{"id":28906,"date":"2021-09-09T12:16:00","date_gmt":"2021-09-09T09:16:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eliamep.lncdoo.com\/i-tourkia-stis-germanikes-ekloges-tou-2021-oi-apopseis-ton-kommaton-gia-tin-tourkia-symfona-me-tis-proeklogikes-diakiryxeis-tous-dr-ronald-meinardus\/"},"modified":"2024-08-28T11:06:18","modified_gmt":"2024-08-28T08:06:18","slug":"i-tourkia-stis-germanikes-ekloges-tou-2021-oi-apopseis-ton-kommaton-gia-tin-tourkia-symfona-me-tis-proeklogikes-diakiryxeis-tous-dr-ronald-meinardus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/i-tourkia-stis-germanikes-ekloges-tou-2021-oi-apopseis-ton-kommaton-gia-tin-tourkia-symfona-me-tis-proeklogikes-diakiryxeis-tous-dr-ronald-meinardus\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey in Germany\u2019s 2021 Elections: Political party manifestos and their views on Turkey – Dr Ronald Meinardus"},"content":{"rendered":"

Rarely has an election outcome in Germany been as uncertain as it is today. Berlin\u2019s future policy towards Ankara, and not at least the related refugee issues, especially following the recent developments in Afghanistan, will be one of the topics future coalition partners will need to agree on.\u00a0The election manifestos of the political parties provide an important source for analyzing the political views of the political actors. All parties criticize the dire situation of human rights and the rule of law in today\u2019s Turkey. While CDU\/CSU and the far-right AfD reject a Turkish membership in clear terms, the other parties are less outspoken in this point. Potentially the most consequential divergence as reflected in the electoral programs relates to Germany\u2019s arms export policy and the EU Refugee Agreement of 2016. Unlike the other parties, both the Greens and \u201cDie Linke\u201d want to terminate the migration deal as well as the export of German arms to Turkey.<\/p>\n

You may read here<\/a>\u00a0in pdf the Policy Paper by Dr Ronald Meinardus<\/strong>, Istanbul-based political analyst and commentator; ELIAMEP Senior Research Fellow as of 1 October 2021.<\/p>\n

\n

WITH ANGELA MERKEL stepping down after sixteen years in power, a political era is coming to an end in Germany. The federal\u00a0elections of September 26 will determine what happens next in Berlin. Rarely has an election outcome been as uncertain as it is today. According to the pollsters, the country may face arduous coalition negotiations. While foreign policy issues will not be the dominant concern in these, they will still play an important role. The recent events in and around Afghanistan have shown how volatile the situation is and how new and unforeseen issues can emerge overnight to dominate political debates. In this context, Berlin\u2019s future policy toward Ankara, and not least the related refugee issues, especially in the light of the recent developments in Afghanistan, will be one of the topics future coalition partners will need to agree on.<\/p>\n

The election manifestos of the political parties are an important source for analyzing the political views of the political actors. All the parties represented in the Bundestag make more or less extensive references to Turkey and the question of how Germany should deal with the nation.<\/p>\n

Criticism of the prevailing state of affairs in Turkish domestic politics under President Erdo\u011fan and the dire human rights and rule of law situation are common denominators in every party\u2019s manifesto. Without exception, the political parties share their views on the issue of Ankara’s EU relations and, ultimately, Turkey\u2019s prospects of joining the European Union. On this crucial point, Germany\u2019s parties adhere to different policies: while the CDU\/CSU and the far-right AfD reject Turkish membership in no uncertain terms, the other parties are less outspoken on the issue. Potentially the most consequential divergence, as reflected in the electoral programs, relates to Germany\u2019s arms export policy and to the EU Refugee Agreement of 2016. Both the Greens and Die Linke emphasize their intention to terminate the migration deal, as well as to end the export of German arms to Turkey.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

The wording is straightforward: \u201cA sovereign Europe, the transatlantic partnership, work to support peace and security, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and commitment to multilateralism are the guiding principles of German foreign policy\u201d[1]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n

This is how Germany\u2019s Federal Foreign Ministry welcomes visitors to their homepage. In general, all major political forces agree on these principles. As a result, foreign policy debates in Germany typically focus less on these stated fundamentals. They deal instead with how best to put the principles into practice in an international environment that is permanently changing.<\/p>\n

