{"id":50200,"date":"2025-05-19T15:22:20","date_gmt":"2025-05-19T12:22:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/?p=50200"},"modified":"2025-05-19T15:22:20","modified_gmt":"2025-05-19T12:22:20","slug":"i-evropaiki-antimetopisi-tis-metanasteftikis-krisis-mia-axiologisi-ton-symfonion-me-trites-chores","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/rethinking-solutions-the-role-of-third-country-agreements-in-europes-migration-crisis\/","title":{"rendered":"Rethinking Solutions: The Role of Third-Country Agreements in Europe\u2019s Migration Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"

In an effort to avoid a repeat of the 2015 migration crisis, European states are increasingly turning to third-country agreements, exemplified by the recent deal with Tunisia. This paper explores two central questions: How effective are third-country agreements in addressing the complex and persistent challenges of European migration, and why do European leaders continue to favor this policy approach? The paper argues that Europe\u2019s ongoing migration dilemmas stem from the inherently “wicked” nature of the crisis\u2014one that defies simple solutions and requires policies that move beyond short-term deterrence logic. It assesses the policy\u2019s effectiveness in deterring irregular migration, its role in enabling migration weaponization, and its potential to generate hypocrisy costs. It posits that third-country agreements serve immediate political interests by offering the appearance of control and responsiveness. Ultimately, the success of such agreements depends on the analytical lens\u2014while they may appear effective in the short term, they risk entrenching long-term failures, thereby reinforcing the intractability of the crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

Read here<\/a> the Working paper by Zoe Raptis<\/strong>,Tufts University.<\/p>\n

\n

\u0399ntroduction<\/h2>\n

Europe\u2019s shortcomings in managing migration have been evident since the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis. Since then, the salience of migration for Europe has not abated, especially as illustrated by the recent 2024 European elections. The European struggle with migration, I argue, persists because of the inherently wicked character of the migration crisis, as illustrated by issues of border security and migration weaponization. Beyond illustrating the wicked character of the dynamic interplay of the aforementioned issues, the European case is particularly salient when evaluating a policy used as a common mitigating \u201csolution\u201d to the migration crisis: third-country agreements. These agreements come in different forms, but all agreements are a policy of externalization, which seeks to alleviate the wicked problem of border security by limiting the influx of refugees and asylum seekers through deterrence. I will conduct an evaluative policy analysis of these third-country agreements to answer two questions: First, how effective is the policy of third-country agreements in addressing the wickedness of the European migration crisis? Second, why is this policy so popular among European leaders?\u00a0<\/u><\/p>\n

Regarding the first question, I will evaluate the effectiveness of third-country agreements based on two criteria: Firstly, whether these agreements successfully achieve their primary aim of deterrence, and secondly, whether they adequately address the European migration crisis in the long run. I hypothesize that the policy of third-country agreements is ineffective on both grounds. These agreements, at best, deter refugees and asylum seekers aiming to enter European states only in the short run. Europe\u2019s deterrence-based approach to migration does not deal with its root causes, and even if some deterrence is produced, the costs incurred outweigh any positive effects of deterring migrants. Thus, the short run-long run paradox is at play, as the policy may lead to the short run benefit of reducing the number of irregular migrants, but this has exacerbated the possibility of long run failures. The most significant drawback of this policy is the weaponization of migration. That is, third-country partnerships grant the third countries disproportionate amounts of power, which can be used to weaponize migration. By mitigating border security issues, these agreements propel another wicked problem in the weaponization of migration. Lastly, these partnerships are ineffective due to hypocrisy costs for domestic and international actors. These agreements often violate human rights, contradicting the liberal ideals many European states promote. However, hypocrisy costs are the least significant drawback, as other states rarely impose them. For hypocrisy costs to significantly impact states, they must be imposed frequently, but they are primarily enforced by human rights organizations, which wield comparatively less influence than states. States seldom hold European states accountable for hypocrisy since they themselves are often guilty of similar policies. The absence of condemnation is also due to strong anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, so domestic and regional actors are not concerned with states acting hypocritically if it means keeping migrants out.<\/p>\n

For the second research question, I will employ a short run rather than a long run framework to display why the policy of third-country agreements is so popular among European leaders. I propose that European leaders are not ignorant that these agreements are only short-term solutions; in fact, this is part of the appeal of such a policy. These partnerships improve the optics of the proactiveness of states in dealing with migration challenges, accomplishing a sufficient temporary reduction in migration numbers. While they serve only as a temporary fix, states are willing to bear the costs of such measures, considering that the alternative\u2014structural reform\u2014poses a formidable obstacle, as such an approach would conflict with the short-term political motivations of leaders. Thus, leaders respond to a crisis-by-crisis approach instead of considering long-term solutions, which I posit produces an inability to address the wicked problems at play.<\/p>\n

The European migration crisis embodying wicked problems<\/h2>\n

The framework of wicked problems was formulated by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber by categorizing certain policy planning problems as \u201cinherently wicked,\u201d embodying ten characteristics.[1]<\/sup><\/a>A wicked policy problem defies straightforward solutions due to its interconnectedness with other problems and a multiplicity of stakeholders with conflicting interests and values. The European migration crisis is interwoven by many wicked problems, such as border security, weaponization of migration, and poverty, thereby making the crisis wicked. The European migration crisis embodies many of the ten characteristics defining wicked problems. There are multiple conflicting values, as seen by the disagreement within the EU on migration. The crisis is difficult to define, as it mutates and changes over time, as seen by the difference now in 2024 with Ukrainian refugees compared to 2015 with Syrian refugees. There is no single root cause of the crisis\u2019s complexity as it is interconnected with many other problems, such as poverty in origin countries, wars, and environmental degradation. The European migration crisis, in short, is more than a security problem. It is \u201ca humanitarian crisis based in the suffering of individuals who [have] abandoned their homes; a geopolitical conflict ranging across countries and continents; a security threat for both receiving and transit countries; a potentially heavy financial burden on already overtaxed states; and the breakdown of collaboration in the network of EU member states.\u201d[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The wicked character of the European migration crisis points to the difficulty of solving the crisis, as we cannot even neatly define it. The solution to the crisis can never be right or wrong but good or bad. In this paper, I will argue that the policy of third-country partnerships falls into the \u201cbad\u201d category of solutions.[3]<\/sup><\/a> However, this policy can be seen as \u201cgood\u201d from the short-run perspective of political leaders \u2013 which incidentally adds to the wickedness of the problem, as perspective and incentives greatly influence evaluations of third-country agreements.\u00a0 The European migration crisis can never be solved entirely, as so many wicked problems are at play that, due to their nature, can never be fully answered. Even if push factors are weakened, several migrants will always want to enter Europe. Due to my focus on evaluating the policy of third-country agreements, I will focus on the wicked problems of border security and the weaponization of migration.<\/p>\n

