{"id":28808,"date":"2021-04-02T12:08:00","date_gmt":"2021-04-02T09:08:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eliamep.lncdoo.com\/epanexetazontas-ti-symfonia-metanastefsis-ee-tourkias-tou-2016-mia-efkairia-gia-tin-ellada-peran-tou-na-einai-aplos-i-aspida-tis-evropis-k-kirisci\/"},"modified":"2024-08-28T11:06:05","modified_gmt":"2024-08-28T08:06:05","slug":"epanexetazontas-ti-symfonia-metanastefsis-ee-tourkias-tou-2016-mia-efkairia-gia-tin-ellada-peran-tou-na-einai-aplos-i-aspida-tis-evropis-k-kirisci","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/epanexetazontas-ti-symfonia-metanastefsis-ee-tourkias-tou-2016-mia-efkairia-gia-tin-ellada-peran-tou-na-einai-aplos-i-aspida-tis-evropis-k-kirisci\/","title":{"rendered":"Revisiting and going beyond the EU-Turkey migration agreement of 2016: an opportunity for Greece to overcome being just \u201cEurope\u2019s aspis\u201d – K. Kiri\u015fci"},"content":{"rendered":"

You may read the Policy Paper by Professor<\/strong> Kemal Kiri\u015fci,\u00a0<\/strong>Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Vice-President of IGAM-Academy in pdf here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In contrast to early last year, marked by a \u201cborder crisis\u201d that erupted after the Turkish President finally put into action his long-standing threat to \u201copen the border\u201d for Syrian refugees, the year 2021 had a more promising start. The intense tensions in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean that followed the \u201cborder crisis\u201d appear to be subsiding. The European Council statement of March 25 offers a possible framework for dialogue and diplomacy to take over from what was an annus horribilis<\/em> in Greek-Turkish and EU-Turkish relations.<\/p>\n

Within this framework, room is also made for revisiting the EU-Turkey statement adopted in March 2016 to manage the aftermath of the European migration crisis that had seen a mass displacement of refugees and migrants primarily from Turkey to Greece and on to Europe. The statement has had many opponents and its implementation has faced multiple grievances and recriminations from both sides. Addressing and overcoming these challenges will call for extensive diplomatic effort, good will and take considerable time.<\/p>\n

In the interim, however, the emerging positive climate offers the possibility to explore expanding cooperation in a relatively successful but inadequately appreciated part of the EU-Turkey statement known as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT). FRIT has been instrumental in supporting Syrian and other refugees in Turkey. It has been an important manifestation of burden-sharing with Turkey and has benefitted refugees in concrete terms. Advancing cooperation in this area would also help contribute to mutual confidence building and have a positive spill over into other more complicated issue areas in the migration domain and broader bilateral relations.<\/p>\n

The implementation of FRIT created a poorly acknowledged but impressively constructive public space of cooperation between European actors (member states, the Commission, European NGOs), Turkish stakeholders (government agencies, municipalities, and local civil society) and international organizations. However, as the size of the Syrian refugee population fast approaches four million with little prospects of return to Syria or resettlement to third countries, their presence in Turkey has become protracted. Managing the largest refugee population in the world with an economy that is adversely impacted by the COVID pandemic is becoming increasingly challenging.<\/p>\n

This picture calls for exploring innovative avenues of cooperation that need to go beyond the FRIT framework. It would be in the interest of both the EU and Turkey to cooperate, as challenging as it might be, and find, in the words of the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, spoken right after the \u201cborder crisis\u201d of last year, a \u201cwin-win solution going forward.\u201d It would also be an effort that would be in line with the letter and spirit of the approaching 70th<\/sup> anniversary of the adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that emphasizes burden-sharing over responsibility shifting.<\/p>\n

However, the external dimension, the so-called \u201cground floor,\u201d of the \u201cNew Pact on Migration and Asylum\u201d proposal from the European Commission announced in September 2020, falls short of offering much guidance on how to arrive at such a \u201cwin-win\u201d solution. It fails to offer convincing policy ideas that transcend the EU\u2019s\u00a0long-standing policy\u00a0of\u00a0externalizing\u00a0the cost and responsibility of managing its external borders to countries outside the EU.<\/p>\n

Instead, this report explores policy ideas from the Global Compact on Refugees\u00a0(GCR) that is more in line with genuine partnership based on burden-sharing. Adopted in December 2018, the GCR recognizes that the current refugee protection system based on the 1951 Geneva Convention is strained, as 85 percent of the world\u2019s refugees find themselves in developing countries, while\u00a077 percent\u00a0of them are in protracted situations. It advocates for the need to improve the self-reliance of refugees and social cohesion by helping to transform refugees from a humanitarian burden to a development and economic opportunity. To achieve this, it calls, inter alia<\/em>, for the promotion of \u201ceconomic opportunities, decent work, job creation and entrepreneurship programs for host community members and refugees\u201d in countries hosting them. One specific policy tool it advocates to bring this about is the extension of preferential trade arrangements \u201cfor goods and sectors with a high level of refugee participation in the labor force.\u201d<\/p>\n

All EU member countries, apart from Hungary, have endorsed the GCR. Though the GCR is not a legally binding document, self-interest, not to mention moral obligation, calls for exploring the implementation of such policy ideas if secondary movements of refugees, as well as the human and political toll reminiscent of the 2015-16 European migration crisis, are to be averted.<\/p>\n

To explore how this policy idea can be transformed into a \u201cwin-win\u201d outcome for the EU, Greece, and Turkey, but especially the refugees, this report is divided into four parts. The first section discusses the events and the domestic developments that led to the crisis on the Greek-Turkish border early in 2020. It is followed by an assessment of the shortcomings, successes, and lessons to be drawn from the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement of 2016. The third section examines the current refugee situation in Turkey and discusses how the country\u2019s capacity to absorb 3.6 million Syrian refugees, who are entering their 10th<\/sup> year of displacement, is under strain. The picture is further complicated by the presence of an additional close to 330,000 non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers, not to mention an ever-increasing pool of irregular migrants trapped in the country. The final section offers a set of recommendations derived primarily but not solely from the GCR that could be incorporated into a revised EU-Turkey statement and\/or negotiated as a standalone agreement. The paper concludes by suggesting ways in which Greece could help and play a role that is not limited to being just \u201cEurope\u2019s \u2018shield\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

Calling the year 2020 in Greek-Turkish relations an annus horribilis<\/em> would not be an exaggeration. The Turkish president\u2019s decision to realize his long-standing threat of \u201copening the borders\u201d and precipitating a major humanitarian and political crisis on the Greek-Turkish land border set the tone for the rest of the year, a year which was marked by Turkey becoming a source of \u201cpoly-crises\u201d engendering \u201csecurity threats, risks and challenges in Greece\u2019s immediate security environment.\u201d[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In contrast, 2021 started with prospects of possible improvements as an initial round of Greek-Turkish exploratory talks began in January. It was preceded by a video conference call between the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen.[2]<\/sup><\/a> On the occasion Erdo\u011fan, somewhat unexpectedly, remarked that \u201cTurkey wanted to turn a new page in its relations with the EU in the new year\u201d and that he saw \u201cTurkey\u2019s future in Europe.\u201d He dispatched, right away, his Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevl\u00fct \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu to Brussels to meet with Josep Borrell, the EU\u2019s foreign policy chief, to get the so-called ball rolling.<\/p>\n