This time around, however, Germany itself is contributing to the uncertainties. With Angela Merkel stepping down after 16 years at the helm of the EU\u2019s leading power, the effect this may have on Berlin\u2019s foreign policies is a topic governments and analysts are discussing in every part of the world.<\/p>\n

This paper deals with Germany\u2019s foreign policy vis-\u00e0-vis Turkey and aims to show what can be expected in this regard as the \u201c\u00c4ra Merkel\u201d[2]<\/a> comes to an end. Given that Berlin is a key player in the European Union, the future direction of Germany\u2019s policies regarding Turkey is of special importance for Ankara\u2019s anything but easy relationship with the EU.<\/p>\n

Every electoral campaign is different. In this year\u2019s contest, Germany\u2019s political parties have focused their campaigns on how best to cope with the lingering pandemic and on how to deal with the catastrophic effects of climate change. We are living in extraordinary times and foreign policy issues have, for obvious reasons, been relegated to a back seat \u2013 without, of course, being completely left out of the political debates, as the recent discussions relating to Afghanistan show.<\/p>\n

Heading the list of perpetual foreign policy issues once again has been the relationship with Putin\u2019s Russia and an increasingly assertive China, a major business partner for Germany. A recurring theme in related debates has been the future of Europe and how the European Union can be more effective at dealing with its numerous challenges in the future.<\/p>\n

While not at the very top, Turkey has also figured prominently in German foreign policy debates \u2013 and controversies. The importance of Turkey in Germany\u2019s international relations is reflected not least in the frequent references made to the country in political discussions, media reports, and the election programs of major political parties. As we will see, all parties refer more or less extensively to Turkey, and to how Germany should position herself vis-\u00e0-vis Ankara, in their campaign manifestos.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cPrograms or platforms play an important role in Germany\u2019s party politics.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Programs or platforms play an important role in Germany\u2019s party politics. The \u201claw on political parties\u201d (Parteiengesetz[3]<\/strong><\/sup><\/a><\/em>) mandates that political parties lay down their objectives in political programs. In this context, election programs (or manifestos) are important. Typically published well ahead of polling day, these Wahlprogramme<\/em> should not be confused with the more basic policy programs (Grundsatzprogramm<\/em>) which define the ideological orientation of the party and are, as the name implies, more \u201cfundamental\u201d and thus long-lasting.<\/p>\n

Both formats are the result of intensive political debates at various levels of the party which culminate in their formal adoption by a party convention. While the more ideological Grundsatzprogramm<\/em> is directed primarily at the party\u2019s rank-and-file, and aims to orientate their members and followers, the election program targets voters, which is to say the general public. In them, using simple language, the parties explain what they intend to do in the various policy areas should they come to power, or \u2013 and this a more probable scenario today \u2013 should they be part of a coalition government.<\/p>\n

Political chromatics and the need for coalitions<\/h2>\n

Throughout her sixteen years at the helm, Angela Merkel has never ruled alone, having always shared power with a coalition partner: First, from 2005 to 2009, with the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) in a \u201cgrand coalition.\u201d Following that, from 2009 to 2013, with the liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP)<\/em>, referred to in Germany\u2019s political chromatics as the \u201cBlack Yellow\u201d coalition. After the Liberals\u2019 failure to pass the five percent threshold and win representation in parliament in 2013, Merkel returned her party to its \u201cgrand coalition\u201d with the Social Democrats.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the pollsters believe the electorate may deliver a result that will necessitate three parties joining hands to secure a majority in parliament.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It is widely expected that there will be a shift in power following the upcoming Bundestag elections. According to numerous polls, various coalitions are possible, with no party expected to win the majority needed to form a government alone. Political observers opine that none of the former coalitions \u2013 referring to the present \u201cgrand coalition\u201d of CDU\/CSU and SPD, a Black-Yellow coalition of CDU\/CSU and FDP, a social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP, and lastly a Red-Green coalition \u2013 is likely to result this time round. All these coalitions have one thing in common \u2013 they consisted of two parties \u2013 , while the pollsters believe the electorate may deliver a result that will necessitate three parties joining hands to secure a majority in parliament.<\/p>\n

