{"id":49997,"date":"2025-04-10T15:59:39","date_gmt":"2025-04-10T12:59:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/?p=49997"},"modified":"2025-09-15T16:03:03","modified_gmt":"2025-09-15T13:03:03","slug":"emvathynontas-sti-lefki-vivlo-gia-tin-evropaiki-amyna","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/a-deep-dive-in-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence\/","title":{"rendered":"A deep dive in the White Paper on the Future of European Defence"},"content":{"rendered":"

The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU\u2019s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources.<\/p>\n

The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU\u2019s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential:<\/p>\n

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  1. Coordination gaps: <\/strong>Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other \u2013 national and\/or domestic \u2013 objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability.<\/li>\n
  2. Financial markets\u2019 sensitivity:<\/strong> While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined.<\/li>\n
  3. Creative ambiguity:<\/strong> The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country\u2019s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified.<\/li>\n
  4. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight:<\/strong> Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter\u2019s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.<\/p>\n

    Read here<\/a>\u00a0in pdf the Policy Paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Senior Research Fellow, <\/strong>Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business and Panos Politis Lamprou, <\/strong>Junior Research Fellow, EU Policies and Institutions Programme, ELIAMEP.<\/p>\n

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    Introduction<\/h2>\n

    In response to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities \u2013 including but not limited to the protracted Russian war on Ukraine and the Trump 2.0 administration \u2013 and following the earlier announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence was published in March 2025. The White Paper outlines the path to enhanced EU defence capabilities and aims to mobilise hundreds of billions of EUR, detailing measures to finance and strengthen the EU’s military readiness.<\/p>\n

    The White Paper features well-intentioned objectives and its communication strategy was well orchestrated. It does provide answers to two key questions: first, where the money will come from and second, in what defence capabilities the EU is going to invest. Starting from the former, in the best-case scenario, national resources up to \u20ac650 billion will be mobilised through the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact<\/a> (SGP), which defines the fiscal governance framework for the EU member-states and sets rules for constraining national government deficit and debt. In essence, this clause will allow member-states to accommodate additional defence spending. The \u20ac650 billion will be topped by EU resources of up to \u20ac150 billion that will be gathered through the common issuance of bonds, as envisaged by the new SAFE instrument. In addition to these \u20ac800 billion, the White Paper proposes four additional -but rather vague and not quantified- ways to step up defence spending: a) redirecting existing EU funds towards defence (e.g., cohesion funds), b) contributions from the European Investment Bank (EIB), c) private investments, and d) ensuring financial predictability for the European defence industry in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), currently under negotiation. Overall, the resources envisaged in the White Paper are shown in Figure 1.<\/p>\n

    Figure 1: Envisaged resources for EU defence in the White Paper<\/em><\/p>\n

    \"\"<\/a>\u00a0\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

    Regarding the capability needs, the White Paper identifies seven priority areas: Air and missile defence, Artillery systems, Ammunition and missiles, Drones and counter-drone systems, Military Mobility, AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and strategic enablers & critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation (i.e., the \u20ac150 billion funding instrument mentioned above that accompanies the White Paper) refers to the following two categories of defence products, the common procurement of which will be funded:<\/p>\n

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    1. Category One: ammunition and missiles, artillery systems, small drones and related anti-drone systems, critical infrastructure protection, cyber and military mobility, and<\/li>\n
    2. Category Two: air and missile defence, drones (other than small ones) and related anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space assets protection, AI and electronic warfare.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      \u00a0<\/strong>\u2018Money Makes the World Go Round\u2019: Financing EU Defence<\/h2>\n

      National resources for defence<\/strong><\/p>\n

      In 2023, the EU member-states spent \u20ac279 billion on defence, marking an almost 10% increase in defence spending compared to 2022 (\u20ac254 billion). Approximately one fourth of this expenditure (26%) was directed to research, development and procurement of defence equipment.[1]<\/a> In 2024, the total defence expenditure made by the EU member-states reached (provisionally) \u20ac326 billion, an almost 17% rise compared to 2023, which amounts to 1.9% of the EU\u2019s GDP and is very close to the 2% NATO requirement. These figures are in line with the broader, decade-long trend of increased military spending, especially fuelled by the Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022.<\/p>\n

      Still, Europe is lagging in military deterrence and defence, and much more money needs to be poured to close the gap in terms of military capabilities, especially should the US truly reconsider its military presence in Europe. This is the underlying logic behind the proposal to create additional fiscal space for member-states to invest more in defence, bypassing the strict framework of the EU\u2019s macroeconomic governance. The ReArm Europe plan calls for such a fiscal margin for higher defence expenditures (of up to \u20ac650 billion) through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause by the member-states. The national escape clause will apply from 2025 to 2028, for expenditure up to 1.5% of GDP.\u00a0 The reference year is 2021, i.e., the last pre-war year when the EU member-states had spent \u20ac214 billion on defence. In other words, if the national escape clause has been activated and a member-state\u2019s increase of military expenditure remains within the 1.5% ceiling, the excessive deficit procedure will not be launched, even if the total budget deficit exceeds the limits set by the revised rules of the fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework. The EU\u2019s executive branch has invited all \u2013 interested \u2013 member-states to submit a request to activate this escape clause by the end of April 2025. The member-states\u2019 requests will be coordinated by the Council in order to accelerate the process, and the recommendations activating the national escape clause(s) will be adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV).<\/p>\n

      On- and Off-EU Budget resources for defence<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Besides the financial resources under the full control of each member-state\u2019s government at the national level, there are two main channels of financing defence-related activities at the EU level: first, a direct budget line from the EU budget and second, off-EU budget resources that are collectively managed by EU member-states. As regards the former, Article 41<\/a> of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) forbids, in principle, the use of the Union budget for operations having military or defence implications. Hence, the Commission\u2019s main defence-related initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening the European defence industry and supporting the development of dual use infrastructure, with an allocated budget of approximately<\/a> \u20ac10.55 billion in the current MFF.[2]<\/a> These initiatives comprise the European Defence Fund<\/a> (EDF), the Military Mobility<\/a>, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production<\/a> (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act<\/a> (EDIRPA). The European Defence Industry Programme<\/a>, which falls in this category and is agreed to provide 1.5 billion over the period 2025-2027, has yet to be adopted. The legal basis for financing the European defence industry lays primarily in Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which touches upon the industry\u2019s competitiveness. Other<\/a> relevant TFEU articles that could be used to finance European defence-related projects comprise Article 179, on the improvement of the EU\u2019s scientific and technological base, Article 170 on the development and interconnection of trans-European networks, and Title XIX on research, technological development and space policy. As far as the second channel is concerned, the largest defence-related, off-EU budget tool is the European Peace Facility (EPF). As depicted in Figure 2, comparing the two categories, the biggest part of the funds allocated to EU defence remain under full member-states\u2019 control.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

      Figure 2: EU budget and off-budget major defence-related tools<\/em><\/p>\n