{"id":57190,"date":"2026-07-14T19:11:34","date_gmt":"2026-07-14T16:11:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/?p=57190"},"modified":"2026-07-14T19:11:58","modified_gmt":"2026-07-14T16:11:58","slug":"epirroi-choris-ischy-epanaprosdiorizontas-tis-ellinoafrikanikes-scheseis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/influence-without-power-rethinking-greek-african-relations\/","title":{"rendered":"Influence without Power: Rethinking Greek-African relations"},"content":{"rendered":"

This policy brief argues that Greece should rethink its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through selective partnerships, education, religion, diaspora networks and civil society. Instead of competing financially with larger powers, Greece can generate long-term influence by concentrating resources where it has comparative advantages. A policy aligned with EU priorities that will focus on practical, low-cost initiatives can produce significant diplomatic dividends.<\/p>\n

Read here<\/a> in pdf the Policy brief by Asterios Huliaras<\/strong>, Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of the Peloponnese and member of ELIAMEP\u2019s Advisory Committee.<\/p>\n

\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

Africa[1]<\/a> is emerging as one of the most strategically important regions of the twenty-first century. Despite armed conflicts, democratic backsliding, debt crises, and persistent poverty, the continent is characterized by rapid demographic growth, increasing urbanization, expanding markets, and rising geopolitical significance. Global actors such as China, Russia, Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Brazil have significantly expanded their political and economic engagement with African countries. Greece, by contrast, has traditionally maintained weak and fragmented relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. However, recent European developments, particularly the European Union\u2019s Global Gateway strategy and the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA), create an opportunity for a strategic rethinking of Greek policy.<\/p>\n

The challenge for Greece is not whether it should engage with Africa, but how it can do so with limited diplomatic, financial, and administrative resources. Rather than attempting to imitate larger powers, Greece should adopt a selective strategy emphasizing concentrated partnerships, network diplomacy, educational links, and societal actors.<\/p>\n

The Policy Challenge<\/h2>\n

The starting point of Greek engagement with Africa is structurally weak. Although geographically close to the continent, Greece maintains only eight embassies across forty-nine countries of Sub-Saharan Africa serving a population of approximately 1.2 billion people (in comparison, Turkey maintains thirty-two embassies in the region). Furthermore, only the Greek embassy in South Africa has a commercial attach\u00e9, while official high-level political visits have been extremely rare (an exception was Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias official visits to several Sub-Saharan African countries, looking mainly for support for Greece\u2019s candidature for the UN Security Council). No Greek Prime Minister has visited a Sub-Saharan African country during the last three decades. Greek exports to Africa represent only approximately 0.3 percent of total exports, while investment remains minimal.<\/p>\n

The weakness of institutional engagement contrasts sharply with the continent’s growing significance. Africa currently hosts some of the fastest-growing economies in the world and the African Continental Free Trade Area aims to create a market of approximately 1.5 billion consumers. In addition, under the European Union\u2019s Global Gateway initiative, \u20ac150 billion out of the overall \u20ac300 billion package are directed toward Africa.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Greece possesses assets that remain largely underutilized.<\/p>\n

Existing Greek Assets and Untapped Opportunities<\/h2>\n

The Orthodox Church represents one of Greece\u2019s most important but often neglected channels of influence in Africa. The Patriarchate of Alexandria maintains bishoprics in twelve African countries with an estimated flock of approximately 1.2 million faithful. Historically, religious diplomacy has often operated as an informal channel for strengthening relations and promoting social initiatives in education, health, and community development.<\/p>\n

The Church could therefore function as an instrument of soft power by supporting educational programmes, scholarships, local partnerships, and social services. For example, cooperation between Greek universities and schools connected to the Patriarchate of Alexandria could create educational networks extending from Egypt and Kenya to countries of Central and Southern Africa. Such initiatives would be relatively inexpensive while generating long-term influence. However, the Russian Orthodox Church has increasingly attempted to expand its presence in Africa, potentially weakening the historical position of the Patriarchate of Alexandria (numerous African Greek Orthodox priests have joined the Russian Church in recent years). Consequently, supporting the activities of the Patriarchate also acquires broader geopolitical significance, especially in the current context.<\/p>\n