As of the time of writing (late August 2021), the following coalitions are the most discussed:<\/p>\n

Kenya Coalition \u2013 Black, Red, Green: CDU\/CSU; SPD, Greens (B\u00fcndnis 90\/Die Gr\u00fcnen<\/em>)<\/p>\n

Jamaica Coalition \u2013 Black, Yellow, Green: CDU\/CSU; FDP, Greens<\/p>\n

Germany Coalition \u2013 Black, Red, Yellow: CDU\/CSU, SPD, FDP<\/p>\n

Traffic Light Coalition \u2013 Red, Yellow, Green: SPD, FDP, Greens<\/p>\n

The phraseology is based on the symbolic colors of the political parties: black for the Christian Democrats, red for the Social Democrats, yellow for the Liberals and, yes, Green for the ecological party. These same colors are found on the national flags of Kenya, Jamaica and Germany, which explains how creative minds came to develop the popular terminology.<\/p>\n

The ups and downs of German-Turkish relations<\/h2>\n

During the long years of Angela Merkel\u2019s rule, relations between Germany and Turkey have seen numerous ups and downs \u2013 with more downs than ups.[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Today, the relationship between Germany and Turkey is at a \u201chistorically low point,\u201d write Burc, R. & Copur, B (2017, p. 7) in their assessment of Germany\u2019s policy toward Turkey. They conclude that \u201cTo the greatest extent, the relationship of trust is shattered,\u201d going on to compare Euro-Turkish relations to a \u201cpile of shards\u201d.<\/p>\n

This has not always been the case, the authors say, referring to the period between the recognition of Turkey as an accession candidate and the beginning of accession negotiations (1999\u20132005). This period is also referred to as \u201cthe golden years of \u201cEuro-Turkish relations.\u201d Importantly, this phase coincides with a high in bilateral German-Turkish relations.<\/p>\n

In those years, a Red-Green coalition government was in charge in Berlin. According to Rosa Burc and Burak Copur, the Social Democrat Gerhard Schr\u00f6der and his Green Party foreign minister Joschka Fischer were the \u201cdriving force\u201d behind the positive developments in Euro-Turkish affairs.<\/p>\n

The change of government in 2005 and the coming to power of Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led to a paradigm shift in Germany\u2019s policies toward Turkey, with wide-ranging negative implications for Turkey\u2019s relationship with the European Union:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe departure from the pro-active policy towards Turkey by Germany after 2005 went hand in hand with a systematic deterioration of the relationship between Ankara and Brussels,\u201d write Rosa Burc and Burak Copur (ibid.). With this observation, the authors highlight the close link that exists between domestic political developments in Germany and the status of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union.<\/p>\n

While the SPD and the Greens proactively supported the idea of Turkey\u2019s membership in the EU, Angela Merkel pleaded for a \u201cprivileged partnership.\u201d This did not bring the political process to an end, but it did slow it down considerably.<\/p>\n

\u201cDuring Merkel\u2019s tenure as Chancellor, German-Turkish relations have experienced numerous crises.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

During Merkel\u2019s tenure as Chancellor, German-Turkish relations have experienced numerous crises.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe bilateral relationship has been influenced by the unresolved integration problems of some of the Turkish and Kurdish immigrants living in Germany and the overall state of human rights and democracy in Turkey,\u201d writes Szabo (2018), referring to the assessment of Germany\u2019s prime expert on Turkey at the time, Heinz Kramer of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP)<\/em>. With the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union in 2004, a further disruptive factor was added to Turkey\u2019s relations with the EU, though it would not initially have major negative side effects for German-Turkish affairs.<\/p>\n

Recently, in the context of the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, we saw how a Greek-Turkish dispute \u2013 and the Cyprus question could also be perceived as a Greek-Turkish issue \u2013 could have disruptive effects on the German-Turkish relationship.<\/p>\n

A few years back, another crisis of global proportions which would destabilize domestic politics in Germany led Ms. Merkel to readjust her foreign policy vis-\u00e0-vis Turkey \u2013 and in a positive manner from a Turkish vantage point. The government in Berlin came to the conclusion that the Syrian refugee crisis, which had already become the dominant theme in Germany, could not be managed without the close cooperation of President Erdo\u011fan. Germany\u2019s forceful political activities culminated in the EU-Turkey agreement on refugees of March 18, 2016.<\/p>\n

