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THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN IN 2020: SCENARIOS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE GULF REGION IN 2020: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Dr. Eduard Soler i Lecha
Dr. Thanos Dokos
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The Future of Mediterranean Security and Politics

The Western Mediterranean in 2020: Scenarios for Regional Security and Cooperation after the Arab Uprisings

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As the so-called Arab Spring unfolds, there is a growing consensus that the Arab transformations are an open-ended process. Initial visions of a region suddenly moving from authoritarianism to democracy have given way to more realistic and specific assessments of what type of democracy, if any, the Arab world is transitioning to. Many predict that democracy will indeed take root in many of the countries involved, but the emergence of a liberal type to democracy that values and respects pluralism, including in religious matters, may not be a likely outcome. The debate has also rightly become more country-specific, as the cross-regional spread of protest movements over the past year is giving way to different political experiences in the various local contexts. Indeed, it seems clear that countries in both the Middle East and North Africa will follow particular trajectories of economic and political development, possibly further diversifying the already complex regional picture. In many cases, setbacks and false starts will make the process of change very uncertain. In others, transitions have not even started.

Albeit an open-ended process, the Arab transformations have already radically altered the strategic landscape of the region, with significant implications for all local actors and external players, starting with the United States and Europe. The two papers included in this report are focused precisely on the nexus between the domestic transformations in many of the Middle Eastern and North African countries and the evolution of the strategic outlook of the region. They also put most recent strategic developments into the larger context of “Mediterranean security,” developing a debate that was already lively before the advent of the Arab Spring. The paper by Dr. Eduard Soler i Lecha analyzes developments in the Western Mediterranean whereas the one by Dr. Thanos Dokos focuses on the Eastern Mediterranean. They both take the long view, speculating on what the Mediterranean region will look like by 2020.

The authors seem to agree that the security challenges emanating from the disintegration of the old regional order are at least as many as the opportunities for political and economic development. The region seems set to become more multipolar with a growing role of some re-emerging actors, such as Turkey, and the possible reassertion of traditional ones, such as Egypt. The traditional division between Eastern and Western Mediterranean is partly blurred and partly redefined by the ongoing transformations, but the authors tend to agree that the Middle East may remain comparatively more unstable and conflict-prone than North Africa. At the same time, the Maghreb’s growing interconnectedness with adjacent regions, such as the Sahel, may mean negative spillovers in terms of security. The situation of Libya, which went through a protracted civil war, and Algeria, which for now has not embarked on significant internal reform, further complicate the assessment.

In order to take into account new future shocks and dynamics of change, both papers explore different scenarios, and provide policy relevant recommendations to guide transatlantic actors in their definition of the new strategies toward the region. In so doing, they help delineate the future(s) of Mediterranean security.

Dr. Emiliano Alessandri
Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Washington, DC, December 13, 2011
THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN IN 2020:
SCENARIOS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION
AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

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The transformative wave in the Arab World has reached a point of no return, which will have major consequences for Western Mediterranean security and could alter cooperation dynamics among the countries of the region as well as with the transatlantic allies. Since the first protests erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, the Arab world has changed rapidly, and it continues to do so. In few months, several countries have started democratic transitions or launched constitutional reforms, a conflict has put an end to Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year regime in Libya, public opinion has emerged as a major political actor, Islamist parties have won the elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, and persistent social mobilizations have become a serious threat to the ruling elites.

The Arab uprisings represent a unique opportunity for the expansion of democracy in a region where previous political openings have failed. Yet, these changes have also unveiled social and political tensions and have shown the brutality of some regimes in the contention of ongoing protests. This region is entering a decade full of unknowns. Will popular movements persist in their quest for freedom and dignity? Will ongoing transition and reform promises result in democratic systems? Will Islamist forces fully embrace democratic values and integrate themselves (and be integrated by others) in the political system? Could counter-revolutionary forces curtail the democratic opening? To what extent can international actors contribute to this process?

All these factors will have a major impact in regional cooperation dynamics in the Western Mediterranean throughout the next decade. Scenarios remain very open, and moving in one or other direction depends primarily on the success of political transitions and the prospects for regional stability, including the pacification of post-Gaddafi Libya. However, the attitude of international leaders and their willingness to transform cooperation dynamics in the Mediterranean stand as factors that can either speed up or slow down the process. In the case of the EU, the response to the ongoing changes will very much depend on the capacity to overcome its own current political and economic crises. This paper argues that the response by the United States and the EU could either represent a paradigm shift that considers change and democracy as an exceptional opportunity to build a more stable and secure region or, on the contrary, could reinforce a conservative approach conceiving political change as a risk in terms of political radicalization, transnational terrorism, arms trafficking, or uncontrolled migrations.

This paper focuses its attention in the Western Mediterranean, a sub-regional complex comprising five countries from North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya) and five from Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Malta). The aim of this paper is to underline whether or in which aspects the Arab uprisings challenge the conventional understanding of security in this region and to identify which effects this could have in regional cooperation dynamics. It aims to grasp the depth and nature of the changes the region is going through, and to do so it starts by explaining the rationale of security dynamics in the region before 2011. The paper reflects the differences in terms of intensity, development, and impact of the uprisings in North Africa and assesses the often hesitant response by the international community, in general, and by European actors, in particular. The paper then identifies domestic, regional, and international drivers shaping security dynamics in Western Mediterranean in the coming decade, draws scenarios for 2020, and points out possible policy implications for the transatlantic community.
Fear of radicalization and instability was used as a means to legitimate the regimes’ authority and, in parallel, upgrade security cooperation with international actors.

Before the Tunisian revolution, the political situation in the Maghreb, just as in the rest of the Arab world, was characterized by the lack of prospects of substantial political reform. Political and economic power was accumulated in a few hands, including mechanisms for repression and cooptation, to weaken any kind of opposition. Fear of radicalization and instability was used as a means to legitimize the regimes’ authority and, in parallel, upgrade security cooperation with international actors. The Maghreb also suffered from protracted conflicts and deadlocked regional integration processes.

As happened in other Arab countries, until 2011 the main question mark in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya was not political change or the scope of major reforms but succession to their aging leaders. The absence of meaningful reforms as well as the high levels of corruption in most of these countries resulted in popular disaffection vis-à-vis the political class, often illustrated by low turnovers, (37 percent and 35 percent respectively in the Moroccan and Algerian 2007 legislative elections). In parallel, most regimes justified the lack of reforms, the strength and privileges of the security apparatus, or the perpetuation of emergency laws, arguing that this was necessary to maintain stability, fight against terrorism, and avoid the rise of radical movements. From this perspective, the security of the state was equivalent to the security of the regime.

This conservative message resonated internally, where memories of the Algerian civil conflict of the 1990s, the so-called “décennie noire,” are still very recent. Since then, important segments of the population, not only in Algeria but elsewhere in the region, are afraid of the rise of radical movements and the consequences this might have in terms of violence and chaos. The fear of instability was accentuated by the situation in the Sahel, with parts of this territory becoming the hub for all sorts of illegal trafficking and a safe heaven for terrorist and criminal groups such as Al Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb. This same message was echoed in the international arena, particularly since the United States and European countries had suffered terrorist activities in their own territory.

In general terms, the EU and the United States have perceived the Maghreb and adjacent regions such as the Sahel and the Middle East, as a potential or actual source of insecurity. This was particularly true for Southern European countries, which, due to geographical and historical proximity, were particularly afraid of the effects of political and social destabilization in their southern neighbors. In this situation, cooperation with the ruling governments was seen by governmental authorities as the only effective way to fight against transnational terrorism, to combat organized crime, to control irregular migration flows, and to

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secure energy supplies. At the same time, Maghreb governments demanded international assistance in training, technology transfer, and intelligence cooperation to contain these threats. These converging interests materialized, on one hand, in multilateral security cooperation frameworks such as NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the 5+5 defense and interior dialogues. On the other, it boosted bilateral cooperation. The collaboration between Morocco and Spain, United States and Algeria, or Libya and Italy, on a wide range of issues comprising border control, maritime surveillance, intelligence-sharing, energy infrastructures, counter-terrorism, and the fight against organized crime, are telling examples of this complex grid of more or less formalized bilateral cooperation initiatives.

The centrality of these security needs overshadowed and undermined attempts by both the United States and the EU to promote political reforms. This is the case, for instance, of the U.S.-sponsored Middle East Partnership Instrument (MEPI), a program supporting civil society, the empowerment of women and youth, educational efforts, economic reform, and larger political participation. The EU also financed many projects offering administrative and judicial support and civil society cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process and through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

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<th>Table 1: Membership in Multilateral Organizations</th>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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Source: Own elaboration


5 The 5+5 Dialogue started in Rome in 1990 as a forum for political dialogue and cooperation which brings together ten countries bordering the Western Mediterranean Basin: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Malta, Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal.

The stagnation of reform processes in the region and the paralysis of the negotiations on the Western Sahara conflict indicate that, so far, the status quo has been fairly convenient to the elites in power.

In the meantime, there has been no significant progress in the negotiations of the Western Sahara conflict. This conflict, which in one way or another has involved almost all Maghreb countries, has become a protracted regional conflict. Since 1991, the conflicting parts could not reach a compromise or bring their positions closer, while the UN-sponsored negotiations have been unable to deliver any significant result. Peter Van Walsum, former special envoy of the UN for the Western Sahara put it bluntly when he affirmed that nothing could change as “Polisario [the pro-independence movement] will continue to demand a referendum with independence as an option, Morocco will continue to rule that out, and the Security Council will continue to insist on a consensual solution.”

In a 2007 report, the International Crisis Group described the current situation as a “vicious circle, with each link in the circular chain blaming another for the stalemate.”

The stagnation of reform processes in the region and the paralysis of the negotiations on the Western Sahara conflict indicate that, so far, the status quo has been fairly convenient to the elites in power. It also illustrates the incapacity or the unwillingness of the international actors to exert pressure and provide the right incentives for conflict-resolution in the region. The result is that for 20 years, the different rounds of negotiations have not achieved any progress. Meanwhile, the situation in the Moroccan-administered zones of the Western Sahara has become tenser, as shown by the violent dismantling of the Agdayim Izik protest camp near the city of Laayoune by Moroccan security forces in 2010.

Together with the Western Sahara conflict, territorial disputes and sovereignty claims have also poisoned Spanish-Moroccan relations during the last decades. Since the 1980s, Spanish governments have successively designed a strategy of promoting common interests and institutionalizing bilateral relations to “limit the scope of bilateral tensions and encapsulate the crises that periodically stirred the tensions.” However, they could not prevent an escalation of tension in 2002 on the sovereignty of the islet of Perejil/Leila, which even required U.S. mediation to end the military standoff.

In addition to the persistent Spanish-Moroccan tensions, resentment of the colonial past has also been a burden for French-Algerian relations as was the case between Tripoli and Rome until the signature of the 2008 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Libya and Italy.

During the last 20 years, progress in South-South regional integration has also been minimal. Endogenous sub-regional integration processes such as the Arab Maghreb Union, formally launched in 1989, have suffered from a very rigid
EU-lead attempts to encourage North-South regional integration have also been hindered by weak political willingness, scarce resources, institutional rigidities, and, above all, a very hostile regional context.

Institutional framework and also from the lack of willingness of the major actors in the region to make any significant progress. As explained by Luis Martinez, North African economies have been ignoring each other and their leaders have been engaged in relations marked by mutual distrust. Algeria-Morocco rivalry, as well as the democratic deficit in the countries of the region, has hindered sub-regional integration with the exception of cooperation among interior ministries and intelligence units in the fight against terrorism.

Finally, EU-lead attempts to encourage North-South regional integration on a Euro-Mediterranean scale, firstly through the Barcelona Process, and later in the framework of the French-inspired Union for the Mediterranean, have also been hindered by weak political willingness, scarce resources, institutional rigidities, and, above all, a very hostile regional context, characterized by continuous tension in the Middle East. Actually, since November 2008, it has been impossible to convene any Euro-Mediterranean summit or foreign affairs ministerial meeting.

To put it in a nutshell, over the past decades, a “security first” paradigm has shaped domestic politics in the five Maghreb countries, broader regional dynamics as well as European and U.S. policies towards this region. In this old paradigm, security was defined as “state security” and this has been equivalent to the security of the regimes. From this perspective, the security of the regime was essential to maintaining stability and containing radical and violent forces in the Maghreb. This, in return, was indispensable to prevent security threats emanating in this region, which could impact European and international security. For decades, partial and top-down reforms, more or less sophisticated assistance programs, and attempts to improve regional integration have been unable to challenge the primacy of a securitizing approach in bilateral and multilateral relations in the Western Mediterranean.

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16 In fact, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been highlighted as the main obstacle to cooperation and political dialogue. See: Asseburg, Muriel & Salem, Paul (2009) “No Euro-Mediterranean community without peace” 10 papers for Barcelona 2010, 1, ISS-EU/ IEMed.
Most analysts, observers, and politicians did not anticipate that Arab societies were reaching a saturation point.

The Western Mediterranean, and particularly the Maghreb, are at the core of the transformation of Mediterranean political and security landscape. This is relatively new as previous major events affecting the whole Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, such as the 1967 war, the 1978 Camp David accords, or the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, originated in the Middle East. In other words, North African countries are now the forerunners of a new political cycle in the Arab World, which has the potential to transform the treatment of security issues in this region and lay new bases for international and intra-regional cooperation in this field.

Most analysts, observers, and politicians did not anticipate that Arab societies were reaching a saturation point, as the dominant perception was that ruling regimes were solid, that the population was rather passive, and Islamists represented the only strong and visible alternative. In retrospect, it is relatively easy to identify elements that are common to most countries in the region that created a breeding ground of revolt and that were already pointed out, since 2002, in the UNDP Arab Human Development Reports. These are: growing social and territorial disparities, high levels of corruption, worrying rates of youth unemployment, the increase of food prices, waiving civil and political freedoms, abuses of power by security forces, and the eroded legitimacy of the governments in place.

A combination of these elements pushed a young Tunisian from Sidi Bouzid, a small city in the deprived center-west of the country, to set himself on fire in front of the governors’ office. The desperate act of Mohamed Bouazizi, followed by massive demonstrations, public outrage, and brutal repression throughout the country, started an unprecedented and largely unforeseen wave of protests that led to the fall of the then Tunisian ruler, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The success of the Tunisian revolution inspired Egyptian demonstrators, which in a few weeks also succeeded in overthrowing Hosni Mubarak, and other protest movements across the Arab world. During the first months of 2011, all countries from Morocco to the Gulf were affected, with different intensity and effects, by this wave of social and political unrest.

As in the rest of the Arab world, in the Maghreb, the form and scope of the protests as well as the response of the regime varies from one country to the other, depending among other factors on: 1) the nature, resources and cohesion of the regime, 2) socio-economic conditions, 3) the organization of political opposition, and 4) the existence of regional, ethnic, religious, or linguistic tensions. These factors are relevant to understand not only when and how protests have erupted, but also how the political situation could evolve in the coming years in each of these countries.

