RADICALISATION THAT MAY LEAD TO VIOLENCE

POLICY REPORT ON GREECE

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1. Introduction

Over the past fifteen years, the phenomenon of radicalisation has anew emerged as salient in the USA, in Europe and elsewhere. The attacks against the World Trade Centre in New York and in Washington DC in September 2001 rendered dramatically visible the growth of radical Islam militancy and its destructive consequences. However, the forms that radicalisation takes extend well beyond those related to religion-inspired extremism, and their intensity, as well as the responses of governments and state authorities significantly vary across countries. Prompted by increasing incidents of political violence, primarily but not solely linked to Islamist radicalism, scholarly interest in the subject has surged. A wealth of studies explore the motives and causes of radicalisation, as well as the processes whereby individuals and groups come to espouse radical ideas and engage in violent actions. Islamist radicalisation, as well as right-wing extremism have attracted a large amount of research, while left-wing extremism has received far less attention since the 1980s when it began to decline (albeit not disappear) after its heyday in the 1970s.

In the countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe though, the phenomenon of radicalisation has generally been understudied, despite the fact that extremism and political radicalism have been long-standing in most countries in the region. The project RAD MONITOR sought to address this gap in research and knowledge. The rise of ‘new’ and the resurgence of ‘old’ forms of radicalisation are an emerging issue for policy-makers and there is limited understanding of the threats leading to violence, both within policy circles and academia. Policy-makers and state agencies face significant challenges in devising appropriate strategies to address the factors contributing to extremism and violent radicalisation. There is a clear need for research and evidence-based advice on this issue. Policy debates on how to confront different types of radicalisation have been ongoing in many states in the EU in view of recent global threats. Yet in many member states decision-makers lack the appropriate evidence base to guide policy actions, especially in the field of Islamist radicalisation.

In the frame of the RAD MONITOR project, the ELIAMEP team explored the main characteristics, causes, organizational features and repertoire of actions of four different kinds of radicalization that have been evidenced in Greece: the extreme left radicalization and its continuity in the broader anti-authoritarian movement, the far-right radicalization, football hooliganism, and Islamic radicalization. While these are entirely different phenomena that cannot be treated as comparable to one another, there is a common aspect that ties them together: the prime place of violent speech in the ideas and ideologies that they espouse, as well as the tendency to deploy violence in their repertoire of actions. The findings from our research on the case of Greece is presented and analysed in three reports.

Besides exploring the phenomenon of radicalization in Central and Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Greece and the Czech Republic), the second goal of the RAD MONITOR project was to develop a tool for the identification and monitoring of radicalization processes, which can be used by front-line practitioners. The Radicalization Monitoring Tool (RMT) that was developed, contains a series of indicators that reveal tendencies, situations and behaviours that may entail the risk of radicalization. The aim of the indicators is to act as a red flag for the identification of individuals or groups that are vulnerable to radicalization, or who are in the process of crystallizing their motives and/or organize their involvement in acts of political violence.

This policy report provides a brief overview of the phenomenon of radicalization in its different forms in Greece, which is based on the research conducted in the frame of the RAD MONITOR project. The second part contains a list of policy recommendations that specifically pertain to indicators and tools for the prevention and monitoring of far-right and Islamist radicalization, and their relevance for the Greek context.
2. The Greek case: an overview

In Greece, the phenomenon of radicalisation has been present throughout the period from the mid-1970s when the country made the transition from a military dictatorship to democracy, until today. Greece displays one of the most persistent problems of terrorism in Europe, raising anew the question of why extremist and revolutionary organisations continue to emerge and be active in democracies. The intensity and nature of political violence in Greece, as well as the forms that it takes have evolved over time. Levels of political violence originating from far-left groups have remained high in Greece and even rose from the 1970s until the 2000s, as data on number of attacks from the Global Terrorism Database shows (GTD). The GTD records 1169 incidents between February 1973 and December 2014 of far-left political violence in Greece. The number of incidents have hiked in particular years and periods of time, such as in 1977-78, in 1989-1990, and less so in 1998-99, while they saw the highest peak in 2008.¹

In the course of the 2000s, and especially since 2010, right-wing and left-wing extremism and radicalisation intensified. In the past seven years, their intensification has taken place in the context of a deepening social and economic crisis linked to the country’s external debt problems, the adoption of austerity policies, declining incomes and high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth. Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions have been accompanied by the fragmentation of what used to function as a two-party political system and by a profound legitimacy crisis of the Greek political system as we knew it until 2010. Right-wing extremism and violence have also sharply grown since 2010 and they have been substantially connected to the appearance of a far-right political party, the Golden Dawn (GD), which has gained representation in the Greek Parliament. The GTD though, as well as the EUROPOL Terrorism Reports, do not record attacks by far-right groups, largely due to the fact that such data was not recorded by the Greek state itself until 2012.