The March 2021 European Council call to \u201cenhance cooperation\u201d with Turkey \u201csubject to the established conditionalities\u201d builds on these initial positive developments.[3]<\/sup><\/a> Beside the heavy focus on the Eastern Mediterranean, the customs union and migration management are identified as two areas for possible improvement. Cooperation in Turkish-EU relations had long been squeezed into these two issue areas in recent years, though both sides have had their long list of complaints and grievances. Nevertheless, there is general recognition that for all its problems the customs union has been beneficial to both sides and that it needs to be modernized.[4]<\/sup><\/a> There is also a rich body of commentary that sees the modernization of the customs union as a tool that could help improve EU-Turkish relations, including with Greece.[5]<\/sup><\/a> In the migration area the EU-Turkey statement of March 2016, as it enters its fifth year, has become the reference point with respect to managing relations between both sides.[6]<\/sup><\/a> It too has suffered from complaints from both sides and encountered challenges that have brought relations to a breaking point on several occasions. Addressing and overcoming these challenges will call for extensive diplomatic effort, good will and take considerable time.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026this report argues that the emerging positive climate offers the possibility to explore expanding cooperation in a relatively successful but inadequately appreciated part of the EU- Turkey statement of 2016 known as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT). Advancing cooperation in this area could contribute to mutual confidence building and have a positive spillover into the other more complicated issue areas in the migration domain.\u201d <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the meantime, this report argues that the emerging positive climate offers the possibility to explore expanding cooperation in a relatively successful but inadequately appreciated part of the statement known as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT).[7]<\/sup><\/a> Advancing cooperation in this area could contribute to mutual confidence building and have a positive spillover into the other more complicated issue areas in the migration domain. There are five realities that makes the need for such a narrowly defined cooperation indispensable in terms of the interest of both sides, but also in terms of striving to live up to the global refugee protection standards. Firstly, the FRIT set up to implement the disbursement of funds promised in the statement has positively impacted the situation on the ground for the refugees, especially in terms of meeting their basic needs. Secondly, the implementation of FRIT has created a poorly acknowledged but impressively constructive public space of cooperation between European actors (member states, the Commission, European NGOs), Turkish stakeholders (government agencies, municipalities, and local civil society) and international organizations. Thirdly, the refugee numbers are fast approaching four million, and with each passing year their likelihood of returning to Syria is diminishing. Their presence in Turkey has become protracted.[8]<\/sup><\/a> This calls for a new momentum and innovative avenues of cooperation to enhance their self-reliance. Fourthly, as the 70th<\/sup> anniversary of the adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees approaches, it must be remembered that the protection of refugees is an international responsibility calling for burden-sharing and not responsibility shifting. Finally, and beyond altruism, it is in the interest of both the EU and Turkey to cooperate, as challenging as it might be, and find, in the words of the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a \u201cwin-win solution going forward\u201d in addressing this enduring reality.[9]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the so-called \u201cground floor,\u201d of the \u201cNew Pact on Migration and Asylum\u201d proposal does not offer much guidance on how to arrive at such a \u201cwin-win\u201d solution. It fails to offer convincing policy ideas that transcend the EU\u2019s long-standing policy of externalizing the cost and responsibility of managing its external borders.<\/em> \u00a0Instead, this report will explore policy ideas from the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This report considers that the external dimension, the so-called \u201cground floor,\u201d of the \u201cNew Pact on Migration and Asylum\u201d proposal does not offer much guidance on how to arrive at such a \u201cwin-win\u201d solution.[10]<\/sup><\/a> It fails to offer convincing policy ideas that transcend the EU\u2019s\u00a0long-standing policy\u00a0of\u00a0externalizing\u00a0the cost and responsibility of managing its external borders. \u00a0Instead, this report will explore policy ideas from the Global Compact on Refugees\u00a0(GCR).[11]<\/sup><\/a> Adopted in December 2018, the GCR recognizes that the traditional refugee protection system based on the 1951 Geneva Convention is \u201cbroken\u201d,[12]<\/sup><\/a> and that 85 percent of the refugees find themselves in developing countries, while\u00a077 percent\u00a0of these refugees are in a protracted situation.[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the GCR calls on the international community to work together \u2014 in the spirit of burden- and responsibility-sharing \u2014 to improve the self-reliance of refugees and the resilience of their host communities, as well as help transform refugees from a humanitarian burden to a development and economic opportunity.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Against this reality, the GCR calls on the international community to work together \u2014 in the spirit of burden- and responsibility-sharing \u2014 to improve the self-reliance of refugees and the resilience of their host communities, as well as help transform refugees from a humanitarian burden to a development and economic opportunity. To achieve this, it calls, inter alia<\/em>, for the promotion of \u201ceconomic opportunities, decent work, job creation and entrepreneurship programs for host community members and refugees\u201d in refugee hosting countries. One specific policy tool it advocates, to bring this about, is the extension of preferential trade arrangements \u201cfor goods and sectors with a high level of refugee participation in the labor force.\u201d [14]<\/a> All EU member countries, apart from Hungary, have endorsed the GCR. Though the GCR is not a legally binding document, self-interest, not to mention moral obligation, calls for its implementation if secondary movements of refugees as well as the human and political toll reminiscent of the 2015-16 European migration crisis are to be averted.<\/p>\n

To explore how this policy tool can be transformed into a \u201cwin-win\u201d outcome for the EU, Greece, and Turkey, but especially the refugees, this report is divided into four parts. The first section discusses the events and the domestic developments that led to the crisis on the Greek-Turkish border early in 2020. It is followed by an assessment of the shortcomings, successes, and lessons to be drawn from the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement of 2016. The third section examines the current refugee situation in Turkey and discusses how the country\u2019s capacity to absorb 3.6 million Syrian refugees, who are entering their tenth\u00a0year of displacement, is under strain. The picture is further complicated by the presence of an additional close to 330,000 non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers,[15]<\/sup><\/a> not to mention an ever-increasing pool of irregular migrants stuck in the country. The final section offers a set of recommendations derived primarily but not solely from the GCR that could be incorporated into a revised EU-Turkey statement and\/or negotiated as a standalone agreement. The paper concludes by suggesting ways in which Greece could help and play a role in the EU\u2019s migration management that is not limited to being just \u201cEurope\u2019s \u2018shield\u2019.\u201d[16]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Section I: The border crisis and its lessons<\/h2>\n

The sense that 2020 would be an annus horribilis<\/em> was triggered when President Erdo\u011fan announced late in February that his government would not hold back those refugees and migrants who wanted to leave the country and make their way to the EU. He had long been threatening to \u201copen the borders\u201d and expressing his discomfort with the quid pro quo<\/em> embedded in the EU-Turkey statement of March 2016 (to be discussed in the next section). As early as in the fall of the same year, during his address to the United Nations General Assembly, he delivered a scathing criticism of the EU for closing its doors to refugees. He argued, showing a graph to the plenary, that \u201cTurkey has successfully fulfilled its commitments within the framework of its agreement with the European Union. Nevertheless, we regret that the promises made by the European Union \u2026 has been nearly forgotten, and artificial excuses are raised all the time\u2026We expect them to keep their promises.\u201d[17]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0These remarks set the tone for employing the refugee issue as leverage in Turkey\u2019s ever worsening relations with the EU. Yet, it was the confluence of a specific set of domestic and external developments that would eventually culminate in Erdo\u011fan putting his threats into effect.<\/p>\n

