330,146	20	54
Abruzzo	32,466	20	53	38,582	20	53	43,849	21	53	48,018	21	53
Molise	3,183	18	55	3,790	19	55	4,250	18	56	4,834	18	57
Campania	65,396	14	55	85,773	14	56	92,619	14	57	98,052	15	58
Puglia	42,985	20	47	47,943	21	46	48,725	21	48	51,242	22	49
Basilicata	5,154	17	48	5,923	17	51	6,407	19	52	6,726	19	53
Calabria	27,413	16	50	31,195	16	52	33,525	17	53	35,216	18	55
Sicilia	62,900	20	48	69,679	20	48	74,595	21	48	78,242	22	49
Sardegna	14,371	15	50	15,972	17	51	17,930	17	51	19,445	17	52
Total Italy	1,990,159	21	49	2,402,157	21	49	2,670,514	22	49	2,938,922	23	50

Source: Istat

**Table 2 - Number of valid residence permits (1st of January), by region (Years; 1990-2007)**

REGION	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Piemonte	31326	31160	35303	33311	36589	39697	44402	63169	67376
Valle d'Aosta	932	1276	1594	1628	1664	1643	1768	2222	2195
Lombardia	63808	95756	124220	116103	125515	135531	146492	205952	220307
Trentino - Alto Adige	9199	11684	14671	14957	17049	18803	20000	26312	22998

<b>Veneto</b>	26688	36107	43053	43066	48972	51676	56988	75524	83415
<b>Friuli - Venezia Giulia</b>	13653	13660	18659	21224	24761	26230	26227	28603	29623
<b>Liguria</b>	15086	16684	20242	18918	21272	21256	23095	28134	30380
<b>Emilia - Romagna</b>	23117	36927	51253	45284	48299	50348	56172	72983	81527
<b>Toscana</b>	38911	38703	44034	43203	48265	49931	52759	71592	68760
<b>Umbria</b>	12493	11139	11690	11876	13961	14457	16124	17716	19354
<b>Marche</b>	7412	8997	10664	11220	12672	13754	15199	19668	22182
<b>Lazio</b>	121775	151533	154525	133440	144415	146385	156230	202691	204712
<b>Abruzzo</b>	6068	6704	7766	7885	10586	10730	11164	14266	14310
<b>Molise</b>	967	941	1014	908	946	996	998	1301	1439
<b>Campania</b>	31801	28271	31754	26236	29642	30690	31949	54530	54332
<b>Puglia</b>	11500	11041	16288	14760	16383	17005	18286	27074	25895
<b>Basilicata</b>	844	1549	1581	1415	1402	1454	1378	2140	2145
<b>Calabria</b>	5280	6707	7169	6639	7289	7455	8024	13706	13909
<b>Sicilia</b>	30727	44060	46202	31035	31871	31871	34016	47911	47333
<b>Sardegna</b>	5426	7412	7253	6349	7549	7879	7888	10526	10704
<b>ITALY: total</b>	<b>457013</b>	<b>560311</b>	<b>648935</b>	<b>589457</b>	<b>649102</b>	<b>677791</b>	<b>729159</b>	<b>986020</b>	<b>1022896</b>
<b>REGION</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>
<b>Piemonte</b>	70054	83568	91034	101178	107950	171497	173841	175863	191026
<b>Valle d'Aosta</b>	2362	2531	2492	2860	2870	3681	4178	3891	4758
<b>Lombardia</b>	235154	301291	312254	331369	346768	512632	518487	555226	584863
<b>Trentino - Alto Adige</b>	26234	28683	30843	36497	38092	44006	48889	52634	57372
<b>Veneto</b>	97915	125920	139104	143242	153524	225994	244506	270157	279594
<b>Friuli - Venezia Giulia</b>	32383	38248	42947	43548	49024	61522	66369	66601	72513
<b>Liguria</b>	31219	36044	37743	33452	35360	58336	56041	52665	65909
<b>Emilia - Romagna</b>	90129	108518	114012	140269	147787	218573	235024	251050	266255
<b>Toscana</b>	86394	108365	111636	103666	111133	174997	181875	171146	205445
<b>Umbria</b>	21150	24665	25150	29022	29928	44696	47097	46523	47504
<b>Marche</b>	25122	31698	35681	45027	47090	65419	71782	75316	78680
<b>Lazio</b>	201390	242533	240599	242210	238586	333533	310181	296943	274504
<b>Abruzzo</b>	15112	18513	18444	19537	21212	33037	35313	34564	38640
<b>Molise</b>	1520	1935	1939	2172	2395	3500	3619	3813	4336
<b>Campania</b>	55029	68336	65554	61910	58038	114360	99565	92276	89694
<b>Puglia</b>	27925	34553	33139	30347	31168	42608	39149	36854	42429

<b>Basilicata</b>	2321	3130	3021	3264	3475	5649	5470	5280	5868
<b>Calabria</b>	12333	15530	14110	14816	17475	33051	28178	25411	27611
<b>Sicilia</b>	46750	53927	48717	52116	49706	65331	59499	54463	62357
<b>Sardegna</b>	10324	12667	11330	11890	11705	15145	16485	15348	15614
<b>ITALY: total</b>	<b>1090820</b>	<b>1340655</b>	<b>1379749</b>	<b>1448392</b>	<b>1503286</b>	<b>2227567</b>	<b>2245548</b>	<b>2286024</b>	<b>2414972</b>

Source: Istat

**Table 3 - Total resident population in Italy, by geographical area. Year 1990 and 2007**

Area of residence	1990		2007	
		%		%
<b>North-West</b>	15,130,854	26	15,630,959	26
<b>North-East</b>	10,419,306	18	11,204,123	19
<b>Central</b>	11,012,346	19	11,540,584	20
<b>South &amp; Islands</b>	21,183,657	37	20,755,621	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>57,746,163</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>59,131,287</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Istat

**Table 4 - Resident migrants by geographical area of origin and nationality - Year 2005**

Geographical area and nationality	Male	Female	Total	%	Geographical area and nationality	Male	Female	Total	%
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>518,722</b>	<b>603,554</b>	<b>1,122,276</b>	<b>47</b>	<i>of which: Ethiopia</i>	1,660	3,367	5,027	0
European Union	71,289	135,360	206,649	9	<i>Mauritius</i>	4,101	4,620	8,721	0
Europe 15	53,313	84,716	138,029	6	<i>Somalia</i>	2,390	3,704	6,094	0
NMC	17,976	50,644	68,620	3	Central-Southern Africa	6,492	5,849	12,341	1
<i>of which Poland</i>	13,307	37,487	50,794	2	<b>ASIA</b>	<b>222,895</b>	<b>182,132</b>	<b>405,027</b>	<b>17</b>
Eastern Europe	441,786	461,346	903,132	38	Western Asia	12,592	7,837	20,429	1
<i>of which Albania</i>	182,145	134,514	316,659	13	<i>of which: Iran</i>	3,820	2,730	6,550	0
<i>Bosnia - Herzegovina</i>	12,923	9,513	22,436	1	<i>Israel</i>	1,300	809	2,109	0
<i>Croatia</i>	10,972	9,740	20,712	1	Central-Southern Asia	111,463	62,095	173,558	7
<i>Macedonia.</i>	35,090	23,370	58,460	2	<i>of which: Bangladesh</i>	25,625	10,160	35,785	1



<i>Moldova</i>	11,759	26,212	37,971	2	<i>India</i>	34,154	20,134	54,288	2
<i>Romania</i>	123,452	125,397	248,849	10	<i>Pakistan</i>	25,487	10,022	35,509	1
<i>Russia,</i>	3,316	13,872	17,188	1	<i>Sri Lanka</i>	25,521	20,051	45,572	2
<i>Serbia e Montenegro</i>	32,618	25,556	58,174	2	Eastern Asia	98,840	112,200	211,040	9
<i>Ukraine</i>	15,516	77,925	93,441	4	<i>of which: China</i>	59,750	51,962	111,712	5
Other European countries	5,647	6,848	12,495	1	<i>Philippines</i>	33,334	49,291	82,625	3
<i>of which: Switzerland</i>	4,276	5,456	9,732	0	<i>Japan</i>	2,238	3,875	6,113	0
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>403,343</b>	<b>238,412</b>	<b>641,755</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>AMERICA</b>	<b>80,433</b>	<b>149,610</b>	<b>230,043</b>	<b>10</b>
Northern Africa	289,223	158,087	447,310	19	Northern America	7,469	9,052	16,521	1
<i>of which: Algeria</i>	13,986	4,750	18,736	1	<i>of which: United States</i>	6,431	7,724	14,155	1
<i>Egypt</i>	38,659	14,206	52,865	2	Central-Northern Italy	72,964	140,558	213,522	9
<i>Morocco</i>	182,630	112,315	294,945	12	<i>of which: Argentina</i>	6,025	7,695	13,720	1
<i>Tunisia</i>	52,250	25,980	78,230	3	<i>Brazil</i>	7,526	18,297	25,823	1
Western Africa	95,918	55,801	151,719	6	<i>Colombia</i>	5,006	10,837	15,843	1
<i>of which: Ivory Coast</i>	7,056	6,172	13,228	1	<i>Dominicana Rep.</i>	4,410	10,876	15,286	1
<i>Ghana</i>	19,031	13,723	32,754	1	<i>Ecuador</i>	19,592	33,628	53,220	2
<i>Nigeria</i>	12,994	18,653	31,647	1	<i>Peru</i>	19,908	33,470	53,378	2
<i>Senegal</i>	45,350	8,591	53,941	2	<b>OCEANIA</b>	<b>1,005</b>	<b>1,455</b>	<b>2,460</b>	<b>0</b>
Eastern Africa	11,710	18,675	30,385	1	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,226,712</b>	<b>1,175,445</b>	<b>2,402,157</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Istat