Tunisia, the first country to experience massive protests, had gone unnoticed on international radars. Tunisia was praised for its model of social and economic progress and its government cooperated extensively in issues such as counter-terrorism and migration control. Yet, the country was under one of the most authoritarian and corrupt regimes of the region. In recent years, there were episodic protests such as the 2005 demonstrations in defense of freedom of expression when Tunis hosted the World Summit on Information Society or, even more important,
With a single majority in the new Constituent Assembly, Ennahda will play a major role in shaping Tunisian politics in the months and years to come but will need to reach agreements with other political parties.

Table 2: Socio-Economic Indicators in the Maghreb

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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>95/ 28.38</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>133/47.33</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>164/ 72.50</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>95/ 28.38</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>160/ 63.50</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>n.d</td>
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*International Transparency 0= Highly Corrupt; 10= Very Clean

in 2008, major clashes occurred in the mining area of Gafsa between workers and security forces.\(^{19}\) Despite these signs, the regime was still perceived, internally and externally, as solidly anchored in power while the opposition movements were weak and mostly disconnected from the Tunisian street. Indeed, the December 2010 and January 2011 protests were unprecedented in their magnitude and, even more important, in terms of the brutality of the regime’s response.\(^{20}\) This led Tunisians to revolt against a regime that had lost all legitimacy, and was unable to remedy the increase of prices and harsher daily living conditions for most citizens while the Presidential family and its entourage got visibly richer. Tunisian citizens used all means at their disposal, particularly the internet and social networks, to spread information on the regime’s abuses and to organize massive protests all over the country. Despite Ben Ali’s desperate promises of reform and the reiteration of the alternative was chaos, he could no longer convince demonstrators and found himself cornered and without the support of the armed forces, who refused to crack down on protesters. After Ben Ali’s fall, the 1959 Constitution was suspended and the country started its political transition. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held on October 23 and Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party led by Rashid Gannouchi, obtained 37 percent of the votes. With a single majority in the new Constituent Assembly, Ennahda will play a major role in shaping Tunisian politics in the months and years to come but will need to reach agreements with other political parties.

Algeria also experienced riots in January 2011, with violent clashes in Bab el Oued and other popular quarters of Algiers and Constantine over the high prices of food such as sugar, flour, and oil. Unlike its eastern neighbor, these riots did not turn into massive uprisings throughout the country and, until now, the Algerian regime has comfortably resisted the pressure of demonstrators. This can be explained, firstly, by the traumatic memories of the civil war of the 1990s, which made people fear that political activism and demonstrations would


While the new Moroccan constitution has introduced significant political reforms, there are doubts as to whether the content and form of this reform will calm the protest movements. Secondly, the government of this energy-rich country has made gestures in terms of subsidizing food prices, wage increases for civil servants, and promises of support to young entrepreneurs. Thirdly, the regime has been relatively tolerant towards criticism, protests, and strikes mushrooming in the country and has respond to these demands with decisions such as lifting the state of emergency or promises of constitutional reform. Finally, demonstrations are lead by weak and divided political opposition movements. Thus, to date Algeria has remained relatively calm and the regime has reacted cohesively in front of these pressures. Yet, large unemployment rates among frustrated youngsters as well as the uncertainty regarding President Abdelaziz Buteflika’s succession could continue to fuel social and political unrest in the country and internal competition within the regime.

Morocco has always presented itself as the country in the region that had undertaken the largest political reform process, in tune with a strategic choice of coming increasingly closer to the West and to the European Union in particular. Indeed, the country holds pluralistic elections and has left behind the repression of the so-called Years of Lead. However, these reforms have not modified the large executive powers kept by the king, the freedom of press in the country is not yet complete and, above all, the social and territorial imbalances have persisted despite ambitious projects such as the National Initiative for Human Development. Morocco was, therefore, a fertile ground for political and social mobilization. Following the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the country experienced large pro-democracy demonstrations mainly lead by the so-called “Movement of 20 February.” In response to these protests, King Mohammed VI gave a speech on March 9 promising a constitutional reform, which was approved by referendum on July 1, 2011 and the country held parliamentary elections November 25. Following Tunisia’s example, the Justice and Development Party, a moderate Islamist party, won the elections. While the new text of the constitution gives greater power to the parliament and the government, increases judicial independence, and promotes decentralization and the recognition of Amazigh as an official language, there are doubts as to whether the content and form of this reform will calm the protest movements. High poverty and low human development rates, the gap between urban and rural zones, the degradation and over-population of slums, persistent unemployment among Morocco’s educated youth, the king’s grip on the economy, tension in the Moroccan-administered parts of Western Sahara, and large corruption scandals are issues that will not find a solution through this constitutional reform and, consequently, social and political conflict is likely to persist.

22 According to Francis Ghilès “the country will not stay for ever immune from the clamour for change voiced by millions of younger people who cannot find employment and want a say in the running of countries characterised by ageing oligarchies.” In Francis Ghilès (2011) “Ahead of Spring in Algeria: Tough Energy and Economic Challenges Await” Notes Internacionales CIDOB, 32.
23 See the special issue “Reform in the Arab World”: the experience of Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics, 12, July 2, 2009.
In 2003, Gaddafi’s Libya had reintegrated into the international community by disarming its Weapons of Mass Destruction arsenal, and by cooperating with U.S. and European governments in the fight against Al Qaeda.26 Libya also became a reliable partner in migration control.27 However, by pursuing a very aggressive strategy against demonstrators since mid-February, Gaddafi returned the Jamahiriya into the status of a pariah state. The regime attacked protesters and threatened not only the Libyan population, but neighboring countries and Europe as well.28 Resistance against Gaddafi turned violent, resulting in a conflict that lasted eight months and with a decisive international involvement as a result of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone and allowing the launch of military operations to protect civilians.29 Together with internationalization and violence, another distinctive feature of the Libyan uprising was that it triggered a humanitarian crisis, with internal displacements and refugees flocking to neighboring countries. The new Libya faces two enormous challenges: the first is to hold the country together, avoiding territorial and tribal frictions, and the second being the disarmament and demobilization of the militias while making sure that parts of Libyan territory do not become a safe heaven for terrorist and criminal groups.

Mauritania is the poorest country in the Maghreb and has been politically unstable, with two coup d’états, in 2005 and 2008, and several election rounds. The ruling president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, instigated the 2008 coup but legitimated himself through the 2009 elections. Since February 2011, the current government has been challenged by sporadic protests urging for political and social reforms. These protests have been led by youth and student movements from the urban and middle classes and aim to transcend Mauritania’s tribal and ethnic cleavages.30 Later on, in September 2011, violent protests against the government population census were held. Protesters feared that the new national identity procedure was discriminatory against the black population and put their citizenship in question. Yet, Mauritania still stands as one of the Arab countries where the protests have been of a lower intensity. Thus, the main concern of the government remains the fight against Al-Qaeda militants operating in desert areas between Mauritania, Algeria, and Mali.31 Until now, Nouakchott has opted for a tough line against Al-Qaeda, rejected any kind of negotiations with groups and launched military operations against its operational bases.32 Thus, to date, the control of its vast desert regions and not the political protests stand as the major security challenge for Mauritanian authorities.


28 Gaddafi warned, for instance, that the Mediterranean would turn into a battlefield and that Europe would be invaded by thousands of migrants. He also threatened Europeans to abandon the fight against terrorism.

29 Specifically the resolution urges “to take all necessary measures, (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” and Resolution 1973 (2011) adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on March 17, 2011.

30 Lum, Khalid “Mauritania’s days of rage” in Arab Reform Bulletin, May 18, 2011.


32 One of the latest events was the operation of the Mauritanian army in northern Mali, destroying a base and vehicles of the terrorist group, which was replicated by an AQMI attack against a Mauritanian military base in the east of the country in July.
The Arab uprisings caught the international community off guard. The European Union and its member states were particularly criticized not only for their intimate relations with authoritarian elites but also for their hesitant response when the first protests erupted. The EU tried to respond those criticisms by reviewing the European Neighborhood Policy mechanisms. Brussels then promised an additional €1.2 billion to the region, better access to the EU market, new civil society and democracy promotion mechanisms and a perspective of visa facilitation for a targeted group of countries, which nevertheless has fallen short of expectations.33 In September, the EU also approved the SPRING Program (Support for Partnership, Reform, and Inclusive Growth) to support democratic transformation, institution-building, and economic growth, with a total value of €350 million. All these efforts where overshadowed by the alarmist reaction of some member states to the arrival of refugees and irregular migrants to European territory, visible disunity regarding the intervention in Libya, and the limited resources made available to tackle the huge challenges in its southern neighborhood, which reflect the structural problems of a European Union self-absorbed in the management of the effects of its own economic and financial crises.

The reaction of Southern European countries deserves specific attention as it is a critical factor for Western Mediterranean cooperation dynamics.34 France, after having supporting Ben Ali until the very end, changed its discourse, welcomed the political transitions, stood as one of the promoters of the military intervention in Libya and proposed, in May’s G8 meeting, a package of $40 billion to support new Arab democracies. Italy’s early reactions were characterized by its alarmism and anxiousness, with official declarations by Foreign Affairs Minister, Franco Frattini, on the risk of an “exodus of biblical proportions” or the “rise of an Islamic emirate” in eastern Libya.35 While concern over migration and refugees remain high on the Italian agenda and despite the economic consequences of the Libyan conflict, Italy decided to join NATO’s operation in Libya, and its leaders have sent more positive messages regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy and have pledged for a “Marshall Plan” for the Arab world. Spain, a country that never stood out for its support of the democratic opposition in the Mediterranean, endorsed the Tunisian and Egyptian protest movements after an initial period of silence. The government, with almost unanimous support from the Parliament, also participated, albeit more discreetly, in the military operations in Libya. In regard to the protest movements in Morocco, Spanish authorities have applauded the promises of reform and have welcomed the approval the new constitution. Similarly to its French and Italian counterparts, the Spanish authorities have also requested an increase in international cooperation and larger financial support for the democratic process.

We can identify three common trends in the reaction of Southern European countries: 1) the degree of prudence was proportional to the interests at stake and historical relations; 2) they have nevertheless tried to reposition themselves

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34 See Aliboni, Roberto et al. (2011) Southern Europe and the Mediterranean: National Approaches and Transatlantic Perspectives, Mediterranean Paper Series, GMFUS/IAI.

with the domestic and Arab public opinion by welcoming the Tunisian and Egyptian transition as an opportunity for political and social progress; and 3) they have been asking for a global commitment to financially support these economies. However, their own internal economic problems, particularly in the cases of Spain and Italy, have limited the scope of such promises.

In conclusion, despite the diversity of the situations in the region, there is no doubt that the 2011 events put an end to the so-called “Arab exceptionalism,” refuting widespread assumptions of the incapacity of North African citizens to change their state of affairs as well as on the resilience of the regimes to perpetuate themselves in power. The inability of most regimes to meet the political, economic, and social demands of the population, the abuses of their dominant position, and the compliance of international actors has resulted in an unprecedented (and mostly unexpected) wave of popular mobilization, which has become the greatest challenge to the decades-old systems. This wave of protests is not only resulting in more or less radical changes in regional security and the political systems of Maghreb countries but it is also forcing third actors such as the United States, the EU, and EU member states such as France, Italy, and Spain to reconsider their policies towards this region. Specifically, the Arab uprisings open a window of opportunity to revise security strategies, to redefine the relation between security, stability, and democracy, to dissociate national security from the regimes’ security, and to reformulate accordingly security political dialogue and security cooperation frameworks in the Mediterranean.
The Western Mediterranean region has entered, in 2011, an area of turbulence. In the Maghreb, the coming years will lay the ground for the formation of new political systems, for regional cooperative or competitive dynamics, and for the resolution or deterioration of regional conflicts. Simultaneously, the EU will struggle to overcome a deep economic and political crisis that affects the entire continent but Southern Europe in particular. Scenarios for 2020 are very open and depend, with different intensity, on the following domestic, regional, and global drivers.

The Struggle Between Democratic and Reactionary Forces

Since January 2011, the Maghreb countries have experimented with diverging political evolutions: Tunisia put an end to Ben Ali’s regime and started a political transition; Morocco and Algeria have taken the reformist path, although this does not exclude new social and political tensions; the Mauritanian regime does not seem worried about ongoing mobilizations and is focusing its efforts in the fight against terrorist and criminal organizations; finally, Libya is starting to turn the page post-Gaddafi’s era while uncertainty persists regarding the basis of the new political regime and the capacity of the new authorities to pacify and stabilize the country.

The possibilities of consolidated political transitions and sustained reforms will depend on the relative strengths of the democratic camp, on one hand, and different forms of reactionary forces on the other. Many factors will have a crucial impact on the domestic evolution in each of the aforementioned countries in the coming years. In the short-run, this will depend on:

- the integration of different political sensibilities into broad constitutional pacts;
- the intelligence of democratic forces to leave aside their differences and team up in the transitory phase;
- the ability to control disruptive elements that would be tempted to provoke chaos to justify a return to the old system and preserve their privileges; and
- the strength of the reformist agents in those regimes that have conducted or promised political changes.

In the mid-term, the success of democratic forces or the counter-revolutionary and reactionary forces will also depend on:

- the evolution, strength, and political strategy of Islamist parties, that is, whether the majority of their party cadres and followers opt for a model similar to the one of the AKP in Turkey;
- the ability of the structures of previous regimes to resist or accommodate political changes;
- more equilibrated civil-military relations and democratic control of security apparatus;
- prevention and control of different forms of political or religious radicalism, including the terrorist threat;
- the ability to appease and prevent new ethnic or communitarian tensions; and
- the capacity of newly elected governments to meet people’s expectations in fields such as eradication of corruption, economic performance, and reduction of social and territorial unbalances.

The path towards fully-fledged democratic systems is long and often suffers from temporary setbacks. The Maghreb countries will not be an exception; the “deep state” and terrorist organizations will
be tempted to curtail democratic openings and this could lead each of the five countries to follow diverging evolutions. If the democracy camp succeeds in most of them, this could have positive effects on the whole region. Likewise, the political evolution in the rest of the Arab World can also have an impact in internal political struggles in the Maghreb. Specifically, the evolution of the political transition in Egypt will set an example for the rest of the countries of the region and can have positive or negative spill-over effects.

In the Maghreb, in Egypt, and in the rest of the Arab World, public opinion and ordinary citizens have become strong political actors. Therefore, in the coming years, the so-called Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian “street” will not remain a passive actor. Governments will be closely scrutinized and their policies will have to integrate the demands and concerns of a politically-engaged public. Ordinary citizens are likely to put pressure on the governmental sphere through demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of protest to defend what they may consider fair and legitimate, presented in some occasions as a “Revolution acquis.” The persistent mobilization of a generation that succeeded in overthrowing Ben Ali and Mubarak, but also their capacity to endorse political compromises, will determine whether democratic forces can withstand the offensive of authoritarian and reactionary sectors.