The immediate trigger was the urgency to avert public attention away from the news report of the killing of at least 33 Turkish soldiers in northern Idlib, Syria\u2019s last rebel-held bastion, by the Syrian army and its allies.[18]<\/sup><\/a> The offensive in December 2019 had displaced an estimated one million people, the \u201cbiggest single displacement\u201d\u00a0since the start of the conflict in Syria, towards Turkey\u2019s border, aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation.[19]<\/sup><\/a> The urgency of the situation also led to the calculation that the opening of the border might compel the EU to support Turkey\u2019s long-standing calls for the creation of a safe zone in northern Syria. Early in September Erdo\u011fan had advocated the idea of a safe zone on the Syrian side of the border to where at least one million refugees could be returned and had threatened to open the borders if the EU would not support the plan.[20]<\/sup><\/a> Then the following month he promised his Justice and Development Party (AKP) members of parliament that \u201cWe will open the gates and send 3.6 million refugees your way\u201d.[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cErdo\u011fan\u2019s narrative, known as \u201cEnsar-\u0131 Muhacir,\u201d [\u2026] had helped mobilize considerable support for Syrian refugees, especially among his large electoral base at the time. However, the influence of this narrative weakened as years went by and even sporadic acts of violence against Syrian refugees began to occur.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Placating public opinion was another important factor. In the initial years of the arrival of Syrian refugees, Turkish society received them pretty much with open arms. Erdo\u011fan\u2019s narrative, known as \u201cEnsar-\u0131 Muhacir<\/em>,\u201d drawing parallels to the era when the Prophet Mohammad and his congregation had to flee Mecca for Medina and enjoy protection and hospitality from its residents, had helped mobilize considerable support, especially among his large electoral base at the time.[22]<\/sup><\/a> However, the influence of this narrative weakened as years went by and even sporadic acts of violence against Syrian refugees began to occur. Additionally, in the early years of the Syrian crisis there existed the widely held belief, strongly propagated by the then minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davuto\u011flu, that the Assad regime would not last long and would be replaced by a new government led by the opposition that Turkey supported. Hence the public expectation was that the refugees\u2019 stay would be temporary.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn sharp contrast to 2014 when almost 58 percent of respondents objected to the statement \u201cthe Refugees should be sent back to their country,\u201d a survey from July 2019 showed that more than 83 percent of the respondents called for the return of all refugees and disagreed with the government\u2019s policy of hosting them.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

However, as the conflict in Syria dragged out and the number of Syrian refugees reached ever increasing numbers, the public mood changed dramatically. In sharp contrast to 2014 when almost 58 percent of respondents objected to the statement \u201cthe Refugees should be sent back to their country,\u201d[23]<\/sup><\/a> a survey from July 2019 showed that more than 83 percent of the respondents called for the return of all refugees and disagreed with the government\u2019s policy of hosting them.[24]<\/sup><\/a> This disagreement with the government is seen, including by a former AKP member of parliament, as a primary reason for Erdo\u011fan\u2019s party performing poorly in the local elections of March 2019, losing major metropolitan cities long held by the AKP to the opposition.[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Not surprisingly, shortly after the AKP candidate was defeated during the re-run local election in Istanbul in June, the government hastily announced a policy demanding that Syrian refugees residing outside their initial places of registration return to their assigned locations. This was accompanied by numerous returns to Syria that many criticized as amounting to refoulement, in violation of the 1951 Geneva Convention.[26]<\/sup><\/a> In an effort to show to the public the government\u2019s intention to change course, at the 74th<\/sup> General Assembly Erdo\u011fan called for the international community to support his plan for a safe zone to resettle \u201cone to two million refugees\u201d and presented an elaborate construction project to house them.[27]<\/sup><\/a> His repeated threats directed to the EU to \u201copen the borders\u201d need to be seen in this particular domestic political context. Very dramatically, in October 2019 he announced the launching of a military operation into northern Syria ostensibly to prevent terrorism as well as to create a safe zone to return millions of Syrian refugees.<\/p>\n

The public discontent with refugees was also enhanced by the slowdown in Turkey\u2019s economic growth coupled with growing unemployment. The economy had contracted from an 11.2 percent growth rate in 2011\u00a0when refugees first began to arrive, to\u00a00.9 percent in 2019.[28]<\/sup><\/a> Unemployment reached its highest level since 2015 increasing from 9.7 to 13.9 percent in July 2019 before barely falling to 13.7 percent, with a total of 4.4 million people out of work.[29]<\/sup><\/a> Against such an economic picture, Erdo\u011fan\u2019s frequent practice of referring to the USD 40 billion spent on refugees and complaints that the EU was slow in delivering the funds promised to Turkey aggravated matters. His statement at the Global Forum on Refugees in Geneva in December 2019 is likely to have engendered the pressure to act on his promises of opening the borders as the public\u2019s skepticism about the wisdom of the EU-Turkey deal intensified.[30]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cRecriminations flew in both directions. EU member states denounced \u201cTurkey\u2019s use of migratory pressure for political purposes.\u201d Turkish officials accused the EU\u00a0of \u201chypocrisy\u201d for violating the same fundamental rights it continuously criticized Ankara for disrespecting.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The decision to open the borders precipitated a scramble among refugees and migrants to the Greek-Turkish border. The situation quickly evolved into a major humanitarian crisis, once Greece suspended asylum procedures and forcefully prevented migrants from crossing into Greece.[31]<\/sup><\/a> Recriminations flew in both directions. EU member states denounced \u201cTurkey\u2019s use of migratory pressure for political purposes.\u201d Turkish officials accused the EU\u00a0of \u201chypocrisy\u201d for violating the same fundamental rights it continuously criticized Ankara for disrespecting.[32]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The crisis came to an end as precipitously as it had flared up. Shortly after the first COVID-19 case was reported in Turkey, on March 18 the government announced the closure of its land borders with both Greece and Bulgaria, as a precaution against the spread of the virus, and began to move refugees and migrants away from the border. In the end few migrants made it across. It is difficult to establish the actual number but one Turkish refugee advocacy group put the number at much less than 3,000, citing the UNHCR, significantly less than the 150,000 claimed by the Turkish government.[33]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, most of those who tried to cross the border were not Syrian refugees but nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan and Somalia, as well as Turkish citizens.[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cErdo\u011fan failed to achieve his objective of \u201csending 3.6 million refugees\u201d the EU\u2019s way. The crisis further aggravated already poor EU-Turkish relations. However, the EU\u2019s image did not come out unscathed either.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Ultimately, Erdo\u011fan failed to achieve his objective of \u201csending 3.6 million refugees\u201d the EU\u2019s way. The crisis further aggravated already poor EU-Turkish relations. However, the EU\u2019s image did not come out unscathed either. The emphasis put on border security over human rights did not help with the EU\u2019s already withering reputation as a normative power.[35]<\/sup><\/a> The only positive outcome, as challenging as the realization might be, was the prospect of finding \u201ca common understanding of what is missing and what is already in place\u201d in the EU-Turkey 2016 statement and \u201cthen to implement the missing elements\u201d noted by Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, after her meeting with Erdo\u011fan.[36]<\/sup><\/a> Her remark that \u201cMigrants need support, Greece needs support but also Turkey needs support, and this involves finding a path forward with Turkey\u201d is promising. The next section assesses the EU-Turkey statement to identify these \u201cmissing elements.\u201d<\/p>\n