**Table 5 – Distribution of residence permits, by area of residence. Years 1990-2007**

Area	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
North-West	24.3	25.9	27.9	28.8	28.5	29.2	29.6	30.4	31.3
North-East	15.9	17.6	19.7	21.1	21.4	21.7	21.9	20.6	21.3
Central	39.5	37.5	34.0	33.9	33.8	33.1	33.0	31.6	30.8
South & Islands	20.3	19.0	18.3	16.2	16.3	15.9	15.6	17.4	16.6
Italy	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Area	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
North-West	31.1	31.6	32.1	32.4	32.8	33.5	33.5	34.5	35.1
North-East	22.6	22.5	23.7	25.1	25.8	24.7	26.5	28.0	28.0
Central	30.6	30.4	29.9	29.0	28.4	27.8	27.2	25.8	25.1
South & Islands	15.7	15.6	14.2	13.5	13.0	14.0	12.8	11.7	11.9
Italy	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Istat

**Table 6 - Participation, employment and unemployment rates in Italy, by gender and area. Year 1995, 2006**

Gender and area	1995	2006	1995	2006	1995	2006
	Participation rate		Employment rate		Unemployment rate	
<b>Male</b>	<b>72.6</b>	<b>74.6</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>70.5</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>5.4</b>
North-West	73.5	77.6	68.9	75.2	6.2	3.0
North-East	75.9	78.8	73.0	76.8	3.8	2.4
Central	72.5	76.3	67.7	72.9	6.5	4.5
South & Islands	70.1	69.3	59.8	62.3	14.5	9.9
<b>Female</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>50.8</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>8.8</b>
North-West	50.1	59.0	44.8	56.0	10.4	5.1
North-East	51.2	60.2	46.2	57.0	9.7	5.3
Central	46.6	56.0	39.6	51.3	15.0	8.2
South & Islands	35.5	37.3	26.6	31.1	24.9	16.5
<b>All</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>6.8</b>
North-West	61.9	68.3	56.9	65.7	7.9	3.9
North-East	63.8	69.6	59.8	67.0	6.1	3.6
Central	59.5	66.0	53.6	62.0	9.8	6.1
South & Islands	52.5	53.2	42.9	46.6	18.1	12.2

Source: Istat

**Table 7 - Migrants' share\* over total population, by area of residence. Years: 1990-2007**

Area	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
North-West	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	2.0	2.1

<b>North-East</b>	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.9	2.1
<b>Central</b>	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.8
<b>South</b>	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.8
<b>Italy</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.8</b>
	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>
<b>North-West</b>	2.2	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.3	4.9	4.9	5.1	5.4
<b>North-East</b>	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.6	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.0
<b>Central</b>	3.0	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.9	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.3
<b>South</b>	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4
<b>Italy</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.1</b>

\* The stock of migrants is measured using the number of valid residence permits in each year

Source: author's calculations using data from Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Istat

**Table 8 - Irregularity rate\* of full-time equivalent labour units, by geographical area. Years 1995-2003**

<b>Area</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>North-West</b>	11.3	11.3	11.2	11.0	10.8	10.8	11.0	9.5	8.3
<b>North-East</b>	11.2	11.1	11.1	11.5	11.3	11.3	11.2	10.3	9.3
<b>Central</b>	14.2	14.2	14.8	14.9	14.9	15.4	14.9	13.3	12.3
<b>South &amp; Islands</b>	20.7	20.9	21.6	22.5	22.3	22.4	22.8	23.1	22.8
<b>Italy</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>13.4</b>

\* The irregularity rate is the ratio of irregular labour units and total labour units

Source: Istat

**Table 9 - Amnesties in Italy: total number of migrants granted legal status, by area of residence (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002)**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Amnesties</b>									
	<b>1986</b>		<b>1990</b>		<b>1995</b>		<b>1998</b>		<b>2002</b>	
<b>North-West</b>	24,296	23	54,969	25	74,651	31	80,740	37	233,943	33
<b>North-East</b>	11,678	11	31,337	14	39,959	16	29,608	14	132,291	19
<b>Central</b>	33,056	32	72,116	33	73,165	30	68,281	31	203,852	29
<b>South</b>	35,970	34	59,204	27	56,717	23	38,495	18	132,070	19

Italy 105,000 100 217,626 100 244,492 100 217,124 100 702,156 100  
Source: author's calculation on Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs data

**Table 10 - Estimates of total foreign born population (documented and undocumented) in Italy. Years: 1981-1998**

Year	Authors	Categories of Foreigners	Estimates (thousands)			Year	Authors	Categories of Foreigners	Estimates (thousands)		
	Year of publication		Total	Undocumented	% Undocumented		Year of publication		Total	Undocumented	% Undocumented
1981	Natale [1986]	Total	361-401	28	7	1990	De Simoni [1992]	Extra UE	986-1,283	307-604	31-47
1984	Natale [1986]	Total	523	97	19	1990	Censis [1993]	LDCs	886	406	46
1984	Casacchia [1987]	Total	480	54	11	1991	Censis [1993]	LDCs	1	587	53
1984	Natale [1986]	Total	725	299	41	1991	Blangiardo [1997]	LDCs	705-770	174-239	25-31
1984	Perali [1986]	Total	385-805	379	47	1992	Natale e Strozza [1997]	Total	961-1,014	295-348	31-34
1984	Casacchia [1987]	Total	715	289	41	1992	Esposito [1996]	Total	1,505	839	56
1984	Schoorl et al. [1996]	Africans	296	254	86	1992	Quirino [cfr. Esposito, 1996]	Total	1,478	812	55
1986	Natale e Strozza [1997]	Total	720-781	294-355	41-46	1992	Censis [1993]	LDCs	1,180	714	61
1988	Natale [1990a]	Total	737	185	25	1992	Baldassarini e Freguja [1995]	Extra UE workers	977	427	44
1988	Natale [1990a]	Total	857	305	36	1993	Natale e Strozza [1997]	Total	1,091-1,167	358-434	33-37
1988	Bartoli e Esposito [1993]	Total	1	461	46	1993	ISTAT [1994]	Total	1,300-1,500	567-767	44-51
1988	Natale [1990a]	Total	1	507	48	1993	Natale e Strozza [1997]	Total	1	413	36
1989	Birindelli [1990]	Total	824	303	37	1993	Censis [1993]	LDCs	1	644	55
1989	ISTAT [1991]	Total	1	623	55	1993	Schoorl et al. [1996]	Africans	903	694	77
1989	Censis [1993]	LDCs	656	364	56	1994	Murer [1995]	Total	1,100-1,150	337-387	31-34

1989	Schoorl et al. [1996]	Africans	691	582	84	1994	Natale e Strozza [1997]	Total	1,228-1,327	465-564	38-43
1990	Böhning [1991]	Total	1	600	47	1994	Natale e Strozza [1997]	Total	1,194	431	36
1990	Natale [1990b]	Total	849	170	20	1994	Blangiardo e Papavero [1997]	LDCs	833-912	286-365	34-40
1990	Natale [1990b]	Total	1,016-1,201	338-522	33-44	1998	Blangiardo [1998]	LDCs	982-1,101	176-295	18-27

Source: (Strozza 2004)

**Table 11 - ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy (thousands). Years 2003-2007**

	1.1.2003	1.1.2004	1.1.2005	1.1.2006	1.1.2007
<b>Total documented migrants</b>	1800	2570	2740	3012	3633
<b>of which:</b>					
<b>residents</b>	1549	1990	2402	2671	2939
<b>non-resident</b>	251	580	338	341	694
<b>Total undocumented</b>	-	-	541	650	349
<b>% of undocumented</b>			16.1	17.7	8.8
<b>Total presence</b>	-	-	3358	3662	3982

Source: (Blangiardo 2006), (Blangiardo 2007) (Blangiardo 2008)

**Table 12 - ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy, area of residence. 1st July 2005**

Area	Total migrants	Documented migrants		Undocumented migrants	% of Undocumented migrants
		Residents	Non-residents		
	Thousands				
Northern & Central Italy	2863	2188	267	408	14.3

<b>Southern Italy</b>	495	311	51	133	26.9
<b>Italy</b>	3358	2499	318	541	16.1
	<b>Percentage</b>				
<b>Northern &amp; Central Italy</b>	85.3	87.6	84	75.4	
<b>Southern Italy</b>	14.7	12.4	16	24.6	
<b>Italy</b>	100	100	100	100	

Source: (Blangiardo and Tanturri 2006)

