{"id":28850,"date":"2021-05-21T07:35:00","date_gmt":"2021-05-21T04:35:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eliamep.lncdoo.com\/allazoun-oi-kairoi-tria-kommata-tis-tourkikis-antipolitefsis\/"},"modified":"2024-08-28T11:06:11","modified_gmt":"2024-08-28T08:06:11","slug":"allazoun-oi-kairoi-tria-kommata-tis-tourkikis-antipolitefsis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/allazoun-oi-kairoi-tria-kommata-tis-tourkikis-antipolitefsis\/","title":{"rendered":"”The Times They Are A-Changin'”? – Three Turkish Opposition Parties"},"content":{"rendered":"

While the main focus of international media and academics is oriented towards Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), together with their nationalist allies, the Turkish opposition is giving growing signs of deep changes and transformations.<\/p>\n

Obliged to operate within a \u201ccompetitive authoritarian\u201d environment, the three biggest parties of the opposition, namely the Republican People\u2019s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), the Good Party (\u0130Y\u0130 Parti) and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve At\u0131l\u0131m Partisi-DEVA) are in a multidimensional process of transformation and adaptation to the emerging needs and expectations of a growing part of the Turkish society.<\/p>\n

By exploring new ways to circumvent polarization that brings them closer to the vibrant society, and by searching for new interpretations of nationalism that open new perspectives of inclusiveness, these three opposition parties have the potential to emerge not only as significant political alternatives but also as a reflection of societal change.<\/p>\n

You may find here<\/a> in pdf the Policy Paper by Georgios Angeletopoulos<\/strong> and Evangelos Areteos<\/strong>, Research Associates at ELIAMEP’s Turkey Programme.<\/p>\n

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Introduction<\/h2>\n

This paper focuses \u03bfn three parties of the Turkish opposition, namely the Republican People\u2019s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP<\/em>), the Good Party (\u0130Y\u0130 Parti<\/em>) and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve At\u0131l\u0131m Partisi, <\/em>DEVA, which means \u201ccure\u201d in Turkish) with respect to their declared ideology, their internal balances and their potential as political alternatives in the Turkish political scene. CHP was selected because it is the main political formation of the opposition, \u0130Y\u0130 and DEVA because they show a consolidated upward tendency in recent polls. Ahmet Davuto\u011flu\u2019s Future Party (Gelecek Partisi<\/em>) doesn\u2019t seem to follow this dynamic[1]<\/sup><\/a> for the time being and the Peoples\u2019 Democratic Party (Halklar\u0131n Demokratik Partisi, HDP<\/em>) deserves a separate case study because of the intrinsic Kurdish dynamics.<\/p>\n

Despite its initial \u201cconservative democrat\u201d phase after the 2002 electoral victory, the ruling AKP and its head, Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, moved towards a political approach defined by a heavily Islamist and nationalist agenda. This approach was further intensified after the challenges posed by the Gezi <\/em>uprising in early summer 2013 and the open conflict with Fethullah G\u00fclen that broke out later that year. The failed coup of July 2016 did nothing but exacerbate the regime\u2019s insecurity and feelings of threat, which in turn led to the intensification of its political authoritarianism.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe culmination of the authoritarian posture on behalf of the government poses an imminent challenge to the opposition so as to respond effectively to the growing societal demands for a different course.\u201d <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This ongoing period in Turkish politics is marked by deep polarization, democratic deficit and a major setback to individual freedoms and human \u2013 especially women\u2019s \u2013 rights, with continuous verbal confrontations between the government and the opposition. Consequently, an attempt to further clarify the latter’s position is important for counterbalancing the almost exclusively Erdo\u011fan-AKP-MHP[2]<\/sup><\/a> centred political analysis. This neglect of the other Turkish parties’ milieu <\/em>leads to a flawed understanding of Turkish politics and consequently to a distorted picture of its internal dynamics. Even more so since the culmination of the authoritarian posture on behalf of the government poses an imminent challenge to the opposition so as to respond effectively acta et verba<\/em> to the growing societal demands for a different course.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe current authoritarian environment in Turkey is crucial in shaping the behaviour and strategies of the opposition and offers them the opportunity to grow and become agents of political change.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Our research is based on the assumption that the current authoritarian environment in Turkey, which dominates the political \u2013and to a certain extent the social\u2013 dynamics in the country, is crucial in shaping the behaviour and strategies of the opposition. The potential and the dynamics of the latter are significant and can play a catalytic role for change in Turkey because \u201cthe political regime in Turkey is still competitive authoritarian\u201d and \u201chas not yet turned into full authoritarianism, as some scholars claim.\u201d[3]<\/sup><\/a> This is a major factor that actually triggers deep ideological and pragmatic transformations within the opposition parties and offers them the opportunity to grow and become agents of political change.<\/p>\n