Section II: Assessing the EU-Turkey Statement<\/h2>\n

The EU-Turkey statement emerged because of more than a million refugees of Syrian and other origins pouring into the EU via Turkey and other routes. It provoked a humanitarian catastrophe and tragedies of epic proportions, leading one writer to resemble it to a \u201cNew Odyssey.\u201d[37]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

This massive secondary movement triggered \u201cpanic\u201d that it would threaten the very pillars of the EU and weaken it \u201cpermanently and radically\u201d.[38]<\/sup><\/a> This engendered a need to urgently find an arrangement with Turkey to stop or slow down the flow of migrants, to mitigate the adverse effect on the institutions of the EU. This panic coincided with a moment when the government in Turkey also began to recognize that the developments in Syria were not promising in terms of prospects of return for refugees and that the \u201cburden\u201d of hosting refugees was becoming politically and economically difficult to sustain.<\/p>\n

The then minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davuto\u011flu, had in 2013 noted that for Turkey the psychological limit was 100,000 refugees and that beyond it Turkey would need international support.[39]<\/sup><\/a> The numbers by the end of 2015 had reached over 2.5 million and close to $8 billion was spent on their upkeep, with limited international support.[40]<\/sup><\/a> There was also growing public discomfort with the cost of the refugees on the economy and their taxes being spent on them.[41]<\/sup><\/a> Independently from the refugee issue, on the Turkish side, for domestic political reasons, there was also an urge to revive the sagging accession process and resolve the long-standing visa liberalization issue.<\/p>\n

It is against this picture that both sides\u2019 interests converged, and they were compelled to negotiate first the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in October 2015[42]<\/sup><\/a> and then the EU-Turkey statement in March 2016. The primary objective was to curb the sudden surge of irregular crossings into Greece in 2015 and 2016. Turkey increased border security and Greece was promised the possibility to return \u201call new irregular migrants\u201d to Turkey. In return, Turkey would receive two tranches of 3 billion euros in grants to support the refugees and enhance its border security. Additionally, to encourage regularized paths to asylum, the deal envisaged the resettlement of one registered asylum seeker from Turkey for each irregular migrant returned from Greece. Finally, Turkey\u2019s EU accession process was also to be re-energized through a visa liberalization program, and a new chapter in the membership negotiation process was to be opened.<\/p>\n

The statement met with some sharp criticism ranging from those calling it a \u201cdirty deal\u201d to those who saw it as product of raw cynicism that resembled \u201chorse trading\u201d at the price of \u201cthe rights and dignity of some of the world\u2019s most vulnerable people.\u201d[43]<\/sup><\/a> Human rights organizations objected on the grounds that Turkey was not a safe third country for returning refugees.[44]<\/sup><\/a> There were also question marks raised on the actual legality of the statement in terms of EU rules governing the making of international agreements.[45]<\/sup><\/a> Others argued that the arrangement risked undermining the 1951 Convention and was a manifestation of growing externalization of migration controls that contradicts international\u00a0refugee law at large.[46]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Subsequently, there were also grievances from both sides with respect to the implementation of its terms. On the EU side the greatest complaint was about the periodic threats coming from Erdo\u011fan to\u00a0\u201copen the borders\u201d\u00a0and let refugees stream towards Europe. There have also been reciprocal complaints concerning the one-to-one scheme, the European side expressing displeasure about the low numbers of irregular migrants being accepted by Turkey while the Turkish side complained that resettlement of refugees from Turkey remained low. In Turkey, the\u00a0greatest criticism\u00a0came from government officials who found the funds sorely inadequate. Additionally, the government complained\u00a0about the slow disbursement of the funds and the EU\u2019s preference to allocate the funds to U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations, rather than directly transferring them to the government. Lastly, absence of progress, resulting from constant democratic backsliding, towards visa liberalization and the re-energizing of Turkey\u2019s accession process were raised by the Turkish government as a failure of the EU to keep its promise.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the implementation of the statement was effective both in terms of improving the EU\u2019s border security concerns and sharing some of Turkey\u2019s burden in meeting the needs of the refugees. The number of illegal crossings across the Aegean Sea dropped dramatically, from about 855,000 in 2015, to just under 30,000 in 2017.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Nevertheless, the implementation of the statement was effective both in terms of improving the EU\u2019s border security concerns and sharing some of Turkey\u2019s burden in meeting the needs of the refugees. The number of illegal crossings across the Aegean Sea dropped dramatically, from about 855,000 in 2015, to just under 30,000 in 2017.[47]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Funding made available to Turkey went into providing cash assistance to the refugees, as well as to enhanced educational facilities and capacity, access to healthcare, and opportunities for improving livelihoods through numerous language and vocational training programs. As of December 2020, all the 6 billion Euro funds under the two tranches of FRIT have been \u201ccommitted and contracted and \u20ac4.1 billion disbursed.\u201d[48]<\/sup><\/a> Implementation of the projects is monitored closely by the EU and the UN\u2019s 3RP-Turkey reports.[49]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

What did the parties get out of this arrangement?<\/p>\n

\u201cYet, with the statement [\u2026] the EU quite successfully acquired for itself an \u201casylum space.\u201d As of the end of 2020, Turkey hosts over 3.6 million refugees (with an additional more than 320,000 non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers asylum applications) compared to the 2.9 million in all of Europe.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

With respect to migration management, Turkey had long been engaged by the EU, initially as an accession country and more recently as a third country.[50]<\/sup><\/a> This engagement was primarily driven by the EU\u2019s practice of externalizing its migration policies. This traditionally met with considerable resistance from the Turkish side.[51]<\/sup><\/a> Yet, with the statement, as one prominent professor of international refugee law argued, the EU quite successfully acquired for itself an \u201casylum space.\u201d[52]<\/sup><\/a> As of the end of 2020, Turkey hosts over 3.6 million refugees (with an additional more than 320,000 non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers asylum applications) compared to the 2.9 million\u00a0in all of Europe.[53]<\/sup><\/a> In other words, Turkey became a \u201cgood fence\u201d and hence a \u201cgood neighbor,\u201d though not a foolproof one, in ensuring a solid and \u201csteady reduction in flows\u201d of irregular migrants towards Greece.[54]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cAnother related and very significant achievement of the statement from the perspective of the EU, little discussed or acknowledged, is that Syrian refugees since 2016 have become to a large extent settled, if not integrated, into Turkish society.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Another related and very significant achievement of the statement from the perspective of the EU, little discussed or acknowledged, is that Syrian refugees since 2016 have become to a large extent settled, if not integrated, into Turkish society. This is recognized by the government too.[55]<\/sup><\/a> The fact that only a few of them attempted to benefit from the \u201copening of the border\u201d in February 2020 speaks for itself. The Syrians Barometer 2019, a survey of Turkish and Syrian respondents, supported by the UNHCR, shows that almost 89 percent of Syrians feel that they are \u201ccompletely\/almost completely\u201d and \u201cpartially\u201d integrated with their host communities.[56]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