In the context of a profound economic, social and political crisis since 2010 in Greece, incidents of sports-related violence (hooliganism) have also recorded a considerable increase. What is more, far-right and anarchist ideologies, and organised crime have apparently penetrated the terraces of sports grounds, creating in this way a system of ‘communicating vessels’ between organised hard-core fan clubs and extremism. Hooliganism, which emerged after the end of the dictatorship in 1974, has become in recent years a youth strategy to escape from reality. It has been tolerated and, in some cases, even fomented, directly or indirectly, by the boards of sports clubs and sports federations, which has exposed the weaknesses of the self-regulated institutional setting of sport (predominantly football) in Greece.

So far, Islamist-related radicalization activity has been limited to a logistical, recruitment and support basis. However, Greek authorities declare that they are ‘at a heightened state of vigilance’ at the moment, due to the fact that Greece is a Jihadist crossover to and from Syria. The large pool of young male irregular immigrants from Muslim countries, whose presence is not recorded in official data, in combination with their dire living conditions and the lack of formal and monitored places of worship create a fertile environment for Islamist radicalisation.

3. Far-right radicalization

In order to explore the appropriateness and validate the behavioral and situational indicators for far-right radicalisation in Greece, we performed a validation study on the basis of a

Situation Assessment analysis, a component of the Radicalisation Monitoring Tool that was developed in the frame of the RAD MONITOR project. The aims of the Situation Assessment analysis were the following: 1) to evaluate the capacity of the Greek Ministry Of Citizen Protection, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, and Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) to collect, provide and analyse data as per the categories and baseline indicators presented in Table 1 and Table 2 below; 2) to identify data that is already collected by the respective actors; 3) to identify what data is not collected by the respective actors; 4) to refine the analytical framework and provide recommendations for compiling a comprehensive analysis report at national level; and 5) to draft a pilot Situation Assessment Report based on the data collected.

Table 1 Overview of key categories related to hate crimes and racist violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific criminal offences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perpetrators of specific criminal offences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities: manifestations of extremism and radicalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actors: organisations, groups, movements, individuals engaged in specific areas of activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremist content on the internet (spread, nature, use, engagement, recruitment)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penetration of radical ideas in society (active support and (cognitive) agreement with ideas)</td>
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Table 2 Overview of baseline indicators related to hate crimes and racist violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Baseline Indicators</th>
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<tr>
<td>Incidence (crimes of interest)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share in violent criminal activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share in overall criminal activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of specific crime sub-types</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notable events – overall count</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Events by type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent attitudes presented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in extremist or support organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement with extremist acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement with radical ideas</td>
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The Greek validation on far-right radicalisation drew on desk research, and collected information from institutional web sites, as well as publicly available reports and analyses, in order to identify if data along the categories and the baseline indicators contained in the RMT
(Annex I of Situation Assessment Report) was publicly accessible. Moreover, we sent written data inquiries to the competent agencies and institutions (i.e. Ministry Of Citizen Protection, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, and Racist Violence Recording Network), in which we requested relevant data for the past 6 years (2010-2015). Furthermore, we conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with representatives of respective agencies and institutions. The aims of the qualitative semi-structured stakeholder interviews were: a) to collect information that had not been obtained through the first two methods (mainly related to the qualitative assessments of key indicators, threats and trends); b) to clarify the reasons for the absence of data along certain categories and baseline indicators set in Annex I and various methodological issues; and c) to discuss the potential of the respective agencies and institutions to collect presently missing data. In total, 3 interviews were conducted with representatives of respective organisations and institutions, and 1 written response to a questionnaire was provided for the purposes of this validation study. Based on the information collected, we completed a pilot Situation Assessment Report at the end of the validation study. The pilot Situation Assessment Report put forward an overview of quantitative, as well as qualitative analysis of the collected data along the categories and indicators listed in Annex I.