Sel\u00e7uk and Hekimci argue that \u201cthe rise of the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage explains the coordination of opposition parties from various ideological backgrounds\u201d and that \u201cthe process of democratic backsliding gave rise to the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage, which gradually overshadowed the historically rooted secular-religious conservative and the Turkish-Kurdish social cleavages in the party-system\u201d. Moreover they draw attention to the fact that \u201cthe opposition parties framed their coordination over their fight for democracy and muted their programmatic differences about the role of Islam and how to address the Kurdish conflict. Because of their coordination, the opposition parties successfully undermined AKP\u2019s parliamentary majority in 2015 and 2018. In the 2019 local elections, opposition coordination led to power change in Istanbul, Ankara, and other key cities.\u201d[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201c<\/em>Amidst the \u201ccompetitive authoritarian\u201d environment the \u201cpolitical coordination\u201d of the Turkish opposition runs parallel and is intrinsic to deep social dynamics and transformations that frame the political and ideological sphere.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This is exactly what happened when in 2018, CHP and \u0130Y\u0130 Party led the Nation\u2019s Alliance (Millet \u0130ttifak\u0131<\/em>) composed of several centre\/right-wing parties, such as the Islamist-oriented Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP)<\/em> and the conservative right Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP<\/em>). During the 2019 local elections the mainly Kurdish-oriented HDP\u2019s voters expressed their support for the opposition coalition\u2019s candidates, permitting them to win the mayoralty of many big cities (\u0130stanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Mersin, Adana etc.). We argue that amidst this \u201ccompetitive authoritarian\u201d environment the \u201cpolitical coordination\u201d of the Turkish opposition is not merely based on pragmatic political calculations generated by the rules of the current electoral system. It runs parallel and is intrinsic to deep social dynamics and transformations that frame the political and ideological sphere and offer new opportunities for ideological transitions to all parties and specifically to the parties of the opposition.<\/p>\n

\u201c<\/em>Despite AKP and President Erdo\u011fan\u2019s dominant religious rhetoric on political and social affairs Turkish society moves contrariwise. It develops a high potential towards essential secularization and modernization.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

During our last extensive examination of the Turkish landscape we had verified the hypothesis that, despite AKP and President Erdo\u011fan\u2019s dominant religious rhetoric on political and social affairs, Turkish society moves contrariwise. It is developing a high potential towards essential secularization and modernization by forming a multitude of alternative hybrid identities in order to define itself individually as well as collectively.[5]<\/sup><\/a> This transitional phase is highlighted by an evident need for change, where both societal and political agents shouldn\u2019t be identified only with what they were yesterday but also with what they will be tomorrow.<\/p>\n

We also observed a similar process for the Turkish political parties, stating that the transformation of both \u201cKemalism\u201d and CHP \u201cis in full process and accelerating during the last period\u201d, as was the case with other parties of the Turkish political spectrum as well.[6]<\/sup><\/a> Subsequent developments verified that AKP, CHP and \u0130Y\u0130 are indeed undergoing deep internal transformations, which often lead to grievances, disagreements and sometimes even to the exit of dissidents and the formation of new parties.<\/p>\n

\u201c<\/em>Certain transition cleavages depict the transition from a traditional ideological and political attitude towards a novel, hybrid one that tries to reflect the new social dynamics while accommodating each party’s traditional matrix.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In order to highlight the ideological transformations that are taking place within the three selected parties of the current study and their potential to sustainably engage in transformative politics, we discerned certain transition cleavages<\/em>. These depict the transition from a traditional ideological and political attitude towards a novel, hybrid one that tries to reflect the new social dynamics while accommodating each party’s traditional matrix.<\/p>\n

In order to describe these cleavages<\/em> we have established a set of four indicators<\/em> i.e. mainstream conceptual frames in present Turkish social and political reality, which reflect the process of party change:<\/p>\n