Explaining the policy of third-country agreements<\/h2>\n

Third-country agreements come in many different forms, but the overarching framework is that European destination countries use these agreements as an externalization policy to deter irregular migrants by either moving migrants to a safe third country or shifting the responsibility to transit countries to deal with asylum claims. This policy \u201chas shifted beyond the state by both relocating the border outside the state\u2019s territory (externalisation) and delegating border control functions to non-state and third-state actors (outsourcing).\u201d[4]<\/sup><\/a> Through third-country agreements, European states focus on shifting the burden to border states instead of burden-sharing. This policy may often come in the form of a safe third country agreement. This agreement transfers the responsibility of a state to process asylum claims to another state \u2013 a safe third country. A third country is considered safe if it respects the principle of non-refoulement and treats an asylum seeker in accordance with accepted international standards, such as obeying the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol.[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

An example of this policy being considered successful is Spain and Morocco\u2019s transactional migration agreement.[6]<\/sup><\/a> A form of a third-country agreement that many examples I discuss fall into is transactional forced migration. Adamson and Greenhill coined this term and define it as the process surrounding \u201cpolitical deals intended to facilitate and\/or forestall engineered cross-border population movements, wherein the parties to the deal do not include the displaced themselves.\u201d[7]<\/sup><\/a> In the Spain-Morocco example, \u201cMorocco is also cooperating with its neighbour Spain in efforts to stem the flow of illegal migration by sea with the attendant humanitarian concerns.\u201d[8]<\/sup><\/a> Another prominent example is the infamous EU-Turkey deal, where Greece could return new irregular migrants to Turkey in exchange for six billion euros in financial support for Turkey.[9]<\/sup><\/a> One of the most extreme examples of this policy is the UK\u2019s current Rwanda Plan, where \u201canyone entering the UK illegally \u2013 as well as those who have arrived illegally since 1 January 2022 \u2013 may now be relocated to Rwanda\u201d even if they have never set foot in Rwanda, distinguishing it from the EU-Turkey deal.[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Deterrence<\/h2>\n

To evaluate the effectiveness of the third-country agreement policy, I will first examine whether the policy fulfills its main objective \u2013 deterrence. The primary aim of the policy is to deter irregular migrants from entering European states. For example, the goal of the UK\u2019s Rwanda Plan is to \u201cstop the boats\u201d and \u201cdeter dangerous and illegal journeys.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 The policy relies on the belief that people claiming to seek asylum in the UK will be deterred if they believe they will be sent to Rwanda. Similar logic applies to all third-country agreements, as European leaders think the threat of being sent away from a European state will deter irregular migrants from making the journey in the first place. However, this policy rarely provides a stable long-term deterrence effect. Many scholars agree that \u201cthere is limited evidence to suggest that the Rwanda deal will reduce the number of small boats crossing the Channel.\u201d[12]<\/sup><\/a> One of the critical reasons this policy fails to provide deterrence is due to the limited enforcement of these agreements. For example, in 2015, the number of migrants arriving in Greece was approximately 885,386.[13]<\/sup><\/a> The EU-Turkey deal was intended to curb this, but only 2,140 people have been returned from Greece to Turkey after the deal.[14]<\/sup><\/a> This occurrence is not limited to the EU-Turkey deal, as \u201cjust 20 percent of eligible Dublin cases were actually transferred between EU Member States.\u201d[15]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, transfer rates are low, and this is due to practical challenges, but also legal obstacles, as many European states are subject to EU and international law, which prevents them from rejecting asylum seekers.<\/p>\n

Another reason why deterrence fails in the long run is because it underestimates asylum seekers\u2019 persistence and determination to flee from persecution in their home countries. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan state, \u201crefugees remain resourceful despite the plight they are forced to endure, and may exhibit extraordinary resilience in their efforts to find safety and protection.\u201d[16]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 For example, in the hope of finding safety in Europe, at least five people died in icy waters in January 2024 near northern France as they tried to traverse the English Channel to Britain.[17]<\/sup><\/a> Asylum seekers have to decide whether it is best to stay home where they know they will face persecution or risk fleeing to European countries where it is not certain if they will be granted refugee status. If lethal violence is the main push factor, asylum seekers will not be easily deterred.[18]<\/sup><\/a> The latter option is more appealing to asylum seekers, especially since European states have a reputation for not properly enforcing their deterrence measures.\u00a0 If the policy third-country agreements do not effectively secure their main aim, deterrence, then this questions if the policy truly ameliorates the wickedness of the European migration crisis.<\/p>\n

Nonetheless, this policy at times succeeds in yielding the desired deterrence effect, albeit in the short run. Even though I questioned the EU-Turkey deal in achieving deterrence, it is undeniable that the numbers, albeit not significantly, went down when viewing irregular migration flows. The deal is seen as a success in European policy circles as it achieved its aim of deterring people in the short run.[19]<\/sup><\/a> However, third-country agreements as a policy will not provide a sustainable or stable deterrence. The aspect of the EU-Turkey deal that contributed most to a decrease in flows was not safe third-country provisions but rather interceptions of migrant boats in the Aegean by the Turkish Coast Guard.[20]<\/sup><\/a> According to the Turkish interior ministry, more than 79,000 migrants and refugees were intercepted attempting to cross into Greece during the first four months of 2019\u2014dwarfing the number of people returned under the safe third country agreement.[21]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 If deterrence is best achieved through deals that involve interceptions, this is far from a sustainable, long-term solution that appreciates the wickedness of the migration crisis.<\/p>\n

Assuming deterrence is even effective under this policy, its efficacy is undermined if it does not adequately deal with the wicked problems interwoven in the European migration crisis. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan argue that \u201cwhile specific deterrence measures may be successful in stemming a particular migration path in the short term\u2026displacement of migration flows towards alternative routes often significantly, if not completely, undermine the effect over time.\u201d[22]<\/sup><\/a> They cite the EU-Turkey deal as an example showing that while the number of asylum seekers decreased along the Balkan route, the number of refugees and migrants using the Central Mediterranean route via Egypt or Libya dramatically increased during the same period.[23]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, by closing the Greek point of entry the policy did not effectively deter people as they simply found a new route to enter Europe, proving how unsustainable the policy is. Even the Spain-Morocco agreement, which is also viewed as a success, does not come close to dealing with the wickedness of migration. The moment Spain stops complying with Morocco\u2019s demands, the number of asylum seekers will instantly rise at the Spanish border. Already the EU\u2019s deal with Tunisia does not seem to provide a stable deterrent, as MEP Jeroen Lenaers of the European People\u2019s Party, has openly denounced lagging results as \u201carrivals continue to increase\u201d after the conclusion of the deal.[24]<\/sup><\/a> Not to mention the exorbitant costs countries face with this policy. For example, Italy had to pay Libya five billion dollars in 2007 in a negotiation regarding irregular migration.[25]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Currently, as of December 2023, the UK government has spent a total of \u00a3240 million to Rwanda, and more is planned to be sent on a yearly basis.[26]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The policy of third-country agreements by European states wrongly focuses on one criterion: reducing numbers. Viewing the European migration crisis from the one problem-solving perspective of reducing numbers is a gross oversimplification of the complexity of the wicked problems at play. Wicked problems, due to their complex nature, cannot ever be fully solved, but there are better and worse ways to handle them. The wicked problem of border security in the European migration crisis requires policies that move beyond the logic of deterrence. The European migration crisis is a structural, long-term phenomenon that requires policies that transcend short-term objectives. The policy of third-country agreements is a crisis-by-crisis approach rooted in short run deterrence logic, which provides patchy results at best. Irregular migration to Europe will never entirely be stopped, but instead of trying to prevent migrants from coming through these agreements, European states should employ a more long run sustainable policy of addressing the root causes of irregular migration or focusing inwards on its asylum systems instead of outwards. As Moreno-Lax and Pedersen state, \u201cThe short-term European goal of preventing asylum seeker flows thereby risks compromising the stated long-term goal of tackling the root causes of displacement, which is sacrificed in the altar of externalised \u2018integrated border management.\u2019\u201d[27]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Externalization policies are not new, despite each third-country agreement being presented as a new, innovative solution. Third-country agreements have existed for decades, and the European migration crisis still exists and is mutating in different forms, proving this deterrence-based policy did not adequately address the crisis or the wicked problem of border security.<\/p>\n