Regional Stability and Prospects for Integration
Could new and old conflicts be solved during the coming decade? Will this make Western Mediterranean a more secure and integrated region? The pacification of Libya, finding a solution to the Western Sahara conflict and putting an end to tensions between Rabat and Algiers are of paramount importance to stabilize the Maghreb and boost integration process. As for broader Western Mediterranean dynamics, territorial disputes between Morocco and Spain remain an obstacle to fully normalize relations.

The post-conflict management in Libya represents a serious challenge, first and foremost, for the Libyan people but also at a regional level. Firstly, because it is an additional burden to already complicated transition processes in Tunisia and, to a lesser extent in Egypt. Secondly, because the risk that parts of the country could escape state control, combined with the large quantities of weapons on the ground, could result in a serious security problem for neighboring countries and particularly for Algeria. Thirdly, because prolonged instability in Libya could represent a risk in terms of energy and maritime security across the region. Fourthly, as the three largest Southern European countries (France, Italy, and Spain) have participated in the military operations in Libya, the Libyan dossier will continue to play a major role in North-South relations and will surely affect security cooperation prospects in the Western Mediterranean.

The next decade is full of unknowns regarding the Western Sahara conflict: how long can this protracted conflict last? Could the Polisario unilaterally break the 1991 cease-fire and embark on new guerrilla operations against Morocco? Could the Saharawi population in the Moroccan-administered areas embark on peaceful and massive demonstrations as already happened in 2010 in Laayoune? How would the international community react if Morocco decided to violently

36 Francis Ghilès, in his article “Tunisia’s economic fallout” published by Al Jazeera (July 5, 2011) considers that “a prolonged military campaign in Libya presents a serious strategic threat to its northern neighbour, Tunisia” and identified three major impacts of current destabilization: refugees, the risk of increased infiltration by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the difficulty to recover tourism due to the proximity of the Libyan crisis and an estimated cost $1 billion from the crisis in Libya in terms of the drop in migrant remittances and Libyan business and health tourism.

put down a popular uprising in the Sahara? Will Algeria continue to back the Polisario? Could current Polisario leaders be challenged by some sort of internal opposition?

For the moment, the 2011 uprisings have revamped Morocco’s proposals for greater decentralization. Rabat considers this situation a window of opportunity to defend the idea of a large autonomy plan for the “Southern provinces” as a means to resolve the conflict and believes that as time goes by, the possibility of holding a self-determination referendum is less likely. Morocco also insists that the current situation leaves parts of the Sahara desert out of state control. In other words, Morocco relies on the time factor, its domestic political reform process, and international fears for regional destabilization to strengthen its position in this conflict.

Yet, in a mid-term perspective, the 2011 uprisings could have a two-fold and somehow contradictory impact on this protracted conflict. On one hand, they could result in changes in the power structures of the region, particularly in Algiers, and this could favor a rapprochement between Algiers and Morocco.38 Indeed, in the King’s speech on the day of his 12th anniversary in power, he exposed Morocco’s willingness to fully normalize relations and proposed the opening the land border closed since 1994.39 On the other hand, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions have set an example regarding the potential impact of persistent and peaceful mobilization as a form of defying well-anchored regimes and this could set an inspiring precedent for Saharawi political activism.40

It remains to be seen which could be the impact of this new political context in latent territorial conflicts between Morocco and Spain. Morocco claims sovereignty on two Spanish North African cities (Ceuta and Melilla) as well as on several garrisoned rock fortresses lying just off the Moroccan coast. The risk of confrontation between Madrid and Rabat on this very issue could not be excluded, particularly in social and political unrest in Morocco persists. In this scenario, tensions with Spain could be instrumentalized to divert the attention from domestic problems.

Overcoming the European Crisis

In the EU, the 2008 global economic and financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis, which has shaken some of the pillars sustaining the European integration process. A vivid debate on multi-speed Europe, on the durability of the Economic and Monetary Union, on the limits of solidarity among Europeans, and on the interventionism of the European institutions in domestic politics has placed the EU in a critical juncture.

During the next decade, the EU will have to find ways to overcome three different crises. In the economic field, there is an urgent need to recover economic growth, which would leave behind the risk of a prolonged recession, while creating jobs and finding a solution to high public debt levels and ending doubts on the solvency of some European countries. The European integration process is also at risk. The principles on which the EU was founded are under question and the leadership vacuum does not contribute to recovering trust in

38 This already happened in late 1980s, as the opening of the Algerian political system coincided with the Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement of 1987 and also resulted in progresses in regional integration and conflict-resolution (the Zeralda summit of 1988, which laid the bases for creating the Union of the Arab Maghreb and subsequent progress in the negotiations between Polisario and Morocco, which crystallized in the 1991 cease-fire).


40 Since February 2011 isolated demonstrations have been reported in Dakhla, Laayoune and cities in Southern Morocco with a strong Saharawi population. For the moment, those demonstrations have been articulated around socio-economic demands but have also denounced Moroccan policies for its discriminatory effects on the Saharawi population.
European institutions. Related to this, a crisis of values, illustrated by the rise of populism across the EU, can also undermine social cohesion and fuel political crises. Ultimately, this could result into new forms of protectionism.

The effects of an unresolved European crisis can have a global impact but its effects could be particularly strong in neighboring regions, including the Southern Mediterranean. North African economies are particularly dependent on European markets, tourism, and remittances sent by workers installed since decades in different European countries. By the same token, a persistent crisis in Southern Europe would undermine any attempt to further liberalize agriculture trade, as many North African countries are currently requesting. Persistent unemployment and deterioration of social services can also degenerate into a rise of populist and xenophobic movements.

All in all, a self-absorbed and inward-looking Europe would not be a constructive partner for young democracies in Southern Mediterranean.

In contrast, if the EU finds solutions to this triple crisis, this would have positive spill-over effects, through trade and investments, for Southern Mediterranean economies. Taking into account the aging demographic structure of the EU, the economic recovery could open a window of opportunity to define a more inclusive migration policy. A more self-confident EU could also deploy more ambitious and far-reaching policies towards the Mediterranean, aiming at promoting conflict-resolution, economic prosperity, and political reforms.

Figure 1: Area of Activity of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

![Figure 1: Area of Activity of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb](source: Agence France Press)

The effects of an unresolved European crisis can have a global impact but its effects could be particularly strong in neighboring regions, including the Southern Mediterranean.

Troubled Neighborhoods

As said before, Western Mediterranean security cannot be delinked from security threats originating in neighboring regions such as the Sahel and the Middle East. In the coming decade, the control of the desert and the fight against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb will remain a major priority for Western Mediterranean countries and will push them to increase their security cooperation and to tie closer links with countries such as Niger, Mali, or Chad. One of the main concerns is the impact of the Libyan conflict in terms of militarization of criminal and terrorist groups operating in the region.41 An increasing awareness on the drug trafficking in Western Africa, with new routes developing from the Gulf of Guinea to the Sahel and from there reaching Europe, can also become a major area of concern and joint actions in the coming years.

One of the consequences of ongoing destabilization in the Sahel region is that persisting insecurity in this region gives additional arguments to those

defending the maintenance of a strong security apparatus and consequently, this could undermine demands for more equilibrated civil-military relations, particularly in countries where this is a major issue, such as Algeria and Mauritania. As has happened before, the terrorist threat also could be exploited to induce international actors to be less demanding about democratic reforms.\(^{42}\)

As for the Middle East, there is no doubt that the Arab-Israeli conflict will remain very close to the hearts of the Arab public, including those from the Maghreb. A scenario of instability and violence in the Middle East, be it in the form of a third intifada or a massive attack by Israeli forces, would put North African governments in a difficult situation. Popular pressure to react to any defiant measures by Israel will be stronger after the 2011 popular uprisings and could result in large demonstrations, political instability, etc. Moreover, this could strengthen those radical political and religious movements that would not hesitate to instrumentalize the Palestinian question to attack the governments in place, regain popularity, and boycott transitions. In contrast, any progress in the Peace Process could only have a positive effect as it would create a more favorable environment for ongoing political transitions.

**A Shifting Regional Balance of Power**

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran are trying to retain or regain regional leadership. Since the Camp David accords in 1978 and the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Middle Eastern regional order has been articulated around the tension between the so-called pro-Western “moderate countries” and the Iranian-led radical or revolutionary camp. The 2011 uprisings might modify foreign policy choices and regional alliances. While these transformations are likely to have a greater impact in the Eastern Mediterranean region than in the Maghreb, some collateral effects could be also felt in this region.

Egypt is likely to re-emerge as a leading political reference — an influential and more autonomous foreign policy actor — as already proved by its role in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation and some diplomatic gestures towards Iran.\(^{43}\) Saudi Arabia is determined to prevent any form of regime-change in the Gulf States as shown by its intervention in Bahrain. With the aim to enlarge their sphere of influence and give support to other Arab monarchies, the Saudis have also proposed the enlargement of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

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\(^{42}\) Cristiani, Dario & Fabiani Riccardo (2011) “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Implications for Algeria’s Regional and International Relations” IAI Working Papers, 11/7 (April).

(GCC) to Jordan and Morocco. Some experts, such as the former foreign minister of Mauritania, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, consider that Saudi Arabia could profit from the remaking of the Arab world’s medium-term strategic dynamics. Turkey, a country that has rediscovered its Middle Eastern neighbors, is often described as a model or a source of inspiration for Arab countries both in political and economic terms. Ankara will certainly try to take advantage of the appeal of the ruling AKP’s model, particularly among Islamist parties but also among secular elites in the region and will try to expand its growing social and economical presence across the region. Moreover, Turkish officials have proposed the articulation of a new Egyptian-Turkish “axis of democracy” between “the two biggest nations in our region, from the north to the south, from the Black Sea down to the Nile Valley in Sudan.”

**Figure 3: Migrants Smuggling Routes from Africa to Europe**

![Migrant smuggling routes from Africa to Europe. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe Report, 2006](image)

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45 “Which Summer for the Arab Spring?”, The Washington Note, June 14, 2011.
46 The Arab uprisings have revamped the idea of how Turkey could inspire new democracies in the Arab world (see for instance, Göksel, Nigar “Europe’s Neighborhood: Can Turkey Inspire?” German Marshall Fund of the United States On Turkey, May 5, 2011) however, the idea of a Turkish model is not new as it was already utilized at the end of the Cold War for the Central Asian Republics and at the beginning of the 21st century as a “democratic model” for the Middle East (see Altunisik, Melih (2005). “The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 27, 1-2, pp.1-17.
47 Ibahim Kalin, the Turkish prime minister’s chief adviser, in his article published in Today’s Zaman May 23 entitled “Turkey and the Arab Spring,” presents the new political situation as a challenge and also an opportunity, praises Turkey’s policies of engagement with both governments and the Arab public, affirms that “the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia, and Hamas in Palestine will all play important and legitimate roles in the political future of their respective countries” considering that “Americans and Europeans will need to engage these groups publicly and directly, as Turkey has done.” Kalin concludes that “a democratic and prosperous Arab world will make Turkey’s standing in the region stronger, not weaker.”
influence, particularly as Syria’s destabilization represents a major concern for Tehran. Despite official statements framing the Arab uprisings as an extension of the Islamic revolution and its unsuccessful attempts to instrumentalize sectarian divisions, the 2011 uprisings could weaken some of Iran’s proxies in the region.49

As said before, the effects of this reconfiguration of regional alliances and the changing spheres of influence of the main regional powers are more profound in the Middle East than in the Maghreb. In the latter, the competition for regional leadership between Algeria and Morocco still constitutes the pivotal factor of regional order since 1960s. However, one should not neglect the potential impact of Morocco’s membership or associate status to the GCC, the increasing political and economic presence of Turkey in North Africa, Iran’s destabilization capacity, Saudi Arabia’s support to specific political and social movements all across the Arab and Muslim world, or the impact of an eventual Egyptian-Saudi competition for regional leadership.50

The EU and the United States: Readapting or Resetting Policies?
The United States and European countries, traditional allies of some of the regimes that have collapsed during the Arab Spring, have been severely criticized for their unconditional support of some authoritarian regimes. They have tried to adapt and react to the new political circumstances by promising additional funds to support ongoing transitions, adopting new sanctions against Syrian officials and launching a military intervention in Libya to protect civilian population. Nonetheless, they could not avoid criticisms of slowness, opportunism, and double-standards.

The coming years will tell us whether the EU decides to opt for a simple adaptation of existing policies to a new regional environment or, instead, launches a more ambitious policy-review process, revising priorities, strategies, and alliances. To do so, the EU will need to overcome its political and economic crises, which are particularly acute in Southern European countries, from where the EU’s Mediterranean policies have traditionally been led. Conditional to a greater ambition and political leadership of the EU, during the next decade, we could see the reformulation of multilateral cooperation initiatives as well as the design of innovative forms of participation in the EU market and new forms of association in decision-making systems being offered to those countries that have undertaken political and economical reforms. Depending on both domestic politics in Europe and the economic and political evolution in the Southern Mediterranean, the EU could also adopt a more open-minded and less-defensive approach to the issue of mobility in the Mediterranean. Indeed, fulfilling these promises in the field mobility stands as a litmus test for the EU’s credibility in the region.

The United States has also acknowledged the need to review its policies, declaring that its strategy could not be solely based upon the narrow pursuit of national interests.51 Taking into account that there were almost no signs of anti-Americanism in the 2011 protests in Tunisia, Egypt or elsewhere in the Arab world, U.S. authorities, particularly the White House, grasped this situation as a unique opportunity to realize Obama’s 2009 call for a “new beginning” in U.S.-Arab relations. However, U.S. credibility in the region, including in the Maghreb, will depend on its capacity to make real

49 “Managing Arab Spring’s Fallout in Iran (interview with Farideh Fard) in Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2011.
50 Nelson, Brad “The state of Egyptian-Saudi Arabian relations” in Al Ahram On-line, June 16, 2011. Timo Behr &Mika Aaltola (FIIA Briefing paper, 76, March 2011) also refers to an eventual “Arab Cold War by pitting an alliance of post-revolutionary states against the conservative Gulf monarchies eager to fend off any threat of contagion.”
51 Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, May 19, 2011.
its promises to support ongoing democratic transitions, the management of new crises in the Middle East and the results of the forthcoming presidential elections. The image of the United States in the region will depend, among other things, on its position regarding: 1) the Middle East Conflict (the Palestinian statehood bid in different multilateral fora has already undermined the U.S. credit in the region), 2) the acceptance of election results that can bring into power political groups that have been very critical with U.S. policies in the region, and 3) the growing tensions between Iran and Israel on Teheran's nuclear program.