Racist violence/hate crime has increased in Greece since 2010. Related incidents have occurred in all but one (i.e. Epirus) administrative regions of Greece. The largest volume of such incidents is observed in Attica and Central Macedonia – the largest, most populous, and with the highest concentration of migrants – administrative departments of the country. The largest increase was observed between 2011 and 2012, a period during which penetration of radical ideas and support to acts of extremism were at their highest levels within the Greek society. It is during this period that the far-right extremist party, Golden Dawn, established itself in the Greek parliament. 2011-2012 was also characterised by a considerable rise in the number of physical racist attacks against mainly third country nationals. A large number of these attacks inflicted life-threatening injuries to the victim(s). Furthermore, up to 2013, almost all recorded incidents of racist attacks concerned group attacks, while 1 out of 2 incidents of racist violence involved the participation of members of extremist groups, according to the victims’ perception. All in all, up to 2013, racist violence in Greece mainly targeted third country nationals and was characterised by high levels of organisation and physical violence. At the same time, Greek society more broadly exhibited signs of radicalisation, which was manifested in high levels of public support for far-right radical ideas and acts of extremism.

Since 2014, the characteristics of racist violence in Greece gradually started to change, a development which might be related to the prosecution of the vast majority of Golden Dawn’s MPs and leadership. More specifically, racist violence became ‘softer’ (i.e. verbal abuse, rather than physical racist attacks, became the predominant form of racist violence in the country). At the same time, it became more diffused, as the total number of officially recorded incidents of racist violence peaked in 2015. Racist violence also started to become less organised, as the lowest number of group attacks was recorded in 2015, while the participation of members of extremist groups in acts of racist violence appears to be extremely low. Furthermore, a significant increase in the number of racist attacks motivated by biases against the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victims was recorded, and the number of recorded racist attacks against both women and trans individuals also increased. This shift in the characteristics, modus operandi, and victims’ and perpetrators’ profiles of racist attacks presents Greek authorities with a considerable challenge in relation to their data collection and analysis capacity in monitoring the phenomenon.

In general terms, Greek institutions demonstrate average capacity to collect and analyse data regarding (potential) hate crimes/incidents of racist violence. More specifically, the Hellenic Police has the capacity to produce indicators such as “Incidence of potential hate crimes”, “Share in violent criminal activity”, and “Share in overall criminal activity” baseline indicators, which are foreseen in the Situation Assessment Tool. However, the latter
two baseline indicators are not utilised by the Hellenic Police, as the share of potential hate crimes in overall criminal activity and violent criminal activity is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the Hellenic Police has the capacity to produce indicators such as “Proportion of hate crimes sub-types” baseline indicators, based on the data that they have at their disposal: “Proportion of different bias motivations in the total number of potential hate crimes” and “Proportion of different types of violence in the total number of potential hate crimes (physical/verbal)”. Finally, the Hellenic Police also utilises two additional indicators, which measure the efficiency of the institution, and which were not foreseen in the Situation Assessment Tool: “Proportion of (non-)cleared potential hate crimes in the total number of potential hate crimes” and “Number of prosecuted individuals per potential bias motivation”.

Yet, the data collection and analysis capacity of the Hellenic Police can be improved in a number of ways. First, there is a surprising lack of data regarding notable far-right events, level of participation in such events, and their evolution. Hence, the Hellenic Police is not capable of producing indicators such as “Notable events – overall count”, “Participation”, “Events by type”, and “Violent attitudes presented” baseline indicators due to a lack of relevant data. In this respect, the Hellenic Police should try to increase their data collection capacity across the area of far-right events, as quite often such events pave the way for racist attacks.

Secondly, the Hellenic Police should quantify the available data regarding prosecuted individuals for potential hate crimes. At the moment, the Hellenic Police has at its disposal rich raw data regarding the demographic and socioeconomic background of potential perpetrators of hate crimes, which can be particularly useful to the authorities when processed and quantified. Thirdly, in a similar way, much more information can be extracted through the process and quantification of raw data regarding victims’ profile.

Last but not least, the Hellenic Police should adopt four “Proportion of hate crimes sub-types” baseline indicators that have been used by RVRN, and appear to be particularly useful in the monitoring of hate crime/racist violence trends in Greece: “Membership in extremist organisation”, “Share of group attacks in the total number of racist violence incidents per year”, “Proportion of different levels of organised violence in the total number of incidents of racist violence”, and “Proportion of different levels of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents”. In other words, the Hellenic Police should try to extract as much information as possible from the victims’ testimony regarding the qualitative characteristics of racist attacks. Finally, the Hellenic Police should start collecting data on a regular basis regarding online hate speech. At the moment, relevant data are collected by the Hellenic Police only on an ad hoc basis, which, however, cannot be utilised in the consistent monitoring of online hate speech.