Weaponization of migration<\/h2>\n

A key aspect of what makes wicked problems so complex is that attempted solutions \u201cafter being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an extended -virtually an unbounded- period of time.\u201d[28]<\/sup><\/a> When evaluating a potential solution, in this case, a policy, I aim to determine if \u201cthe next day’s consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh the intended advantages or the advantages accomplished hitherto.[29]<\/sup><\/a> I posit that the policy of third-country agreements in attempting to tackle the wicked problem of border security in the European migration crisis inadvertently creates another wicked problem: the weaponization of migration. Thus, by focusing on short-term deterrence logic this helps the probability of long- term failures, specifically migration weaponization.<\/p>\n

Greenhill significantly elevated the discourse surrounding the issue of the weaponization of migration, emphasizing its pertinence as a wicked problem. She underscores the compelling incentives for states to \u201ccreate, manipulate, or simply exploit migration crises, at least in part, to influence the behavior of target states.\u201d[30]<\/sup><\/a> Coercive engineered migration is pertinent to understanding the wicked problem of migration weaponization: \u201cCross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated by state or non-state actors in order to induce political, military and\/or economic concessions from a target state or states.\u201d[31]<\/sup><\/a> It is important in the context of the policy of third-country agreements that Greenhill asserts the incentives are particularly compelling for weak states, as they lack the recourse for traditional methods of influence.[32]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, the threat of using migrants as weapons can be more effective than unsuccessfully attempting to extract concessions using military means.[33]<\/sup><\/a> An infamous example of coercive engineered migration was in 2004 when the then leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, threatened the EU to lift remaining sanctions and financially assist Libya in exchange for cooperation on the migration issue.[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

I will now show the connection between the policy of third-country agreements and the wicked problem of weaponization of migration. Third-country agreements as a policy are ineffective in addressing the wickedness of the European migration crisis as they grant the third countries disproportionate amounts of power, which can be used to weaponize migration. For example, Libya has been weaponizing or threatening to weaponize migration against Italy and the EU since 2004. In 2008, Italy and Libya signed a migration deal, in which Italy agreed to pay Libya five billion dollars to stop the flow of African migrants to Europe.[35]<\/sup><\/a> This deal gave Libya\u2019s leader, Gaddafi, considerable leverage as in 2010, he threatened to \u201cturn Europe black\u201d if the EU did not comply with his demands, such as lifting arms sanctions and providing aid.[36]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, during the 2011 Arab Spring, Gaddafi tried to deter the EU from providing support to the rebellion by warning the EU would be \u201cbombing a wall which stood in the way of African migration to Europe.\u201d[37]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Per Greenhill\u2019s theory, Gaddafi acted as a generator as he threatened to create cross-border population movements unless the EU complied with his demands.[38]<\/sup><\/a> However, Libya has acted as an opportunist as well, proving that third-country agreements can promote distinct types of challengers. Despite Libya’s threats, Italy did not learn its lesson as the two nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Migration with Libya in 2017. Italy provides Libya with financial support to prevent irregular migration to Europe by intercepting migrants at sea, establishing temporary refuge within its borders to screen asylum seekers, and repatriating individuals willing to return to their countries of origin. The EU has also financially assisted Libya, allocating 57.2 million euros for \u201cIntegrated Border and Migration Management in Libya\u201d since 2017.[39]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Libya capitalized on Europe\u2019s migration crisis in 2015 by negotiating this deal following the blueprint set out by the EU-Turkey deal. Thus, according to Greenhill\u2019s theory, Libya acted as an opportunist as it did not create the migration crisis but carefully exploited it for its own gain.[40]<\/sup><\/a> As Greenhill states, \u201ca crisis can help level the playing field, enhance the credibility of weak actors, increase the potency of their threats, and thereby improve their coercive capabilities.\u201d[41]<\/sup><\/a> Another notable threat was from Ergodan during the EU-Turkey deal, as he threatened to \u201copen the gates and send 3.6 million refugees your way\u201d if the EU did not stop calling his Syrian offensive \u201can invasion.\u201d[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The problem with the policy of third-country agreements is that the third countries are aware of Europe\u2019s struggle to deal with migration, so they can exploit Europe\u2019s weakness and keep asking for concessions. Turkey knew it had the upper hand during negotiations with the EU and did not just ask for money but also political concessions, such as making the EU reopen talks about Turkish EU membership.\u00a0 Thus, I take it as far as to say no partnership is safe from the threat of coercive engineered migration. Even the Spain-Morocco partnership, which is seen as a policy success, has been subject to the weaponization of migration. This was seen in 2021, as Morocco acted as a generator by threatening Spain there would be \u201cconsequences\u201d after the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, who is subject to a Moroccan arrest warrant for terrorist acts, was admitted for treatment in a Spanish hospital.[43]<\/sup><\/a> Morocco weaponized migration by letting down its guard on the border with Ceuta, which allowed thousands of migrants to enter Spain. Thus, the short run benefit of reducing the numbers of irregular migrants to Spain caused the long run problem of migration weaponization, which is a problem Spain has been facing for years and will continue to do so under this policy.<\/p>\n

Another example was in 2022, Morocco shifted Spain\u2019s Western Sahara policy by creating a border crisis.[44]<\/sup><\/a> This is an example of exportive engineered migration, as Morocco engineered migration to fortify a domestic political position.[45]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, despite the partnership between the two nations spanning decades, this failed to deter Morocco from using migrants as an instrument to exert pressure on Spain. Spain and Morocco will continue to perpetuate the same pattern of engagement as they have done since the late 1990s, so Spain will always have to comply with Moroccan demands to curb irregular migration flows. In 2015, countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon tangentially benefitted from the post-2015 European fear, allowing them to negotiate migration deals without threatening refugee arrivals due to European trauma.[46]<\/sup><\/a> It may not be 2015, but Europe will continue to expect migration crises, as seen since the influx of Ukrainians refugees and predictions of future migration due to climate change.<\/p>\n

