{"id":29212,"date":"2022-12-13T14:47:00","date_gmt":"2022-12-13T11:47:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eliamep.lncdoo.com\/o-metakemalismos-kai-to-mellon-tis-tourkikis-diakyvernisis-nicholas-danforth\/"},"modified":"2024-08-28T11:07:01","modified_gmt":"2024-08-28T08:07:01","slug":"o-metakemalismos-kai-to-mellon-tis-tourkikis-diakyvernisis-nicholas-danforth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/o-metakemalismos-kai-to-mellon-tis-tourkikis-diakyvernisis-nicholas-danforth\/","title":{"rendered":"Post-Kemalism and the Future of Turkish Governance &#8211; Nicholas Danforth"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"the-content\"><p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Disillusionment with Erdo\u011fan and the AKP after 2013 has reshaped the study of Turkish politics and history, leading scholars to focus on new themes and new periods.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Comparative approaches, political economy and a newfound interest in the Cold War have offered a more nuanced understanding of Turkish authoritarianism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Post-Kemalism remain more popular in the U.S. and Europe than in Turkey.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Read <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Policy-brief-173-Nicholas-Danforth-final.pdf\">here<\/a>\u00a0in pdf the Policy brief by <strong>Nicholas Danforth<\/strong>, Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, Turkey Programme.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>The Limits and Lacunae of Post-Kemalism<\/h2>\n<p>ELIMED\u2019s October 24 webinar began with a candid discussion about the stakes of the post-Kemalism debate, focused on the interplay of political dynamics and personal experiences that drew many of us into it.<\/p>\n<p>\u0130lker Ayt\u00fcrk, who co-edited the recent volume <em>Post-Post-Kemalizm<\/em> with Berk Esen, explained that in the late 2000s he became \u201cincreasingly frustrated with the way Erdo\u011fan was being analyzed and studied.\u201d As a visiting scholar in the United States between 2011 and 2012, he watched as his colleagues ignored the red flags about Erdo\u011fan\u2019s autocratic behavior and continued to shower him with praise for democratizing Turkey. The sense of isolation this created only changed with the 2013 Gezi Park protests, at which point, \u201cpeople who were scolding me for criticizing Erdo\u011fan then became greater critics.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Cang\u00fcl \u00d6rnek also began on a personal note, saying that as a graduate student her classmates were all interested in studying the early Republican era and critiquing Kemalism. They were not interested in developments during the subsequent decades, because they \u201cdid not think Turkey had changed a lot after the 1930s.\u201d In keeping with the widespread mood in academia at the time, they believed that \u201cTurkey was somehow frozen in the 1930s and Turkish society revolves around the problems created by the Kemalist elite.\u201d<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>The current critique of post-Kemalism, then, focuses on the relationship between the way Turkish history was understood in recent decades and the support that Erdo\u011fan received from many academics during this same period.\u00a0\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Historians will readily admit that history is political. As Ayt\u00fcrk put it, \u201cAcademia responds to political challenges\u201d and \u201cacademic paradigms are driven by the political exigencies of the moment.\u201d The current critique of post-Kemalism, then, focuses on the relationship between the way Turkish history was understood in recent decades and the support that Erdo\u011fan received from many academics during this same period.<\/p>\n<p>In her opening presentation, \u00d6rnek identified a number of ways that the scholarly focus on the early Republican period at the expense of later periods, particularly the Cold War, contributed to undue optimism about Erdo\u011fan\u2019s democratizing potential. She argued that the \u201ccore argument of post Kemalism\u201d was that \u201cthe decisive conflict in Turkey is the one between the state and \u2018the rest.\u2019\u201d Yet post-Kemalists assumed the state to be an independent actor which was \u201cisolated from society.\u201d This, in turn \u201cled them to read Turkish history as the unfolding of the will of the Kemalist state\u201d and conclude that \u201cthe solution was reducing the sphere of influence of the state \u2013 thus making democratization easy.\u201d While the state was treated as monolithic, \u201csociety was portrayed as a combination of different groups actors,\u201d which, post-Kemalists assumed, \u201cwere in equal distance from the state\u201d and thus \u201cshared a common interest in being opponents of the strong state.