**Global Trends, Regional Effects**

The impact of the rise of food prices and the popularization of new communication tools during the 2011 uprisings are two telling and recent examples of how global trends affect regional dynamics. A wide range of factors, including economic developments, environmental challenges, social changes, and power shifts in the global order, are likely to influence the evolution of Western Mediterranean in the coming decade.

In the economic field, there is an ample consensus that most Arab countries were relatively untouched by the global economic and financial crises.

The impact of these crises in the Arab countries depended on exposure to global financial markets or the degree of their economic integration with European economies. As for the future, a European economic recovery could have a positive impact on the economic performance of countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, which are very dependent on European markets and to a lesser extent on migrant worker remittances.

In contrast, price increases in the global market did have a direct influence in fueling social unrest and precipitating the first demonstrations in North Africa (see Table 3). Price increases in food staples as a result of both growing demand by emerging economies and speculative movements in the global markets are certainly one of the factors that fueled the first round of protests in Tunisia and Algeria. Consequently, fluctuations in food prices during the next decade can amplify (or reduce) social conflicts and budgetary problems.

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**Table 3: Food Price Index (1990-2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Food price index</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>78</td>
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Source: FAO, 2011

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52 International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook. Middle East and Central Asia, May 2009.
Energy prices are another crucial factor for political and social evolution in the region, as high prices are a necessary condition to allow rentier states to maintain heavily subsidized policies and appease social tensions. Unless a systemic crisis or a major technological discovery happens in the coming decade, predictions are for an increase in energy prices. In this scenario, oil and gas exporter countries such as Libya and Algeria could continue with ongoing subsidizing policies but could be a burden for economic development of energy-dependent countries such as Morocco. In these cases, investments in renewable energies appear as a means to control the risk of a sharp increase in oil prices.

In recent years, one of the major changes in the social and cultural arena has been the widespread use of new communication and information technologies (on-line social networks and transnational satellite channels in Arabic). This phenomenon has accelerated in the last five years and has made the organization and multiplication of protests across the region easier and more effective. The so-called “Facebook generation” or the “Al Jazeera phenomenon” are two different facets of new communication dynamics that will continue to play a critical role in the coming decade. Yet, it remains to be seen whether authoritarian regimes could try to make use of new technologies as a repression and control tool.

As for the environmental factor, most experts characterize the Mediterranean as a particularly vulnerable region. Coastal countries are directly affected by uncontrolled maritime pollution, over-exploitation of fisheries, water stress, and desertification. In the Southern rim, this is already triggering rural exodus, urban sprawl, and regional competition for scarce resources. The effects of environmental degradation, be it in the Maghreb or in neighboring regions in Africa, are expected to amplify security threats in the form of humanitarian crisis, environmental refugees, or water-related conflicts.

Finally, in an increasingly multipolar global order, the United States and Europe are no longer the only game in town in the Western Mediterranean. The so-called BRICS are broadly regarded as new players in the region. The growing presence of the Chinese in Africa — including energy-rich

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### Table 4: Internet Data (Per 100 Inhabitants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>12.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>36.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### Table 5: Facebook Data (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Users</th>
<th>Penetration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>34,895,000</td>
<td>878,660</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>31,285,174</td>
<td>1,763,800</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>642,000</td>
<td>143,960</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>10,486,339</td>
<td>1,554,760</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>n.d</td>
<td>n.d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

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58 According to Menon and Wimbush, (op. cit, p. 29), India has become Morocco’s largest buyer of phosphates and has become a critical supplier for its agriculture.

The growing influence of these actors in the Western Mediterranean can have multiple effects: it could trigger a competition for spheres of influence between old and new powers or even among the emerging powers themselves; it could imply a more direct intervention of these countries in regional tensions (e.g. if workers’ safety or strategic investments are threatened); and, finally, it may also limit European and U.S. influence in a region where they used to be the leading actors.
Table 6: North African Export Trends to the BRICS

5 Scenarios for the Western Mediterranean in 2020

Drawing scenarios for 2020, particularly in terms of political evolution, security threats and cooperation dynamics can appear as a foolhardy exercise, given that no one predicted the 2011 Arab Spring. Antonio Missiroli put it nicely when he said that “in the age of climate change, predicting next seasons [sic] is nearly impossible.”

Indeed, after this unforeseen “spring” it is almost impossible to envisage what kind of summer will come next and how long it will last. The situation is still very open and that is why three very different scenarios remain plausible. The drivers identified abroad help us to design these scenarios for Western Mediterranean security and cooperation dynamics in 2020. Obviously, variations and combinations of these factors and, consequently, intermediate scenarios can be envisaged. While relative certainties can be identified, many elements listed in the following table can still evolve in opposite directions.

A dream-world scenario consists of the Western Mediterranean becoming an area of prosperity, freedom, and stability. A decade after the Tunisian revolution, democracy would have consolidated across the region through democratic transitions and reforms. Libya would not be an exception, and the new authorities would successfully manage a process of national reconciliation. Islamist parties, following the Turkish AKP example, would fully embrace democratic values and would have a major role in the political system. Meanwhile, radical movements and reactionary forces would be politically cornered and socially marginalized. Security forces would be submitted to civilian control and would be an integral part in the social and political transformation of the region.

New Maghreb governments would favor regional integration processes and sustained and well-managed economic growth would provide job opportunities and a better redistribution of wealth. Domestic and regional tensions would be eased, the negotiations on the Western Sahara conflict would find a way to move forward, new prospects for regional integration would be explored, and intra-regional trade would experience a boom. Some sort of competition for regional leadership could persist between Morocco and Algeria, but not to the extent of hampering major regional cooperation projects, boosting intra-regional trade. The Maghreb would then become attractive for direct foreign investments from Western countries but also from emerging economies. The region would finally become what some analysts had a decade earlier described as the “North-African tiger.”

Cooperation between North African and Sahel countries would also intensify, having a positive effect in coping with security threats. In the meantime, Europeans would have overcome the economic, political, and social crisis. The Northern Mediterranean would stand again as an area of economic growth, technologic innovation, and social cohesion, with positive spill-over effects on the other side of the Mediterranean. The European Union would develop a more ambitious foreign policy and, together with the United States, would design new forms of cooperation with North African new democracies and fast-growing economies. Some elements of anti-Americanism and post-colonial resentment could still persist among some highly-politicized segments of society, but people-to-people initiatives, student-exchanges, tourism, and new communication tools would have played a major role in deconstructing deep-rooted stereotypes and mutual prejudices. In this scenario, the United States, the EU, and North African partners would become natural partners and would closely cooperate in multilateral institutions, with

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joint initiatives on issues of common interest such as global warming, energy, maritime security, or Africa’s development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Certainties</th>
<th>Uncertainties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Job creation and social disparities as a major challenges for Maghreb economies</td>
<td>• Consolidation/Failure of democratic transitions and reform processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Central role of Islamist forces in the political system</td>
<td>• Participation/Exclusion of Islamists parties in the political game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social and political tensions</td>
<td>• Role of civil-military relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increasing linkages between Sahel and Maghreb security</td>
<td>• Resurgence of ethnic, linguistic, and communitarian tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Domestic instrumentalization of Middle East tensions</td>
<td>• Ability of old regime structures and radical factions to curtail the reform processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Environmental vulnerability</td>
<td>• Stabilization in Libya and regional spill-over effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Food dependency in the Maghreb</td>
<td>• Resolution of the Western Sahara conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Southern European energy dependency from the Maghreb</td>
<td>• Deterioration/Improvement of Morocco- Algeria relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Growing use of new technologies as a social and political tool</td>
<td>• Territorial disputes between Spain and Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing presence and influence of emerging powers</td>
<td>• Speed and depth of economic recovery, both in Europe and the Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rise of populism and xenophobia in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State of affairs of European integration process and its effects in Southern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Impact of regional competition among Middle Eastern powers in Western Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Western actors’ willingness to escape from a “security first” paradigm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The future of cooperation initiatives such as 5+5, the UpM and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• U.S. interventionism in North Africa and the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evolution of the global financial crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Oil and food prices</td>
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A **nightmare scenario**, on the contrary, implies that the Southern Rim of the Western Mediterranean could become a new arch of crisis. The democratic opening of 2011, not only in the Maghreb but also
in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, would collapse. Both old regime elites and radical Islamist forces, particularly salafist movements, would be the winners in such a scenario. The reform processes in countries such as Morocco and Algeria could fade and social and political conflict could intensify; Tunisia’s democratic transition could become hostage to the lack of economic growth, persistent political instability, and growing tension between secular and religious segments in society; Libya could degenerate into a failed state, heavily militarized and with portions of its territory falling out of state control, becoming a serious threat for neighboring countries such as Tunisia and Algeria; Mauritania could suffer again from new military intervention and coup episodes while the clashes with terrorist and criminal groups operating in its territory could absorb many of the country’s scarce resources. External actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia could meddle in North African internal affairs and a highly unstable situation in the Sahel could increase insecurity in the Maghreb.

This scenario could imply mounting regional tensions as authoritarian elites (particularly the security apparatus) could instrumentalize domestic tensions, terrorist threats, or long-standing regional rivalries to regain popular legitimacy and unite the population around “national causes.” This could then result in a deterioration of Algeria-Morocco relations, mounting tension in the Western Sahara (both in the Saharawi camps in Tindouf and in the Moroccan-administered areas), a new arms race absorbing many of the region’s resources, a complete collapse of regional cooperation dynamics, new disputes between Morocco and Spain, or the re-emergence of ethnic/linguistic tensions in Mauritania (between Moor and Black populations), in Algeria (in Kabylia), or in Libya (with Touaregs living in the south of the country). A highly unstable political scenario would have a very negative impact in economic terms and this would result in growing social tensions in the slums of big cities but also in peripheral and under-developed interior regions. This would be aggravated by energy and food prices shocks. This situation, together with environmental degradation, would foster rural exodus and internal displacements, as well as additional migratory pressures on Europe.

In the meantime, Europe would still be entangled in a deep economic recession, resulting in political and social unrest. Populism and xenophobia would be on the rise, and solidarity among Europeans would be broken, shaking the very bases of the European Union. In the worst-case scenario, the European integration process could collapse. Europeans would also perceive the Mediterranean as a source of instability and threats. Consequently, the policies of international actors towards this area, and particularly in the case of European countries, could become even more reactive and defensive than before the 2011 uprisings. This implies not only the return to a “security first” paradigm but also the consolidation of a “security only” approach to the Maghreb and the rest of the Arab world.

Finally, a mixed scenario would be characterized by disparate political evolutions in the region, deadlocked regional integration, frozen conflicts, and limited transformative influence of EU and U.S. policies. In such a scenario, we could envisage the isolated success of the Tunisian democratic transition, confirming some sort of Tunisian exceptionality, while more or less authoritarian trends would prevail in the rest of the region. The security apparatus in Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania would play a dominant role in their countries’ political and economic structures while traditional elites in Morocco would hold the reigns of power despite growing popular discontentment and social pressures for further reform.
A mixed scenario would be characterized by disparate political evolutions in the region, deadlocked regional integration, frozen conflicts, and limited transformative influence of EU and U.S. policies.

The conditions for boosting regional integration processes would not be met, the Western Sahara would remain a latent conflict, and Libya and the Sahel area would become major sources of regional instability. Both political and security conditions would not favor either a rapid and sustained economic growth, or a better redistribution of wealth. Intra-Maghreb trade would continue to be negligible, foreign investment would be limited to infrastructure and the exploitation of raw materials, and the region would be the scenario of sporadic protests regarding price increases, unemployment, and corruption. However, these protests would not be strong or persistent enough to challenge the regimes in place.

While emerging powers would be gaining influence across the region, EU and U.S. policies following the Arab Spring would have lacked coordination, ambition, and generosity, missing a historic opportunity to consolidate democracy in North Africa. The duration and depth of the economic crisis would have prevented Europeans from playing a larger and more constructive role, particularly as South European countries would have been seriously weakened. By 2020, Europe would start to recover from the economic and political paralysis but, to a large extent, EU policies towards this region would continue to follow old schemes: engaging with authoritarian governments to maintain security and stability, trying to promote partial transformations from inside the regime and more or less voluntarist attempts to revitalize regional cooperation schemes. All in all, low economic growth and segmented political power would make the Mediterranean a peripheral region in a multipolar system where Asia and Latin America become new political and economic centers.
Table 8: Scenarios for Western Mediterranean 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Drivers</th>
<th>Nightmare Scenario</th>
<th>Mixed Scenario</th>
<th>Dream-World Scenario</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Struggle between democratic and reactionary forces in the Maghreb | • The success of counter-revolution  
• Inexistent or failed democratic transitions and collapse of reform processes  
• Social and political conflicts intensify  
• Old regime elites and radical Islamist forces, particularly Salafist movements, are the winners in such a scenario | • Turbulent transition process  
• “Tunisian exceptionality” as successful democratic transition  
• Troubled civil-military relations  
• Security apparatus in Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania playing a dominant role in political and economical structures | • Democratic consolidation across the region  
• Islamist parties embrace democratic values and fully participate in the political game  
• Radical movements and reactionary forces are politically cornered and socially marginalized  
• Democratic control of security sector |
| Regional stability and prospects for integration | • Libya becomes a failed state, heavily militarized  
• Severe deterioration in Morocco–Algeria relations, mounting tension in Western Sahara, and new arms race  
• Collapse of regional cooperation dynamics  
• New disputes between Morocco and Spain | • Libya as a source of regional instability  
• Western Sahara remains a latent conflict  
• Dysfunctional regional integration processes  
• Latent tensions and sporadic diplomatic incidents between Morocco and Spain | • Reconciliation and stabilization in Libya  
• Viable resolution of Western Sahara conflict  
• Détente in Algeria-Morocco relations and boost of regional integration  
• Resolution of sovereignty disputes between Madrid and Rabat |
| EU Crisis | • Collapse of the European integration process  
• Persistent economic recession  
• Rise of populism and xenophobia  
• New protectionism | • Two speeds Europe (marginalizing Southern Europe)  
• Economic stagnation  
• Social and political unrest in specific countries (particularly in Southern Europe) | • A stronger and more integrated European Union  
• Economic recovery  
• Improvement of democratic standards  
• A more open migration policy |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Drivers</th>
<th>Nightmare Scenario</th>
<th>Mixed Scenario</th>
<th>Dream-World Scenario</th>
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</table>
| **Troubled Neighborhoods** | • Sahel countries lose territorial control and the region becomes a safe-haven for terrorists and other criminal groups  
• Severe deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and instrumentalization in domestic debates in the Maghreb | • Sahel remains a source of regional instability  
• Status quo in the Middle East | • Sahel becomes an area for extended regional cooperation  
• Progresses in the Middle East Peace Process |
| **Shifting regional balance of power**  
(Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran) | • Violent regional competition and/or interference in domestic affairs of North African countries | • Both regional competition and cooperation with North African countries | • Regional cooperation among emerging actors and with North African countries |
| **EU and U.S. policies towards North Africa and the Middle East** | • The EU becomes irrelevant in North Africa as a transformative force  
• The United States becomes entangled in Middle East tensions and loses influence and popularity in the region  
• Security-only paradigm | • Lack of coordination and limited transformative influence of EU and U.S. policies  
• EU and U.S. policies are trapped in a security first paradigm | • The EU and United States become major partners of young democracies and fast-growing economies  
• De-securitized Mediterranean policies |
### Key Drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Trends</th>
<th>Nightmare Scenario</th>
<th>Mixed Scenario</th>
<th>Dream-World Scenario</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Systemic and long-lasting economic and financial crises</td>
<td>The effects of the financial and economic crisis are still visible in Western economies</td>
<td>Global economic and financial recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food and energy insecurity</td>
<td>Sporadic fluctuations of oil and food prices</td>
<td>Stabilized oil and food prices</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>New information and communication technologies are used as a repressive tool</td>
<td>Marginal impact of technologic and communication innovation</td>
<td>New information and communication technologies as a tool for democratic and civil activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severe environmental deterioration, resulting in disputes and environmental refugees</td>
<td>Environmental degradation with few progresses in specific areas (e.g., better use of water resources)</td>
<td>Environment becomes an area of cooperation among Mediterranean countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open competition for resources and spheres of influence between emerging and old powers or even among emerging powers themselves</td>
<td>The Mediterranean becomes a peripheral region in a multipolar system where Asia and Latin America become new political and economic centers</td>
<td>Mediterranean countries become active and constructive actors in a multipolar order in cooperation with both transatlantic partners and emerging powers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Will the democratic illusions of the 2011 uprisings be remembered as a parenthesis in the contemporary evolution of the Mediterranean? Or, on the contrary, will it herald the beginning of a new era characterized by democratic consolidation, regional integration, and sustained and inclusive economic development? This paper has outlined three different scenarios, ranging from a rosy one, in which everything moves towards a positive direction, and a nightmare one, in which everything goes wrong. Both scenarios, as well as a mixed one in which some countries or some factors evolve in diverging directions, are still feasible.