With respect to the Turkish side, a lot has been said and written about how the quid pro quo<\/em> embedded in the statement has equipped Turkey with a \u201cstrong hand\u201d and \u201cleverage\u201d over the EU.[57]<\/sup><\/a> However, the record is a mixed one. The conspicuous reality is that the Turkish side failed to achieve its most important goals: revitalizing the accession process, realization of the modernization of the customs union and visa liberalization, not to mention getting the EU to support a safe zone in northern Syria. However, Erdo\u011fan did skillfully employ this newfound leverage with respect to getting the EU to tone down its criticism on Turkey\u2019s democratic backsliding and de-Europeanization.[58]<\/sup><\/a> The limited attention and the mild language on democracy and human rights that the European Council statement of March 2021 has opted for is very revealing of this leverage. Previously, the EU had found itself deterred from imposing sanctions for Turkey\u2019s policies in the Eastern Mediterranean and then adopting limited ones only at the end of 2020.[59]<\/sup><\/a> Internally, the arrangement did give an opportunity for Erdo\u011fan to sell the statement to the public as a \u201creputational boost\u201d and evidence of a changed strategic balance with the EU, demonstrating Turkey\u2019s increased relative power.[60]<\/sup><\/a> However, this did not help diffuse the mounting public resentment against the government\u2019s policies on refugees.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe one substantive benefit flowing from the statement[\u2026] is FRIT. FRIT, with other EU contributions, has provided close to 80 percent of the international funding for a multitude of projects to support refugees and their host communities.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The one substantive benefit flowing from the statement, little acknowledged by Erdo\u011fan and the upper echelons of his government but frequently mentioned by officials from public agencies and municipalities as well as by civil society representatives, is FRIT. FRIT, with other EU contributions, has provided close to 80 percent of the international funding for a multitude of projects to support refugees and their host communities.[61]<\/sup><\/a> Foremost among them are the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) and the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) that provide socio-economic support in the form cash assistance to the neediest households.[62]<\/sup><\/a> The ESSN and CCTE were designed in conjunction with the Turkish government. ESSN currently reaches out to 1.8 million beneficiaries. The program is recognized as the single largest humanitarian program in the world and is evaluated to have earned \u201cgood performance marks\u201d.[63]<\/sup><\/a> CCTE provides cash assistance to families whose children attend classes regularly and is achieving positive results considering than more than half of the Syrian refugee population is children.[64]<\/sup><\/a> FRIT funds have also helped support government agencies with their provision of education, health and social assistance services to the refugees.[65]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201c[FRIT] offers a win-win outcome for all, without which all, but especially refugees, would be in a much more vulnerable state then they are today.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As much as the financial resources supporting FRIT may be dwarfed by the Turkish government\u2019s expenditures, it still constitutes the most successful aspect of the EU-Turkey statement that offers a win-win outcome for all, without which all, but especially refugees, would be in a much more vulnerable state then they are today. However, the current situation, the focus of the next section, is very different than what it was in 2016 when the statement was signed.<\/p>\n

Section III: Current situation<\/h2>\n

\u201cAccording to the UNHCR, since 2014 Turkey has been hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. Beyond Syrian refugees, between 2011, when Syrians first began to arrive, and the end of 2020 Turkey received close to 560,000 asylum applications.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

According to the UNHCR, since 2014 Turkey has been hosting the largest number of refugees in the world.[66]<\/sup><\/a> Beyond Syrian refugees, between 2011, when Syrians first began to arrive, and the end of 2020 Turkey received close to 560,000 asylum applications.[67]<\/sup><\/a> As of early 2021, the top three countries of origin were Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran with 173,000, 116,000 and 27,000 asylum seekers under protection respectively.[68]<\/sup><\/a> This picture is further complicated by the pool of irregular migrants whose size is by its very nature difficult to estimate. Based on the number of apprehended irregular migrants and interviews with government officials, one expert estimated, in February 2020, the number of irregular migrants in Turkey to be \u201cno less than one million.\u201d[69]<\/sup><\/a> He cautiously notes that the government may have been able to send back to their countries of origin only, at best, 20 percent of them.<\/p>\n

\u201cAs much as there may be good reasons for the resentment and blame Greece and the EU put on Ankara, managing this many refugees and asylum seekers, not to mention irregular migrants, naturally is not an easy task.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As much as there may be good reasons for the resentment and blame Greece and the EU put on Ankara, managing this many refugees and asylum seekers, not to mention irregular migrants, naturally is not an easy task. The primary piece of legislation governing the management of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants is the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP).[70]<\/sup><\/a> It is no less than miraculous that the law was adopted in 2013 just as a mass influx of refugees was gathering. The law had been in the making since 2008 and was part of a UNHCR supported reform process going back to the mid-1990s and gathering pace with Turkey\u2019s EU harmonization efforts. The law reformed, reorganized, and modernized Turkey\u2019s otherwise archaic and disjointed migration management legislation.<\/p>\n

However, the law retained the \u201cgeographical limitation\u201d mentioned in Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention granting \u201cfull\u201d refugee status only to asylum seekers who flee \u201cevents occurring in Europe.\u201d[71]<\/sup><\/a> Other asylum seekers whose applications are accepted are granted \u201cconditional refugee\u201d status giving them the right to remain in Turkey only until their resettlement into a third country can be arranged. The law also created a brand-new agency to implement the terms of this new law, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). Without the law and DGMM today the management of the refugee situation, not to mention the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement, would have been much more difficult, if not impossible.<\/p>\n

The government was quick to adopt an \u201copen door\u201d policy for Syrian refugees in 2011 and its policy evolved in a piecemeal fashion as their numbers increased and their prospects of return diminished. Based on the LFIP, in October 2014 the government formally extended \u201ctemporary protection\u201d to the refugees, granting formal protection as well as access to basic public services on the condition that they are registered.[72]<\/sup><\/a> This was also a time when the practice of hosting refugees in more and more camps reached its limits and refugees increasingly found themselves initially in urban centers along the Syrian border, then practically in all corners of Turkey. This brought new challenges in terms of access to housing, as well as livelihood and education for the children. Just as the European migration crisis was unfolding, calls for the need to recognize that refugees would be here for the long term and that the focus should be increasingly on their integration into Turkish society, were emerging.[73]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Beyond ESSN\/CCTE, discussed earlier, FRIT in parallel with the UN\u2019s 3RP framework, initially supported protection, and basic needs-oriented assistance. However, in due course these programs expanded more and more into education, health, access to livelihood and social cohesion, as well as support for municipal services. The programs are shaped by strategic objectives negotiated between the Turkish government, the European Commission and UN agencies and laid out in the EU\u2019s Updated Strategic Concept Note and 3RP for 2021-2022.[74]<\/sup><\/a> Both FRIT and 3RP have digital platforms from where it is possible to access information on projects across Turkey funded through these two programs.[75]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cIt is the view of the author of this report that without the funds provided by the EU and other international donors, the situation of Syrian refugees would have been much worse. This would also have been accompanied by greater tensions with the host community and a greater likelihood of them resorting to secondary movements.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

These programs are critical to supporting the refugees and are an important manifestation of burden-sharing with Turkey that has benefitted refugees. It is the view of the author of this report that without the funds provided by the EU and other international donors, the situation of Syrian refugees would have been much worse. This would also have been accompanied by greater tensions with the host community and a greater likelihood of them resorting to secondary movements. However, what is more pertinent in terms of the future is that the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey has become protracted and adjustments need to be made to the framework of support that Turkey receives.<\/p>\n