European states must decide what wicked problem they want to prioritize. The policy of third-country agreements may address the wicked problem of border security, albeit I argue not effectively, but it further propels and ignites the wicked problem of weaponization of migration. Looking at the numbers, it is undeniable that the Spain-Morocco partnership reduced the number of irregular migrants entering Spain. However, the question is: how sustainable is this deterrence effect, and is the cost of potential weaponization worth it? I have argued that this deterrence effect is far from sustainable, and if an over-30-year partnership is susceptible to weaponization, then all partnerships are under threat. Thus, the EU-Tunisia MOU is also under threat of weaponization of migration, and so is the UK vis a vis Rwanda. Already, Tunisia is wielding significant power against the EU as in October 2023, Tunisian president Kais Saied rejected financial support from the EU, claiming the money \u201cwas a small amount,\u201d and Saied was unsatisfied that the EU \u201clacks respect.\u201d[47]<\/sup><\/a> The European Commission said it would disburse 127 million euros to Tunisia as part of their deal to curb illegal immigration to Europe.[48]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 However, rejected what the EU announced, saying that \u201cthe proposal conflicts with the memorandum of understanding signed in July.\u201d[49]<\/sup><\/a> The July deal included a pledge of 1 billion euros in aid to Tunisia. During the dispute between the two parties, a record number of migrants arrived on the Italian island of Lampedusa from Tunisia and North Africa.[50]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 However, migrant numbers have been rising in many places in Europe, but I still question if this was a coincidence and is potentially proof of Tunisia weaponizing migration against the EU. Thus, Tunisia would not have been able to weaponize migration as easily against the EU and extract financial concessions without the third-country agreement between them. The agreement increased Tunisia\u2019s legitimacy on the negotiating table by giving Tunisia a platform to increase its power in migration diplomacy. Hence, threats to alter or suspend third-country agreements in response to political disagreements or disputes can create a dynamic where migration becomes a tool for exerting influence. Due to geographical limitations, Rwanda may not directly weaponize migration by sending migrants to the UK. Still, it has the power to cause instability in the region and potentially threaten the UK. The weaponization of migration should not be underestimated, and I argue that the policy of third-country agreements is ineffective due to underestimating the power of migration weaponization that it is facilitating. As Greenhill’s research shows, coercers achieved at least some of their objectives in about three-quarters of the cases. In more than half the cases, coercers obtained all or most of what they sought.\u201d[51]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Hypocrisy costs<\/h2>\n

Another significant cost of the policy of third-country agreements is hypocrisy costs. Greenhill defines hypocrisy costs as \u201cthose symbolic political costs that can be imposed when there exists a real or perceived disparity between a professed commitment to liberal values and norms and demonstrated actions that contravene such a commitment.\u201d[52]<\/sup><\/a> Third-country agreements often violate human rights, contradicting the liberal democratic ideals many European states promote. However, I previously argued that the policy fails to provide an effective deterrence effect, as although European states want to keep migrants out, states rarely send many migrants back due to legal constraints. Nonetheless, just because European states are constrained by international law does not mean they do not incur hypocrisy costs. In fact, this policy creates a lose-lose situation: if the European state fails to keep unwanted immigration out, it fails the policy\u2019s original aim of deterrence. However, if European states do manage to keep migrants out, this is usually a result of illiberal means, potentially incurring hypocrisy costs. Thus, I want to ensure that I do not appear contradictory by introducing the drawback of hypocrisy costs to the policy, as even if deterrence is not effective, hypocrisy costs may still be incurred because human rights organizations have criticized European states for making deals with authoritarian leaders.<\/p>\n

Hathaway argues that the right of states to remove refugees is conditional if the safe third country implements and respects the rights of the refugee under the Refugee Convention or any other legal instruments it is subject to.[53]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 I use Hathaway’s formulation of the expectations of safe third countries and the principle of non-refoulement as a baseline to determine if third-country agreements have abided by human rights expectations. For example, the EU-Turkey deal rested on the notion that Turkey is a safe third country. However, Turkey\u2019s safe third-country status has been questioned, mainly due to the surge in Turkish state violence against minorities since 2017.[54]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Greek courts in early 2018 found that Turkey was not a safe third country, delaying the number of migrants that could be sent back.[55]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, the deal was ineffective in offering sustainable deterrence and displayed hypocritical behavior. Hypocrisy costs were incurred as, the Greek national court, not just human rights organizations, condemned state behavior for human rights, thereby highlighting the discrepancy between the liberal values European states must obey by law versus the restrictive agenda leaders want to pursue. The UK\u2019s Rwanda Plan is an even more extreme example, as the UK\u2019s Supreme Court has declared the policy unlawful, and the European Court of Human Rights has also prevented the first scheduled flight taking asylum seekers to Rwanda.[56]<\/sup><\/a> The policy also goes against the principles of non-refoulement due to the severe risk asylum seekers would be returned to their home countries from Rwanda.[57]<\/sup><\/a> Instead of listening to the Supreme Court, the government tried to create legislation to enforce its Rwanda plan. Thus, the Rwanda Plan is a policy that incurred huge hypocrisy costs, as both domestically and internationally the government was being rebuked.\u00a0 The UK is one of the leading proponents of liberal democracies globally, yet this policy goes against the values it espouses.<\/p>\n

The MoU between Libya and Italy is laden with human rights abuses. Firstly, Libya is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol, which already raises legal and ethical questions about whether migrants should be sent to Libya from Italy. UNHCR expressed concern, stating \u2018it is far from clear that Italy has taken the necessary precautions to ensure that it is not sending back any bona fide refugees to Libya, which cannot be considered a safe country of asylum.\u201d[58]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, UNHCR stated that refugees being removed from Libya to their country of origin violate the principle of non-refoulement.[59]<\/sup><\/a> Both Italy and the EU have provided technical and financial support to Libya to stop migration flows to Europe, but a UN report states the migrants that are intercepted at sea and sent back face \u201cmurder, enforced disappearance, torture, enslavement, sexual violence, rape, and other inhumane acts \u2026 in connection with their arbitrary detention.\u201d[60]<\/sup><\/a> Similarly, an ICC prosecutor stated crimes against migrants in Libya \u201cmay constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.\u201d[61]<\/sup><\/a> Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch have argued that the EU and Italy are thus complicit in such crimes.[62]<\/sup><\/a> Hence, the Libya case study is a salient example of exposing the hypocrisy displayed by European leaders, as \u201cthe anxiety over a refugee invasion from Africa reveals the contradictions present in Europe today, where, on the one hand, the moral imperative of universal emancipation is proclaimed, but on the other, policies and practice continue the trend of refusing a safe haven to the very refugees they have helped to create.\u201d[63]<\/sup><\/a> Beyond the case of Libya, the EU is facing scrutiny for atrocious human rights abuses in Tunisia by EU funded security forces.[64]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Hence, European states are seen as hypocritical as they advocate for human rights protection on the world stage yet are knowingly putting migrants in a situation where their rights are violated. Moreno-Lax and Pederson argue that \u201cEU border externalization entrenches forms of undemocratic governance in third countries, empowering undemocratic actors, transforming their relative weight within domestic structures, and weakening democratic channels of scrutiny, accountability, and power control.\u201d[65]<\/sup><\/a> Hence, the EU may espouse democratic values and condemn authoritarianism, but concerning migration, they are more than willing to shift the responsibility to third countries and embolden their undemocratic, illiberal practices to keep migration out of Fortress Europe. As stated by Galeotti, European states are \u201cunderscoring a fundamental point, that authoritarian regimes can get not only a free pass from the EU on many issues but also lucrative assistance, so long as they continue to keep migrants out.\u201d[66]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Nonetheless, I argue that hypocrisy costs are a less significant drawback of the policy than other drawbacks, such as the weaponization of migration. My reasoning is based on strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the countries where this policy is used. For example, data by Pew suggests that \u201cGreeks and Italians are also the most likely to be concerned about immigration from outside the EU (84% and 76%, respectively, are concerned about this).\u201d[67]<\/sup><\/a> I am not arguing that European states are predominantly anti-immigrant, but rather that anti-refugee\/migrant camps in European states are strong and current populist governments in Europe feed on anti-immigrant sentiment. Migration has moved from low politics to high politics and is now at the center of many political debates.[68]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 The Leave campaign during Brexit attributes its success partially due to exploiting xenophobic views in British society when it came to migration.[69]<\/sup><\/a> As stated by Greenhill, \u201cpopular political discourses within the EU draw upon traditional nationalistic sentiments and xenophobic assertions that current waves of migrants and refugees reduce national living standards by siphoning away social resources from \u2018real\u2019 citizens, taking employment away from more qualified applicants, bringing tensions from their home state with them and committing a disproportionate amount of crime.\u201d[70]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, it is irrelevant if migrants pose a real threat, but \u201cif they are perceived as fundamentally threatening to their security, culture or livelihood, anxious and motivated individuals and groups will mobilize to oppose their acceptance.\u201d[71]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, due to migrant opposition, hypocrisy costs are less of a drawback to the policy of third-country agreements as many European citizens, particularly those who border the Mediterranean, are not concerned with migrant rights or if states are being hypocritical, so it is less likely the cost will be imposed.<\/p>\n

