{"id":53158,"date":"2025-11-05T15:18:54","date_gmt":"2025-11-05T12:18:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/?p=53158"},"modified":"2025-11-05T15:28:08","modified_gmt":"2025-11-05T12:28:08","slug":"o-lavyrinthos-tis-venezouelas-mia-alli-anagnosi-tis-krisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/the-venezuelan-labyrinth-a-crisis-reframed\/","title":{"rendered":"The Venezuelan labyrinth: A crisis reframed"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"the-content\"><p><\/p>\n<div role=\"presentation\" data-olk-copy-source=\"MessageBody\">\n<ul>\n<li>Venezuela\u2019s crisis has long been narrated through an opposition prism: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>A draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under\u2011secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo\u2011Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>For the architects of Washington\u2019s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Washington\u2019s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby\u2019s \u201chomeland first, hemisphere next\u201d doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Latin America\u2019s response reflects both caution and fatigue. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The regime\u2019s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after Mar\u00eda\u202fCorina\u202fMachado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself: 1) Ruling\u2011party managed transition; 2) Negotiated exit; 3) Forced removal; 4) Regime endurance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Venezuela\u2019s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington\u2019s \u201cAmerica first\u201d doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<p>Read <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Policy-brief-195-Eduardo-Massieu-Paredes-final.pdf\">here<\/a> in pdf the Policy brief by <strong>Eduardo Massieu Paredes, <\/strong>Executive-in-residence Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>VENEZUELA\u2019S CRISIS HAS LONG BEEN NARRATED THROUGH AN OPPOSITION PRISM: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but <strong>what the United States is prepared to do<\/strong>, and why. The United States deployed a naval buildup that includes more than 10 ships, including amphibious assault ships, a nuclear\u2011powered submarine, a special operations ship and an aircraft carrier, unprecedented to the Caribbean. For all that, the Venezuelan portfolio does not solely sit in the Pentagon or the State Department: Stephen Miller, the president\u2019s homeland security adviser, has also taken a leading role in deciding which vessels to target. U.S. forces have so far destroyed sixteen suspected drug\u2011smuggling boats in international waters. This intervention could underscore a new viewpoint: is this campaign choreographed for a U.S. audience? Furthermore, how far are they willing to go?<\/p>\n<h2>A Don-Roe Doctrine?<\/h2>\n<p>Two forces shape the Caribbean stand\u2011off. First is a policy shift. President Donald Trump returned to office on an agenda that places national security, economic strength and sovereignty ahead of traditional diplomacy. Marco Rubio, the new secretary of state and the first Hispanic to hold the job, has been tasked with turning that creed into policy. The State Department\u2019s first hundred\u2011day report notes that foreign\u2011aid programs were cut and visa rules tightened to ensure U.S. dollars serve \u201cAmerica First\u201d priorities. It also touts persuading Panama and other Central American countries to reduce cooperation with China\u2019s Belt and Road infrastructure plans. The message is clear: the Western Hemisphere is once again Washington\u2019s sphere of influence.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo<\/em><em>\u2011<\/em><em>Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Second, a draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under\u2011secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo\u2011Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America. In this view, Venezuela is not simply a faltering dictatorship but a potential beachhead for Iranian or Russian influence; deterrence must be visible and follow in line with this administration\u2019s motto of \u2018peace through strength\u2019.<\/p>\n<h2>Always Victory at Home<strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>For the architects of Washington\u2019s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. The White House homeland\u2011security adviser, Stephen Miller, chairs a reworked council that picks targets and sometimes sidelines the State Department. He has reportedly described the government in Caracas as a cartel\u2014language calibrated for a domestic audience that wants to see criminals punished. War Secretary Pete Hegseth told marines aboard the USS Iwo Jima that their deployment is not a drill but a real\u2011world mission to \u201cend the poisoning of Americans,\u201d casting it as a crusade that keeps citizens safe. The presence of these two figures, alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscores how closely the \u2018MAGA\u2019 operation aligns with familiar Republican hawkishness: tough on security, unilateral when necessary, and keenly aware of how it plays in the electoral map.