The prospects of return for Syrian refugees remain dim in the short, medium, and long term, given the destruction and ongoing instability in their home country, as well as the unlikely resolution of what has become a \u201cfrozen conflict.\u201d[76]<\/sup><\/a> According to the Syrians Barometer 2019 the response, among Syrians in Turkey, to the statement \u201cI don\u2019t plan to return to Syria under any circumstances\u201d has shot up from just under 17 percent in 2017 to 52 percent in 2019, while those who supported the statement \u201cI would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed\u201d dropped by half from almost 60 to 30.3 percent during the same period.[77]<\/sup><\/a> The issue of repatriation to Syria and the relevant data is opaque. Repatriation has occurred to three pockets in northern Syria controlled by the Turkish military and its local allies. According to the Turkish Ministry of Defense, as of the end of 2019 more than half a million Syrians have gone back to these three areas.[78]<\/sup><\/a> The Ministry of Interior puts the figure at close to 420,000 as of early December 2020, whereas the UNHCR puts this number at just over 101,000 for the end of 2020.[79]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThe UNHCR has projected that there will be 423,600 places of resettlement needed for Turkey in 2021. As of the end of November 2020 the UNHCR reported there were only 3,867 departures from Turkey out of 6,000 submissions. This number is even lower than the 10,286 resettlement departures the previous November in 2019.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Global resettlement prospects in general are equally unpromising because of the anti-refugee and anti-immigrant political climate in most traditional resettlement countries, such as the United States and leading European Union member countries. Only minute numbers of resettlements are occurring from Turkey compared to the size of the numbers of forced migrants in need of resettlement. The UNHCR has projected that there will be 423,600 places of resettlement needed for Turkey in 2021.[80]<\/sup><\/a> As of the end of November 2020 the UNHCR reported there were only 3,867 departures from Turkey out of 6,000 submissions.[81]<\/sup><\/a> This number is even lower than the 10,286 resettlement departures the previous November in 2019.[82]<\/sup><\/a> The statement had referred to the prospect of 72,000 refugees being resettled from Turkey of which, as of March 2020, only 27,000 had been realized,[83]<\/sup><\/a> \u201ca figure comparable to the number of Syrian refugees that nearly any given district in Istanbul hosts.\u201d[84]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThis is not surprising considering that 87 percent of the Turkish public believe Syrians \u201cshould not be given any political rights\u201d and 76.5 percent are against the granting of citizenship, with very strong majorities from supporters of Erdo<\/em>\u011f<\/em>an\u2019s governing coalition.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Local integration in the form of granting Syrian refugees a path for eventual citizenship in Turkey has not happened either. The granting of citizenship to the refugees is a very sensitive, politicized, and procedurally difficult issue.[85]<\/sup><\/a> Obtaining statistics on the topic is notoriously difficult. The only publicly available figure stands at 110,000 and dates from the end of 2019.[86]<\/sup><\/a> Erdo\u011fan had advocated the idea several times but had to retract it in the face of strong push back from the opposition and his own party in favor of Syrians\u2019 return. This is not surprising considering that 87 percent of the Turkish public believe Syrians \u201cshould not be given any political rights\u201d and 76.5 percent are against the granting of citizenship, with very strong majorities from supporters of Erdo\u011fan\u2019s governing coalition.[87]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In the absence of durable solutions, Syrian refugees are by default becoming increasingly self-integrated. The process is multifaceted, complex, and mostly driven through the acquisition of Turkish language skills, interaction with local community members, sending their children to Turkish schools, inter-marriages, and employment. The latter is especially critical. Employment and the possibility of becoming self-reliant is recognized as the most important driver of integration.[88]<\/sup><\/a> This is also the case with Syrian refugees in Turkey and is highlighted by FRIT\u2019s updated strategic concept note that calls for programs \u201cwith a focus on providing sustainable socio-economic support and livelihood opportunities within Turkey.\u201d This is a diplomatic and discreet way of saying employment, given sensitivities in Turkey.<\/p>\n

\u201cA survey conducted late in 2017 found that more than 71 percent of respondents believed that Syrians were taking jobs away from people in Turkey. According to the Syrians Barometer 2019 this figure was 65 percent. This is despite numerous econometric studies that demonstrate the minimal adverse impact that Syrians\u2019 entry into the Turkish labor market has had on employment and wages.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the meantime, a very large proportion of the approximately one million Syrian refugees of working age (almost 92 percent), as estimated by the ILO, are employed in the informal sector.[89]<\/sup><\/a> This picture not only leaves Syrians in very precarious work and social conditions, but also exacerbates public resentment driven by falling wages and rising unemployment among unskilled local labor. A survey conducted late in 2017 found that more than 71 percent of respondents believed that Syrians were taking jobs away from people in Turkey.[90]<\/sup><\/a> According to the Syrians Barometer 2019 this figure was 65 percent.[91]<\/sup><\/a> This is despite numerous econometric studies that demonstrate the minimal adverse impact that Syrians\u2019 entry into the Turkish labor market has had on employment and wages.[92]<\/sup><\/a> More general studies, including one by the IOM, show how the employment of migrants leads to little to no significant displacement of locals from the labor market.[93]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, there have also been efforts to draw Syrians into the formal sector. In January 2016, the government introduced legislation opening the Turkish labor market to Syrian refugees and enabled them to apply for work permits. For a range of reasons success has been limited and the number of Syrians employed formally with work permits was reported to stand at a little over 132,000 at the end of 2019.[94]<\/sup><\/a> There have also been concerted efforts during recent years by the government and international community, as well as local stakeholders, to draw Syrians into the formal economy, such as programs and projects focusing on improving life skills, the provision of language and vocational training for forced migrants with a view to enhancing their employability in the labor market. These have been accompanied by numerous projects to encourage self-employment and the creation of small businesses.<\/p>\n

However, this focus on the supply and small business side of the employment equation has not generated significant sustainable employment for refugees. According to the most recent 3RP Monitoring Report, over 11,000 Syrian and host community members gained access to economic opportunities and jobs in 2019.[95]<\/sup><\/a> Though the Report highlights that \u201cthis is double the achievement of 2018,\u201d it also recognizes that this is only \u201ca small contribution to responding to the overall needs, considering that the estimated active Syrian population in need of livelihoods support is at least 487,000\u201d.[96]<\/sup><\/a> Engaging the Turkish private sector to employ more Syrians in innovative ways has also been advocated as a method to close this large gap in achieving sustainable livelihood for refugees.[97]<\/sup><\/a> However, it is important to remember that \u201cfirms are not charities\u201d and that it is unrealistic to expect them to act based on purely philanthropic motivations.[98]<\/sup><\/a> They will need to be economically incentivized to employ refugees and this will need to make commercial sense.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Turkish economy is nowhere near what it was when Syrian refugees first began to arrive in Turkey in large numbers. Turkish GDP per capita dropped from its peak in 2013 at 12,614 to 9,126 USD in the latest available year, reflecting growing economic structural problems. These problems, and especially persistent unemployment, have now been further aggravated by the COVID pandemic.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Turkish economy is nowhere near what it was when Syrian refugees first began to arrive in Turkey in large numbers. According to the World Bank, Turkish GDP per capita dropped from its peak in 2013 at 12,614 to 9,126 USD in the latest available year, reflecting growing economic structural problems.[99]<\/sup><\/a> These problems, and especially persistent unemployment, have now been further aggravated by the COVID pandemic.[100]<\/sup><\/a> These developments, in addition to the pandemic, are impacting the lives of refugees in diverse and profound ways, including their access to income and their prospects of livelihood opportunities. According to a report by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC)\u00a069 percent of refugees surveyed have lost their jobs during the pandemic.[101]<\/sup><\/a> Another report by 3RP notes many Syrian-run business closures as well as a significant loss of income and increase in household debt, accompanied by food insecurity.[102]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The pandemic is also setting back gains made against endemic negative coping strategies involving child labor, thanks to the FRIT-supported CCTE program.[103]<\/sup><\/a> The pandemic is also fueling fears that after a long period of gains made in reducing poverty, growing sections of the Turkish population together with refugees, of which almost half were already living under the poverty line, will be slipping back into poverty.[104]<\/sup><\/a> Lastly, to these economic challenges one also needs to add the fact that job opportunities for 640,000 Syrian children coming through the Turkish national education system need to be considered.[105]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The next section will discuss a two-pronged approach to addressing the challenges resulting from the current refugee situation in Turkey, to mitigate the prospects of secondary movements. The first leg of the approach is based on the premises that \u201cintegration is key to ensuring onward migration reduces\u201d and that employment is one of the best avenues to ensure such an outcome.[106]<\/sup><\/a> The second leg will explore other \u201cmissing elements\u201d from the EU-Turkey statement of March 2016 in the form of revamping resettlement but also supporting greater humanitarian assistance to north-western Syria where many displaced people live in make-shift camps.<\/p>\n