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But this perspective \u201ctrivialized antagonisms\u201d between different social groups, who did not in fact share the same relationship with the state. \u201cThink of Islamists,\u201d \u00d6rnek asked: \u201cWere they really equally excluded from the state as the Turkish Left? I think we can confidently say no.\u201d Similarly, as for the business community, \u201cDid they receive the same treatment from the state that the working class received?\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>In short, academics operating within the post-Kemalist paradigm tended to view the Kemalist state as having been consistently opposed to religious conservatives and the business community. However, a greater historiographic focus on the Cold War era, as well as a greater methodological focus on political economy, helped reveal the extent to which these groups had often worked together in opposition to Left-wing actors. This why some of the early critics of post-Kemalism emerged from the Left, among scholars who \u201cdid not neglect the capitalist character of the state.\u201d Thus, \u00d6rnek concluded, only by appreciating phenomena such as \u201canti-Americanism, Islamization and anti-Communism\u201d which emerged in the second half of the 20<sup>th<\/sup> century was it possible to understand the political dynamics behind Erdo\u011fan\u2019s consolidation of power.<\/p>\n<h2>New Circumstances, New Directions<\/h2>\n<blockquote><p><em>Both Berk Esen and Alp Yenen stressed that where post-Kemalist scholarship often implied there was something sui generis about Turkey\u2019s experience, more recent scholarship has better integrated Turkey into global trends.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The conversation then shifted to how scholarship was adapting as attitudes toward Erdo\u011fan and the AKP became decidedly more negative following the Gezi Park protests. Both Berk Esen and Alp Yenen stressed that where post-Kemalist scholarship often implied there was something <em>sui generis<\/em> about Turkey\u2019s experience, more recent scholarship has better integrated Turkey into global trends. Yenen noted a shifted toward \u201cmore global and comparative and connected histories,\u201d while Esen said that in addition to \u201cnew methods\u201d and \u201cnew archival sources,\u201d there was also an increase in comparative work looking at Turkey in relation to other, similar cases.<\/p>\n<p>Ayt\u00fcrk emphasized a number of new themes that were now receiving greater attention and were making important contributions. First, he emphasized that recent scholarship on Turkey and the rise of the AKP was addressing the political economy of populism, thereby contributing to a larger global debate about populism itself. Second, there was a newfound interest in analyzing contemporary Turkish politics from the perspective of competitive authoritarianism, again putting the country\u2019s recent experience in conversation with a number of other countries\u2019. Third, he identified a \u201crediscovery\u201d of <em>laicit\u00e9<\/em> in scholarship, as well as a greater appreciation for its value. Finally, there was newfound interest in the post-1945 period, which was being treated as a \u201cserious subject of study\u201d for the first time. This, Ayt\u00fcrk argued, was the most important development, particularly as Turkish citizens were \u201csurrounded by a political elite who grew up during the Cold War years.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u00d6rnek, too, stressed how moving beyond the post-Kemalist paradigm and focusing more on the Cold War period facilitated seeing Turkey in a global context, while also bringing new themes to the fore. She noted that post-Kemalism \u201ctended to analyze Turkey in terms of its differences\u2026 especially from Europe.\u201d Turkey was a unique case that could be best explained with reference to itself. Ironically, in this regard, \u201cthe Kemalist interpretation of Turkey was shared by post-Kemalism as well.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Moving beyond the post-Kemalist paradigm, \u00d6rnek argued, led to a newfound interest in the origins of Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s. There is now more attention being paid to \u201cthe interaction between the state, particularly the military, and Islamist groups\u201d and a recognition that the military and Islamists were \u201cpartners as well as enemies.\u201d The result was a newfound tendency to view Islamist movements in Turkey as a part of a \u201cglobal phenomena,\u201d influenced by factors such as Saudi Arabia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution.<\/p>\n<p>Ayt\u00fcrk then discussed the way some post-Kemalist scholars have tried to \u201cmake a comeback\u201d with what he described as the \u201cgreen Kemalism argument.