**Table 13 - Amnesties in Italy - Documented and undocumented(\*) immigrants by region. Years: 1995, 1998, 2002**

Region	1995					1998					2002				
	Documented Migrants	%	Undoc. Migrants (*)	%	Ratio (Undocum. / Docum.)	Documented Migrants	%	Undoc. Migrants (*)	%	Ratio (Undocum. / Docum.)	Documented Migrants	%	Undoc. Migrants (*)	%	Ratio (Undocum. / Docum.)
Valle d'Aosta	1,643	0.2	302	0.1	0.2	2,195	0.2	274	0.1	0.1	2,860	0.2	672	0.1	0.2
Piemonte	39,697	5.9	17,871	7.2	0.5	67,376	6.6	24,410	7.4	0.4	101,178	7.0	57,116	8.1	0.6
Lombardia	135,531	20.0	51,270	20.6	0.4	220,307	21.5	93,378	28.2	0.4	331,369	22.9	158,293	22.5	0.5
Liguria	21,256	3.1	5,254	2.1	0.3	30,380	3.0	6,742	2.0	0.2	33,452	2.3	17,862	2.5	0.5
<b>North-West</b>	<b>198,127</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>74,697</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>320,258</b>	<b>31.3</b>	<b>124,804</b>	<b>37.7</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>468,859</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>233,943</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>0.5</b>
Trentino Alto Adige	18,803	2.8	1,347	0.5	0.1	22,998	2.2	1,730	0.5	0.1	36,497	2.5	5,565	0.8	0.2
Friuli Venezia Giulia	26,230	3.9	2,295	0.9	0.1	29,623	2.9	1,824	0.6	0.1	43,548	3.0	8,249	1.2	0.2
Veneto	51,676	7.6	16,639	6.7	0.3	83,415	8.2	26,132	7.9	0.3	143,242	9.9	61,418	8.7	0.4
Emilia Romagna	50,348	7.4	13,555	5.5	0.3	81,527	8.0	14,906	4.5	0.2	140,269	9.7	57,059	8.1	0.4
<b>North-East</b>	<b>147,057</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>33,836</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>217,563</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>44,592</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>363,556</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>132,291</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>0.4</b>
Toscana	49,931	7.4	15,668	6.3	0.3	68,760	6.7	28,245	8.5	0.4	103,666	7.2	50,903	7.2	0.5
Umbria	14,457	2.1	2,721	1.1	0.2	19,354	1.9	4,488	1.4	0.2	29,022	2.0	13,852	2.0	0.5
Marche	13,754	2.0	2,908	1.2	0.2	22,182	2.2	3,610	1.1	0.2	45,027	3.1	14,906	2.1	0.3
Lazio	146,385	21.6	52,675	21.2	0.4	204,712	20.0	66,773	20.1	0.3	242,210	16.7	124,191	17.7	0.5
<b>Central</b>	<b>224,527</b>	<b>33.1</b>	<b>73,972</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>315,008</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>103,116</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>419,925</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>203,852</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>0.5</b>
Abruzzo	10,730	1.6	3,084	1.2	0.3	14,310	1.4	3,784	1.1	0.3	19,537	1.3	10,301	1.5	0.5
Campania	30,690	4.5	29,204	11.8	1.0	54,332	5.3	25,347	7.6	0.5	61,910	4.3	67,678	9.6	1.1
Molise	996	0.1	254	0.1	0.3	1,439	0.1	332	0.1	0.2	2,172	0.1	1,055	0.2	0.5
Basilicata	1,454	0.2	802	0.3	0.6	2,145	0.2	830	0.3	0.4	3,264	0.2	2,400	0.3	0.7
Puglia	17,005	2.5	8,216	3.3	0.5	25,895	2.5	10,501	3.2	0.4	30,347	2.1	14,096	2.0	0.5

Calabria	7,455	1.1	5,209	2.1	0.7	13,909	1.4	4,098	1.2	0.3	14,816	1.0	15,686	2.2	1.1
<b>South</b>	<b>68,330</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>46,769</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>112,030</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>44,892</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>132,046</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>111,216</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>
Sicilia	31,871	4.7	16,749	6.7	0.5	47,333	4.6	10,901	3.3	0.2	52,116	3.6	17,689	2.5	0.3
Sardegna	7,879	1.2	2,478	1.0	0.3	10,704	1.0	3,119	0.9	0.3	11,890	0.8	3,165	0.5	0.3
<b>Islands</b>	<b>39,750</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>19,227</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>58,037</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>14,020</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>64,006</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>20,854</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>0.3</b>
<b>ITALY</b>	<b>677,791</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>248,501</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>1,022,896</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>331,424</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>1,448,392</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>702,156</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.5</b>

(\*) Undocumented migrants are measured as the number of applicants for the 2002 amnesty.

Source: Istat and Italian Minister of Internal Affairs

**Table 14 - Quotas of foreign born workers allowed by the "Flow Decrees" - Years 1998-2007**

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Foreign born workers	58,000	58,000	63,000	83,000	79,500	79,500	79,500	99,500	550,000	170,000

Source: (Barbaglio 2007) p.82

**Table 15 - Number of applications for the "2007 Decree on migrants workers' flows", by region and nationality - February 2008**

Region	Morocco	China	Bangladesh	India	Ukraine	Moldova	Albania	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Liguria	2,707	1,122	1,429	289	713	523	2,050	187	469
Lombardia	27,082	15,533	11,371	16,774	11,209	6,649	6,664	15,812	7,678
Piemonte	13,823	4,506	1,568	891	1,871	2,462	3,426	475	381
Valle d'Aosta	395	73	14	42	13	43	56	11	1
<b>North-West</b>	<b>44,007</b>	<b>21,234</b>	<b>14,382</b>	<b>17,996</b>	<b>13,806</b>	<b>9,677</b>	<b>12,196</b>	<b>16,485</b>	<b>8,529</b>
Emilia Romagna	18,086	8,974	5,895	4,547	5,482	8,077	4,709	7,523	2,330
Friuli Venezia Giulia	1,178	2,190	2,411	611	594	478	689	182	35
Trentino Alto Adige	644	407	131	178	325	674	424	579	34
Veneto	17,378	13,149	11,618	5,256	2,790	9,206	2,859	1,553	3,715
<b>North-East</b>	<b>37,286</b>	<b>24,720</b>	<b>20,055</b>	<b>10,592</b>	<b>9,191</b>	<b>18,435</b>	<b>8,681</b>	<b>9,837</b>	<b>6,114</b>
Lazio	2,354	2,442	15,128	6,959	3,890	3,496	1,945	864	2,410
Marche	4,258	3,792	3,303	1,524	924	1,330	1,473	1,861	386
Toscana	6,956	6,205	2,980	1,551	1,851	1,353	4,983	2,356	1,675
Umbria	2,406	868	301	583	771	583	1,202	128	86
<b>Central</b>	<b>15,974</b>	<b>13,307</b>	<b>21,712</b>	<b>10,617</b>	<b>7,436</b>	<b>6,762</b>	<b>9,603</b>	<b>5,209</b>	<b>4,557</b>
Abruzzo	2,657	2,143	993	369	599	173	1,070	476	126
Basilicata	758	136	104	344	111	54	132	103	12
Calabria	4,217	1,151	1,536	3,778	1,270	190	330	532	138

Campania	6,544	3,382	4,656	2,871	10,690	630	1,166	1,460	3,421
Molise	323	188	57	280	69	34	64	40	5
Puglia	2,385	1,448	843	1,497	580	128	1,636	346	541
Sardegna	1,130	772	332	122	490	53	51	267	32
Sicilia	4,565	2,777	4,716	816	436	73	989	393	4,289
<b>South</b>	<b>22,579</b>	<b>11,997</b>	<b>13,237</b>	<b>10,077</b>	<b>14,245</b>	<b>1,335</b>	<b>5,438</b>	<b>3,617</b>	<b>8,564</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>119,846</b>	<b>71,258</b>	<b>69,386</b>	<b>49,282</b>	<b>44,678</b>	<b>36,209</b>	<b>35,918</b>	<b>35,148</b>	<b>27,764</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
<b>Region</b>	<b>Philippines</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>Peru</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>Senegal</b>	<b>Ghana</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>%</b>
Liguria	265	388	987	359	256	7	3,560	<b>15,311</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Lombardia	9,220	17,538	9,809	4,121	7,927	3,810	22,734	<b>193,931</b>	<b>27.6</b>
Piemonte	1,134	1,925	3,284	1,038	1,206	348	4,647	<b>42,985</b>	<b>6.1</b>
Valle d'Aosta	5	10	21	75	7	0	83	<b>849</b>	<b>0.1</b>
<b>North-West</b>	<b>10,624</b>	<b>19,861</b>	<b>14,101</b>	<b>5,593</b>	<b>9,396</b>	<b>4,165</b>	<b>31,024</b>	<b>253,076</b>	<b>36.1</b>
Emilia Romagna	2,774	1,340	915	4,889	2,344	3,550	9,521	<b>90,956</b>	<b>13.0</b>
Friuli Venezia Giulia	229	120	40	375	202	1,477	3,107	<b>13,918</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Trentino Alto Adige	40	48	56	233	75	26	739	<b>4,613</b>	<b>0.7</b>
Veneto	1,294	390	363	1,441	2,458	3,901	11,724	<b>89,095</b>	<b>12.7</b>
<b>North-East</b>	<b>4,337</b>	<b>1,898</b>	<b>1,374</b>	<b>6,938</b>	<b>5,079</b>	<b>8,954</b>	<b>25,091</b>	<b>198,582</b>	<b>28.4</b>
Lazio	5,799	2,172	2,711	635	223	41	5,786	<b>56,855</b>	<b>8.1</b>
Marche	312	83	675	1,201	883	198	3,155	<b>25,358</b>	<b>3.6</b>
Toscana	1,959	556	2,605	944	2,526	43	5,159	<b>43,702</b>	<b>6.2</b>
Umbria	341	57	409	253	22	8	1,801	<b>9,819</b>	<b>1.4</b>
<b>Central</b>	<b>8,411</b>	<b>2,868</b>	<b>6,400</b>	<b>3,033</b>	<b>3,654</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>15,901</b>	<b>135,734</b>	<b>19.3</b>
Abruzzo	114	48	88	101	249	1	1,176	<b>10,383</b>	<b>1.5</b>
Basilicata	30	37	7	102	4	1	175	<b>2,110</b>	<b>0.3</b>
Calabria	576	43	15	143	66	11	1,159	<b>15,155</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Campania	748	160	248	523	241	380	4,031	<b>41,151</b>	<b>5.9</b>
Molise	14	13	4	4	9	1	145	<b>1,250</b>	<b>0.2</b>
Puglia	372	94	54	287	227	23	1,945	<b>12,406</b>	<b>1.8</b>
Sardegna	308	51	35	50	362	1	486	<b>4,542</b>	<b>0.6</b>



Sicilia	952	531	61	4,474	227	335	1,487	27,121	3.9
<b>South</b>	<b>3,114</b>	<b>977</b>	<b>512</b>	<b>5,684</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>753</b>	<b>10,604</b>	<b>114,118</b>	<b>16.3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,486</b>	<b>25,604</b>	<b>22,387</b>	<b>21,248</b>	<b>19,514</b>	<b>14,162</b>	<b>82,620</b>	<b>701,510</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>11.8</b>		

Source: Italian Home Office;

[http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala\\_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/0848\\_APP\\_domande\\_pervenute\\_NON\\_STAGIONALI.html](http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/0848_APP_domande_pervenute_NON_STAGIONALI.html)