Section IV: A new model of cooperation<\/h2>\n

As the European Commission launched the proposal \u201cNew Pact on Migration and Asylum,\u201d Vice President Margaritis Schinas\u00a0likened the pact\u00a0to a building with three floors, comprised of: an external dimension (\u201ccentered around strengthened partnerships with countries of origin and transit\u201d), \u201crobust management\u201d of external borders, and \u201cfirm but fair internal rules.\u201d On the ground floor, protecting Europe\u2019s borders remained primarily centered around \u201cmore of the same\u201d practice of externalizing\u00a0the cost and responsibility of managing its external borders to third countries.[107]<\/sup><\/a> The proposal continues to tie policy issues such as development assistance, trade concessions, security, education, agriculture, and visa facilitation for third-country nationals to those countries\u2019 willingness to cooperate on migration management.<\/p>\n

Such an approach is unlikely to be adequate for improving the EU\u2019s management of its external borders. There is a foundational basement missing in the proposal, which recognizes the reality that most of the world\u2019s refugees are hosted in the developing world and find themselves in protracted situations in the absence of durable solutions. This reality calls for policies inspired by the GCR \u2014 in the spirit of burden- and responsibility-sharing but also self-interest \u2014 for transforming victims of forced displacement from being a burden on a host country to becoming agents or contributors to development.<\/p>\n

The benefits of mainstreaming migration to development have long been advocated in academic and policy-oriented literature.[108]<\/sup><\/a> Migrants are recognized as a resource capable of contributing to the prosperity of their host communities if conducive social, cultural, political, and economic policies are adopted towards their inclusion. It is seen as an approach considered to be in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of Agenda 2030 and the commitment \u201cto leave no one behind.\u201d Most of this literature, however, is focused more on regular economic migration and on the question of how to help the development of countries of origin and assist them in better connecting with traditional countries of immigration.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026research shows that proper employment prospects for refugees and a welcoming environment for their entrepreneurs contribute to economic growth in the host country. This research also demonstrates that the faster obstacles to formal employment are resolved, the faster refugees integrate as productive members of their host society.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yet, with the European migration crisis of 2015-2016, the notion of harnessing the potential contribution of refugees to the development of their host communities gathered more attention.[109]<\/sup><\/a> A growing body of research shows that proper employment prospects for refugees and a welcoming environment for their entrepreneurs contribute to economic growth in the host country.[110]<\/sup><\/a> This research also demonstrates that the faster obstacles to formal employment are resolved, the faster refugees integrate as productive members of their host society. Furthermore, this kind of positive integration enhances refugees\u2019 likelihood of return to their country of origin and their ability to help with reconstruction.<\/p>\n

However, so far, the Turkish case suggests that there is, nevertheless, a qualitative difference between how forced displacement connects to development compared to regular migration. Most importantly, in contrast to voluntary migration, the mass influx of forced migration occurs suddenly, in an unwarranted manner and in very large numbers. This raises quite different challenges compared to regular migration. One of these challenges is how to deal with the expectation that the situation will be temporary and that the victims of forced migration will eventually be able to return to their homes. This becomes complicated as the growing presence of refugees becomes intensely intertwined, in a complicated manner, with domestic politics, economics, and issues of identity, adversely impacting local public attitudes towards their presence in the country. Hence, it is not surprising that Turkish public attitudes towards migrants are among the most negative when compared to many other countries according to a poll conducted in 2019.[111]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026in 2018 the government adopted the \u201cExit Strategy from the ESSN\u201d that recognizes that \u201cthe SuTP is more settled in Turkey,\u201d and shows a willingness to \u201cimplement more development-oriented assistance programs rather than humanitarian assistance. [\u2026] The strategic purpose of this \u201cgraduation\u201d process is identified as \u201cto increase the social cohesion of the SuTP by supporting their adaptation to the labour market\u201d in Turkey.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This complicates the government\u2019s ability to develop and implement a coherent integration-focused long-term strategy to guide policy. It finds itself in a dilemma, recognizing that such policies would undermine the notion that refugees are here temporarily and encourage them to remain. This dilemma in turn leads to policies that continue to look more like \u201cpragmatic muddling through\u201d[112]<\/sup><\/a> and fail to deal with a growing reality that an estimated 80 percent will stay in Turkey.[113]<\/sup><\/a> Nevertheless, the Turkish government has been edging towards a transition from a humanitarian assistance focus to a developmental one. Opening the Turkish labor market to refugees has already been mentioned. More importantly, in 2018 the government adopted the \u201cExit Strategy from the ESSN\u201d that recognizes that \u201cthe SuTP is more settled in Turkey,\u201d and shows a willingness to \u201cimplement more development-oriented assistance programs rather than humanitarian assistance. For this reason, a graduation strategy is considered vital for enhancing the skills and competences of the SuTP and making them less dependent on the social assistance.\u201d The strategic purpose of this \u201cgraduation\u201d process is identified as \u201cto increase the social cohesion of the SuTP by supporting their adaptation to the labour market\u201d in Turkey. [114]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

The 11th<\/sup> Development Plan of Turkey, covering the period up to 2023, calls for strengthening the institutional base for better integrating foreign nationals into the economy, the adoption of the pending National Migration Strategy document and more effective cooperation with the international community.[115]<\/sup><\/a> Time will tell if this strategy document will include the recommendations from the report of the Special Migration Commission emphasizing the importance of incorporating migrants, including refugees, into Turkey\u2019s broader developmental plans.[116]<\/sup><\/a> In the meantime, public agencies in cooperation with a range of international and local stakeholders support programs to facilitate access to livelihoods, with a growing emphasis on vocational training, programs fostering entrepreneurship and tax subsidies, to create sustainable employment. These programs have been reported extensively as well as discussed in numerous public events and conferences.[117]<\/sup><\/a> However, as mentioned earlier, as much as they may have increased the \u201cemployability\u201d of their beneficiaries, these programs have not, in fact, translated themselves into actual jobs and job creation in any significant manner.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026the GCR suggests exploring \u201cpreferential trade arrangements \u2026 especially for goods and sectors with high refugee participation\u201d to spur employment both for refugees and locals to help social cohesion.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