The Racist Violence Recording Network (hereby RVRN, in Greek Dyktio Katagrafis Peristatikon Ratsistikis Vias) demonstrates high data collection capacity. More specifically, the RVRN is capable of producing “Incidence of racist violence incidents (per administrative region and year)”, “Membership in extremist or support organisation”, and “Proportion of hate crimes sub-types” baseline indicators. With specific regard to this last indicator, the RVRN can produce “Proportion of different bias motivations in the total number of racist violence incidents”, “Proportion of different types of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents”, “Proportion of different levels of organised violence in the total number of incidents of racist violence”, “Share of group attacks in the total number of racist violence incidents per year”, and “Proportion of different levels of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents” sub-indicators. Additionally, it can produce “Proportion of incidents of racist violence per victim’s profile and year”, “Gender identity of racist violence perpetrators per year”, and “Gender identity of racist violence victims per year”. Indeed, some of these indicators were not foreseen in the Situation Assessment Tool, and, in this respect, they constitute particularly useful additions.
The data collection and analysis capacity of the RVRN can be improved in a number of ways. First, RVRN should attempt to quantify the rich qualitative data at its disposal, which concern the modus operandi, characteristics, perpetrators, victims, and sites of racist attacks. Indeed, the vast majority of the aforementioned baseline indicators are not produced at the moment by the RVRN, despite the availability of relevant data, due to the focus on purely qualitative reports. Quantitative data have a higher impact among policymakers, and, in this regard, the RVRN can increase its impact through the quantification of some of its data.

Secondly, racist attacks against religious and ethnic minorities in Greece seem to be particularly underrepresented in the RVRN data. In this respect, the RVRN should improve its data collection capacity among these communities too. Thirdly, the RVRN should try to draw on public opinion survey data in order to complement its own data. Indeed, public opinion survey data can identify the level of penetration of radical ideas and support to extremist acts among the Greek society at a given time, which can be particularly useful information in the study of racist violence trends. Finally, the RVRN should start collecting data on a regular basis regarding online hate speech. Despite the fact that it constitutes a phenomenon that appears to be on the rise in Greece at the moment, neither State nor civil society actors have the capacity to monitor online hate speech.

The General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights demonstrates average data collection capacity. More specifically, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights is capable of producing the following indicators: “Total number of convicted hate crimes perpetrators”; “Total number of prosecuted individuals in relation to hate crimes”; “Share of cases for which criminal proceedings have been initiated”; and “Share of cases for which disciplinary measures have been taken”. Moreover, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights has at its disposal data regarding the demographic and socioeconomic profile of prosecuted and convicted individuals in relation to hate crimes.

The data collection and analysis capacity of the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights can be improved in a number of ways. At the moment, the biggest challenge of the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights has to do with its ability to follow-up a case from the point of recording by the Hellenic Police, to the initiation of criminal proceedings and conclusion of the case before the court. In this respect then, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights should try to ensure the validity and reliability of collected data by producing a single specific template, which will be used and completed by competent authorities (i.e. courts and the Hellenic Police) during data collection process. In this way the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights will be able to coordinate the collection of data among all competent authorities in a more effective way. In this respect, it can be assisted by the newly established National Council against Racism and Intolerance and the regional special prosecutors for hate crimes/racist violence. Secondly, each incident of racist violence that is reported to the Hellenic Police, should be assigned a unique ID number, which will enable the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights to follow-up each case at a later stage. Finally, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights should attempt to produce the aforementioned indicators. Indeed, these indicators are not produced at the moment by the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights, despite the availability of relevant data and their potential usefulness in monitoring the phenomenon.