A \u201cstrategic partner\u201d: Turkey in the CDU\u2019s election manifestos<\/h2>\n

Against the backdrop of the refugee deal, the Christian Democrats emphasize the important role of Turkey as a strategic partner:<\/p>\n

\u201cWe appreciate the strategic and economic importance of Turkey for Europe [\u2026]. We want as strong as possible cooperation between the European Union and Turkey, as well as a close strategic cooperation in issues relating to foreign and security policies.\u201d (CDU\/CSU, 2017, p.58)<\/p>\n

The rhetoric is reminiscent of statements from the Cold War era, when mainly conservative forces celebrated Turkey for its role as a bastion of the free world against the \u201ccommunist onslaught.\u201d However, the perceived threat has changed now, and communism is no longer the peril; the new challenge is how to keep millions of desperate individuals fleeing warfare and misery, and seeking protection in Europe, away from the borders. To handle this challenge, Mr. Erdo\u011fan proved a not-always-easy, but ultimately cooperative and effective partner.<\/p>\n

In their 2017 election manifesto, the CDU deals with Turkey in two paragraphs. The first highlights, as just seen, the strategic significance of the relationship, while the second is shorter and more straight forward: \u201cWe reject a full membership of Turkey, because the country does not meet the necessary conditions.\u201d (ibid.) The party is worried by recent developments concerning the human rights and rule of law situation, the manifesto states.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere will be no EU membership for Turkey with us.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This year\u2019s electoral platform conveys more or less the same message, while \u2013 as regards the topic of EU membership \u2013 the wording has been adjusted slightly, and in a negative manner: \u201cThere will be no EU membership for Turkey with us.\u201d As an alternative, the party suggests a \u201cclose partnership,\u201d whose wording is weaker, involving less commitment, than the earlier talk of a \u201cprivileged partnership.\u201d (CDU\/CSU, 2021, p. 20).<\/p>\n

That there could be no business as usual in Berlin\u2019s relationship with Ankara is another message conveyed in the program: \u201cOur relationship with Turkey is in need of a new perspective.\u201d Unlike the 2017 manifesto, the 2021 program includes a reference to NATO as an \u201calliance of values,\u201d meaning that all members are obliged to respect human rights and the rule of law.<\/p>\n

Brief and evasive: The SPD\u2019s positions<\/h2>\n

Not least because it is the party of the foreign minister, the SPD\u2019s programmatic positioning on Turkey deserves special attention. Titled \u201cOut of Respect for Your Future,\u201d the 66-page document is the shortest manifesto of all the major political parties, and the laconic nature of its remarks on Turkey, which is dealt with in just three sentences, is in tune with this brevity:<\/p>\n

\u201cWe observe developments in the Turkish government\u2019s domestic and foreign policy with concern. Turkey must respect the principles of the rule of law, democracy and international law. It is a matter of extreme urgency that the dialog between the EU and Turkey be intensified in order to address these issues in a critical manner.\u201d (SPD, 2021, p. 60)<\/p>\n

In their election manifesto of 2017, the Social Democrats allotted far more space to Turkey, which is termed \u201can important, but now very difficult partner.\u201d The SPD then went on to criticize the \u201cmassive arrests\u201d of journalists and oppositionists. As for its take on Turkey-EU relations, the SPD \u2013 unlike the CDU, with which it is in coalition \u2013 is evasive: \u201cNeither Turkey nor the European Union are ready for accession in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the accession negotiations are the only continuing dialog format of the European Union with Turkey. Isolating Turkey is not in the interest of Europe.\u201d (SPD, 2017, p. 100)<\/p>\n

This support for the continuation of the accession talks in the 2017 manifesto has been dropped in this year\u2019s document. It should be mentioned that the SPD included one clear caveat in 2017: \u201cShould Turkey reintroduce the death penalty, the accession negotiations must be terminated.\u201d (ibid.)<\/p>\n