Diaspora communities constitute another important but largely underexploited resource. Although the Greek diaspora in Africa has declined dramatically\u2014from approximately 150,000 individuals in 1960s to only a few tens of thousands today\u2014it still provides networks and contacts across various sectors. At the same time, the African diaspora in Greece, including entrepreneurs, artists, athletes, and community organizations, has become more influential and can function as an important bridge.<\/p>\n

Civil society organizations have already demonstrated the potential of such engagement. Organizations including the Greek-African Chamber of Commerce, several consultancies, but also NGOs like Doctors Without Borders\u2013Greece, Lalibella, YouthmakersHub, and ELIX already undertake projects across African countries, often financed through European and private resources. University initiatives such as the AfriquEurope programme of the University of the Peloponnese illustrate that society has often moved ahead of the state and ELIAMEP\u2019s agreement with Pretoria University.<\/p>\n

Policy Recommendations<\/h2>\n

Given its limited resources, Greece should avoid a continent-wide strategy and instead focus on one or two strategic partner countries that can function as anchor states. Kenya, for example, combines strong economic growth, regional influence, and importance in logistics and maritime activities. Ethiopia represents another possible case because of historical links and religious connections. Concentrating resources would allow Greece to build expertise and create visibility at manageable cost.<\/p>\n

Second, Greece should strengthen educational and digital partnerships. Universities could expand English-language and French-language programmes specifically targeting African students. Visa procedures should also be simplified. It is inefficient for prospective African students to wait five or six months for visa appointments.<\/p>\n

Third, Greece should establish a national volunteer programme inspired by international examples such as the Peace Corps in the US or similar programmes in Europe. Young Greeks could participate in educational, environmental, or healthcare projects in African countries. Such a programme could seek financial support from the Greek Public Employment Service (DYPA) and the EU, create networks and simultaneously improve Greece’s currently limited development profile.<\/p>\n

Moreover, Greece should create a digital platform on Greek\u2013African relations that could serve as an innovative mechanism for strengthening coordination, visibility, and interaction among the multiple actors involved in the relationship. The platform could function as a shared digital ecosystem bringing together public institutions, private enterprises, civil society organizations, academic institutions, diaspora networks, and cultural actors from Greece and African countries. It could include databases of ongoing initiatives and partnerships, funding opportunities, business and educational collaborations, cultural exchanges, and development projects, while also providing interactive tools such as discussion forums, thematic working groups, and networking spaces. Beyond its informational role, such a platform could facilitate dialogue and the co-production of ideas, reduce fragmentation among existing initiatives, and create synergies between actors who currently operate in isolation. In this way, it could strengthen relational ties and transform dispersed activities into a more coherent framework of engagement, enhancing Greece\u2019s visibility and influence through networking, participation, and sustained interaction rather than through traditional forms of state power.<\/p>\n

Finally, Greece should adopt a broader understanding of migration and mobility by creating more legal pathways for seasonal workers in agriculture, construction, and care services. Bilateral agreements with countries such as Ethiopia could address labour shortages while strengthening long-term partnerships.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

Greece cannot compete with larger powers in Africa through financial resources or extensive diplomatic infrastructures. However, it can develop influence through networks, education, religion, and societal links. Rather than perceiving Africa as a distant periphery, Greece should view the continent as an emerging strategic space where modest but carefully designed interventions can generate substantial diplomatic dividends.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> In this paper, the term \u201cAfrica\u201d refers specifically to Sub-Saharan Africa, unless otherwise indicated. North Africa is treated separately due to its distinct historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural dynamics.<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This policy brief argues that Greece should rethink its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through selective partnerships, education, religion, diaspora networks and civil society. Instead of competing financially with larger powers, Greece can generate long-term influence by concentrating resources where it has comparative advantages. A policy aligned with EU priorities that will focus on practical, low-cost […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":57198,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[102,492],"tags":[],"program":[20],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57190"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=57190"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57190\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":57215,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57190\/revisions\/57215"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/57198"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=57190"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=57190"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=57190"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=57190"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}