\u201d This perspective draws an \u201coverarching line that connects Mustafa Kemal to Erdo\u011fan,\u201d thereby ignoring intellectual and ideological differences between different eras and movements in order to \u201cmake Kemalism the ur-authoritarianism in Turkey.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Esen too pointed to the way advocates of post-Kemalism were trying \u201cto shift their thesis onto a continuity argument,\u201d in which contemporary Turkish authoritarianism could still be traced back to the early Republic. In contrast to this approach, however, Esen identified an encouraging trend toward seeking \u201calternative sources of authoritarianism\u201d in Turkish history, including \u201cIslamic political culture, the Cold War, the Ottoman legacy, cultural politics, anti-Alevi and anti-Kurdish tendencies, [and] political institutions.\u201d<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Yenen stressed that changes \u201cin the area of minority studies, nationalism studies and genocide scholarship\u201d were \u201chere to stay and for very good reason.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>On the subject of what post-Kemalist insights would and should prove lasting, Yenen stressed that changes \u201cin the area of minority studies, nationalism studies and genocide scholarship\u201d were \u201chere to stay and for very good reason.\u201d He argued that the breakthroughs made in scholarship on the Armenian genocide were particularly important. Yenen then referenced Yektan T\u00fcrky\u0131lmaz\u2019s claim that there is now \u201ca new generation of intellectuals who are committed to the ideals of the Republic but still recognize the violence it was accompanied by.\u201d<\/p>\n<h2>The Politics of Post-Post-Kemalism<\/h2>\n<p>The conversation concluded with a discussion of how future political developments, particularly the 2023 Turkish elections, would shape the evolution of scholarship on Turkey, as well as the impact of different political circumstances on scholars working inside and outside of the country.<\/p>\n<p>Ayt\u00fcrk explained that he did not see post-post-Kemalism as a paradigm, but rather as a response to the dominant paradigm. \u201cI would hate to see Turkish studies reduced once again to a hegemonic paradigm,\u201d he said, but would rather see an era \u201cin which different approaches will appear.\u201d Ideally, he added, there would be room for class-based approaches, and even neo-nationalist and neo-Kemalist ones.<\/p>\n<p>Yenen added that it was important to avoid the impression that post-post-Kemalism was &#8220;just a Trojan horse for bringing Kemalism back in.&#8221; Unfortunately, he argued, both Kemalism and post-Kemalism became \u201cmirror images of each other,\u201d an inversion reminiscent of the \u201cBizarro Jerry\u201d episode of Seinfeld.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Ayt\u00fcrk predicted that the post-post-Kemalism argument was unlikely to make inroads into Turkish studies outside Turkey because academics in the U.S. and Europe were responding to different political realities.\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Ayt\u00fcrk predicted that the post-post-Kemalism argument was unlikely to make inroads into Turkish studies outside Turkey because academics in the U.S. and Europe were responding to different political realities. Here, he argued, his colleagues studying the Islamic world felt they had \u201ca responsibility to defend this community against a sea of Westerners who have no understanding of it, and this makes them very reluctant to hear from scholars based in Turkey that there are things wrong there.\u201d As a result, Turkey studies was likely to split: scholarship in Turkey would become more post-post-Kemalist, while outside \u201cpost-Kemalism will have a new lease on life\u201d and \u201cbecome a diaspora phenomenon.\u201d Yenen took a more optimistic perspective, suggesting that European and American academia would eventually follow the trail blazed by scholars in Turkey, with young scholars who are going abroad playing a \u201ckey role.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u00d6rnek predicted that an ongoing reassessment of laicism was likely in response to the AKP\u2019s policies. \u201cFor all the criticism,\u201d she argued, \u201cwe see how laicism is of critical importance for the life of many sectors of society today, including the working class, women, the LGBT community, and women with headscarves.\u201d Women in particular had come to recognize the \u201canti-secularism of the AKP\u201d as a threat, even as a matter of life and death. This was already prompting a reaction in Turkish society which, she concluded, would be reflected in Turkish studies over the coming years.<\/p>\n<p>Esen, in turn, believed that post-Kemalism would remain in the diaspora, but that \u201cwe will witness some major changes, especially if the opposition wins in the 2023 elections.