**Table 16 – Full-time equivalent labour units: regular and irregular (thousands). Years 2000-2005**

Year	Full-time equivalent labour units (thousand)			Employed workers (thousand)		
	Irregular	Total	% Irregular	Irregular	Total	% Irregular
<b>2000</b>	3,111	23,412	13.3	2,686	22,930	11.7
<b>2001</b>	3,280	23,829	13.8	2,851	23,393	12.2
<b>2002</b>	3,056	24,132	12.7	2,660	23,793	11.2
<b>2003</b>	2,812	24,283	11.6	2,452	24,150	10.2
<b>2004</b>	2,794	24,294	11.5	2,500	24,256	10.3
<b>2005</b>	3,014	24,329	12.4	2,539	24,333	10.4

Source: (Istat 2008)

**Table 17 - Irregular (full-time equivalent) labour units, by type (thousands). Years: 2000-2005**

Year	Irregular labour units, by type (thousand)						
	Residents	%	Non resident migrants	%	Multiple activities	%	Total
<b>2000</b>	1,540	49.5	656	21.1	915	29.4	3,111
<b>2001</b>	1,626	49.6	721	22.0	934	28.5	3,280
<b>2002</b>	1,644	53.8	464	15.2	948	31.0	3,056
<b>2003</b>	1,686	60.0	114	4.0	1,012	36.0	2,812
<b>2004</b>	1,637	58.6	125	4.5	1,033	37.0	2,794
<b>2005</b>	1,692	56.1	275	9.1	1,048	34.8	3,014

Source: (Istat 2008)

**Table 18 - Employed migrants, by residence and employment status. Years: 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001**

Residence	Employment	Total number (thousands)							
		1994		1996		1999		2001	
<i>Authorized</i>	<i>Registered</i>	211	31	391	53	585	62	700	60
<i>Authorized</i>	<i>Undeclared</i>	138	20	166	23	245	26	160	14
<i>Unauthorized</i>	<i>Undeclared</i>	341	49	182	25	115	12	300	26
<b>Total</b>		<b>690</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>945</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1160</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: (Reyneri 2003)

**Table 19 - Undocumented migrants identified by Italian police forces within the Italian territory. Years 1997-2006**

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Total</b>	57,509	61,720	64,444	88,750	92,561	105,988	77,583	77,517	96,045	101,704
<i>% change with respect to previous year</i>	44.7	7.3	4.4	37.7	4.3	14.5	-26.8	-0.1	23.9	5.9

Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (aa.vv. 2007)

**Table 20 - Undocumented migrants deported from within the Italian territory. Years: 1999-2005**

Area	1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
<b>North-West</b>	5,452	22.8	5,662	23.8	10,990	32.0	12,680	30.0	8,888	30.0	7,423	29.5	9,986	37.0
<b>North-East</b>	7,180	30.0	8,158	34.2	10,557	30.7	16,233	38.4	8,314	28.1	6,775	26.9	5,813	21.5
<b>Central</b>	2,494	10.4	3,232	13.6	4,274	12.4	4,900	11.6	6,547	22.1	5,241	20.8	5,656	21.0
<b>South</b>	8,829	36.9	6,784	28.5	8,569	24.9	8,432	20.0	5,881	19.8	5,757	22.8	5,530	20.5
<b>Italy</b>	<b>23,955</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>23,836</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>34,390</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>42,245</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>29,630</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>25,196</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>26,985</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs

**Table 21 – ISMU estimates of migrant population living in Lombardy region; by legal status, gender and nationality. Year 2006**

Nationality	Females		Males		Total	
	Total (doc. and undocumented)	% of undocumented	Total (doc. and undocumented)	% of undocumented	Total (doc. and undocumented)	% of undocumented
<b>Morocco</b>	36,945	12	61,648	15	98,593	14
<b>Albania</b>	39,490	13	54,657	17	94,147	16
<b>Romania</b>	35,817	25	38,381	24	74,198	24
<b>Egypt</b>	13,532	13	44,521	22	58,054	20

Philippines	25,885	14	19,502	19	45,387	16
China	20,214	18	21,877	14	42,091	16
Ecuador	23,958	21	16,769	23	40,727	22
Peru	23,604	22	15,301	23	38,905	23
India	11,691	13	19,988	10	31,679	11
Senegal	5,408	14	25,119	17	30,528	16
Ukraine	24,161	26	5,995	18	30,155	24
Pakistan	7,345	15	17,319	12	24,664	13
Sri Lanka	9,620	13	13,267	18	22,886	16
Tunisia	7,182	13	15,661	15	22,843	14
Serbia - Montenegro	6,140	19	7,041	12	13,181	16
Ghana	5,594	14	7,198	13	12,791	14
Brazil	8,101	19	4,498	23	12,600	21
Bangladesh	3,758	14	8,619	15	12,377	15
Moldova	7,209	26	2,960	14	10,169	22
Macedonia	3,740	17	4,689	15	8,429	16
<b>Total (all nationality)</b>	<b>396,368</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>463,690</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>860,059</b>	<b>18</b>

Source: (Barbaglio 2007) p.335

**Table 22 - ISMU estimates of undocumented migrants living in Lombardy region, by gender and nationality. Year 2006**

Nationality	Undocumented migrants				
	Females		Males		Total
		%		%	
Romania	8,954	49	9,211	51	18,165
Albania	5,134	36	9,292	64	14,426
Morocco	4,433	32	9,247	68	13,680
Egypt	1,759	15	9,795	85	11,554
Ecuador	5,031	57	3,857	43	8,888
Peru	5,193	60	3,519	40	8,712
Ukraine	6,282	85	1,079	15	7,361
Philippines	3,624	49	3,705	51	7,329
China	3,639	54	3,063	46	6,702
Senegal	757	15	4,270	85	5,027
Sri Lanka	1,251	34	2,388	66	3,639
India	1,520	43	1,999	57	3,519
Tunisia	934	28	2,349	72	3,283

Pakistan	1,102	35	2,078	65	3,180
Brazil	1,539	60	1,035	40	2,574
Moldova	1,874	82	414	18	2,288
Serbia - Montenegro	1,167	58	845	42	2,012
Bangladesh	526	29	1,293	71	1,819
Ghana	783	46	936	55	1,719
Macedonia	636	48	703	53	1,339
<b>Total (all nationality)</b>	<b>71,346</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>83,464</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>154,810</b>

Source: author's calculation from (Barbaglio 2007)

**Table 23 - Legalized migrants: gender and nationality. Amnesties: 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002**

Geographical area and nationality	Law 39/90			Law 489/95			Law 1998			Law 189/02 e 222/02		
	MF	% F	%	MF	% F	%	MF	% F	%	MF	% F	%
<b>Total legalized</b>	<b>217,626</b>	<b>26.0</b>		<b>244,492</b>	<b>31.0</b>		<b>217,124</b>	<b>28.0</b>		<b>646,829</b>	<b>46.2</b>	
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>27,699</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>63,128</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>25.8</b>	<b>81,672</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>383,107</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>59.2</b>
Eastern Europe	22,650	35.4	10.4	61,673	31.2	25.2	81,024	29.7	37.3	382,992	56.9	59.2
of which: - Albania	2,471	11.7	1.1	29,724	18.4	12.2	38,996	16.9	18.0	47,763	19.3	7.4
- Moldova	-	-	-	-	-	-	950	69.2	0.4	29,471	71.7	4.6
- Poland	5,366	51.8	2.5	7,926	66.8	3.2	5,077	72.4	2.3	30,021	78.0	4.6
- Romania	760	56.2	0.3	11,099	28.8	4.5	24,098	33.4	11.1	134,909	45.2	20.9
- Ukraine	-	-	-	295	79.0	0.1	2,050	79.0	0.9	101,651	85.3	15.7
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>127,027</b>	<b>15.2</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>96,926</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>39.6</b>	<b>72,012</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>108,540</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>16.8</b>
of which: - Morocco	48,670	8.9	22.4	34,258	10.2	14.0	23,850	11.3	11.0	48,174	13.5	7.4
- Senegal	15,966	2.9	7.3	9,889	2.6	4.0	10,727	5.3	4.9	12,372	9.3	1.9
- Tunisia	26,318	7.0	12.1	10,362	9.6	4.2	5,565	6.1	2.6	8,843	4.6	1.4
<b>ASIA</b>	<b>46,973</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>61,349</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>47,768</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>22.0</b>	<b>87,949</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>13.6</b>
of which: - Bangladesh	3,861	1.0	1.8	6,162	0.9	2.5	6,689	0.7	3.1	10,687	0.7	1.7
- China	8,580	37.3	3.9	14,445	41.4	5.9	16,787	39.1	7.7	33,950	37.8	5.2
- Philippines	13,684	62.3	6.3	21,406	62.7	8.8	6,696	64.7	3.1	9,821	60.1	1.5
- India	2,819	11.8	1.3	5,623	3.6	2.3	4,697	3.8	2.2	13,399	2.9	2.1
- Pakistan	4,510	2.1	2.1	4,499	1.4	1.8	6,592	1.1	3.0	9,649	0.7	1.5
- Sri Lanka	5,258	22.6	2.4	6,993	26.2	2.9	4,090	27.6	1.9	7,030	20.0	1.1
<b>AMERICA</b>	<b>15,501</b>	<b>64.2</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>23,021</b>	<b>69.5</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>15,597</b>	<b>68.5</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>67,143</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>10.4</b>

- Ecuador	344	70.3	0.2	2,066	72.1	0.8	5,178	70.3	2.4	34,292	64.7	5.3
- Peru	2,057	60.8	0.9	12,753	69.2	5.2	4,960	67.5	2.3	16,213	65.5	2.5
<b>% over documented migrants</b>	<b>120.9</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>45.9</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>24.9</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>47.8</b>		<b>100</b>