Likewise, while European states are acting hypocritically, it does not mean hypocrisy costs are incurred. For the cost to be incurred, another actor needs to condemn the state for displaying hypocritical behavior. However, this policy is used globally from the US to Australia, thereby shielding European states from hypocrisy costs as many states themselves engage in the same behavior. Thus, it is usually human rights groups that condemn European states for their hypocritical behavior, which holds less weight compared to if another state did the same.<\/p>\n

Examining the popularity of the policy among European leaders<\/h2>\n

This paper has primarily focused on evaluating the effectiveness of third-country agreements and concluding that the policy fails to address the wicked problem of border security and, in turn, creates significant drawbacks, such as the wicked problem of weaponization of migration and hypocrisy costs. Thus, this raises the question why the policy is so widespread in Europe. Thus far, my analysis has been centered on a long run perspective that aims to address the wickedness of the crisis. I assumed the European migration crisis is a long-term structural phenomenon; thereby, my evaluation of the policy of third-country agreements is predicated on a long run rather than a short run analysis. For this section, I am viewing the policy from the eyes of the European leaders who created and implemented the policy. Hence, I will now view the policy from a short run perspective, as the actors involved are short-term political actors.<\/p>\n

In essence, governments focus on the short term, as democratic countries are all plagued by short-termism. Offe argues in Europe Entrapped <\/em>that democratically elected governments cannot address the structural issues afflicting the European Union because citizens are focused on the short-term, stating \u201cthe problem is one of \u2018time inconsistency\u2019: The implementation of promising long-term strategies is obstructed by the failure of \u2018presentist\u2019 electorates fixated on a short-term time horizon to grant them green light, unless political leaders can persuade their constituencies to adopt a more far-sighted perspective.\u201d[72]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, due to how democracies are structured, it is not politically palatable to campaign on long-term strategies. Politicians\u2019 primary goal is to get elected and to stay in power, so when it comes to migration management, politicians are not incentivized to devise policies focused on a long-term perspective on migration that addresses structural and wicked problems. As Streeck puts it, \u201clong-term solutions are not even attempted because short-term problems take priority; holes keep appearing that can only be plugged by making new holes elsewhere.\u201d[73]<\/sup><\/a> In the case of the policy of third-country agreements, the \u201cnew holes\u201d are the wicked problem of migration weaponization.<\/p>\n

I will now examine the statements of European leaders to showcase how short-term political perspectives connect with the externalization policy of third-country agreements. Meloni states in regard to her support of the MoU with Tunisia that \u201cwork[ing] on the external dimension and stop[ping] the illegal departures of immigrants\u201d is \u201cthe only way to seriously address the problem.\u201d[74]<\/sup><\/a> She continues, \u201cthis is what European citizens are asking of us.\u201d[75]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, European leaders recognize that citizens want solutions, and leaders believe third-country agreements can yield short-term tangible results. Von der Leyen echoes Meloni, stating that \u201cirregular migration is a European challenge\u201d that \u201cneeds a European answer.\u201d[76]<\/sup><\/a> This European answer is not dramatic structural reform on fixing Europe\u2019s asylum systems or improving legal pathways to residency or citizenship. Instead, externalization persists as the preferred approach and will likely remain so: \u201cWe want our agreement with Tunisia to be a template. A blueprint for the future. For partnerships with other countries in the region.\u201d[77]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 The UK is following suit, as Sunak states, \u201cIn order to fully solve this problem, we need a deterrent. We need to be able to say pretty simply and unequivocally that if you come to our country illegally, you won\u2019t get to stay.\u201d[78]<\/sup><\/a> For European leaders, \u201can immediate reduction in irregular arrivals is sufficient for a deal to be considered successful, and a partner country to be cooperative and effective.\u201d[79]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, while I criticize the EU-Turkey deal and the Italy-Libya partnership, in EU circles, these deals are considered a success when viewed merely from the lens of a short-term number.<\/p>\n

Thus, depending on what lens you evaluate the policy it is possible to view it as a success, which adds to the wickedness. These deals manage to decrease numbers, albeit for a short period. According to figures provided by the Italian government, between 5 May and 31 December 2009, 3,185 migrants landed on Italian coasts, compared with 31,281 over the same period in 2008.[80]<\/sup><\/a> Other factors besides the Italy-Libya agreement affected the numbers, but it is undeniable that the agreement played an important role. In large part, though, this reduction was not due to migrants being deterred but because they were intercepted at sea and returned to Libya. Nonetheless, now Italy is facing the same problem it did back in 2023, but instead of Libya being the main partner, now it is Tunisia. It is the same story but slightly different characters, as European leaders use the same policy of third-country agreements as a temporary band-aid to reduce numbers. As Hansen states, \u201c\u2018root cause\u2019 approaches are often eclipsed by the more \u2018instant impact\u2019 control policies.\u201d[81]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