The successes or frustrations of ongoing transitions and reform processes, which in the case of Libya have the additional challenge of healing the wounds of eight months of conflict, are the most crucial factor in the configuration of Western Mediterranean security and cooperation dynamics for 2020. This will depend, among other factors, on the capacity to reach inclusive constitutional pacts, the ambition in ongoing reform process, the political strategy of Islamist parties, the ability of the structures of previous regimes to resist or accommodate political changes, the evolution of civil-military relations, the contention of political or religious radicalism, the risk of new ethnic or communitarian tensions, and the capacity of newly elected governments to meet people's expectations. Regional and global factors such as finding a solution to the ongoing economic and political crisis in the EU, the policies of external actors, the impact of conflicts in neighboring areas, and global and systemic factors analyzed in this paper can slow down or speed up this process but are not likely to determine its course.

The EU and the United States would benefit from the consolidation of an area of stability, democracy, and prosperity in the Maghreb and, both would pay a heavy price if the Western Mediterranean fell into the scenario of persistent crises, political stagnation, and unremitting social conflict.

The consequences of entering a vicious circle of authoritarianism, economic recession, and violence would directly affect the EU, and less so the United States, in terms of irregular migration, terrorism, political and religious radicalism, and loss of political credibility as a transformative actor in its
own neighborhood. Similarly, if the EU is able to overcome its economic and political crisis, this could have positive spill-over effects across the Mediterranean and would allow the EU to define more ambitious and inclusive policies towards its southern partners. Finding a stable solution to its internal problems stands as Europe’s best contribution to stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region.

Despite its pressing internal difficulties, the EU and the United States still have some margin of maneuver to contribute to political stabilization, democracy consolidation, and economic dynamism in the region. In the economic field, they could undertake specific and tailored measures to open markets, make a better use of available financial opportunities, provide advice to the economic authorities of newly elected governments, support legitimate governments to recuperate assets from former authoritarian rulers, and push for cooperation among international financial institutions and emerging powers to launch strategic development projects in the region. They could also make a positive contribution in the political domain by publicly acknowledging the failures and contradictions of previous policies, by unconditionally accepting the results of free and fair elections, by materializing their promises to support civil society and independent media, by providing support in electoral process and international observation, and by defining more sophisticated mechanisms to monitor ongoing reform processes. Associating Turkey and other influential actors with these efforts could multiply the effects of such measures.

In Libya’s post-conflict scenario, transatlantic partners will also have the chance to support or even participate in future law-enforcement missions in Libya, push for national reconciliation processes, and promote all sorts of initiatives on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of confronting factions. All these actions can take the form of bilateral support to the new Libyan authorities, significant contributions to UN-lead initiatives, cooperative actions with regional organizations such as the African Union or the Arab League, or even the launch of a specific EU mission on the ground.

Meanwhile, regional integration processes, be it among the five Maghreb countries, in the Western Mediterranean or on a broader Euro-Mediterranean or intra-Arab scale, can either find a window of opportunity in the current political context or face additional obstacles if political reform stagnates and the situation in Libya degenerates. Neither the EU nor the United States should consider regional integration as a means to enforce political transitions in the Maghreb but rather as a possible outcome of a political opening in the region. In other words, the future of initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, or the 5+5 Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean depends on the political evolution of the region and not the other way round.

The Arab uprisings have already challenged conventional approaches on Mediterranean security and will continue to shape cooperation dynamics between Arab countries and the transatlantic partners in the coming decade. It is still unclear what the endgame of this unprecedented wave of political and social mobilization across the Middle East and North Africa will be but the region has reached a point of no return. A status quo ante is no longer a feasible scenario. What remains to be seen is whether Americans and Europeans will go hand in hand with the democratic and transformative forces or, on the contrary, will be trapped in short-term security concerns and will remain absorbed by their economical difficulties and political divisions.

Despite its pressing internal difficulties, the EU and the United States still have some margin of maneuver to contribute to political stabilization, democracy consolidation, and economic dynamism in the region.
THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE GULF REGION IN 2020:
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR
THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Dr. Thanos Dokos
Director-General, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy
Introduction

The Eastern Mediterranean and its adjoining regions — especially the Gulf region — contain a sizable number of flashpoints, and the security environment remains “Hobbesian.” Although the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the future of Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear program, as well as internal stability in Syria and Yemen, remain the most important unsettled issues, the wider Mediterranean security environment is predominantly characterized by multiple sources of insecurity, fluidity, instability, and continuing change and evolution.

The regional environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as the broader Middle East, has been radically transformed since the end of the Cold War, and even more after 9/11 and the U.S. wars against Iraq and Afghanistan. The Arab revolts will probably cause an exponential increase in the region’s volatility and unpredictability. In this context, several of the key characteristics of the regional security environment have either changed in terms of importance or are no longer relevant and new ones have emerged, including:

- the emergence of new or the qualitative transformation of existing functional challenges (substantial imbalances in the distribution of income at the national level, demographic changes and population movements, the emergence and growing influence — at least in some countries- of Islamic parties and political movements, terrorism, climate change);
- the appearance of new (China, India) or the return of old (Russia) extra-regional actors in the Mediterranean, and the emergence of regional powers with increasing influence (Turkey, Iran);
- the declining influence and impact of the EU’s soft power and the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Mediterranean; and
- the increasingly — although unequally — felt impact of globalization on a region that, with few exceptions, has not benefited greatly from this trend.

At the same time, however, most “old” regional conflicts remain unresolved (the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, the Kurdish issue, and the Cyprus problem), while new ones have appeared, such as Iran’s nuclear program, Iraq’s future after the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces, and the domestic situation in several Arab countries.

The aim of this foresight exercise is to present and analyze the main trends and drivers that will shape the region in the next ten years. The focus will be on both existing and new facets of security with the potential to disrupt a linear evolution of the security environment. Geographically, the paper will focus on the Eastern Mediterranean, although the wider Middle East and other adjoining regions

1 There are diverging views on the strategic unity of the Mediterranean. In this context, is Fernand Braudel’s prediction that “The fate of the whole Mediterranean will be a common one” correct? Does the Mediterranean constitute a single “regional security complex” or is it actually a matter of overlapping, interwoven regions and security sub-systems, for instance, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Transcaucasia? While a few analysts claim that a regional security complex is emerging, the great majority argues that the region is highly heterogeneous. At a minimum, two regional sub-systems can be identified: Eastern Mediterranean (Mashreq), with predominantly “hard” security problems, and Western Mediterranean (Maghreb), with “soft” security problems. Still others describe the Mediterranean as a multi-fragmented region. In any case, it would probably make little sense to examine the Mediterranean, Eastern or Western, from a security perspective, in isolation from developments in the adjoining regions of the Persian Gulf, Transcaucasia/Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Horn of Africa.

The Arab revolts will probably cause an exponential increase in the region’s volatility and unpredictability.
will also be taken into consideration. As there is an obvious link with global trends and changes, there will be a brief reference to key global trends and drivers (with an emphasis on the role of emerging powers and of non-state actors, population/demographic dynamics, economy, natural resources and technology) and their potential influence on regional developments.

To outline alternative “security futures” for 2020, the potential evolution of the following key regional drivers will be examined:

- Domestic developments and foreign policies of pivotal regional states: Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran;
- The prospects for the resolution of key regional conflicts: i) Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict; ii) the Iranian “problem” and security concerns in the Gulf region; iii) the Kurdish issue and resulting problems of stability in Iraq and Turkey; and iv) new types of conflict;
- Hard security problems: i) Weapons of mass destruction proliferation; ii) military expenditures and the possibility of a conventional arms race; and iii) jihadist or other forms of terrorism;
- Changing role and influence of extra-regional actors: United States, EU, Russia, China, and India. Consequences of an emerging multiplayer environment, new relationships and the structure of a future regional security architecture;
- Soft security drivers: i) organized crime, cyber-warfare, maritime security; ii) demographic trends and population movements (impact of increasing urbanization); iii) impact of climate change on already fragile ecosystems (food security and environmental refugees/migrants); iv) natural resources (water, hydrocarbons); v) failed/dysfunctional states (in sub-Saharan Africa); and vi) pace and impact of globalization. Drivers (iii)-(iv) could be described as secondary to contributing factors;
- Game changers (e.g. a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran and the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons between those states or anywhere else in the wider region; an incident of catastrophic terrorism; a major pandemic; the discovery of a major non-carbon-based source of energy; the violent overthrow of a regime by a radical group, etc.)

After briefly analyzing each individual driver, three alternative regional scenarios will be outlined: 1) “Heaven” (all or most drivers develop in a “positive” direction); 2) “Hell” (all or most drivers develop in a “negative” direction); and 3) “Earth” (some drivers develop “negatively” and others “positively”).

2 For an analysis of particular regions, Barry Buzan’s methodological approach seems particularly useful. He uses the concept “regional security complex”—an empirical phenomenon with historical and geopolitical roots—which he defines as a group of states whose chief security concerns are so closely linked and interwoven that the problems of national security they face cannot be examined separately, country by country. (Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. New York, 1991, p. 194).

3 According to the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, a driver is a factor that directly influences or causes change. (Global Strategic Trend — Out to 2040, Strategic Trends Programme, UK Ministry of Defence, 4th edition, January 2010, p. 6) For NATO, a driver designates the course of an event that results in a specific trend into a component. (Future Security Environment (FSE) 2025, Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia, June 2007, p. 11) Jair van der Lijn defines drivers as underlying causes or incentives for an actor or phenomenon. (Jair van der Lijn, Crystal Balling Future Threats 2020-2030: Security Foresights of “Actors” and “Drivers” in Perspective, Defense & Security Analysis, Vo. 27, No. 2, June 2011, p. 149).

4 Defined as “developing countries whose futures were poised at critical turning points and whose fates would significantly affect regional, and even international, stability.” (Robert Chase, Emily Hill, Paul Kennedy (eds.), The Pivotal States, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999, p. 4).
There is increasing agreement among experts and policymakers that the U.S. unipolar moment is already behind us and that the future international political system will be multipolar, with the United States as primus inter pares, but with China (already the second largest global economy and projected to surpass the United States sometime in the next 20 years), India, Japan, the EU, and probably a number of regional powers playing an increasing role. In combination with the financial and political crises of the last two to three years and other global challenges, this raises questions of global governance. Already the G7/8 institution has in practice been largely replaced by the G20, although there is increasing talk about a G2 (US and China). The term “CHIMERICA” is being used by a number of analysts and smaller states are even starting to position themselves between the United States and China to optimize political gains. A hostile relationship between the current and the future superpower is not unavoidable, but efforts to reach a modus vivendi will be neither easy nor painless. Ambitious regional powers will cause turbulence and tension in various parts of the world, the Middle East included.

The larger number of poles of power and of active and influential international actors, and the increasing number and role of nonstate actors [be they agents or spoilers of cooperation], have transformed the global and regional security chessboards into substantially more complex environments. New legal norms, such as the R2P/responsibility to protect, the evolution of international institutions and concerns about global economic and political governance, the need for protection of global commons, and the competition for natural resources will be instrumental in shaping the global strategic environment.

Demographic changes will also play an important role. Global population recently passed the 7 billion mark and is expected to reach 8 billion by 2025. In the period 2010-2020, 98.4 percent of the increase will take place in developing countries, and six countries will account for half of the projected increase: India, China (although it will also be faced with aging problems), Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. At the same time, over 20 countries, mostly in Europe, have declining populations.

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5 The term BRIC(S) (for Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with the very recent addition of South Africa) first coined by Goldman Sachs has been an instant success. There are, however, serious methodological problems in grouping together countries of different current and potential capabilities.


7 Defined as including actors and phenomena, which may pose a direct threat (international power blocks, new great powers, medium-sized powers, rogue states, failing states, informal networks, and natural phenomena and disasters (der Lijn, pp. 149-150).

8 EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture, Paris, 2010, p. 12; Richard Haass introduced the notion of non-polarity, arguing that the struggle over power and influence in the international system is increasingly less dominated by state power, whereas the influence of non-state actors is increasing. (van der Lijn, p. 154).

9 China is growing old before it has grown rich. There were six Chinese children for every one elder in 1975; in 2035 there will be two Chinese elders for every one child. (2010, p.17) How Beijing will support this coming tsunami of senior citizens as well as the large number of unmarried, discontented young men? (Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Demographic Implosion,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, November/December 2010, p. 59) For other important demographic challenges, see also Jack A. Goldstone, “The New Population Bomb. The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, no. 1, January/February 2010, pp. 31-43.

10 FSE 2025, p. 65; EU-ISS, p. 5; Eberstadt estimates that “over the next two decades, sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh and Pakistan will generate nearly half the growth in the world’s working age population” (Eberstadt, p. 56).