Source: Istat and Italian Home Office

**Table 24 - Amnesty 2002: legalized and documented migrants**

Area	Country	Legalized migrants					Documented migrants				
		MF	%F	% Married	avg age F	avg age M	MF	%F	% Married	avg age F	avg age M
Eastern Europe	Romania	134,909	45.2	45.8	32.8	31.7	109,468	54.7	58.1	32.6	33.4
	Ukraine	101,651	85.3	54.3	41.8	34.4	15,510	79.5	50.5	35.0	27.5
	Albania	47,763	19.3	39.4	32.5	29.0	192,658	43.3	62.6	34.4	34.1
	Poland	30,021	78.0	38.5	38.1	33.0	34,891	72.8	48.5	35.2	36.2
	Moldova	29,471	71.7	55.3	37.8	33.0	8,798	68.8	56.0	32.5	31.4
	Bulgaria	8,305	52.1	49.2	38.5	34.3	8,814	59.5	48.4	34.6	34.2
	Russia	5,868	89.2	30.1	38.4	34.8	13,119	80.5	52.5	34.8	33.8
Asia	China	33,950	37.8	40.7	31.5	31.3	71,002	47.9	58.8	32.8	33.2
	India	13,399	2.9	29.3	32.3	30.5	35,758	42.8	52.2	35.5	35.1
	Bangladesh	10,687	0.7	28.3	28.1	26.7	23,568	25.4	62.2	28.7	31.5
	Philippines	9,821	60.1	45.3	34.1	33.6	66,278	63.8	58.1	39.3	37.9
	Pakistan	9,649	0.7	29.7	30.5	30.6	21,958	23.4	56.2	31.0	34.2
	Sri Lanka	7,030	20.0	43.4	35.8	32.1	36,017	45.4	69.3	36.3	36.9
Africa	Morocco	48,174	13.5	19.1	31.2	29.4	182,870	35.8	57.2	33.6	35.5
	Egypt	15,470	1.0	21.5	34.1	29.6	31,624	25.0	56.6	32.9	37.1
	Senegal	12,372	9.3	30.7	32.3	31.8	37,348	11.3	64.2	32.3	38.8
	Tunisia	8,843	4.6	18.1	32.4	29.5	53,808	27.6	56.7	32.4	35.9
	Nigeria	5,884	55.7	14.3	26.7	30.0	20,221	60.1	43.4	31.6	34.8
South America	Ecuador	34,292	64.7	35.1	33.5	31.9	14,010	67.3	39.1	34.5	31.5
	Peru	16,213	65.5	29.2	33.7	32.8	32,614	65.7	42.0	37.5	36.2
Total 20 nationalities		583,772					1,010,334				
% of the total		90					64				

<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>646,829</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>30.9</b>	<b>1,580,738</b>	<b>49.2</b>	<b>57.4</b>	<b>34.4</b>	<b>35.0</b>
--------------	----------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	------------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	-------------

Source: Istat and Italian Minister of Internal Affairs

**Table 25 - Naga records: gender composition of undocumented migrants in Milan. Years 2000-2006**

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Women</b>	43,1	43,5	47,4	46,5	46,2	44,4	44,6
<b>Men</b>	56,9	56,5	52,6	53,5	53,8	55,6	55,4
<b>Observations</b>	<b>6,571</b>	<b>6,487</b>	<b>5,993</b>	<b>4,472</b>	<b>4,710</b>	<b>5,119</b>	<b>4,830</b>

Source: (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007)

**Table 26 - ISMU data: age distribution of migrants in Lombardy, by legal status and origin area. Year 2006**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Age range</b>	<b>Immigrants</b>		<b>Total (%)</b>
		<b>Documented (%)</b>	<b>Undocumented (%)</b>	
<b>Eastern Europe (N=2501)</b>	<b>15-29</b>	33	46	36
	<b>30-39</b>	39	27	36
	<b>40+</b>	28	28	28
<b>Asia and Oceania (N=2106)</b>	<b>15-29</b>	34	59	36
	<b>30-39</b>	37	27	36
	<b>40+</b>	30	14	28
<b>Northern Africa (N=2055)</b>	<b>15-29</b>	30	66	35
	<b>30-39</b>	44	26	42
	<b>40+</b>	26	8	24
<b>Sub Saharan Africa (N=1028)</b>	<b>15-29</b>	30	55	33
	<b>30-39</b>	43	37	43
	<b>40+</b>	26	8	25
<b>Latin America (N=1272)</b>	<b>15-29</b>	31	44	33
	<b>30-39</b>	42	38	41
	<b>40+</b>	28	18	26
<b>Total (N=8962)</b>	<b>15-29</b>	32	52	35
	<b>30-39</b>	40	30	39
	<b>40+</b>	28	18	27

Source: (Barbagli 2007)

**Table 27 – Amnesty 2002: age distribution of applicants, by nationality and area of residence**

Area/country of origin	Italy				North-Central Italy				Southern Italy			
	Age range			Mean age	Age range			Mean age	Age range			Mean age
	15-29	30-44	45+		15-30	30-45	45+		15-31	30-46	45+	
<b>Balkan area</b>	52	39	9	31	51	40	9	31	55	36	9	30
<b>Eastern Europe</b>	27	43	30	38	26	43	31	38	29	43	28	37
<b>North Africa</b>	61	37	3	29	61	36	3	29	59	38	3	29
<b>Sub Saharan Africa</b>	54	43	3	30	56	42	3	30	49	47	4	31
<b>Eastern Asia</b>	46	48	5	31	46	48	5	31	46	50	5	31
<b>Middle East</b>	62	34	4	29	63	34	4	29	58	36	6	30
<b>Latin America</b>	44	46	10	32	44	46	9	32	44	44	12	32
<b>Ukraine</b>	19	46	35	40	45	38	14	41	48	30	13	38
<b>Russia</b>	31	39	30	37	37	28	13	36	44	34	13	39
<b>Poland</b>	40	32	28	36	34	30	12	37	28	22	9	34
<b>Bulgaria</b>	33	47	21	36	47	19	11	35	45	28	16	38
<b>Moldova</b>	33	48	19	35	48	19	10	35	46	18	13	35
<b>Philippines</b>	40	50	10	33	50	10	8	33	47	13	11	34
<b>Peru</b>	44	46	10	32	46	10	8	32	45	11	9	32
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	47	43	10	32	45	10	8	32	40	10	7	31
<b>Ecuador</b>	44	47	9	32	47	9	6	32	41	11	10	32
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	45	51	4	31	41	2	2	29	55	5	5	32
<b>Romania</b>	50	42	9	31	42	9	7	31	43	11	9	32
<b>Senegal</b>	48	49	3	31	49	3	3	31	50	5	5	31
<b>Algeria</b>	47	51	2	31	51	2	2	31	50	2	2	31
<b>China</b>	49	48	4	30	47	4	4	30	50	4	4	31
<b>Ghana</b>	52	46	2	30	46	2	2	30	46	3	2	30
<b>Pakistan</b>	56	39	4	30	39	4	4	30	44	6	6	31
<b>India</b>	58	38	4	30	38	3	3	29	40	5	4	30
<b>Tunisia</b>	61	37	2	29	38	2	2	29	35	3	2	29
<b>Egypt</b>	64	34	2	29	34	2	2	29	31	5	5	30
<b>Albania</b>	62	32	6	29	32	6	5	29	31	6	4	28
<b>Morocco</b>	61	36	3	29	36	3	2	29	35	3	3	29

Bangladesh	85	15	0	26	15	0	0	26	17	1	1	26
Other nationalities	51	39	10	31	39	9	7	31	41	11	6	32
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>34</b>

Source: (Conti and Strozza 2006)

**Table 28 - Naga records: age distribution of undocumented migrants in Milan; by gender. Years 2003-2006**

Age range	Women				Men				Total			
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2003	2004	2005	2006	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>15-24</b>	24,5	22,7	22,7	19,8	21,9	19,9	22,9	22,2	23,1	21,2	22,0	21,1
<b>25-34</b>	38,2	37,8	37,8	38,9	43,2	45,5	44,2	45,5	40,9	41,9	41,5	42,6
<b>35-44</b>	21,9	22,4	22,4	25,0	23,2	23,0	22,7	21,6	22,6	22,7	22,7	23,1
<b>45 and more</b>	15,4	17,1	17,1	16,4	11,7	11,7	10,3	10,7	13,4	14,2	13,8	13,2
Observations	2079	2176	2176	2156	2393	2534	2848	2674	4472	4710	5119	4830

Source: (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007)

**Table 29 – ISMU estimates of undocumented migrants living in Italy - by macro area and area of origin (thousands). 1st July 2005**

Area of origin	Northern-Central Italy	%	Southern Italy	%	Italy	%
Eastern Europe	71	53	215	53	339	53
Asia and Oceania	18	13	49	12	80	13
Northern Africa	26	19	65	16	110	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	11	8	36	9	56	9
Latin-America	8	6	43	10	56	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>408</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>100</b>

Source:(Blangiardo and Tanturri 2006)

**Table 30 - ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy; by nationality (thousands). 1st July 2005**

Country	Total migrants	Documented migrants	Documented migrants	Undocumented migrants
		Residents	Non-residents	
	thousands	%	%	%



Albania	459	75.0	10.7	14.3
Romania	437	68.4	10.1	21.6
Morocco	408	78.3	7.4	14.2
Ukraine	180	68.1	9.4	22.4
China	169	76.1	12.5	11.4
Philippines	110	80.3	9.3	10.4
Tunisia	110	76.4	7.5	16.1
Ecuador	89	77.4	8.4	14.2
Macedonia	88	71.9	9.9	18.2
Poland	83	68.9	9.8	21.3
Serbia and Montenegro	83	76.3	9.3	14.4
Senegal	82	71.1	10.8	18.0
Peru	78	76.4	7.8	15.8
India	77	78.4	9.8	11.8
Egypt	75	81.2	6.4	12.5
Moldova	68	70.8	10.1	19.1
Sri Lanka	60	81.8	6.4	11.7
Bangladesh	52	79.2	8.8	12.0
Pakistan	51	78.8	9.4	11.7
Nigeria	50	70.1	10.4	19.6
<b>Total 20 major nationalities</b>	<b>2809</b>			
<b>Total</b>	<b>3358</b>	<b>74.4</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>16.1</b>

Source: (Blangiardo 2006)

Table 31 - ISMU estimates of undocumented migrants living in Italy; by nationality. 1st July 2005