European leaders are not ignorant that the policy of third-country agreements is a short-term solution. The crisis-by-crisis approach is more politically appealing than undergoing structural reform. As previously stated, migration has moved from low politics to high politics. Polling suggests that migration will be a central issue in the upcoming June 2024 elections, where it is predicted right-wing, anti-immigrant parties will significantly benefit.[82]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, since migration is now, at times, the center of political discussions, European leaders must look at least optically that they are addressing the issue. As stated previously, European citizens, particularly those who border the Mediterranean, are not open to refugees and asylum seekers. Not only are they not open, but European citizens are very biased, and \u201cpundits, politicians and even some policy makers may argue that migrants who are from different religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds than the majority in their newly adopted homelands are a danger to societal security.\u201d[83]<\/sup><\/a> For instance, during the 2015 migration crisis, a median of 59% across 10 EU countries voiced concern about the prospect of increased terrorism, and 50% believed refugees are a burden to society because they take jobs and social benefits that would otherwise be available to citizens of each nation.[84]<\/sup><\/a> Mediterranean states saw refugees from Syria and Iraq as a major threat: 69% of Greece and 65% of Italy.[85]<\/sup><\/a> Pew also concluded that negative views towards refugees are tied to negative views about Muslims.[86]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, this explains why Ukrainian refugees in 2022 were more welcome than Syrians in 2015.<\/p>\n

Thus, the refugees and asylum seekers are not always viewed as people in desperate need of protection but as a national liable infringing on cultural identity and economic opportunities. European leaders, instead of trying to change the perceived negative image of migrants, capitalize on this xenophobic sentiment and use it to justify their externalization policies. Most importantly, these policies, such as third-country agreements, do not need to accomplish much. A short-term reduction in numbers will suffice. Overwhelmingly, regardless of one\u2019s position regarding refugees, most Europeans believed that the EU did a poor job in handling the 2015 refugee crisis. This includes a staggering 94% of Greeks and 88% of Swedes.[87]<\/sup><\/a> Disapproval was high among many segments of society but exceptionally high among people with favorable views of the anti-immigrant parties in Britain (UK Independence Party), Germany (Alternative for Germany), and the Netherlands (Party for Freedom).[88]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, European leaders recognize now that, at least optically, they need to show they are taking a hard line on migration to assure the public there will not be a repeat of 2015. This is why the policy of third-country agreements is so appealing: politicians need a fast reduction in numbers, and it does not matter if it’s not sustainable. More sustainable policies addressing the problem’s wickedness, such as expanding legal channels for migrants to access the EU\u2019s labor market, are not as politically desirable as the immediate impact of third-country agreements.<\/p>\n

If the policy of third-country agreements is more about optics than about effectively dealing with the European migration crisis, this begs the question of whether the policy is an instrument of political theater. To properly answer this question, more time and research need to be dedicated beyond what this paper can offer, but I want to briefly touch on it as it pertains to my second research question, which is why European leaders implement this policy. In his book Border Games,<\/em> Andreas outlines in Chapter 1 his thesis of border enforcement as political theater.[89]<\/sup><\/a> The book focuses on the US-Mexico border, but Andreas describes the border as a \u201cpolitical stage\u201d that can also apply to the European context.[90]<\/sup><\/a> In essence, what Andreas means by political theater is that actors enforce certain policies not because of their practical effectiveness but for their symbolic significance. Thus, the policy of third-country agreements is not just to prevent migrants from coming to Europe but also to send a message to the public about the government’s commitment to border security. If we assume the policy of third-country agreements is more about optics, then this explains why leaders care less about incurring hypocrisy costs. If this policy is \u201cfor show,\u201d then it does not matter how effective the policy is. It only matters if the public believes their leaders are doing something about combating the migration crisis. For instance, is the Rwanda Plan a product of political theater, or is it about creating an effective policy to deal with irregular migration in the UK?<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

Thus, by viewing the European migration crisis as a microcosm of a wicked problem or as a wicked problem itself, I determined that the policy of third-country agreements fails to treat the crisis as the long-term structural issue it is. The policy is a product of short run reasoning which fails to address the wickedness of the crisis. Most of my paper viewed the European migration crisis as a complex problem that begets policies that transcend the logic of deterrence. Firstly, I evaluated the policy\u2019s effectiveness on its intended aim of deterrence and concluded that third-country agreements do not provide a sustainable, long-term deterrent effect. The policy deters migrants only in the short run, and even then, results are patchy at best, as seen by the small number of migrants returned from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey deal. Next, I assert that the policy of third-country agreements in trying to address the wicked problem of border security exacerbates the wicked problem of weaponization of migration. I argue that this is the most critical drawback of the policy, as migration weaponization should not be underestimated, and its wickedness entails a whole host of other problems. Migration weaponization is also a notable example portraying how short run deterrence logics leads to creating a bigger problem in the long run. Lastly, I argue that the policy incurs hypocrisy costs but argue that this drawback is less significant compared to the weaponization of migration due to anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe overriding human rights concerns at times.<\/p>\n

For my second research question, my analysis was rooted in short run rather than long run logic, as I viewed the policy from the perspective of the leaders who implement these agreements. I concluded that the policy fulfills the short-term political aims of the politicians implementing the policy. European leaders need to look optically that they are being proactive in tackling migration crises and need to curb migration flows, albeit for a limited period. Thus, the policy of third-country agreements is seen as a politically effective solution as politicians are not aiming at adequately addressing the wicked problems at play but rather putting a band aid over the problem as by the time the problem resurfaces, another political actor will need to deal with it. Through my analysis of political leaders, I infer that what makes the crisis increasingly wicked is that depending what lens you employ -short run or long run- the success of the policy is evaluated differently.<\/p>\n

Recent developments with the EU\u2019s MoU with Tunisia show that this policy appears to be here to stay. The deal with Tunisia already is displaying issues of weaponized migration and hypocrisy costs. Moving beyond the logic of deterrence will be a challenge, but it is the only way to tackle the wickedness of the European migration crisis. Complex problems need innovative solutions, and Europe needs to choose how it wants to deal with a recurring policy crisis. It remains to be seen how the new EU Migration and Asylum Pact will play out and what this means for the policy of third-country agreements, but unless Europe shifts its mindset to the long run, then these wicked problems will only resurface.<\/p>\n

<\/a>1<\/sup> Horst W. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, \u201cDilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,\u201d Policy Sciences<\/em> 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 160, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/bf01405730<\/a><\/p>\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> Karin Geuijen et al., \u201cCreating Public Value in Global Wicked Problems,\u201d Public Management Review<\/em> 19, no. 5 (August 25, 2016): 622, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/14719037.2016.1192163<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> Rittel and Webber, \u201cDilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,\u201d 162.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a>Agnese Pacciardi and Joakim Berndtsson, \u201cEU Border Externalisation and Security Outsourcing: Exploring the Migration Industry in Libya,\u201d Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies<\/em> 48, no. 17 (April 13, 2022): 4010, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/1369183x.2022.2061930<\/a><\/p>\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a>\u201cSafe Third Country,\u201d European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed April 17, 2024, https:\/\/home-affairs.ec.europa.eu\/networks\/european-migration-network-emn\/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary\/glossary\/safe-third-country_en<\/a><\/p>\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> Kelly M Greenhill and Hugo Brady, \u201cArriving at a Crossroads: Can Europe Avoid Replaying the Policy Failures of the 2014-16 Migration Crisis?,\u201d Georgetown Journal of International Affairs<\/em>, publ. online March 2024, https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/2024\/03\/21\/arriving-at-a-crossroads-can-europe-avoid-replaying-the-policy-failures-of-the-2014-16-migration-crisis\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Fiona B Adamson and Kelly M Greenhill, \u201cDeal-Making, Diplomacy and Transactional Forced Migration,\u201d International Affairs<\/em> 99, no. 2 (March 6, 2023): 709, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/ia\/iiad017<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> Commission Communication on the monitoring and evaluation mechanism of the third countries in the field of the fight against illegal immigration. COM(2005) 352 final, of 28 July, paras. 5.1<\/p>\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> Kelly M. Greenhill, \u201cOpen Arms behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,\u201d European Law Journal<\/em> 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 327, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/eulj.12179.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cQ&A: The UK\u2019s Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,\u201d Migration Observatory<\/em>, accessed April 16, 2024, https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/commentaries\/qa-the-uks-policy-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> Megan Specia, \u201cThree Myths around the U.K.\u2019s Rwanda Push for Asylum Seekers,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, publ. online January 2024, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/01\/16\/world\/europe\/uk-rwanda-asylum.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Marley Morris and Amreen Qureshi, \u201cUNDERSTANDING THE RISE IN CHANNEL CROSSINGS,\u201d Institute for Public Policy Research<\/em> (IPPR), 2019, 23, http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/resrep53541<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> Risk analysis for 2016 | Frontex, accessed April 17, 2024, https:\/\/www.frontex.europa.eu\/assets\/Publications\/Risk_Analysis\/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf<\/a> , 6<\/p>\n