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* NATO defines a trend as the evolution of repetitive events. Consequently, trends show how the components (domains) are changing (FSE 2025, p. 11). According to the DCDC, a trend is a discernable pattern of change (Global Strategic Trends- Out to 2040, p. 6).
Environmental issues will increasingly affect economic, social, and political developments throughout the world.

populations. This number could reach 44 by 2050.\(^{11}\)

Another interesting forecast is that whereas median age in 1980 was 34 in Europe and 33 in Japan, in 2030 it will be 47 in Europe, 52 in Japan, and only 39 in the United States (from 37 in 2010).\(^{12}\) At the same time, in the Middle East, for example, there is a disproportionate number of youths (in Iran 70 percent of the population is under 30).\(^{13}\)

One of the key problems for stability at both the global and regional level will remain that of highly uneven distribution and access to natural resources (energy, food, drinking water). There are estimates that despite the progress achieved, approximately 1 billion people still lack clean water [and 2.6 billion lack adequate sanitation]. By 2025, over 3 billion people will be facing water scarcity, mostly in non-OECD countries.\(^{14}\) World food prices are at an all-time high. During the global food crisis of 2008, 43 countries experienced riots and protests because of high food prices.\(^{15}\) It should be noted that food prices also played an important role in the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution.”

The energy landscape is changing, shaped by shifting demand patterns, new deposits and fields entering the production stage, new players and alignments, and evolving rules. At the same time, there is price volatility and investment uncertainty, whereas the threat of climate change and efforts to impose carbon constraints on a fossil-fuel dependent world complicate the situation even further.\(^{16}\) The expected renaissance of the nuclear power industry is currently in doubt because of the Fukushima disaster. Finally, a revolutionary discovery of a new, noncarbon-based source of energy is not expected to take place in the next decade.

As for technological developments, it is argued that biotechnologies and nanotechnologies bear much potential both for progress, for example in the health sector, and for unprecedented risks, if diverted for criminal purposes. Genetic modifications raise profound ethical questions even while breakthroughs are likely to be critical for societies struggling with resource issues such as food and ageing populations.\(^{17}\) Exoskeletons, organic-to-silicon linkages, and drug enhancements are already here and will be widely deployable in the next few years\(^{18}\) and the use of robots in battle may revolutionize warfare.\(^{19}\) Such technologies will only be available to a small number of developed countries.

Environmental issues will increasingly affect economic, social, and political developments throughout the world. The impact of climate change will be even more acute in vulnerable regions and groups that face multiple stresses at the same time — pre-existing conflict, poverty and unequal access to resources, weak institutions, food insecurity and incidence of diseases. However, there is still uncertainty about the exact magnitude, rate, and geographical impact of climate change.\(^{20}\) As a rule, wealthier countries and individuals will be better able to adapt to the impacts of climate change.\(^{21}\) The regions most heavily affected cover most of the globe: the Middle East, North


\(^{13}\) FSC 2025, p. 65.

\(^{14}\) EU-ISS, p. 53; *2010 State of the Future*, pp. 4 & 14.

\(^{15}\) Cohen & Gabel, p. 60.

\(^{16}\) Ibid, p. 48.

\(^{17}\) EU-ISS, p. 19.

\(^{18}\) Cohen & Gabel, p. 24.


Africa, the Sahel zone, Southern Africa, Central Asia, Asia (major deltas, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and China) and the Pacific, Latin America (especially the Andean region and Amazonia) and the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Arctic region.22

3 Main Drivers in the Middle East

Domestic Developments and Foreign Policies of Pivotal Regional States: Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran

The revolts in several Arab states took the international community by surprise (with the exception perhaps of Egypt, where some kind of standoff between the Mubarak regime and the opposition was expected, albeit at the time of the scheduled presidential elections in fall 2011). The fragility of many regimes and the willingness of the citizens of those countries to stand up and even sacrifice their own lives for democracy (although the extremely difficult economic conditions were an equally — if not most important — motive for many of those people) also came as a surprise. As mentioned in Eduard Soler’s paper, “The Western Mediterranean in 2020: Scenarios for Regional Security and Cooperation after the Arab Uprisings,” the common element that contributed to Arab revolts included “growing social disparities, high levels of corruption, worrying rates of youth unemployment, the increase of food prices, waiving civil and political freedoms, abuses of power by security forces, and the eroded legitimacy of the governments in place.”

As a result of the Arab revolts, today’s Middle East can be compared to a seismic faultline which will continue to produce tremors of unpredictable size in various parts of the region, at least for the next few years. Considerable uncertainty will be a standard feature of the region, and several regimes will face substantial challenges for their survival, including Syria and — in the future — Saudi Arabia and Iran. Long-term concerns include possible changes in the regional security environment, the nature and stability of new regimes, the consequences for relations between the West and the Arab world (including the impact on oil prices) and implications for transatlantic policies towards the region. The Arab revolts are likely to lead to a far more heterogeneous and fragmented region and possibly to an increasingly polarized Mediterranean.

Egypt has always been a key country for the Arab world. There is general agreement that “how Egypt emerges from its current uncertainty will shape the entire Middle East.” Indeed, if there is a change of direction in Egyptian policy, whether vis-à-vis the West and Israel, or in the direction of Islamic radicalism, there will be repercussions for the whole region. But the absence of Egypt from regional affairs due to introspection will also be a cause for serious concern for other moderate Arab countries, especially in the Gulf region, as Saudi Arabia will be the only Sunni counterbalance to Shia Iran. It is, of course, impossible at this stage to predict which way Egypt will go. The only certainty is that the road to democracy — however defined — will be difficult and painful, and that the apparently incomplete reform in Egypt will bring new revolts in the future.

Iran is another pivotal country in the Middle East. It occupies an important strategic location, with access to the Strait of Hormuz, through which the majority of the world’s oil supplies transit; it possesses significant natural and human resources; and its regional influence has grown significantly over the past few years. However, despite the generally favorable strategic environment since

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24 “If certain conditions are fulfilled, some countries will move towards a sustainable future, while others will either remain in or accelerate dynamics towards unsustainability, instability and/or conflict” (Nathalie Tocci, State (un)Sustainability in the Southern Mediterranean and Scenarios to 2030: The EU’s Response, MEDPRO Policy Paper no. 1/August 2011, p. 3).
25 As Nathalie Tocci argues, the overall prospects for war and peace in the Middle East will be fundamentally shaped by Egypt’s probable resurgence on the regional scene. It will fill part of the void currently filled by non-Arab countries like Iran and Turkey (Tocci, p. 7).
26 Cohen & Gabel, pp. 64 & 66.
27 It should also be noted that young democracies are often unstable and have weak institutions.
2003, Iran has had mixed feelings of increasing regional influence and vulnerability to international pressure. Iran and most of its Arab neighbors have different perceptions and positions on many issues related to regional security, and their relationship is characterized by considerable lack of trust. Furthermore, its difficult relationship with the West, mainly because of its nuclear program, its support for extremist actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and its inflammatory rhetoric have lead to international sanctions and the relative isolation of Iran. Iran’s domestic political scene is extremely complex (especially after the last presidential elections), and all the actors have multiple agendas. The regime remains fragmented, as several centers of power are involved in the design and execution of Iranian foreign and military policy, whereas the consensual style and the opaque nature of the decision-making process complicate the situation even further. Questions of great importance for Iran’s future, but also for regional security and stability include: what will be the likely impact of a preventive attack against its nuclear program; whether the gradual rise of a new generation of leaders, most of them nonclerical, will lead to a transition from a regime based on Velayat-e faqih (the rule of the jurist) to a more secular one and whether this transition will be a smooth one; whether Iran’s leadership will accept a compromise solution to the nuclear issue and moderate its policies vis-à-vis its neighbors, Israel, and the West, thus becoming a key energy (natural gas) supplier for Europe.

Although Israel seems to be doing fairly well, from a security and an economic perspective despite its relative diplomatic isolation and its disagreements with the Obama Administration (of course, the U.S.-Israeli relationship will be affected by the result of the 2012 U.S. presidential elections), it can be argued that the current policies of the Netanyahu government on the Palestinian conflict are shortsighted and that the lack of a viable solution will negatively affect Israel’s own future. This is even more the case after the Arab revolts and the uncertainty regarding Egypt’s (and perhaps Jordan’s) future orientation and policies vis-à-vis Israel and the West. Future challenges for Israel will be two-fold: a) security challenges as the Palestinian youth, lacking any hope for a better future, may decide to take their struggle against Israeli occupation to the next level of violence, i.e. suicide bombings with the use of nonconventional devices (it is less probable but not impossible that a Muslim country might use military force against Israel using the Palestinian problem as a pretext) and b) challenges to Israel’s democratic system of government as a result of demographic trends (the increase in the percentage of the Arab population living inside Israel).

King Abdullah’s succession in Saudi Arabia will not necessarily be a smooth process, and the country has already been faced with some social tension.

28 Anat Kurz and Schomo Brom recently warned against the risk of the erosion of Israel’s strategic position (Anat Kurz & Schomo Brom, Israel and the Regional Shockwaves in Strategic Survey for Israel 2011, INSS, Tel-Aviv, 2011, p. 201).
Turkey's regional and international roles have been significantly upgraded in the last few years as a result of the country's impressive economic performance and its ambitious multidirectional foreign policy of “zero problems with the neighbors.” Professor Ahmed Davutoglu, the “guru” of the ruling AKP's foreign policy, frequently refers to Turkey as a “central” power and has been using the country's soft power and the Ottoman cultural heritage as means to extend/increase Turkish influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, and beyond. Undoubtedly Ankara has evolved into a more autonomous regional actor, a potentially important energy player (as an energy hub) and a willing mediator in various conflicts and an influential power in the Muslim world (and possibly as a model of the co-existence of political Islam and democracy). Some of the questions debated by foreign policy establishments in various interested countries include whether the AKP government has been gradually transforming Turkey into an Islamic-“lite” country and whether this may cause a strong reaction by Kemalist and other pro-secular forces in Turkish society, whether its regional policies are compatible with transatlantic interests, and whether it is drifting away from the West (“who lost Turkey?”). There is also a feeling in some circles that Turkey may at some point fall into the trap of strategic over-extension (i.e. failure to match means and objectives), but this remains to be seen. The majority of policymakers persist that it is in the best interest of all sides if Turkey remains anchored to Western institutions, but that this may not be an option anymore as far as EU membership is concerned, as there is increasing opposition not only in Europe but also in Turkey itself. Key questions for Turkey's future regional role will be the possible reaction of Egypt and Iran to the attempted expansion of Turkish regional influence, the evolution of its relationship with Israel, the resilience of the “Turkish economic miracle,” and the management of the Kurdish issue.

Regional Conflicts

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Probably accurately labeled the “mother of all conflicts,” the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains, at least symbolically, if not in substance, the most important regional conflict in the Middle East. If not resolved in a mutually acceptable and viable manner, it will continue to cause tension and suffering in all parties involved, and to be used by radicals in the Muslim world as a justifying cause for their jihad(s). There are three possible scenarios:

1. A peace settlement based on the two-state model and the parameters of various plans tabled in the past several years (Camp-David [2000], Taba, Saudi Peace Initiative, Geneva Initiative, etc.). A Multinational Force (MNF) is deployed to guarantee the implementation of the agreement. Problems between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon are resolved in the context of a

Important Variables for the Palestinian Problem

- The domestic situation in Lebanon and especially the role of Hezbollah and the continuing support of Iran (and Syria?)
- The future situation in Syria
- The process of Hamas's transformation to a political party
- U.S. foreign policy
- Domestic politics in Israel (especially the political strength of the extreme right)
Middle East Peace Treaty. This could lead to a large-scale [positive] transformation of the whole region;

2. Continuation of the status quo. A “slight” deterioration is more likely as time passes by without a peace agreement;

3. Severe deterioration. Feeling that they have little to lose, the Palestinians decide to escalate the conflict and take their actions to the next level of violence, seeking ways to inflict damage that the Israeli society will find unacceptable, and so will therefore decide to negotiate along the lines of scenario 1. Scenario 3 may involve radical Middle Eastern governments and nonstate actors, acting overtly or covertly against Israel.

Gulf Security
Regional security problems are not limited to the Iranian nuclear issue, although this is perceived by Western countries and some of Iran’s neighbors as being the most pressing security concern. “The Gulf region and the Middle East in general are quite complex: unstable, vulnerable, and wealthy in parts. Weak, shattered, or embryonic states (Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine) co-exist with strong states like Egypt, cautious ones like Saudi Arabia, and ambitious ones, notably Iran.” Beyond resolving the nuclear impasse in the Gulf region — or rather in order to facilitate the resolution of this problem — as well as several other security issues, including the domestic situation in Iraq and Yemen, relations between the GCC countries and Iran, as well as the U.S. military presence in the region, which remains both a cause for frustration and a security guarantee for most GCC countries — there is an urgent need to address the regional security vacuum.

Of special importance for regional security is the future of Iraq. The end of the combat mission and the gradual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has caused concern about the stability of the country. Although central authority still holds, it is far from certain that Iraq will be a stable and united country in 2020. One can foresee three possible scenarios:

Important Variables for Stability in Iraq
- Turkey’s relations with the Kurds of Northern Iraq;
- Iranian role in Iraq;
- Degree of U.S. involvement and military presence in the region;
- Domestic situation in Iran and Saudi Arabia

The Kurdish Issue
The Kurds remain the largest ethnic group without a state. Their total number is estimated at 25 to 30 million, and they live mainly in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Their desire to create an independent Kurdish state has caused varying degrees of concern to host countries. The Kurds of Northern Iraq have enjoyed wide autonomy for two decades and are unlikely to willingly relinquish it. If circumstances allow in the future they may try to replace de facto with de jure independence. Despite Turkey’s clever policy of economic and political engagement of the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, there is concern that Ankara’s inability to resolve its own Kurdish problem may increase the future attractiveness of a Kurdish state for Turkey’s own Kurdish population. The same is true, to a lesser extent, for Kurdish populations in Iran and Syria.

29 For scenarios on the future of the Gulf region, see The GCC Countries and the World: Scenarios to 2025. Three scenarios are examined (The Fertile Gulf, Sandstorm, Oasis) on the basis of two focal questions: (a) education and innovation and (b) leadership and governance.

Iraq is stable, remains united (although the Kurds retain wide autonomy in the north of the country), and Iranian influence is rather limited. The regime is secular, moderately pro-Western, or at least not strongly anti-Western. Iraq is beginning to regain part of its past influence in the region;

Iraq is unstable but remains united. Kurds enjoy de facto independence, but they remain a de jure constituent part of Iraq. Iranian influence is substantial, especially in the south. The regime is secular but anti-Western. Iraq’s regional role is quite limited;

Iraq no longer remains a united country. The Kurds declare their independence, whereas the rest of the country is in a state of semi-civil war. The government is Islamic and anti-Western, and Iran effectively controls the south. An independent Kurdistan becomes a magnet/strong pole of attraction for Kurds in other regional countries (especially Turkey).