Nationality	Undocumented migrants	
	thousands	%
Romania	94.4	17.4
Albania	65.6	12.1
Morocco	57.9	10.7
Ukraine	40.3	7.4
China	19.3	3.6
Tunisia	17.7	3.3
Poland	17.7	3.3

<b>Macedonia</b>	16.0	3.0
<b>Senegal</b>	14.8	2.7
<b>Moldova</b>	13.0	2.4
<b>Ecuador</b>	12.6	2.3
<b>Peru</b>	12.3	2.3
<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	12.0	2.2
<b>Philippines</b>	11.4	2.1
<b>Nigeria</b>	9.8	1.8
<b>Egypt</b>	9.4	1.7
<b>India</b>	9.1	1.7
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	7.0	1.3
<b>Bangladesh</b>	6.2	1.1
<b>Pakistan</b>	6.0	1.1
<b>Total 20 major nationalities</b>	452.5	83.6
<b>Total</b>	541	100

Source: (Blangiardo 2006)

**Table 32 - ISMU data: : labour market status of migrants in Italy, by legal status (Year 2005)**

Labour market status	Documented migrants			Legalized migrants			Undocumented migrants			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
<b>Unemployed</b>	7.6	7.9	7.7	7.0	9.1	7.9	20.9	20.1	20.5	9.0	9.5	9.2
<b>Inactive</b>	2.6	26.9	14.2	0.3	1.9	1.0	0.0	5.7	2.5	1.5	17.5	8.9
<b>Employed</b>	68.2	54.6	61.8	84.5	85.2	84.8	60.9	66.6	63.3	72.5	64.5	68.8
<b>Self-employed</b>	19.1	6.2	12.9	6.2	1.8	4.3	16.0	4.6	11.1	14.7	4.8	10.2
<b>Other/no answer</b>	2.5	4.3	3.4	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.2	3.0	2.6	2.3	3.5	2.9
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: author's calculations from (Bragato 2006), p.55

**Table 33 - ISMU data: detailed labour market status of migrants in Italy, by legal status. Year 2005.**

Labour market status	Documented migrants			Legalized migrants			Undocumented migrants			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Unemployed	8	8	8	7	9	8	21	20	21	9	10	9
Student	3	6	4	0	2	1	0	2	1	2	4	3
Looking after family/home	0	21	10	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	13	6
Recorded employment:	63	45	54	73	76	74	0	0	0	59	49	54
temporary worker	10	5	8	12	7	10	0	0	0	9	5	8
part time	4	14	9	7	26	15	0	0	0	4	16	10
full time	49	25	37	54	43	49	0	0	0	45	27	37
Unrecorded employment:	6	10	8	12	9	11	61	67	63	14	16	15
"stable"	3	5	4	7	6	7	32	46	38	8	10	9
"unstable"	3	5	4	5	3	4	29	21	26	6	6	6
Self employed: recorded	12	3	8	3	1	2	0	0	0	8	2	5
Self employed: unrecorded	1	1	1	2	0	1	16	5	11	3	1	2
Entrepreneur	6	2	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	1	3
Other condition	2	4	3	1	2	1	0	1	1	2	3	2
No answer	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	2	2	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: (Bragato 2006), p.55

**Table 34 - ISMU data: occupation of migrants, by legal status. Year 2005**

Occupation	Documented migrants			Legalized migrants			Undocumented migrants		
	Centr.North	South	Italy	Centr.North	South	Italy	Centr.North	South	Italy
Unskilled workers: agriculture	2.7	11.3	3.5	2.2	15.1	3.5	3.3	18.2	6.0
Unskilled workers: fishing	0.0	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.1
Unskilled workers: manufacture	14.6	2.4	13.4	9.9	2.4	9.1	1.8	1.1	1.7
Unskilled workers: construction	8.1	5.8	7.9	16.4	9.6	15.7	26.4	10.1	23.4
Unskilled workers: services	8.2	3.4	7.7	8.5	4.2	8.0	5.5	2.6	5.0
Unskilled workers: transports	3.3	0.8	3.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.2	0.1	0.2
Unskilled workers: retail trade and services	4.5	4.6	4.5	6.1	4.3	5.9	2.5	2.1	2.5
Unskilled workers: hotels and restaurants	11.1	8.4	10.8	11.7	10.4	11.6	7.6	8.2	7.7
Household staff	10.5	18.5	11.2	15.5	22.7	16.3	18.1	12.4	17.0
Care workers and babysitters	6.0	9.2	6.3	13.8	16.6	14.2	14.8	17.5	15.2
Owners of commercial activities	7.4	24.6	9.0	2.2	6.6	2.7	11.0	19.7	12.6

Craftsmen	6.3	2.9	6.0	5.0	3.1	4.8	3.0	2.8	2.9
Skilled workers	5.1	0.6	4.7	2.9	0.6	2.7	0.3	0.2	0.3
White collar employees / clerks	3.1	0.9	2.9	1.5	0.8	1.4	1.2	0.1	1.0
Doctors and nurses	1.5	0.8	1.5	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.0
Intellectual jobs	5.8	3.3	5.6	1.6	0.8	1.6	0.8	0.3	0.7
Prostitutes	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	1.7	1.4	1.7
Other	1.7	1.5	1.7	0.3	1.0	0.4	1.8	2.6	1.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: author's calculations from (Bragato 2006), p.67

**Table 35 - ISMU data: immigrants' monthly wages, by legal status. Year 2005**

Legal status	Centr.- North	South	Italy
<b>Documented migrants</b>			
Mean	994	670	965
Median	950	600	900
<b>Legalized migrants</b>			
Mean	878	623	851
Median	850	600	800
<b>Undocumented migrants</b>			
Mean	735	478	690
Median	700	500	600
<b>Total migrants</b>			
Mean	930	621	898
Median	900	600	850

Source: (Bragato 2006), p.74

**Table 36 - Industry of employment of applicants for the 2002 amnesty, by area of origin and area of residence. Year 2002**

Origin area	% by industry of employment							
	Agriculture	Construction	Other manufacture	Retail trade	Hotels and restaurants	Services to families	Other services	Other
	Italy							
Balkan area	6.1	29.4	10.4	2.9	3.3	36.0	7.9	4.1
	100							

East Europe	2.4	5.2	3.4	1.7	2.5	77.3	4.1	3.3	100
North Africa	12.1	29.7	12.0	6.0	5.0	13.3	13.3	8.6	100
Sub Saharan Africa	4.1	7.4	14.4	7.8	1.6	40.7	14.6	9.5	100
Eastern Asia	0.9	2.2	38.2	6.8	8.1	33.5	5.9	4.4	100
Middle East	12.4	13.2	12.3	10.4	6.5	26.3	11.4	7.5	100
Latin America	0.8	6.4	4.1	2.2	3.1	69.0	10.5	3.9	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>46.9</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Northern and Central Italy</b>									
Balkan area	4.2	30.9	10.6	2.8	3.3	36.2	8.0	4.0	100
East Europe	1.2	6.1	3.0	1.2	2.4	78.6	4.4	3.2	100
North Africa	5.4	34.3	12.9	5.9	5.6	11.7	15.4	8.8	100
Sub Saharan Africa	2.5	7.7	17.0	8.4	1.7	37.8	16.6	8.3	100
Eastern Asia	0.4	2.2	38.6	5.9	8.3	34.4	5.9	4.3	100
Middle East	10.4	15.4	12.4	11.8	7.7	21.5	13.1	7.7	100
Latin America	0.8	6.5	4.2	2.2	3.1	68.9	10.7	3.9	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>45.6</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Southern Italy</b>									
Balkan area	26.0	13.1	8.1	3.6	3.1	33.9	7.0	5.1	100
East Europe	5.0	3.3	4.4	2.8	2.7	74.5	3.6	3.7	100
North Africa	38.2	11.8	8.4	6.1	2.8	19.5	5.1	8.1	100
Sub Saharan Africa	9.8	6.3	5.4	5.5	1.3	50.6	7.7	13.5	100
Eastern Asia	4.4	2.1	35.4	13.4	6.4	27.4	5.8	5.1	100
Middle East	19.7	5.0	12.1	5.4	2.3	43.7	5.0	6.8	100
Latin America	1.9	3.1	3.8	3.2	3.8	74.5	5.3	4.2	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: (Conti and Strozza 2006) p.72

Table 37 - Industry of employment of applicants for the 2002 amnesty, by area of origin and area of residence. Year 2002

Industry	% of industry employment
----------	--------------------------

	Italy	North-West	North-East	Central	South
	<b>Total</b>				
Agriculture	5.3	2.1	2.7	4.9	14.8
Construction	16.6	21.2	20.7	14.7	6.4
Other manufacture	10.3	10.0	13.3	10.2	7.9
Retail trade	3.9	3.9	3.5	3.9	4.4
Hotels and restaurants	3.8	4.3	4.0	3.5	2.9
House cleaners	26.9	24.9	21.5	29.0	33.0
Personal care and assistance	20.0	15.9	21.4	23.2	20.2
Other services	8.3	12.2	8.7	5.8	4.9
Other	5.0	5.4	4.1	4.7	5.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
	<b>Women</b>				
Agriculture	0.9	0.2	0.4	0.6	3.1
Construction	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Other manufacture	3.3	2.4	4.3	3.9	2.5
Retail trade	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.7
Hotels and restaurants	3.0	3.2	3.7	2.7	2.4
House cleaners	45.8	48.7	39.2	45.4	48.6
Personal care and assistance	37.8	34.5	43.3	39.0	35.1
Other services	4.1	5.9	4.5	3.2	2.5
Other	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.6	3.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
	<b>Men</b>				
Agriculture	9.0	3.4	4.7	9.1	25.7
Construction	30.5	35.9	38.3	29.0	12.3
Other manufacture	16.3	15.3	21.0	16.5	12.8
Retail trade	6.0	5.6	5.3	6.3	6.8
Hotels and restaurants	4.4	5.0	4.3	4.3	3.3
House cleaners	11.0	8.4	6.4	12.9	18.5
Personal care and assistance	4.9	3.1	2.9	7.7	6.3
Other services	11.8	16.5	12.2	8.4	7.2
Other	6.2	6.7	5.0	5.8	7.1