4. Islamid radicalization

The second component of the Greek validation study focused on Islamist radicalization. It specifically sought to detect the relevance of a series of causal factors and risk indicators, which were contained in the RMT compiled in the frame of the RAD MONITOR project, for
the incidence of Islamist radicalisation in Greece. The aims of this validation were: 1) to test which of the behaviour/actions indicators and factors at the micro and meso levels (see Error! Reference source not found. in Annex I) can be measured and analysed through qualitative assessment by social scientists; 2) to verify the appropriateness of the selected indicators and factors (see Error! Reference source not found. in Annex I) for the national context of Greece; and 3) to revise and finalise the qualitative assessment of risk factors and root causes of Islamist radicalisation within the Greek context.

The validation study drew on desk research aiming to identify the scope of, and trends in Islamist radicalisation in Greece. It specifically sought to explore which of the behaviour/actions factors and risk indicators included in the RMT are relevant to the qualitative study of Islamist radicalisation in Greece. As this report is the first empirical study of Islamist radicalisation in Greece, many of the sources used are primarily from the media. Another method that has been used in this validation study is semi-structured stakeholder interviews with key government representatives/public officials, as well as academics, representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Imams and independent experts in Islamist radicalisation. A total of 8 interviews were conducted for the purposes of this validation study. The aim of the semi-structured stakeholder interviews was to assist in the identification and improvement of the factors and indicators in Annex I that are relevant to the validation study of Islamist radicalisation in Greece. Finally, a list of indicators that could be applied in the Greek context for the monitoring and understanding of the root causes of Islamist radicalisation has been developed.

This validation study constitutes a preliminary attempt to approach the particularly under-researched issue of Islamist radicalisation in Greece, and aims to produce valuable insights for further future research on the topic. Contrary to what was originally foreseen in the project, we were not able to pilot the list of indicators in specific localities and Muslim communities, who are considered to be at risk of Islamist radicalisation. The reason is that there has not been (so far at least) any home-grown and organized Islamist radicalization in Greece. The non-existence of native Islamist fighters radicalised in the country, and the limited number of and lack of information about Muslim migrants who had resided in the past and became radicalised in Greece are the main reasons why piloting the monitoring tool was not feasible.

A list of indicators that can be potentially applied in the Greek context in order to monitor Islamist radicalisation and understand its root causes has been developed (see Table 1). These indicators have been extracted from the risk assessment indicators in the RMT that the RAD MONITOR project developed, and they have been fine-tuned following our interviewees’ comments and recommendations in order to fit better with the Greek context. It should be noted at this point that the provided indicators usually work in combination with others and that they cannot be used as standalone signifiers of trends of radicalisation.

Table 1 Factors and measurable indicators that could be applied in the Greek context for monitoring Islamist radicalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour/actions</th>
<th>Cognitive indicators (attitudes, beliefs, convictions)</th>
<th>Situational factors / background conditions Triggering factors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MICRO LEVEL (INDIVIDUAL)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestive</td>
<td>Suggestive</td>
<td>Suggestive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ‘cutting ties with family and friends – social</td>
<td>- ‘openly voicing grievances’ (Note: in their own language)</td>
<td>- ‘psychological problems’ (Note: particularly Post-</td>
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withdrawal’ combined with ‘seeking or having contacts with a charismatic person or spiritual advisor’ (Note: it does not apply to Christian converts to Islam)

- ‘attending rallies for extremist causes’ (Note: ‘extremist causes’ need to be defined/listed beforehand)

- ‘travel to risk countries/conflict zones’ (Note: ‘risk countries’ need to be carefully defined/listed; use indicator with caution, and always combine with other suggestive and ‘red flag’ indicators)

- ‘received combat / military training’ (Note: Use with caution as combat and military training are mandatory and/or a cultural tradition in some countries/regions)

and in their own community; subsequently, close cooperation between authorities and communities is essential in order monitor this attitude)

- ‘expressing dichotomous worldview’ (Note: close cooperation between authorities and communities is essential in order monitor this attitude)

Traumatic Stress Disorder)

- ‘history of violence’ (Note: the term ‘violence’ needs to be defined)

- ‘prison experience’ (Note: use with caution, as administrative detention of asylum seekers is particularly widespread in Greece)

- ‘financial problems’ (Note: use with caution, and take into account the present economic situation in Greece)

- ‘education and employment situation’ (Note: use with caution, and take into account the present economic situation in Greece)

- ‘family problems’ (Note: take into account the potential de- and/or counter-radicalisation dynamics that might be developed in extended Middle Eastern families)

Red Flag

- ‘contacts with radical groups locally or abroad’ (Note: ‘radical groups’ need to be carefully defined/listed)