The elections for the 19th<\/sup> Bundestag took place on September 24, 2017 and resulted in a crushing defeat for the incumbents. The voters punished both the CDU\/CSU and the SPD severely. Never since the early days of the Republic had the traditional \u201cpeople\u2019s parties\u201d fared so badly at the polls. The CDU\/CSU won 33 percent of the votes, a decline of no fewer than eight percentage points from the previous elections. The SPD fell to 20.5 percent of the vote \u2013 five percentage points down compared to 2013[5]<\/sup><\/a>. As the smaller parties failed to iron out a program for an alternative coalition, Angela Merkel had little choice in the end, after much toing and froing, but to continue governing side by side with the Social Democrats.<\/p>\n

The coalition formation process follows a standardized routine: Initially, the potential partners spend long hours, which often last deep into the night, sounding out common ground. The exploratory talks are then followed by negotiations between the party leaders, and in the end, the party rank-and-file get to vote on the results achieved by the negotiating teams. The process is also rather transparent for this same reason; in the end, the coalition partners publish their agreement \u2013 the so called coalition contract (Koalitionsvertrag<\/em>) \u2013 for everyone to see.<\/p>\n

The Koalitionsvertrag<\/em> carries far more political weight than the Wahlprogramm<\/em> of a specific political party, since it is the contract in which the coalition partners formulate in a binding manner the policies they intend to implement in the coming legislature. The section on future policies toward Turkey is comparatively extensive in the coalition agreement of early 2018:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026we neither wish to open nor to close any chapters in the accession negotiations. Visa liberalization and an extension of the Customs Union are only possible when Turkey meets the required conditions.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u201cTurkey is an important partner for Germany and a neighbor of the European Union with whom we entertain multifold relations. For this reason, we have a special interest in a good relationship with Turkey. The democracy, rule of law and human rights situation has been deteriorating for quite some time in Turkey. For this reason, we neither wish to open nor to close any chapters in the accession negotiations. Visa liberalization and an extension of the Customs Union are only possible when Turkey meets the required conditions.\u201d[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThere is little disagreement among the political class in Germany that Turkey is a strategically important partner and that the state of human rights and the rule of law in that country are not where they should be.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Coalition agreements are always a product of compromise. It is in the nature of such documents: both sides try to push through as many of their policies as possible, and in the end the stronger partner wins. There is little disagreement among the political class in Germany that Turkey is a strategically important partner and that the state of human rights and the rule of law in that country are not where they should be. It is interesting to note which conclusions the coalition partners drew for their prospective policies in early 2018. In the coalition contract of March 2018, they agreed to freeze the accession talks with Ankara. They also agreed that visa liberalization and the modernization of the Customs Union, both of which are important elements of the 2016 Refugee Deal, are conditional.<\/p>\n

Taking the election manifestos into consideration, we may conclude from the wording of the contract that the CDU has prevailed. The coalition contract also determines which party gets which ministries, with the foreign ministry going once again to the Social Democrats. It is also part of the deal, however, that the Social Democrat would have to implement policies contained in the contract which may not necessarily be fully compatible with what the party had advocated prior to forming the coalition.<\/p>\n

New contenders for power, and their policies toward Turkey<\/h2>\n

At the time of writing, it is a distinct possibility that a future government will bring three political parties together in a coalition. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at their perspectives on Turkey and future German policies.<\/p>\n

After failing to pass the five-percent threshold in 2013, Germany\u2019s liberal FDP party won 10.7 percent in the 2017 elections. In this year\u2019s election manifesto, the party, as it did in 2017, talks about ending the accession talks with Ankara: \u201cWe want to terminate the EU-accession negotiations with Turkey in their prior format and put the relationship on a new basis of close cooperation in the economic and security field.\u201d And further: \u201cA Turkey ruled in an authoritarian fashion by President Erdo\u011fan cannot, in the eyes of the Free Democrats, be a candidate for membership.\u201d (FDP, 2021, p. 49)<\/p>\n

\u201cWith reference to the Copenhagen Criteria, Germany\u2019s Liberals set out the conditions for such talks and look into the future, stating that \u2018There will be a Turkey after President Erdo\u011fan\u2019.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

There is no categorical rejection of Turkish membership in the program. With reference to the Copenhagen Criteria,[7]<\/sup><\/a> Germany\u2019s Liberals set out the conditions for such talks and look into the future, stating that \u201cThere will be a Turkey after President Erdo\u011fan,\u201d and that Berlin should prepare for that and other eventualities by intensifying its cooperation with Turkish civil society.<\/p>\n