Total	100	100	100	100	100
-------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Source: (Conti and Strozza 2006) p.74

**Table 38 - Naga records: labour market status of undocumented migrants in Milan, by years of permanence. Year 2006**

Labour market status	Years of permanence in Italy				
	y0-1	y1-2	y2-3	y3-4	4 and more
Employed	38,4	66,6	71,9	75,9	59,0
Unemployed	60,1	32,7	26,8	23,1	40,1
Inactive	1,6	0,7	1,3	1,0	0,9
Observations	1546	978	861	580	644

Source: (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007)

**Table 39 - Naga records: a comparison of educational levels of undocumented migrants in Milan (2006) and those of the Italian population (2001).**

Level of education	Naga records Year 2006			Italian population Census 2001		
	Total (15-64)	25-34	35-44	Total (15-64)	25-34	35-44
Illiterate	4	3	4	1	0	1
Elementary school (age 6-10)	10	10	10	19	5	10
"Media" school (age 11-13)	32	30	30	37	37	41
Secondary education (age 14-19)	44	46	45	35	46	37
University	10	11	12	9	12	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: (Devillanova, Fasani et al. 2007)

**Table 40 - Undocumented migrants residing in Italy, by entry channel (percentage). Years 2000-2006**

Type of entry	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Overstayers	59	61	51	75	67	60	64
Migrants that illegally crossed the border	24	27	34	15	29	26	23
Migrants that shore landed	17	12	15	10	4	14	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Italian Home Office (aa.vv. 2007)

**Table 41. Number of undocumented migrants shore landed in Southern Italian regions (Years 1998-2006)**

Year	Region of arrival				Total Italy
	Puglia	Sicilia	Calabria	Sardegna	
<b>1998</b>	28,458	8,828	848	n.a.	<b>38,134</b>
<b>1999</b>	46,481	1,973	1,545	n.a.	<b>49,999</b>
<b>2000</b>	18,990	2,782	5,045	n.a.	<b>26,817</b>
<b>2001</b>	8,546	5,504	6,093	n.a.	<b>20,143</b>
<b>2002</b>	3,372	18,225	2,122	n.a.	<b>23,719</b>
<b>2003</b>	137	14,017	177	n.a.	<b>14,331</b>
<b>2004</b>	18	13,594	23	n.a.	<b>13,635</b>
<b>2005</b>	38	22,824	176	16	<b>23,038</b>
<b>2006</b>	243	21,400	282	91	<b>21,925</b>

Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs

**Table 42. Immigrants refused entry at the border (Years: 1986-2006)**

Year	Immigrants refused entry at the border	Border type:			Immigrants refused entry by the "Head of Police"	Total immigrants refused entry
		terrestrial	maritime	aerial		
<b>1986</b>	20,054	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>20,054</b>
<b>1987</b>	23,496	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>23,496</b>
<b>1988</b>	31,120	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>31,120</b>
<b>1989</b>	39,977	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>39,977</b>
<b>1990</b>	62,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>62,000</b>
<b>1991</b>	59,908	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>59,908</b>
<b>1992</b>	62,514	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>62,514</b>
<b>1993</b>	69,888	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	<b>69,888</b>
<b>1994</b>	57,132	44,231	8,279	4,622	-	<b>57,132</b>
<b>1995</b>	62,443	37,036	19,130	6,276	-	<b>62,443</b>
<b>1996</b>	54,144	35,990	11,042	7,112	-	<b>54,144</b>
<b>1997</b>	39,888	23,949	8,534	7,405	-	<b>39,888</b>
<b>1998</b>	29,593	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15,564	<b>45,157</b>



<b>1999</b>	36,937	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11,500	<b>48,437</b>
<b>2000</b>	30,871	10,306	14,783	5,782	11,350	<b>42,221</b>
<b>2001</b>	30,625	13,646	11,761	5,218	10,433	<b>41,058</b>
<b>2002</b>	37,656	23,726	7,657	6,273	6,139	<b>43,795</b>
<b>2003</b>	24,202	15,793	3,337	5,072	3,195	<b>27,397</b>
<b>2004</b>	24,528	15,172	2,962	6,394	2,563	<b>27,091</b>
<b>2005</b>	19,646	10,597	1,927	7,122	4,232	<b>23,878</b>
<b>2006</b>	20,547	10,534	1,600	8,413	2,132	<b>22,679</b>

Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs

**Table 43 - ISMU survey 2007: migrants residing in Lombardy, by legal status and year of arrival in Italy**

Year of arrival in Italy	Documented	Undocumented
<b>before 2002</b>	95	5
<b>2003</b>	75	25
<b>2004</b>	66	34
<b>2005</b>	65	35
<b>2006</b>	56	44
<b>2007</b>	58	42
<b>Total</b>	88	12

Source: (Sciortino 2008)

**Table 44 - Stocks of refugees and asylum applications in Europe. Year 2006**

Country	Stock of refugees	# of refugees per 1000 population	Applications for asylum	# applications per 1000 population
<b>France</b>	145,996	2.3	30,690	0.5
<b>Germany</b>	605,406	7.3	21,030	0.3
<b>Italy</b>	26,875	0.4	10,348	0.2
<b>Spain</b>	5,275	0.1	5,310	0.1
<b>United Kingdom</b>	301,556	4.9	27,850	0.5
<b>EU25</b>	<b>1,390,271</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>198,900</b>	<b>0.4</b>

Source: Eurostat; UNHCR; National Committee for the Right of Asylum

**Table 45 – Asylum seekers in Italy: number of applications, applications examined and case outcomes. Years 1990-2006**

Year	Applications for asylum	Applications examined	Case outcomes							
			Granted refugee status	% of examined	Refused - Granted temporary HP	% of examined	Refused	% of examined	Unrecoverable	% of examined
1990	4827	1386	824	59.5	-	-	562	40.5	-	-
1991	23317	20854	944	4.5	-	-	19910	95.5	-	-
1992	6042	6960	336	4.8	-	-	6624	95.2	-	-
1993	1647	1426	126	8.8	-	-	1300	91.2	-	-
1994	1786	1684	298	17.7	-	-	1386	82.3	-	-
1995	1732	1718	285	16.6	-	-	1433	83.4	-	-
1996	675	694	172	24.8	-	-	522	75.2	-	-
1997	1858	1654	348	21	-	-	1306	79	-	-
1998	11122	3465	1026	29.6	-	-	2393	69.1	-	-
1999	24808	8331	785	9.4	853	10.2	6579	79	-	-
2000	18360	24978	1615	6.5	1615	6.5	21617	86.5	11	0
2001	17402	13148	2052	15.6	1312	10	6908	52.5	2838	21.6
2002	16123	16890	1235	7.3	729	4.3	4186	24.8	10662	63.1
2003	13971	11144	720	6.5	1829	16.4	2658	23.9	5854	52.5
2004	9796	8584	771	9	2366	27.6	3277	38.2	2086	24.3
2005	9346	11589	961	8.3	4084	35.2	1701	14.7	4258	36.7
2006	10348	9260	878	9.5	4338	46.8	3681	39.8	262	2.8
2007	14053	13509	1408	10	6318	47	4908	36	400	3

Source: National Committee for the Right of Asylum

## References

- aa.vv. (2007). Rapporto sulla Criminalita' in Italia - Anno 2007, Ministero dell'Interno.
- Baio, G., G. C. Blangiardo, et al. (2008). "Centre sampling technique in foreign migration surveys " (forthcoming).
- Baldassarini, A. (2001). "Foreign labour and non-regular occupation in the new estimates of Italian national accounts." Studi Emigrazione **141**.
- Barbagli, M. (2007). I rapporto sugli immigrati in Italia, Ministero dell'Interno.
- Barbagli, M., A. Colombo, et al. (2004). I sommersi e i sanati. Le regolarizzazioni degli immigrati in Italia. Bologna, il Mulino.
- Barbagli, M. (2007). I rapporto sugli immigrati in Italia, Ministero dell'Interno.
- Blangiardo, G. C. (2006). Foreigners' Presence in Italy. ISMU - The 11th Italian Report on Migration 2005. V. Cesareo, Polimetrica: 35-52.
- Blangiardo, G. C. (2007). Foreigner's Presence in Italy. Quantitative Evaluations and Comments. ISMU - The 12th Italian Report on Migration 2006. V. Cesareo, Polimetrica: 41-58.
- Blangiardo, G. C. (2008). The centre sampling technique in surveys on foreign migrants. The balance of a multi-year experience, United Nations Statistical Commission and EUROSTAT. **Working paper 12 - 29 February 2008**.
- Blangiardo, G. C. and M. L. Tanturri (2004). Il popolo dei regolarizzati. I Sommersi e i Sanati. M. Barbagli, A. Colombo and G. Sciortino. Bologna, il Mulino: 47-70.
- Blangiardo, G. C. and M. L. Tanturri (2006). La presenza straniera in Italia. Il Mezzogiorno dopo la grande regolarizzazione. Immagini e problematiche dell'immigrazione. G. C. Blangiardo and P. Farina. Milano, FrancoAngeli. **III**.
- Boeri, T., F. Fasani, et al. (2004). Immigrazione e assistenza sociale. La finanza pubblica italiana - Rapporto 2004. M. C. Guerra and A. Zanardi. Bologna, il Mulino.
- Bonifazi, C. (2007). L'immigrazione straniera in Italia. Bologna, il Mulino.
- Borjas, G. J. (1999). "Immigration and Welfare Magnets." Journal of Labor Economics **17**(4): 607-37.
- Bragato, S. (2006). La dimensione economica. Il Mezzogiorno dopo la grande regolarizzazione. Immagini e problematiche dell'immigrazione (Vol. III). G. C. Blangiardo and P. Farina. Milano, FrancoAngeli: pp. 53-80.
- Carfagna, M. (2002). I sommersi e i sanati. Le regolarizzazioni degli immigrati in Italia. Assimilati ed esclusi. A. Colombo and G. Sciortino. Bologna, il Mulino: 53-90.
- Caritas/Migrantes (2005). Irregular Migration in Italy. Illegally resident Third Country Nationals in Italy: State approaches towards them and their profile and social situation. EMN European Migration Network - Italian National Contact Point, IDOS.
- Caritas/Migrantes (2007). Immigrazione - Dossier Statistico 2007 - XVII Rapporto. Roma, Idos.
- CBO (2007). The impact of unauthorized immigrants on the budgets of state and local governments. Technical report, Congress of the United States - Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