<\/p>\n<p>Mr Rubio\u2019s involvement also reflects personal and political ties. As Florida\u2019s former senator he cultivated deep relationships with Venezuela\u2019s opposition; he once called Mar\u00eda Corina Machado, the most recent Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the \u201cIron Lady\u201d of her country and published an op\u2011ed praising her courage. He knows that Venezuelan\u2011American and Cuban\u2011American voters are pivotal in his home state, and he is not alone in seeing the Caribbean as fertile ground for political capital. For all three men, pressing a regime they see on the ropes may look like a low\u2011hanging fruit: a way to showcase toughness, score points with a conservative base and, perhaps, advance their own ambitions.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In this view, Caracas is both a proxy and an opportunity: neutralise a hostile regime, demonstrate that Washington will police its neighbourhood and send a message to US\u2019 voters that the administration is protecting the homeland. The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.<\/p>\n<h2>What can Europe learn from the Caribbean<strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n<blockquote><p><em>Washington\u2019s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Washington\u2019s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby\u2019s \u201chomeland first, hemisphere next\u201d doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas. In practical terms, that would mean fewer ships and aircraft watching the South China Sea or the Baltic Sea, and more watching the Caribbean and the southern border. For instance, the U.S. Navy\u2019s most powerful aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, and its strike group departed from Croatia and are heading to the Caribbean for a new deployment. Latin America becomes the arena where America wants to prove it can still dominate without alliances, while Europe and Asia get pushed down the priority list.<\/p>\n<p>This administration also seems to be resuscitating the Reagan-Bush discourse of the \u201cwar on drugs\u201d. Four lethal U.S. strikes against drug boats in the Caribbean are being justified as part of a \u201cnon\u2011international armed conflict\u201d with terrorist cartels. In other words, this administration sees little threats in a geopolitical context of democracy vs. autocracy as well as no need to consult international allies or Congress. Domestic optics\u2014especially playing to voters who want a hard line on drugs and immigration\u2014seem to matter more than European approval or Asian deterrence. The Venezuelan case suggests that, for the foreseeable future, U.S. security decisions may be shaped less by global consensus and more by domestic calculations with a Monroe\u2011style sphere of influence twist.<strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<h2>Reaction from the Neighbourhood<\/h2>\n<p>Latin America\u2019s response reflects both caution and fatigue. Brazil\u2019s President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva described the U.S. naval buildup as a source of tension and warned it could threaten regional peace. He noted that Washington\u2019s drug\u2011trafficking accusations lacked evidence and that the lethal strike on a boat was likely illegal. The comment signals the delicate position of governments that distrust Mr Maduro but also remember past US interventions contemptuously. In Mexico City, Mr Rubio faced questions about sovereignty even as he promised deeper cooperation with President Claudia Sheinbaum. Mexico and Brazil may oppose an \u2018invasion\u2019 but are unlikely to expend political capital defending Caracas. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>As Venezuela\u2019s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>As Venezuela\u2019s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover. This pushes Brazil to continue favoring a negotiated scenario, yet Brazil\u2019s influence has proven limited in the past. The opposition pointed to how it could not secure safe passage for dissidents under its protection in Caracas, and how little diplomatic pressure any international actor can put on Maduro. Brazil will continue to signal to the US against any form of intervention, will quietly promote talks, and essentially seek stability on its border regardless of the fate of Mr. Maduro.<\/p>\n<h2>Legitimacy at a Nadir<\/h2>\n<p>All this is happening while Mr Maduro\u2019s own standing is at its lowest. International observers and independent tallies agree that opposition candidate Edmundo Gonz\u00e1lez Urrutia won the 2024 presidential vote, only for the regime to rewrite the results. Even some of Mr Maduro\u2019s traditional allies in the region\u2014like Brazil and Colombia\u2014acknowledged doubts about the election\u2019s legitimacy and declined to recognise his new mandate. The regime\u2019s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.<\/p>\n<p>Yet that loyalty is brittle. Years of purges and politicisation have left the armed forces fractured. This fragmentation has done two things at once: it has prevented a coup\u2014no faction is strong enough to depose Mr Maduro\u2014yet it also means that if he falls, no coherent military bloc is likely to topple his successor.<\/p>\n<p>As U.S. warships drew closer in September, he ordered the Bolivarian National Militia\u2014a civilian force attached to the armed forces\u2014 instead of the Army to prepare to \u201cdefend the homeland.\u201d In other words, the state\u2019s coercive power rests as much on politicised volunteers as on the regular army\u2014a sign of weakness rather than strength.<\/p>\n<p>Years of dictatorship have also depoliticised society. Under the weight of hyperinflation and collapsing services, many Venezuelans have turned away from ideological debate; politics is secondary to hunger and survival. This makes Mr Maduro\u2019s appeals to defend the homeland against imperialism ring hollow for large swathes of the population. A militarised mobilisation might energise loyalists who benefit from the status quo, but it does not convince those who are simply trying to feed their families. The contrast is stark: on one side, an ageing elite clinging to power; on the other, a society more concerned with the price of food than with slogans about sovereignty.