New Types of Conflict
It is possible that in the future, we may witness conflicts of a nontraditional type in the Middle East. For example, water wars (concerning the Nile or other hydro-systems/river basins in the region), conflicts along the Shia-Sunni schism, and climate change-induced wars.31

Hard Security Threats/Risks
WMD Proliferation
Dealing with Iran’s nuclear file is undoubtedly the most critical strategic question in the proliferation field and a very important issue on today’s international security agenda. Although Iran’s nuclear program is probably in many ways motivated by legitimate security concerns and historical experiences, Iran has clearly violated its legal commitment under the Nonproliferation Treaty not to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and its choices on a number of foreign policy issues.

have not been terribly reassuring for its neighbors and the international community.

The key question is the impact of Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability for regional and international security. It is argued that, at the global level, further proliferation would make the strategic chessboard more complex whilst at the same time multiplying risks and complicating strategic decision-making. There is also growing concern that the open nuclearization of Iran could also, in combination with other negative developments, deal a serious — even deadly — blow to the international nonproliferation regime. The probability of a nuclear “domino effect” has often been emphasized, whereby the presence of nuclear weapons in Iran may well motivate other countries in the region, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or even Turkey (arguably a more remote possibility) to try and develop their own nuclear weapon capability. Although it is quite possible that key states in the region could learn to live with this outcome, it is also possible that a nuclear Iran could serve as a “tipping point” for some states in other regions in their thinking about acquiring a nuclear capability. One could even speculate whether Iran’s nuclearization will be the “straw that broke the camel’s back.”

There is also concern about regional instability and the probability of nuclear use against Israel. It is possible that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability may increase Iran’s self-confidence but also its propensity for brinkmanship and risk-taking. The critical question is whether Iran’s nuclearization creates an intolerable threat for Israel, Iran’s neighbors, and/or the West or instead presents a security problem that can be accommodated. Is it conceivable that under certain circumstances Iran’s leaders might decide to threaten to or even use nuclear weapons? A key issue remains, of course, whether deterrence will be sufficient to ensure restraint in the case of Iran. Richard Haass’ question on whether Iran is an imperial power or a revolutionary state is highly pertinent here. Are Iran’s strategic goals limited to self-defense and regime survival? Are scenarios regarding the probability of nuclear strikes against the United States, Europe, Israel, or any of Iran’s neighbors plausible?

Concern has also been expressed about command and control and safety mechanisms were Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It is generally believed that the possibility of an accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon would be greater in new nuclear-weapon states (NWS) because, in most cases, they would lack most of the safeguards that existing NWS have deployed. The probability that an irrational leader can gain control of nuclear weapons would, in theory, increase with their further spread. While most existing threshold states have a rather good historical record in this respect, there is no assurance that this will continue

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**Important Variables**

- Regional security architecture in the Gulf
- Domestic situation in Iran and key GCC states
- Status of the Palestinian problem

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32 Christoph Bertram points out, however, that “anyone seeing in an Iranian bomb a key factor which might prompt Saudi Arabia, Egypt or other countries to obtain one as well needs to explain why for 40 years the Israeli bomb has not had that effect.” (Christoph Bertram, Rethinking Iran: From Confrontation to Cooperation, Chaillot Paper no 110, August 2008, EU-ISS, Paris).
to be the case in the future. Of course, there is no evidence to the contrary either.33

The probability of the use of nuclear weapons as a result of miscalculation or loss of control during a crisis (as opposed to accidental launching) cannot be dismissed. The lack of secure second-strike forces and reliable C3I systems in most new nuclear weapon states and the adoption of launch-on-warning postures as a consequence could result in strategic instability and could increase the probability of the use of nuclear weapons due to miscalculation. And however small the risk of each individual scenario may be, one should also consider the cumulative risk of all the possible dangers arising from assumed nuclear proliferation.

Would Iran transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations? If we accept that Iran is indeed a rational actor, and aware of the possible consequences for its own security should the weapon be traced to Tehran (while having no full control over its employment), it is quite unlikely that its leadership will contemplate the transfer of nuclear weapons to a terrorist organization. Is it possible, however, that such a decision could be taken by a rogue faction of the government during a power struggle?

Three basic scenarios (and many variations) could be envisaged:

1. Peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem. Iran is included in a regional security architecture. Alternatively, Iran may acquire a peaceful nuclear capability, perhaps even a latent military capability, but the West and Israel are not overtly worried because of a wider understanding with Tehran, and no other country in the region decides to launch a nuclear program;

2. Israel (with U.S. assistance?) uses military force to neutralize Iran’s nuclear capability. High tension in the Gulf region as a result of Iran’s asymmetrical response. Iran starts rebuilding its nuclear program;

3. Through continuation of a process of creeping nuclearization, Iran manages to acquire an undeclared or declared nuclear capability. Unstable nuclear balance between Iran and Israel. A number of other countries launch nuclear programs, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. The probability of nuclear conflict is low but not zero.

Regarding chemical and biological weapons, Iran probably has chemical weapon (CW) bombs and may have developed CW warheads for its SCUD B missiles. It has conducted extensive biological weapons (BW) research and, although there is no evidence of production, it has the infrastructure for a significant BW capability. Syria probably possesses chemical warheads for ballistic missiles and could enhance its capability with the nerve agent VX. There are no indications that its BW program has progressed significantly from the R & D stage. The same is probably true for Israel, although there is little real evidence. Israel is considered capable of manufacturing CW and the same is true for Egypt.

Most missiles in the arsenals of proliferating countries will still be Frogs, Scuds or Scud
derivatives for the next ten years.\textsuperscript{34} The Iraqi derivatives (Al-Abbas and Al-Husayn) compromised the payload and in-flight stability of the missile in the interest of an increased range. As for the capabilities of specific countries, in addition to SCUD-Bs and -Cs, Iran has an unknown number of Shahab-3 missiles, developed with North Korean assistance, with a range of up to 2,000 km. According to the IISS Military Balance, Syria has 94+ FROG, SS-21 and SCUD B/C/D launchers, and approximately 850 missiles. Israel has the most advanced missile capabilities in the region, with its approximately 100 Jericho systems that have a range of over 2,000 km and could probably develop a missile with a range of 5,000 km.

Over 70 countries (40 of them in the developing world, including Egypt, Israel, Iran, and Syria) possess more than 75,000 anti-ship cruise missiles, most with ranges under 100 km. According to analysts, the emerging cruise-missile threat may well represent the prototype of 21\textsuperscript{st} century defense planning challenges: multiple acquisition paths, uncertain development cycles, and opaque monitoring environments.\textsuperscript{35} To counter the missile threat, Israel has developed the Arrow anti-missile defense system, a number of countries in the region have deployed the U.S.-made PATRIOT system, and for several years NATO has been exploring the deployment of a theater missile shield (mainly in response to the Iranian missile threat).

34 In terms of military efficiency, the destructive power of conventionally loaded missiles — often with poor target precision — is small in comparison to modern aircraft. In terms of military utility, not only quality but also quantities are important. Given the limited arsenals of missiles of Third World states, it is hard to imagine a strategically relevant threat unless NBC weapons are involved.

domestic production. The Iranian military is considered capable of conducting only limited, short-duration offensive operations beyond its borders, and in the foreseeable future, it will not be capable of sustaining large-scale offensive actions. This estimate is not expected to change in the next several years.36

Although when it comes to arms control efforts, the Mediterranean and the Middle East is not a vacuum and regional states are signatories of a number of arms control agreements, the prospects for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone and of an effective regional security architecture are rather low. It is safe to assume that there will continue to be strategic uncertainty in the region for the foreseeable future and the possibility of qualitatively and quantitatively higher arms procurement and defense expenditures is quite high (especially as rising oil prices allow some regional countries to continue to spend more for security purposes). It is not clear, however, whether such an arms race would be a main cause or simply a contributing factor to regional tension and conflict.

Jihadist Terrorism
Al Qaeda’s actions and the U.S. reaction to 9/11 have had a major influence on the regional and global security environment. There is increasing agreement among experts that “the large majority of other Islamist extremist organizations pursue predominantly local agendas,” that “Al-Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad is being marginalized in Islamic discourse today”37 and it “is losing its relevance in the Muslim world to rival Islamist groups that are prepared to run in elections and take power through politics.”38 This trend will probably be reinforced by the killing of Osama bin-Laden. Therefore, it is argued by several analysts that Jihadist terrorism should no longer be perceived as an existential threat to Western security.39 This is not to say, however, that at the local/regional level in the Middle East, the risk and consequences of successful terrorist operations will be negligible.

Changing Role and Influence of Extra-Regional Actors: United States, EU, Russia, China, and India
Changes in the global balance of power will be reflected in the Middle East as well. China has adopted a policy of close relations with resource-rich states in Africa and the Gulf region.40 Russia has also been trying to increase its influence in the region, and India is expected to make its presence more felt in the future. For the time being, China and, to a lesser extent, India have limited their regional involvement to the economic sector, satisfied with the U.S. guarantee to the safety of supply lines. But this will probably change given their growing energy dependency. Already interesting signs can be observed, such as the first visits of Chinese warships in the Gulf in 2010, the Indian Navy’s visit to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in 2009, the Chinese financial support of the construction of a deep-sea port at Gwadar in Pakistan41 strategically located only 250 miles from the Strait of Hormuz, and a joint Turkish-Chinese

37 Strategic Trends 2011, p. 9.
39 See for example, IISS, Strategic Survey 2011, pp. 52-53.
40 It is estimated that China already gets around 50 percent of its imported oil from the Middle East. China’s oil imports from the Middle East are expected to rise five- to six-fold until 2030, and its dependency will rise to 70 or even 80 percent. The projection of India’s crude oil imports from the region is quite similar. (Strategic Trends 2011, pp. 51 & 64); Elizabeth Economy, The Game Changer: Coping With China’s Foreign Policy Revolution, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, November/December 2010, p. 142.
41 Strategic Trends 2011, p. 65.
air force exercise in 2010. At the same time, the United States is reducing its military presence in the region and the EU appears to be losing its influence (the trend is less important in the Gulf, where the EU’s influence has always been quite limited, and more worrisome for the Eastern Mediterranean).42

One can foresee three possible scenarios for the EU’s role in the region. In the first, the EU crumbles under the weight of its internal problems, the integration process stops completely or advances extremely slowly, and the EU becomes irrelevant both at the global and at the regional level. The second scenario can be labeled “business as usual.” The EU continues to spend money but still doesn’t get enough influence. There is no substantial strengthening of EU institutions and the Union’s role — even in its backyard, along the Mediterranean coast — is not negligible, but it is not central either. In the third scenario, the EU gets its act together, and develops a coherent foreign policy and a Neighborhood policy, especially vis-à-vis the Middle East. The Union for the Mediterranean or a successor initiative flourishes and there is substantial investment and cooperation, especially on renewable energy. Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries agree on a quota system for workers.

The United States is shifting its strategic attention to Asia and reducing its military presence in the Mediterranean. Its image in the Muslim world remains strongly negative. Again, one can envisage three possible scenarios:

1. The United States uses its leverage to help resolve the Palestinian problem. Its credibility, image, and influence in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general receives a major boost;

2. The United States continues its rather ambivalent policy on the Palestinian problem and its support for conservative regimes in the Gulf. In combination with the growing presence of other major powers, US influence in the region continues its slow decline; and

3. A U.S. Republican administration attempts to resolve the Iranian problem with the use of military force. The United States becomes entangled in yet another war in the Middle East.

Irrespective of which scenario will more accurately reflect future developments in the region, it would be fairly safe to predict that, overall, the wider Middle East is gradually evolving into a multiplayer security system and the West (a concept which probably needs redefinition, anyway) may have to adjust to a new reality where its influence in the Middle East will decline.

Soft Security Drivers

Demographic Trends and Population Movements

Demographic developments and population movements are issues of serious concern for Europe and migration will remain a central and highly politicized issue for most European countries, mostly for domestic political reasons. Ironically, Europe will have a significant labor-shortfall of several million workers within the next 25 years due to the general aging of European populations. The EU member-states are already home to more

42 The EU-ISS examines four scenarios for the EU’s future: 1) barely keeping afloat, 2) fragmentation, 3) concept of Europe redux, and 4) gaming reality: conflict trumps cooperation (EU-ISS, pp. 14-15). Van der Lijn present another five scenarios for the EU: 1) EU integrates further, but militarily it remains the junior partner to the United States. As such, this scenario is more or less a continuation of the current situation; 2) The Union becomes an independent political and military entity that distances itself from the United States; 3) The Union disintegrates and nationalism becomes predominant again; 4) The Union is a strong economic trade unit; and 5) The EU expands too far and too fast and disintegrates into a free trade organization, which is peacefully integrated into the world system (van der Lijn p. 152). See also, Project Europe 2030, Challenges and Opportunities, A report to the European Council by the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, May 2010.
than 6 million immigrants from the Mediterranean nonmembers, especially from North Africa. Illegal movement of people is greatly facilitated by the proximity of North Africa and the Middle East and there are also substantial numbers of irregular migrants travelling via Turkey and crossing to EU territory through Greece’s archipelago of islands, its long coastline, and the land border between the two countries. The population in North Africa and the Middle East is projected to double from 240 million in the early 1990s to almost 500 million by the year 2020.43 Demographic pressures of this magnitude are producing relentless urbanization, social and economic strains, and a steady stream of migrants seeking jobs and social services (a process that starts well to the south of the Maghreb and affects societies on both sides of the Mediterranean). The number of immigrants is increasing as a result of various conflicts and, in the near future, climate change.

One of the most critical geopolitical questions haunting the West is whether the Middle East will be a reliable supplier of oil and gas exports at market driven prices.

### Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Major Mediterranean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Mediterranean North</strong></td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td>176.7</td>
<td>177.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Mediterranean South</strong></td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>230.3</td>
<td>346.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Natural Resources**

The energy dimension is increasingly important. Oil and natural gas will continue to be a major factor in regional and international politics. The consensus view suggests that Caspian resources will provide an important additional long-term source of energy for world markets, although still much less significant than Middle Eastern sources and far from the transforming development that early analyses implied. European oil dependence on the Middle East will continue, thus providing a strong incentive for securing the continuous supply of energy products. In the entire region, a wide range of energy transportation projects are underway, linking energy and economic security interests on a South-South as well as a North-South basis.44

Indeed, one of the most critical geopolitical questions haunting the West is whether the Middle East will be a reliable supplier of oil and gas exports at market driven prices.45 This is not easy to predict in a region with many interregional and internal

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44 As Ian Lesser points out, the “proliferation of new energy routes, and especially gas pipelines, around the Mediterranean and its hinterlands is uniting previously distinct economies and encouraging interest to protect this complex and costly infrastructure. It is a promising area for cooperation on a Mediterranean and sub-regional basis. It will also raise new issues for the transatlantic debate about energy security.” (Ian Lesser, *Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean*, ELIAMEP Policy Paper No 5, Athens, 2005, p. 14).