The chances of the leftist \u201cDie Linke\u201d party joining a government coalition in Berlin are considered to be rather slim. Nevertheless, the party\u2019s positions are relevant, not least since \u201cDie Linke\u201d has time and again initiated policy debates regarding Turkey in parliament and beyond, and could be described as the most ardent critic of Ms. Merkel\u2019s approach.<\/p>\n

While avoiding a clear position on the accession issue, \u201cDie Linke\u201d implicitly creates a linkage with the human rights and democracy situation in Turkey: \u201cWe want all present and future candidates for membership to make unconditional commitments to human rights and democracy. This is particularly the case with Turkey.\u201d (Die Linke, 2021, p. 230)<\/p>\n

In their manifesto, the party pleads for the cancellation of the refugee deal of 2016 and the termination of all arms export from Germany to Turkey. \u201cWe demand an immediate stop to all exports of military hardware,\u201d the party says in its manifesto before putting this into a broader political context: \u201cAll support for NATO states which, like Erdo\u011fan\u2019s Turkey, disregard international law, must be stopped immediately.\u201d (ibid., p. 231)<\/p>\n

While the Green Party\u2019s election campaign ran into a series of problems, most of which were of their own making and which led to a fall in its poll ratings, the group is considered a serious contender for a role in a future coalition government. In relation to discussions on Turkey, the Greens have traditionally played a crucial role in German politics. This pioneering part may also be attributed to the fact that politicians with a migration background play a more prominent role in the Greens than in other parties. This is also reflected in their electoral manifesto for the September 2021 elections.<\/p>\n

In the introduction to a comparatively extensive section on Turkey, the party stresses the common points: \u201cTurkey and Europe are bound together by very much more than divides the two in terms of society, culture and the economy. The relationship between Germany and Turkey is particularly close and multifaceted because of their joint migration history.\u201d (B\u00fcndnis 90\/Die Gr\u00fcnen, 2021, p. 230)<\/p>\n

However, the tone changes abruptly after this conciliatory introduction. Like the other parties, the Greens also denounce the violation of human rights and the rule of law, while demanding once again a \u201creturn to political dialogue and the peace process in the Kurdish question.\u201d<\/p>\n

Regarding Turkey\u2019s EU prospects, the party\u2019s position is conditional: \u201cThe resumption of EU accession talks is our aim,\u201d the party states, though the manifesto then goes on to say that this will only be possible \u201cwhen Turkey makes a turnaround back to democracy and the rule of law.\u201d<\/p>\n

Another important point with potentially far-reaching implications refers to the refugee deal struck between the EU and Turkey in 2016, which the Green Party wants to scrap: \u201cThe EU-Turkey-Deal undermines the international law on asylum and must be terminated,\u201d (ibid., p. 231) the manifesto says.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026an issue the Greens have raised on various occasions, is the demand to stop the export of German submarines to Turkey.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Not explicitly mentioned in the electoral program of the party, but an issue the Greens have raised on various occasions, is the demand to stop the export of German submarines to Turkey. The Greens brought this question into the public debate in 2020 against the background of rising tensions between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the government in Berlin has restricted the export of military hardware to Ankara over the years, the six type-214 submarines produced by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems were not affected by this policy. In separate petitions in the Bundestag, both the Greens and \u201cDie Linke\u201d sought a revocation of the export license, but failed to obtain a majority.[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland-AfD [Alternative for Germany] party is positioned on the right wing of Germany\u2019s political spectrum. According to pollsters and political observers, this party has no chance of joining a government after the elections. Still, for reasons of completeness, the views of this party will be presented here. In the last elections, which were also held against the background of the \u201cmigration crisis,\u201d the AfD won 12.6 percent of the popular vote. The AfD-position on Turkey is strongly impacted by a rejection of Islam and the role of that religion in society. \u201cTurkey does not belong to Europe culturally,\u201d the manifesto says. In line with this, the party is against Turkey\u2019s membership of the European Union. \u201cThe AfD demands the immediate end of all accession negotiations\u201d (Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland, 2021, p. 64).<\/p>\n