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In Turkey, he pointed out, \u201cthe young generation is more urban, more educated and more secular on average.\u201d Moreover, \u201cmany of the cultural battles that fractured Turkey in the 1990s have been resolved, not by politicians but on practical grounds.\u201d Thus, \u201cmembers of the old generation may cling to cultural politics and old vendettas, but even there things are changing.\u201d \u00a0\u201cIf CHP is already changing course,\u201d Esen argued, \u201cit will be impossible to bring back old Kemalist ideas.\u201d Hopefully this will lead to \u201ca new generation of politicians that will cater to bread-and-butter issues and the economic concerns of the voters.\u201d In this context, there would be \u201ca more positive assessment of the Turkish Republic,\u201d without anyone \u201creally trying to push for restoration of the Kemalist paradigm.\u201d There were, however, a number of Kemalist ideas that might nonetheless win greater appreciation in the future, including \u201csecularism, impersonal bipartisan political institutions to overcome patrimonial politics, and a peaceful foreign policy.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In the diaspora, Esen suggested, \u201cas more countries face right wing populist movements that come to power through democratic means,\u201d the comparisons to the Turkish experience might become more apparent. Much as \u201cKemalism has come under significant challenges, many other secular developmentalist nationalist regimes from the first half of the century have also faced challenges\u201d including the rise of the BJP at the expense of the Congress Party in India and the rise of Likud at the expense of the Labor Party in Israel.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, Esen identified the potential for significant continuity in post-Kemalist perspectives, even if the opposition were to win in 2023. Scholars focused on particular topics like the migration crisis, the Kurdish issue or the Armenian genocide might be unlikely to change their position if the opposition did not dramatically break with the policies of past governments. \u201cAs a result,\u201d he concluded \u201ceven after a political change, even after a democratizing movement, they will still maintain their critical view.\u201d<\/p>\n<h2>Bibliography<\/h2>\n<p>Ayt\u00fcrk I\u0307lker. \u201cPost-Post-Kemalizm: Yeni Bir Paradigmay\u0131 Beklerken.\u201d <em>Birikim<\/em> (319), 2015, 34\u201348.<\/p>\n<p>Ayt\u00fcrk, \u0130lker, and Berk Esen, eds. <em>Post-Post-Kemalizm T\u00fcrkiye \u00c7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131nda Yeni Aray\u0131\u015flar<\/em>. (Istanbul: \u0130leti\u015fim Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2022).<\/p>\n<p>Danforth, Nicholas. The Remaking of Republican Turkey: Memory and Modernity since the End of the Ottoman Empire. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Esen, Berk, and Sebnem Gumuscu. \u201cWhy did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP\u2019s authoritarianism\u201d <em>Party Politics<\/em>, 2021.<\/p>\n<p>\u00d6rnek, Cang\u00fcl. T\u00fcrkiye&#8217;nin So\u011fuk Sava\u015f D\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce Hayat\u0131: Antikom\u00fcnizm ve Amerikan Etkisi. (Istanbul: Can Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2015).<\/p>\n<p>Yenen Alp. Legitimate Means of Dying: Contentious Politics of Martyrdom in the Turkish Civil War (1968\u20131982), Behemoth: a Journal on Civilisation 12(1), 2019. 14-34.<\/p>\n<p>Yenen, Alp, and Erik Jan Z\u00fcrcher, eds. <em>A Hundred Years of Republican Turkey: A History in Hundred Fragments<\/em>. (Leiden: Leiden University Press, forthcoming 2023).<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Disillusionment with Erdo\u011fan and the AKP after 2013 has reshaped the study of Turkish politics and history, leading scholars to focus on new themes and new periods. Comparative approaches, political economy and a newfound interest in the Cold War have offered a more nuanced understanding of Turkish authoritarianism. Post-Kemalism remain more popular in the U.S. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":29213,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[492,102],"tags":[],"program":[24],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29212"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29212"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29212\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45202,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29212\/revisions\/45202"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29213"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29212"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29212"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29212"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=29212"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}