45 According to Anthony Cordesman, the “real threats in the Middle East may well consist of how well local powers can achieve enough stability and resources to consistently meet the world’s growing need for oil and gas exports.” (Anthony Cordesman, *Evolving Threats in the Middle East: Their Implications for U.S. Defense Planning*, Testimony to the Middle East and Africa Threat Panel of the House Armed Services Committee, September 28, 2005, p. 2).
conflicts, serious economic and demographic problems. On the other hand, the Middle East is so heavily dependent on the income from energy exports that few — if any — nations will voluntarily limit their export revenues. It has also been argued that, with growing levels of European dependence on gas from the southern periphery, it would not be surprising if NATO (or even the EU) in the 21st century were compelled to plan for operations to restore the flow of gas from unstable regions.

A brief reference should be made to a potentially important energy-related development. The discovery of substantial natural gas deposits in the exclusive economic zones of Israel and Cyprus may provide an additional energy source outside the former Soviet space and the Middle East proper.

Climate Change

In the developing world, even a relatively small climatic shift can trigger or exacerbate food shortages, water scarcity, destructive weather events, the spread of diseases, human migration, and natural resource competition.46 These crises are all the more dangerous because they are interwoven and self-perpetuating.47 It is projected that parts of the Middle East will be affected by climate change in terms of desertification and food production, availability of water resources, and environmentally-induced refugees/migrants.

Table 2: Per Capita Availability of Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990 (m³/per capita/year)</th>
<th>2025 (estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9,940</td>
<td>8,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>109,389</td>
<td>90,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Minimum quantity for an industrial country is 1,000 m³/per capita/year.

46 The World Bank notes that poor nations will bear 75-80 percent of the cost of floods, increased desertification, and other disasters caused by global warming, and it estimates that by 2030, developing countries will need $75 billion annually for adaptation and another $400 billion for low-carbon technology development. The EU estimates that $130 billion a year by 2020 would cost-effectively address climate change (The State of the Future 2010, p. 67).

47 Water shortages can lead to food shortages, which can lead to conflict over remaining resources, which can drive human migration, which can create new food shortages in new regions (John Podesta & Peter Odgen, “The Security Implications of Climate Change,” The Washington Quarterly, 31:1, Winter 2007/08, p. 116).
Cyber-Warfare, Organized Crime, and Maritime Security

As mentioned in a Chatham House report, “Cyber technology can be used to attack the machinery of state, financial institutions, the national energy and transport infrastructure and public morale... Cyber warfare can be a conflict between states, but it could also involve nonstate actors in various ways... Cyberspace gives disproportionate power to small and otherwise relatively insignificant actors.”

Cyber-warfare is an emerging threat, especially for the developed world, but the question is how relevant it is for today’s and tomorrow’s Middle East, with its rather limited dependence on computer networks. The use of the STUXNET computer virus in an effort to delay the Iranian nuclear program is an example of cyber warfare in the region, but it probably is a rather special case. On the other hand, one could envisage the possible use of cyber warfare methods by cyber-terrorists or cyber-criminals against the highly computerized energy infrastructure.

There is little doubt that transnational organized crime (with the drug trade alone estimated at $500-900 billion per year) is a threat of global dimensions and a significant challenge to state authority as well as global governance. The question is whether it is a major regional issue in the case of the Middle East or whether it might evolve in that direction during the next decade.

The hawala system has been used both for money laundering and for financing terrorist activities and has been a source of concern for the region, in addition to drugs and human trafficking.

Although it can be argued that piracy in the Southern Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is, for the time being, more a nuisance than a real threat for maritime commerce, there is increasing concern about maritime security, especially among EU countries. According to a recent report, “Maritime security in the Mediterranean concerns over 500 million people, 150 million of whom live on the coast, and is a key factor for...
economic development, environmental protection, sustainability of natural resources and quality of life.” Specific concerns include migration flows and cross-border crime.

**Fragile and Failed States**

The emergence of fragile, unstable, dysfunctional, or failed states can have important destabilizing consequences not only beyond their borders but also in adjacent regions. In some cases, such states may constitute “black holes” for the whole international system (for example, Afghanistan in the Taliban/Al-Qaeda era). There are a number of states in sub-Saharan Africa that may be classified in the above categories. In some cases, they may constitute safe havens for a wide variety of criminal activities, with only local or limited regional impact. In other cases, such as Somalia, the impact is much wider. One state in the Middle East that could, theoretically, become dysfunctional is Yemen, with its population explosion, resource shortages, crumbling infrastructure, and sectarian violence. Another case might be Gaza. Of course, there are many things that neighboring countries and the international community can do to prevent such a development.

**Globalization**

“Globalization is truly the megatrend of our times” and its impact is being increasingly — although unequally — felt in a region which, with few exceptions, has not benefited greatly from this trend. Thomas Barnett uses the terms Core (connected) and Gap (disconnected) and emphasizes the importance of globalization for the Middle East: “That enemy is neither a religion (Islam) nor a place (Middle East), but a condition — disconnectedness. To be disconnected in this world is to be kept isolated, deprived, repressed, and uneducated...The real asymmetrical challenge will come from globalization’s disenfranchised.” As globalization also affects the flow of information, the role of new information technologies and media (Facebook, Twitter, mobile phones, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya) in the Arab Spring should also be mentioned.

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53 Under the prevailing “business as usual” scenario of the MEDPRO project, the South Mediterranean would account for a mere 3 percent of global GDP in 2030 (up from 2 percent in 2010, with 90 percent of the wealth originating from Turkey and Israel). Rym Ayadi & Carlo Sessa, *What scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 in the wake of the post-Arab spring?*, MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 2/October 2011.


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49 Maritime security in the Mediterranean: Challenges and policy responses; SDA Discussion paper, June 2011, p. 11.

50 Jeffrey Mazo, *Climate Conflict*, pp. 87-118.


There are some events of low to very low probability but of very high potential impact. Were they to take place, they would not only transform the whole region but their consequences would affect most of the globe. Examples include a pandemic, the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict between Israel and Iran, a incident of catastrophic terrorism (if the target was Israel, this might lead to retaliation with the use of nuclear weapons), a major natural disaster with region-wide consequences, the violent overthrow of the regime in a key country by a radical faction that would then take power, or a major discovery in the field of energy (for example, a noncarbon-based form of energy), which would cause a significant decline of the region’s value as an energy supplier. One could even envisage attacks with the use of nanotechnologies to “pollute” energy deposits.

### The Road to 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Certainties</th>
<th>Uncertainties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Population increase</td>
<td>• Degree of instability in many countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Population movements towards Europe</td>
<td>• Conflict resolution: Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kurdish issue, Iraq, Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political change and social unrest in many countries in the region, as a result of empowered populations</td>
<td>• Level of economic development and integration to the global economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No military threat to the West</td>
<td>• Progress in democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continued reliance of global economy on hydrocarbons and consequently continued importance of Middle East as energy supplier but relative shift of supply towards Asia</td>
<td>• Smooth succession processes in Saudi Arabia and Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reduced influence of United States and EU</td>
<td>• Role of political Islam and further rise of anti-Western feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased presence and influence of China (+India?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Jihadist terrorism no longer a major threat (unless Arab Spring is crushed by regimes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Richard Haass referred to the risk of frustration and regression (Richard Haass, “The Arab Spring has given way to a long hot summer,” Financial Times, July 6, 2011).
### Three Scenarios for Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Drivers</th>
<th>Hell</th>
<th>Earth</th>
<th>Heaven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic developments and foreign policies of key regional states: Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran</strong></td>
<td>• Violent regime change and/or radical transformation of all or most key countries</td>
<td>• The transition process is turbulent, but no more than one key country becomes highly problematic</td>
<td>• Smooth processes of political reform, democracy spreads in the region, foreign policy of key countries not anti-Western</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional conflicts: 1) Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict; 2) the Iranian “problem” and security in the Gulf region; 3) the Kurdish issue and resulting problems of stability in Iraq and Turkey; 4) new conflicts</strong></td>
<td>• Severe deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations;</td>
<td>• Continuation of the status quo in Palestine;</td>
<td>• Viable resolution of the Palestinian problem;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low level or even interstate conflict in the Gulf region; Iraq breaks down;</td>
<td>• High tension in the Gulf region;</td>
<td>• Détente and creation of regional security architecture in the Gulf;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Turkey becomes militarily involved to prevent the creation of a larger Kurdish state;</td>
<td>• The prospect of a violent breakdown of Iraq remains quite real;</td>
<td>• Iraq remains united and the Kurds have autonomy in countries of residence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Wars as a result of water shortages, climate change, etc.</td>
<td>• Kurdish insurgency continues;</td>
<td>• No new types of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard security threats: 1) WMD proliferation; 2) conventional arms race; and 3) terrorism</strong></td>
<td>• Iranian nuclearization;</td>
<td>• Creeping nuclearization and Israeli preventive attack; Iran responds asymmetrically;</td>
<td>• Peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nuclear domino in the region;</td>
<td>• High defense expenditures add to regional tension;</td>
<td>• Iran is included in a regional security architecture;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Qualitative and quantitative arms race with destabilizing consequences;</td>
<td>• Jihadist terrorism a manageable threat</td>
<td>• Lower defense expenditures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revival of Jihadist terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Jihadist ideologies lose their influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 A number of interesting scenarios are presented by Rym Ayadi & Carlo Sessa:

1. Intergovernmentalization of Euro-Med relations
2. Sustainable development of an enlarged EU-Med Union (common market and frameworks of action)
3. The Euro-Mediterranean area under threats (weakening and failure of cooperation schemes)
**Changing role and influence of extra-regional actors: United States, EU, Russia, China, India, GCC,* and NATO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Drivers</th>
<th>Hell</th>
<th>Earth</th>
<th>Heaven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU remains absorbed in its own domestic problems and becomes increasingly irrelevant in the regional (and global) context;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU: Business as usual (i.e. limited influence);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States becomes entangled in war against Iran and loses more of its influence in the region;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States retains much of its influence but its image remains negative because of tense relations with Iran and its failure to help resolve the Palestinian problem;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China increases its military presence in the Gulf and adopts unilateral approach;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gradual and cautious increase of Chinese presence and influence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia and India act unilaterally to increase their influence and perceive the West as competitor;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited role for Russia and India; occasional cooperation with other powers but relationship generally remains competitive;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a strong external actor; Zero sum-game approach by all actors; Competition for spheres of influence;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited role for NATO and GCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations like NATO and GCC become increasingly irrelevant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The GCC recently invited Jordan and Morocco to join the Council. Also, according to the IISS, the GCC may be reaching out to new security partners in Asia (IISS, Strategic Survey 2011, p. 58).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Drivers</th>
<th>Hell</th>
<th>Earth</th>
<th>Heaven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft security drivers:</td>
<td>- Organized crime, cyber-warfare, maritime security evolve well beyond the state of nuisance;</td>
<td>- Organized crime, cyber-warfare, maritime security remain issues of concern;</td>
<td>- Organized crime, cyber-warfare, maritime security are dealt with by authorities and through international cooperation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• organized crime, cyber-warfare, maritime security;</td>
<td>- Major population movements cause serious problems;</td>
<td>- Population movements remain issue of serious concern for the EU;</td>
<td>- Agreement between North &amp; South on migrant workers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• demographic trends and population movements</td>
<td>- Severe shortages of water;</td>
<td>- Uncertainty and concern about natural resources (oil, water);</td>
<td>- Smooth supply of hydrocarbons;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• impact of climate change on already fragile ecosystems</td>
<td>- The Middle East is no longer a reliable source of hydrocarbons;</td>
<td>- No more than one failed/dysfunctional state;</td>
<td>- Efficient management of water resources;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• natural resources</td>
<td>- Severe consequences of climate change;</td>
<td>- Globalization remains relatively more harmful than beneficial for the region</td>
<td>- Mitigation and adaptation efforts regarding climate change are successful;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• failed/dysfunctional states</td>
<td>- Several failed/dysfunctional states appear;</td>
<td></td>
<td>- No failed/dysfunctional states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pace and impact of globalization</td>
<td>- Number of “disconnected” grows</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Number of “disconnected” shrinks-globalization beneficial for most of the region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Judging from the region’s history — turbulent and full of major events — it is far more likely that the evolution of the regional security environment will be nonlinear. Furthermore, this is a multi-variable equation, and most variables are interdependent, which makes a foresight exercise even more difficult. With full awareness of the difficulties, three archetypical, rather simplified scenarios were outlined in order to make a contribution in previous efforts (extremely limited, indeed, as the great majority of foresight exercises are focusing on the international system rather than specific regions) to understand the Middle East’s potential evolution. Reality is, of course, much more complex, as threats interact with each other, and there are innumerable variations and combinations of those three “ideal” scenarios and combinations of the trends and drivers. It is even possible that the future of the region will be radically different from any of those scenarios.

Inevitably, any foresight exercise leads to a number of policy-oriented questions. In this case, the pertinent questions include the following: What are the transatlantic policy implications? What could the United States, the EU, NATO, and the international community do to prevent negative developments and increase the prospects for the realization of more optimistic scenarios? And what should be the division of labor among those actors? Furthermore, how can one convince the local stakeholders to actively become involved in such cooperative/joint efforts?

Although it would be practically impossible to put forward recommendations for such a wide range of issues and future challenges, there are some obvious conclusions and suggestions:

- Transatlantic actors need to urgently revise their strategies in view of the Arab revolts and the other changes in the region’s fundamental dynamics described in this paper. Formulating effective responses to new challenges will be even more difficult because of the financial and political crises plaguing — in different ways and degrees — Europe and the United States;

- Security, demographic, political, and socio-economic developments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East will put an increasing strain on Southern European states (which are front-line states whether the Mediterranean is considered a faultline, a bridge, or a barrier). The logical conclusion is that this is by far the most important neighboring region for the EU and it must become the top priority for the Union’s foreign policy;

- Resolution of the Palestinian problem is a necessary — but not sufficient — condition for a substantive improvement of the region’s security situation;

- The West should overcome prejudices about engaging with Islamist political forces, as these will play an important role in many countries in the region. Open channels of communication should be maintained with all political forces in the region;

- Increased influence for emerging powers looks almost unavoidable, at least in the Gulf region. But is should be made clear to them that this also means greater responsibilities. In this context, the creation of a regional security forum with the participation of all regional and extra-regional actors should be a priority;

- If not addressed as early as possible, climate change could cause considerable deterioration in the regional (and the global) security environment; and

- In the context of the Gulf crisis, the international community’s negotiating strategy should consist of a skilful synthesis of readiness.

Conclusion
to accommodate Iran’s legitimate concerns and integrate that important country into an inclusive regional security system, accompanied by concrete incentives, together with a clear understanding of the possible consequences for Téhran if it continues its spoiling actions in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East.

The final and probably most accurate prediction of this study is that the Middle East will not become a predictable and boring place anytime soon.