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after Mar\u00eda<\/em><em>\u202f<\/em><em>Corina<\/em><em>\u202f<\/em><em>Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after Mar\u00eda\u202fCorina\u202fMachado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. It is a powerful endorsement at home and abroad, yet the opposition has not been able to translate its moral authority into decisive action. With prominent leaders jailed, exiled or underground, Machado is the only widely recognised voice, operating from the shadows yet carrying a broad popular mandate. Her ally Edmundo\u202fGonz\u00e1lez, widely regarded as the true winner of the 2024 election, speaks from abroad; together they embody a legitimacy that the regime lacks, though they cannot convert it into power while the armed forces remain fragmented and society is exhausted by poverty and persecution. That credibility matters in a post\u2011Maduro scenario: there is a leader to hand the reins to, even if the day\u2011to\u2011day structures of the state are in disarray. But the longer the standoff drags on, the more the opposition risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. The stalemate endures partly because everyone is too weak to break it.<\/p>\n<h2>Scenarios Beyond the Headlines<\/h2>\n<p>In Washington, the priority is a win that plays at home. The administration shows little interest in adjudicating who governs in Caracas; all signals suggest Mr. Trump\u2019s instinct is to avoid classic \u201cregime change\u201d so much so that the President failed to mention Maduro or Machado by name when he talked about his phone call with the Nobel Peace Prize winner. Is this enough to hypothesize that the US administration could land on a middle course, declare victory over \u201cthe cartels\u201d for a domestic audience while steering clear of Venezuela\u2019s internal power struggle. Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>Ruling<\/strong><strong>\u2011<\/strong><strong>party managed transition<\/strong>: The president may be replaced by senior figures within the ruling socialist party (for example Vice President Delcy Rodr\u00edguez). This would keep the regime\u2019s structures intact but remove its most toxic symbol. International actors might accept this as progress; the democratic opposition would reject this option and would look to access power through a rebellion.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Negotiated exit<\/strong>: Mr. Maduro, under intense international pressure and perhaps fearing arrest or death, could bargain for safe passage abroad, trading his exit for guarantees on his life and property. Such a deal would leave a power vacuum and require a caretaker government with some form of support from the military until fresh elections, which would likely be won by Mrs. Machado.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Forced removal<\/strong> \u2013 An internal coup, mass uprising or foreign\u2011backed intervention could topple Mr Maduro. A new leadership, most likely stemming from the current opposition or unexpected military leaders would need rapid international support to prevent chaos and respond to the collapse of public services. Without a plan, local militias could fracture into insurgent groups with a very weak government on the ground.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Regime endurance<\/strong> \u2013 Mr. Maduro could survive the pressure as he did before, thanks to repression, inertia and a paralyzed opposition. The government would become more repressive and insular; hopes for a negotiated transition would fade, and the world would look away.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>Will Optics Trump Outcomes?<strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n<blockquote><p><em>If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Venezuela\u2019s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington\u2019s \u201cAmerica first\u201d doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades. To some in this administration, reviving Monroe\u2011era language, sinking a few boats, slap the label of \u201cnarco\u2011terrorism\u201d on an adversary, and declaring a mission accomplished to voters in Florida will be a win. To others, victory is only possible if the US collects Maduro\u2019s bounty, but there we will be entering into unknown territory, territory which could make President Trump uncomfortable. In addition, the backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Venezuela\u2019s crisis has long been narrated through an opposition prism: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why. A draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":53165,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[102,492],"tags":[],"program":[20],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53158"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=53158"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53158\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":53212,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53158\/revisions\/53212"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/53165"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=53158"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=53158"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=53158"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=53158"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}