- ‘possessing or disseminating extremist literature and paraphernalia or online materials’ (Note: it should be carefully defined what constitutes ‘extremist’ literature and paraphernalia)

- ‘openly voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes’ (Note: ‘terrorist organisations’ need to be carefully defined/listed)

- ‘openly expressing certain attitudes supporting violence, or against an expressed target revenge or death rhetoric’

Triggers

- ‘personal trauma or crisis event’

- ‘victimisation or conflict situation’

- ‘perception of international or local events’

Suggestive

- ‘instances of members of community implementing security measures, secrecy, other rituals/suspicious group

Suggestive

- ‘instances of community members expressing disrespect for (secular) authorities’ (Note: Such

Suggestive

- ‘lack of trust in public institutions’

- ‘exclusion from political

MESO LEVEL (GROUP, COMMUNITY)
activities’ *(Note: such instances have not been observed in Greece yet)*

- ‘foreign religious emissaries active in locality’ *(Note: This indicator doesn’t indicate anything in itself. It needs to be combined with intelligence regarding the profile of foreign religious emissaries)*

- ‘activities of new/unknown informal organisations, foundations’ *(Note: Use with caution – only if these organisations have the opportunity for regularisation and avoid it, they need to be monitored)*

- ‘leaders spreading narratives and materials glorifying violence’

- ‘military and combat training provision’

- ‘members of community having contacts with or supporting transiting foreign fighters’

- instances have been observed in Western Thrace with respect to ethnic radicalisation. It is assumed that it can be an effective indicator regarding cases of Islamist radicalisation too)

- ‘hate speech by community/group leaders’

- ‘segregation of migrant communities’

- ‘rise of a strong radical/conservative Muslim leadership’ *(Note: proposed instead of ‘lack of strong moderate Muslim leadership’ indicator)*

Currently the threat level originating from Islamist radicalisation in Greece is considered by senior intelligence officials to be ‘very low’. Greece was not a major player in the ‘War on Terror’, as the country did not deploy any troops in Iraq, while the troops in Afghanistan participated mainly in low visibility, low risk engineering and medical activities as well as training missions. Moreover, Muslims hold a positive view of Greece, which is an ancient civilisation that did not have any involvement in the colonial wars. Furthermore, Greece has had good relationships with the Arab world, which started to develop in the early 1980s.

However, there are various reasons to believe that Greece might be perceived by Islamists as an appealing potential target, despite the fact that it lacks the symbolism and strategic interest that such groups seek. Indeed, there are fears that radical Islamist groups could participate in low-risk assignments, such as recruitment, funding, propaganda and training. In fact, recent police operations have uncovered an increased, very low key and
behind the scenes, activity of international Muslim terrorists in the country, which has been limited so far to the creation of a logistical and support basis for operations abroad. In this regard, Greek authorities have been at a ‘heightened state of vigilance’ regarding the use of the country as a transit destination to and from Middle East battlefields already since September 2014.

In this regard, we address the following recommendations to the competent national authorities in order to pre-emptively monitor Islamist radicalisation in the country:

1. Representatives of both the Hellenic Police and Muslim communities in Greece have confirmed the high level of cooperation between them. However, this cooperation is informal, and it certainly does not reach all Muslim migrant communities. Hence, the Hellenic Police and National Intelligence Service should formalise their relations with Muslim communities through the employment of cherry-picked Muslim migrants. This measure will immediately improve the monitoring capacity of the authorities, will extend their reach to previously inaccessible communities, and will formalise the cooperation between law enforcement agencies and Muslim migrant communities.

2. Migrant Integration Councils, which exist in several municipalities in Greece, have proven to be fairly effective in addressing the needs of migrant communities in the country, at least in the municipalities in which they operate. These local government structures include the participation of the largest migrant communities, and they are in a position to attend to local concerns and intra-community changes. Where they operate, the Migrant Integration Councils seem to be the ideal platform for an improved cooperation between the leadership of migrant communities and local authorities, and for alleviating grievances that sometimes can provide fertile ground for Islamist radicalisation.

3. Finally, informal mosques should be given incentives to become regularised. Recently introduced legislation provides for the regularisation of informal places of worship. At the moment, however, the vast majority of informal mosques abstain from this opportunity for regularisation, which is tolerated by the Greek State. In this respect, the Greek State, instead of being indifferent or persecute those informal mosques that opt out of regularisation, should provide them with regularisation incentives.