- Chiuri, M. C., N. Coniglio, et al. (2007). L'esercito degli invisibili. Aspetti economici dell'immigrazione clandestina. Bologna, il Mulino.
- Chiuri, M. C., N. Coniglio, et al. (2006). Does clandestinity damage potential development in the countries of origin? A study of illegal migrants in Italy, mimeo.
- Chiuri, M. C., G. De Arcangelis, et al. (2007). Features and expectations of illegal immigrants: results of a field survey in Italy. Working Papers 01\_07, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics.
- Codini, E. (2007). Developments in regulation. The 12th Italian Report on Migration 2006 - ISMU. V. Cesareo, Polimetrica: 59-70.
- Colombo, A. (2007). Gli Immigrati Irregolari. I Rapporto sugli Immigrati in Italia. M. Barbagli, Ministero dell'Interno: 323-338.
- Colombo, A. and G. Sciortino (2002). Stranieri in Italia - Assimilati ed esclusi. Bologna, il Mulino.
- Coniglio, N., G. De Arcangelis, et al. (2006). Intentions to Return of Undocumented Migrants: Illegality as a Cause of Skill Waste. Discussion Paper No. 2356, IZA.
- Conti, C. and S. Strozza (2006). Lavoratori e lavori sommersi: il quadro attraverso l'ultima regolarizzazione degli stranieri. Il Mezzogiorno dopo la grande regolarizzazione. Vecchi e nuovi volti della presenza migratoria (vol. II). S. Strozza and E. Zucchetti. Milano, FrancoAngeli.
- corriere.it (10 December 2007). Stupri: solo il 10% attribuibili a stranieri. Corriere della Sera.
- Coslovi, L. (2007). Biglietti diversi, destinazione comune. Indagine sul mercato dell'emigrazione irregolare dal Marocco centrale verso l'Italia e la Spagna. Working Paper n.32, CeSPI.
- Coslovi, L., F. Pastore, et al. (2005). Forced return and then? Analysis of the impact of the expulsion of different categories of migrants. A comparative study of Albania, Morocco and Nigeria. Working Papers 13, CeSPI.
- Cottone, N. (21 May, 2008). "Il reato di immigrazione clandestina entra nel pacchetto sicurezza." Il Sole 24 ORE.
- Cottone, N. (25 July 2008). Extracomunitari, il Governo approva lo stato d'emergenza. Il Sole 24 ORE.
- Davila, A., J. Pagan, et al. (1999). "Immigration reform, the INS, and the distribution of interior and border enforcement resources." Public Choice **99**(3-4): 327-45.
- Del Boca, D. and A. Venturini (2003). Italian Migration. DP No.938, IZA.
- Devillanova, C. (forthcoming). "Social Networks, Information and Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Undocumented Immigrants in Milan." Journal of Health Economics.
- Devillanova, C., F. Fasani, et al. (2007). Cittadini senza diritti: abitare e lavorare a Milano da clandestini, . Econpubblica WP 125, Bocconi University.
- Devillanova, C. and T. Frattini (2006). Undocumented Immigrants in Milan: Evidence from Naga Records. Econpubblica - W.P. 110, Bocconi University.
- Dustmann, C., F. Fasani, et al. (mimeo). Remittance behaviour of undocumented migrants, CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration - University College of London.

- Einaudi, L. (2007). Le politiche dell'immigrazione in Italia dall'Unità a oggi. Bari, Laterza.
- Fasani, F. (2008). Undocumented Migrants and Labour Demand Shocks: an Empirical Analysis of Deportations. mimeo, University College of London.
- Fontana, E. (18 May 2008). "Irregolari, corsia speciale per colf e badanti." il Giornale.
- Gathman, C. (2004). The effects of enforcement on illegal markets: evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border. Discussion Paper 1004, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Gatti, F. (2007). Bilal. Il mio viaggio da infiltrato nel mercato dei nuovi schiavi. Milano, Rizzoli.
- Hammarberg, T. (2008). Memorandum - Commissioner for Human Rights - Following his visit to Italy on 19-20 Jne 2008 CommDH(2008)18. Strasbourg, Council of Europe.
- Hanson, G. H. and A. Spilimbergo (2001). "Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement." Canadian Journal of Economics **34**(3): pp. 612-638.
- IDOS and Caritas/Migrantes (2005). Irregular Migration in Italy. Illegally resident Third Country Nationals in Italy: State approaches towards them and their profile and social situation. EMN European Migration Network - Italian National Contact Point.
- Istat (2005). Gli stranieri in Italia: gli effetti dell'ultima regolarizzazione. Popolazione - Statistiche in breve, Istat.
- Istat (2006). La misura dell'economia sommersa secondo le statistiche ufficiali. Anni 2000-2004. Conti nazionali - Statistiche in breve, Istat.
- Istat (2007). La popolazione straniera residente in Italia al 1 gennaio 2007. Popolazione - Statistiche in breve, Istat.
- Istat (2008). L'immigrazione tra nuovi flussi e stabilizzazioni. ISTAT - Rapporto annuale 2007, Istat: 251-306.
- Istat (2008). La misura dell'occupazione non regolare nelle stime di contabilità nazionale. Anni 1980-2005. Statistiche in breve, Istat.
- Jaeger, D. A. and R. Goyle (2005). Deporting the Undocumented: A Cost Assessment, Center for American Progress.
- Jones, T. (May 2, 2008). The triumph of the right. The Guardian: p. 4.
- Kossoudji, S. A. and D. A. Cobb-Clark (2002). "Coming out of the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population." Journal of Labor Economics **20**(3): pp. 598-628.
- Levinson, A. (2005). The Regularization of the Unauthorized: Literature Review and Country Case Studies. Oxford, COMPAS - Center for Migration, Policy and Society - University of Oxford.
- Ludovico, M. and D. Stasio (21 May 2008). Sicurezza: carcere per i clandestini, ma non per decreto. Il Sole 24 ORE.
- Nascimbene, B. (2000). "The Regularisation of Clandestine Immigrants in Italy." European Journal of Migration and Law **2**: 337-359.
- Passel, J. (2007). Unauthorized migrants in the United States: estimates, methods and characteristics. Social, Employment and Migration, WP 57. OECD.

- Pastore, F., P. Monzini, et al. (2006). "Schengen's Soft Underbelly? Irregular Migration and Human Smuggling across Land and Sea Borders in Italy." International Migration **44**(4): 95-119.
- Pinkerton, C., G. McLaughlan, et al. (2004). Sizing the illegally resident population in the UK, UK Home Office.
- Reyneri, E. (1998). "The Mass Legalization of Migrants in Italy: Permanent or Temporary Emergence from the Underground Economy." South European Society and Politics **3**(3): 83-104.
- Reyneri, E. (1998). "The role of the underground economy in irregular migration to Italy: cause or effect?" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies **24**(2): 313-31.
- Reyneri, E. (2003). "Immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market." Journal of Modern Italian Studies **9**(1): 71-93.
- Reyneri, E. (2003). "Immigration and the underground economy in new receiving South European countries: manifold negative effects, manifold deep-rooted causes." International Review of Sociology **13**(1): 117-143.
- Reyneri, E. (2007). Immigration in Italy: trends and perspectives. mimeo.
- Sarzanini, F. (2 November 2007). Pronto il piano per migliaia di espulsioni. Corriere della Sera. p. 6.
- Sarzanini, F. (25 June 2008). Piano «salva badanti» di over 70 e disabili. Corriere della Sera.
- Sciortino, G. (2004). "Immigration in a Mediterranean Welfare State: the Italian Experience in Comparative Perspective." Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis **6**(2): 111-129.
- Sciortino, G. (2007). La popolazione straniera irregolare: cambiamenti e continuit  (ch. 5.3). L'immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. La sesta indagine regionale. Rapporto 2006. G. C. Blangiardo, Fondazione ISMU.
- Sciortino, G. (2008). La popolazione immigrata straniera in condizione irregolare: una realt  fortemente dinamica (ch. 5.3). L'immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. La settima indagine regionale. Rapporto 2007. G. C. Blangiardo, Fondazione ISMU.
- Sciortino, G. and A. Colombo (2004). "The flows and the flood: the public discourse on immigration in Italy, 1969-2001." Journal of Modern Italian Studies **9**(1): 94-113.
- Strozza, S. (2004). "Estimates of the Illegal Foreigners in Italy: A Review of the Literature." International Migration Review **38**(1): 309-331.
- Tapinos, G. and D. Delaunay (1998). La mesure de la migration clandestine en Europe, EUROSTAT.
- Triandafyllidou, A. and M. Veikou (2001). Immigration Policy and its Implementation in Italy: The State of the Art. Migration Pathways. A historic, demographic and policy review of four countries of the European Union. A. Triandafyllidou. Brussels, European Commission Research Directorate: pp. 63-85.
- Valtolina, G. G. (2006). Immigration and Society in Italy. The Eleventh Italian Report on Migrations 2005. V. Cesareo. Milano, Polimetrica.
- [www.corriere.it](http://www.corriere.it) (18th of May, 2008). Sicurezza, il governo apre sulle badanti. Corriere della Sera - online version.
- Zincone, G. (1998). "Illegality, enlightenment and ambiguity: a hot Italian recipe." South European Society and Politics **3**(3): 43-82.

Zincone, G. (2006). "The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy."  
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies **32**(3): pp. 347-375.