[14]<\/sup><\/a> Angeliki Dimitriadi and Asli Selin Okyay, \u201cAre Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management?\u201d ELIAMEP<\/em>, November 2023, 10, \u00a0https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/Perspectives-2-Migration.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/sup><\/a> Susan Fratzke, \u201cInternational Experience Suggests Safe Third-Country Agreement Would Not Solve the U.S.-Mexico Border Crisis,\u201d Migration Policy<\/em>, publ. online February 2022, https:\/\/www.migrationpolicy.org\/news\/safe-third-country-agreement-would-not-solve-us-mexico-border-crisis<\/a><\/p>\n

[16]<\/sup><\/a>Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas F. Tan, \u201cThe End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy,\u201d Journal on Migration and Human Security<\/em> 5, no. 1 (February 16, 2017): 43, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.14240\/jmhs.v5i1.73<\/a><\/p>\n

[17]<\/sup><\/a>Aurelien Breeden and Megan Specia, \u201cAt Least 5 People Die Trying to Cross Icy English Channel,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, publ. online. January 2024, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/01\/14\/world\/europe\/migrants-die-english-channel.html.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/sup><\/a> Helen Hintjens and Ali Bilgic, \u201cThe EU\u2019s Proxy War on Refugees,\u201d State Crime Journal<\/em> 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2019), 87, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.13169\/statecrime.8.1.0080<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/sup><\/a> Dimitriadi and Okyay, \u201cAre Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management,\u201d 20<\/p>\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Susan Fratzke, \u201cInternational Experience Suggests Safe Third-Country Agreement Would Not Solve the U.S.-Mexico Border Crisis,\u201d Migration Policy<\/em>, publ. online February 2022, https:\/\/www.migrationpolicy.org\/news\/safe-third-country-agreement-would-not-solve-us-mexico-border-crisis<\/a><\/p>\n

[21]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[22]<\/sup><\/a> Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, \u201cThe End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy,\u201d 43.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[24]<\/sup><\/a>Mared Gwyn Jones, \u201cEu Lawmakers Clash over Controversial Tunisia Migration Deal,\u201d euronews, 2023, https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/my-europe\/2023\/09\/12\/eu-lawmakers-clash-over-tunisia-migration-deal-denounce-lack-of-results<\/a><\/p>\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, \u201cThe End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy,\u201d 44.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cQ&A: The UK\u2019s Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,\u201d Migration Observatory<\/em>, accessed April 16, 2024, https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/commentaries\/qa-the-uks-policy-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[27]<\/sup><\/a> Violeta Lax Moreno, and Martin\u00a0 Lemberg Pedersen, \u201cBorder-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation through Externalization,\u201d Questions of International Law (February 28, 2019), 17,http:\/\/www.qil-qdi.org\/border-induced-displacement-the-ethical-and-legal-implications-of-distance-creation-through-externalization\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> Rittel and Webber, \u201cDilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,\u201d 163.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[30]<\/sup><\/a> Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy<\/em> (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2016), \u00a02.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 13<\/p>\n

[32]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 2<\/p>\n

[33]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 3<\/p>\n

[34]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 331<\/p>\n

[35]<\/sup><\/a> Mark Galeotti, \u201cHow Migrants Got Weaponized,\u201d Foreign Affairs<\/em>, June 26, 2023, https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/belarus\/how-migrants-got-weaponized<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/a>\u00a0[36]<\/sup>Kelly M. Greenhill, \u201cMorocco \u2018weaponized\u2019 migration to punish Spain. That\u2019s more common than you think,\u201d publ. online June 2021, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/politics\/2021\/06\/01\/morocco-weaponized-migration-punish-spain-thats-more-common-than-you-think\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[37]<\/sup><\/a>\u201cHow Libya Holds the Key to Solving Europe\u2019s Migration Crisis,\u201d BBC News<\/em>, publ. online July 2018, https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-africa-44709974<\/a><\/p>\n

[38]<\/sup><\/a> Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign<\/em>, 23<\/p>\n

[39]<\/sup><\/a>\u201cItaly Reups Funding to Force Migrants Back to Libya,\u201d Human Rights Watch<\/em>, publ. online February 2023, https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2023\/02\/01\/italy-reups-funding-force-migrants-back-libya<\/a><\/p>\n

[40]<\/sup><\/a> Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy<\/em>, 30<\/p>\n

[41]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 23<\/p>\n

[42]<\/sup><\/a> Galeotti, \u201cHow Migrants Got Weaponized.\u201d<\/p>\n

[43]<\/sup><\/a> Aritz Parra, \u201cAn Ailing Sahrawi Leader Shakes Spain and Morocco\u2019s Alliance,\u201d AP News<\/em>, publ. online May 2021, https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/europe-spain-morocco-africa-health-f14419ce2f00ea07b0ac5c1d5c49e83c<\/a><\/p>\n

[44]<\/sup><\/a>Ruben Andersson and David Keen, \u201c\u2018Weapons of Mass Migration\u2019: How States Exploit the Failure of Migration Policies,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, publ. online December 2023, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2023\/dec\/14\/weapons-of-mass-migration-how-states-exploit-the-failure-of-migration-policies<\/a><\/p>\n

[45]<\/sup><\/a> Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy<\/em>, 14<\/p>\n

[46]<\/sup><\/a> Kelsey P Norman, \u201cThe Post-2015 Migration Paradigm in the Mediterranean,\u201d Chapter. In Reluctant Reception: Refugees, Migration and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa <\/em>(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 172.<\/p>\n

[47]<\/sup><\/a>Bouazza Ben Bouazza and Sam Metz, \u201cTunisia Rejects European Funds and Says They Fall Short of a Deal for Migration and Financial Aid,\u201d AP News<\/em>, publ. online October 2023, https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247<\/a><\/p>\n