Because of the right-wing and in parts extremist rhetoric of members of the AfD leadership, the established democratic political parties avoid and exclude any cooperation with the group in the context of forming a government. Nevertheless, some of the party\u2019s views also find popular support beyond the core followers of the group. This is particularly apparent with regard to Turkey.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe German public has an overwhelmingly negative view of contemporary Turkey,\u201d writes Szabo (2018, p. 4) with reference to opinion polls according to which three fourths of Germans polled are in favor of ending the accession talks. According to a survey commissioned by public broadcaster ARD in September 2017, of those polled 84 percent rejected Turkish membership, with only 12 percent approving of it.<\/p>\n

The drama of these numbers is revealed when they are viewed from an historical perspective. In the early years of Erdo\u011fan\u2019s rule, back in 2004, a whopping 54 percent of Germans favored Turkey joining the European Union, with just 35 percent opposing the option. As noted above, these were the \u201cgolden years\u201d of Turkish-European and Turkish-German relations, and they are unlikely to return any time soon after the German elections of September 26.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

Germany\u2019s parliamentary elections of September 26 mark the end of a political era. After 16 years at the helm, Angela Merkel is stepping down and a new epoch is in the making.<\/p>\n

The political programs of political parties and the policy statements of politicians play a more important role in German politics than in other democracies. A critical public and the media, as well as the Opposition, hold the political actors accountable for what they say or write. In this sense, the election manifestos at the center of this research are not random texts without political weight; they are authoritative political documents which play a substantial role, not least when the political party comes to power.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the election programs are also one of various factors in the political decision-making process. This is even more so in the present political situation, in which \u2013 according to most predictions \u2013 forming a government will be difficult and may include not two, as has always been the case thus far, but three political parties.<\/p>\n

As we noted at the start, Germany\u2019s political parties all agree on the key tenets of German foreign policy. However, clear differentiations do exist on important questions–and policies toward Turkey are a point in case–, and these are also reflected in the party programs.<\/p>\n

The German political parties concur in their criticism of the prevailing domestic and foreign policies of the Turkish government. The parties reject what they term the growing authoritarian tendencies of President Erdo\u011fan, the violations of human rights and the undermining of the rule of law.<\/p>\n

Differences exist as to how Berlin should react to these developments. While there is a broad agreement that the current illiberal situation should affect Turkey\u2019s relationship with the EU, we have seen different positions expressed on what long-term perspectives the Turks should be offered. While for the CDU\/CSU and the AfD, things are clear, with no place for Turkey in the Union, the other parties are less outspoken or downright evasive on this point.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the most striking differentiation in the electoral programs, and the one with potentially the most political consequence, relates to the parties\u2019 policies on the issue of arms exports and the EU-Turkey refugee deal of 2016.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Arguably, the most striking differentiation in the electoral programs, and the one with potentially the most political consequence, relates to the parties\u2019 policies on the issue of arms exports and the EU-Turkey refugee deal of 2016. In their programs, both the Greens and \u201cDie Linke\u201d announce that they will scrap the refugee deal and ban the export of submarines to Turkey.<\/p>\n

In the coming weeks and months, there will be a good deal of talk about continuity and change in German politics as the \u201c\u00c4ra Merkel\u201d comes to an end. The extent of the change will largely depend on the outcome of the elections and the subsequent composition of the parliament and government.<\/p>\n