[48]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[49]<\/sup><\/a> Tarek Amara, \u201cTunisia Rejects EU Financial Aid, Casting Doubt on an Immigration Deal | Reuters,\u201d Reuters<\/em>, publ. online October 2023, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/tunisia-rejects-eu-financial-aid-casting-doubt-an-immigration-deal-2023-10-02\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[50]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[51]<\/sup><\/a> Kelly M. Greenhill, \u201cMorocco \u2018weaponized\u2019 migration to punish Spain. That\u2019s more common than you think,\u201d June 1, 2021, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/politics\/2021\/06\/01\/morocco-weaponized-migration-punish-spain-thats-more-common-than-you-think\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[52]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy<\/em>, 4<\/p>\n

[53]<\/sup><\/a>James C. Hathaway, \u201cThe Rights of Refugees under International Law,\u201d 2005, 332-3 https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/cbo9780511614859<\/a><\/p>\n

[54]<\/sup><\/a> Hintjens and Bilgic, \u201cThe EU\u2019s Proxy War on Refugees,\u201d p. 85<\/p>\n

[55]<\/sup><\/a> Dimitriadi and Okyay, \u201cAre Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management?\u201d10<\/p>\n

[56]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cQ&A: The UK\u2019s Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,\u201d Migration Observatory<\/em>, accessed April 16, 2024, https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/resources\/commentaries\/qa-the-uks-policy-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[57]<\/sup><\/a> Emilie McDonnell, \u201cUK Supreme Court Finds UK-Rwanda Asylum Scheme Unlawful,\u201d Human Rights Watch<\/em>, \u00a0publ. online November 2023, https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2023\/11\/15\/uk-supreme-court-finds-uk-rwanda-asylum-scheme-unlawful<\/a><\/p>\n

[58]<\/sup><\/a> UNHCR Press Release, \u2018UNHCR deeply concerned over Lampedusa deportations\u2019, 18 Mar. 2005.<\/p>\n

[59]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[60]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cItaly Reups Funding to Force Migrants Back to Libya,\u201d Human Rights Watch,<\/em> February 1, 2023, https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2023\/02\/01\/italy-reups-funding-force-migrants-back-libya<\/a><\/p>\n

[61]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[62]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[63]<\/sup><\/a>Marco Scalvini, \u201cHumanitarian Wars and Rejected Refugees,\u201d OpenDemocracy<\/em> website, 17 April 2011, accessed 17 April 2024, http:\/\/www.opendemocracy.net\/marco-scalvini\/humanitarian-wars-and-rejected-refugees<\/a><\/p>\n

[64]<\/a> \u201cEurope has questions to answer over migrant abuse in Tunisia, say MEPs and activists,\u201d The Guardian,<\/em> September 20, 2024, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/global-development\/2024\/sep\/20\/europe-has-questions-to-answer-over-migrant-abuse-in-tunisia-say-meps-and-activists<\/a><\/p>\n

[65]<\/sup><\/a> Moreno and Pedersen, \u201cBorder-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation through Externalization,\u201d 17<\/p>\n

[66]<\/sup><\/a> Galeotti, \u201cHow Migrants Got Weaponized.\u201d<\/p>\n

[67]<\/sup><\/a>Jacob Poushter, \u201cRefugees Stream into Europe, Where They Are Not Welcomed with Open Arms,\u201d Pew Research Center, <\/em>April 24, 2015, https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/short-reads\/2015\/04\/24\/refugees-stream-into-europe-where-they-are-not-welcomed-with-open-arms\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[68]<\/sup><\/a> Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy<\/em>, \u00a05<\/p>\n

[69]<\/sup><\/a> Eugene Quinn, \u201cThe Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Europe\u2019s Challenge,\u201d Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review<\/em> 105, no. 419 (2016): 275\u201385. http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/24871398<\/a>, 275<\/p>\n

[70]<\/sup><\/a> Kelly M. Greenhill, \u201cOpen Arms behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,\u201d European Law Journal<\/em> 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 317\u201332, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/eulj.12179, 323.<\/p>\n

[71]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 324<\/p>\n

[72]<\/sup><\/a> Claus Offe, Europe Entrapped <\/em>(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 42.<\/p>\n

[73]<\/sup><\/a> Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism<\/em> (London: Verso, 2014), 14.<\/p>\n

[74]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cPresident Meloni\u2019s Press Statement during Her Visit to Lampedusa with President von Der Leyen,\u201d www.governo.it, September 17, 2023, https:\/\/www.governo.it\/en\/articolo\/president-meloni-s-press-statement-during-her-visit-lampedusa-president-von-der-leyen\/23599<\/a><\/p>\n

[75]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[76]<\/sup><\/a>\u201cPress Statement by President von Der Leyen with Italian Prime Minister Meloni in Lampedusa,\u201d European Commission<\/em> – European Commission, September 17, 2023, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/statement_23_4502<\/a><\/p>\n

[77]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cTunisia Migration Deal a Model for Others, EU\u2019s von der Leyen Says,\u201d Reuters<\/em>, July 23, 2023, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/tunisia-migration-deal-model-others-eus-von-der-leyen-says-2023-07-23\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[78]<\/sup><\/a> Eleni Courea, \u201cRishi Sunak Defends Rwanda Plan during GB News Q&#38;A Session,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, publ. online February 2024, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/politics\/2024\/feb\/12\/sunak-defends-rwanda-plan-to-doubtful-tv-audience<\/a><\/p>\n

[79]<\/sup><\/a> Dimitriadi and Okyay, \u201cAre Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management?\u201d 20.<\/p>\n

[80]<\/sup><\/a> Governo Berlusconi (2010) Fermare l’immigrazione clandestina: stop agli sbarchi, espulsioni pi\u00f9 semplici, www.governoberlusconi.it\/page.php?idf=450&ids=452<\/a><\/p>\n

[81]<\/sup><\/a> Thomas Graae Gammeltoft-Hansen, \u201cOutsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy,\u201d Danish Institute for International Studies<\/em>, 2006, \u00a02<\/p>\n

[82]<\/sup><\/a> Nicolas Camut, \u201cRight Wing Set for Big Gains in 2024 EU Election, Polling Shows,\u201d POLITICO<\/em>, publ. online August 2023, https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/european-election-2024-polls-right-wing-big-gains\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[83]<\/sup><\/a> Greenhill, \u201cOpen Arms behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,\u201d 323.<\/p>\n

[84]<\/sup><\/a> Jacob Poushter, \u201cEuropean Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts,\u201d Pew Research Center<\/em>, publ. online September 2016, https:\/\/www.pewresearch.org\/short-reads\/2016\/09\/16\/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[85]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[86]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[87]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[88]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n

[89]<\/sup><\/a> Peter Andreas, Border Games<\/em> (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2022), \u00a07.<\/p>\n

[90]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In an effort to avoid a repeat of the 2015 migration crisis, European states are increasingly turning to third-country agreements, exemplified by the recent deal with Tunisia. This paper explores two central questions: How effective are third-country agreements in addressing the complex and persistent challenges of European migration, and why do European leaders continue to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":50206,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[104,492],"tags":[],"program":[22],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50200"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=50200"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50200\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":50804,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/50200\/revisions\/50804"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/50206"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50200"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=50200"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=50200"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=50200"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}