The most substantial changes regarding policies toward Turkey should be expected when the Greens \u2013 not to mention \u201cDie Linke\u201d \u2013 are given a mandate to play a determining role in Germany\u2019s foreign affairs.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> https:\/\/www.auswaertiges-amt.de\/en\/aussenpolitik\/themen\/policy-principles\/229790<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> In a good portrayal of the \u201cspecial relationship\u201d of Angela Merkel with Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan entitled \u201cYou cannot choose your partners”\u201d, German correspondent Rainer Hermann speaks of \u201cmutual trust and respect\u201d; Merkel perceives Erdogan in a \u201cmatter of facts and unemotional manner\u201d, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 24, 2020.\u00a0 https:\/\/www.faz.net\/aktuell\/politik\/ausland\/merkel-trifft-erdogan-man-kann-sich-seine-partner-nicht-aussuchen-16597369.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> https:\/\/www.gesetze-im-internet.de\/partg\/BJNR007730967.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> For a good summary and further references, see Szabo, S.F. (2018).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> https:\/\/www.bundeswahlleiter.de\/info\/presse\/mitteilungen\/bundestagswahl-2017\/34_17_endgueltiges_ergebnis.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 19. Legislaturperiode, p. 150. https:\/\/www.bundesregierung.de\/resource\/blob\/656734\/847984\/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7\/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-data.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria (after the European Council which defined them in Copenhagen in 1993), are the essential conditions all candidate countries must satisfy to become a member state. These include political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; the administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis<\/em><\/a>*; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership. https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/policy\/glossary\/terms\/accession-criteria_en<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> The parliamentary debate in which all the parties stated their positions on the issue of arms exports to Turkey is documented (in German) at Deutscher Bundestag. 19. Wahlperiode, 207. Sitzung, January 29, 2021,\u00a0https:\/\/dserver.bundestag.de\/btp\/19\/19207.pdf<\/a>, p. 26180 \u2013 26205.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sources:<\/h2>\n

Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland (2021). Deutschland. Aber normal. Programm der Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland f\u00fcr den 20. Bundestag.<\/p>\n

Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland (2017). Wahlprogramm der Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland f\u00fcr den Deutschen Bundestag.<\/p>\n

B\u00fcndnis 90\/Die Gr\u00fcnen (2021). Bundeswahlprogramm 2021. Bereit, weil Ihr es seid.<\/p>\n

B\u00fcndnis 90\/Die Gr\u00fcnen (2017). Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017. Zukunft wird aus Mut gemacht.<\/p>\n

CDU\/CSU (2021). Das Programm f\u00fcr Stabilit\u00e4t und Erneuerung. Gemeinsam f\u00fcr ein starkes Deutschland.<\/p>\n

CDU\/CSU (2017). Regierungsprogramm 2017\u20132021. F\u00fcr ein Deutschland, in dem gut und gerne leben.<\/p>\n

Die Linke (2021). Zeit zu handeln! F\u00fcr soziale Sicherheit, Frieden und Klimagerechtigkeit. Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2021.<\/p>\n

Die Linke (2017). Sozial. Gerecht. Frieden. F\u00fcr alle. Die Zukunft, f\u00fcr die wir k\u00e4mpfen. Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2017.<\/p>\n

Freie Demokraten. FDP (2021). Nie gab es mehr zu tun. Wahlprogramm der Freien Demokraten.<\/p>\n

Freie Demokraten. FDP (2017). Denken wir neu. Das Programm der Freien Demokraten zur Bundestagswahl 2017.<\/p>\n

SPD (2021). Aus Respekt vor Deiner Zukunft. Das Zukunftsprogramm der SPD.<\/p>\n

SPD (2017). Zeit f\u00fcr mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm f\u00fcr Deutschland.<\/p>\n

References:<\/h2>\n

Burc, R. & Copur, B. (2017). Deutsche T\u00fcrkeipolitik unter Merkel: eine kritische Bilanz, Notes du Cerfa, Nr. 140, Ifri.<\/p>\n

G\u00fczeldere, E.E. (2020): German-Turkey Relations: It could be worse, Eliamep Policy Paper Nr 49.<\/p>\n

Kundani, H. (2021). Germany and Turkey after Merkel, InBrief Series, Berlin Bosporus Initiative.<\/p>\n

Szabo, S.F. (2018). Germany and Turkey: The unavoidable Partnership, Brookings Turkey Project Policy Paper Nr. 14.<\/p>\n

Turhan, E. (2013). The 2013 German Federal Elections: Key determinants and implications for German-Turkish relations, IPC-Mercator Policy Brief. (Submitted August 18, 2021)<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Rarely has an election outcome in Germany been as uncertain as it is today. Berlin\u2019s future policy towards Ankara, and not at least the related refugee issues, especially following the recent developments in Afghanistan, will be one of the topics future coalition partners will need to agree on.\u00a0The election manifestos of the political parties provide […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":28907,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[492,104],"tags":[],"program":[17,24],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28906"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28906"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28906\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45047,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28906\/revisions\/45047"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/28907"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28906"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28906"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28906"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=28906"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}