One way of overcoming this dilemma is to create demand for refugee labor. As noted in the introduction of this report, the GCR suggests exploring \u201cpreferential trade arrangements \u2026 especially for goods and sectors with high refugee participation\u201d to spur employment both for refugees and locals to help social cohesion.[118]<\/sup><\/a> This policy suggestion is fully in line with the notion that\u00a0trade\u00a0liberalization\u00a0through the reduction of tariffs, the expansion or even full elimination of quotas, and the resolution of regulatory obstacles, is a key driver of economic growth and employment.[119]<\/sup><\/a> Such economic growth would also help create demand for the skills and labor of refugees and compliment efforts focused on increasing their employability.<\/p>\n

As much as the New Pact does not bring this up, the German Presidency progress report on key elements of a European Migration and Asylum policy does state that \u201caction on promoting and advancing tailor-made partnerships with key third countries needs to be taken without further delay and with the aim to show tangible results.\u201d[120]<\/sup><\/a> In the specific case of Turkey, the European Commission had indeed flagged gaining access to \u201cexport markets\u2026 and providing preferential export and trading status to specific products\u201d as a \u201cpriority action\u201d for improving Syrian refugees\u2019 self-reliance in Turkey.[121]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026such a policy idea into action would be for the EU to grant concessions that would enable Turkey to expand its agricultural exports to the EU. Such concessions would be tied to the formal employment of Syrian refugees in a manner that meets ILO and EU labor standards.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u00a0<\/em>One specific way to put such a policy idea into action would be for the EU to grant concessions that would enable Turkey to\u00a0expand its agricultural exports\u00a0to the EU. Such concessions would be tied to the formal employment of Syrian refugees in a manner that meets ILO and EU labor standards. A certification and monitoring mechanism could be envisaged to ensure compliance with the implementation terms that would be agreed upon by both sides. Currently, exports of fresh fruits and vegetables, together with the agricultural portion of industrially processed agricultural goods, are excluded from the EU-Turkey customs union. Hence, they are taxed and face regulatory restrictions, such as quotas, leading to a loss of welfare.[122]<\/sup><\/a> Both the agricultural sector and industrial sector processing agricultural goods suffer from\u00a0persistent labor supply shortages.[123]<\/sup><\/a> This shortage is often filled by Syrians and other migrants who are reported to have constituted \u201capproximately 20 percent of 552,000 agricultural workers\u201d in 2019.[124]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The shortage, especially of seasonal agricultural workers, appears to have persisted during the pandemic, though under even more adverse and precarious conditions than usual.[125]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Another policy idea in support of trade facilitation could be to explore the establishment of a Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) near the Syrian border, where nearly a million and a half registered Syrian refugees live. The region (the provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Sanliurfa) is known for its diverse industrial and agricultural production. Kilis, only a few miles from the Syrian border, would be an ideal location. Such a zone would also have an added long-term advantage of spurring economic development and reconstruction across the border in Syria after the end of the conflict. Previous examples of such zones include the U.S.-backed QIZs put into place in 1996 in Jordan and Egypt to generate employment and support for the Arab-Israeli peace process.[126]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, such a QIZ could also attract foreign direct investment interested in benefiting from concessional access to EU markets. In the spirit of burden-sharing underlined in the GCR, developed countries beyond the EU, such as Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea, could also be invited to support this QIZ, especially if the product range is expanded.<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026cooperation between the EU and Turkey to improve refugees\u2019 self-reliance by enabling them to access decent, formal work in the agricultural sector is in the interest of all parties.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Ultimately, cooperation between the EU and Turkey to improve refugees\u2019 self-reliance by enabling them to access decent, formal work in the agricultural sector is in the interest of all parties. For Turkey, implementing these policy recommendations would help refugees stand on their own feet, become productive members of Turkish society, diffuse public resentment, and reduce the likelihood of crime, while at the same time helping the economy grow. For the EU, this plan would reduce the likelihood of secondary movements of refugees and the need to keep raising funds for humanitarian assistance as refugees become more independent. The latter is especially important, as sustaining the mobilization of funds to support FRIT is going to be a growing challenge, even if in July the European Parliament authorized an additional almost half a billion euros and the March 2021 European Council invited \u201cthe Commission to present a proposal to the Council for the continuation of financing for Syrian refugees in Turkey.\u201d[127]<\/sup><\/a> What is more likely to happen is growing resistance from member states to contribute financially to FRIT, as predicted by a diplomat reflecting on the meeting that Erdo\u011fan held with EU leaders to bring the border crisis to an end.[128]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

This GCR-inspired approach, however, will need to be accompanied by a concerted effort to also focus on traditional \u201cdurable solutions\u201d, constituting the second leg of the two-pronged approach. Resettlement of refugees has long been an established practice of burden-sharing. The COVID pandemic adversely affected resettlement that was globally at a low level in the first place. They will need to be revived. Indeed, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum advocates for \u201cproviding protection to those in need through resettlement\u201d and includes support for resettlements in migration management partnerships with third countries.[129]<\/sup><\/a> The EU could also explore avenues to coordinate with the U.S. on resettlement programs. The new U.S. president Joe Biden has taken executive action to revive resettlement by boosting quota to 125,000 from the historically low 15,000 set by the Trump administration. Biden sees increasing these quotas in support of refugee protection as \u201ccentral to a values-based foreign policy that demonstrates American moral leadership on the world stage\u201d.[130]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The EU could be inspired by this perspective and develop a strong resettlement program which would surely benefit the EU\u2019s image as a normative power but also help entice cooperation for mutually beneficial migration management partnership from third countries including Turkey. In Turkey\u2019s case it is also refugees other than Syrians who need resettlement, especially Afghans whose \u201cdestination remains unknown.\u201d[131]<\/sup><\/a> The destination problem is particularly acute for the many undocumented Afghans\u00a0leading hidden lives in Turkey\u2019s big cities, struggling to earn enough to support themselves and their families with constant threat of deportations.[132]<\/sup><\/a> The precarity of Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate the problem of Afghan refugees and irregular migrants.<\/p>\n

In this regard the EU, in the spirit of introducing a \u201cfoundational level\u201d to the New Pact, could also work with the new U.S administration to explore prospects of developing a \u201ccomprehensive plan of action\u201d similar to the one in 1989 that resolved the protracted state of the \u201cboat people\u201d who had fled Vietnam after the end of the war.[133]<\/sup><\/a> Such a plan would focus on the resettlement of refugees from Syria\u2019s neighboring countries and, as difficult as it might be, could\u00a0 be tied to\u00a0 a deal that calls for some local integration.[134]<\/sup><\/a> Such a global scheme should also be extended to Afghans. In the interim, a more modest arrangement like the Voluntary Humanitarian Admissions Scheme that had been envisaged in the EU-Turkey statement could be reached between the EU and Turkey to provide for the pool of Afghan refugees in Turkey with safe and legal alternatives to irregular migration. This could also help overcome the disillusionment on the Turkish side resulting from the EU\u2019s failure to activate the Scheme for Syrian refugees.[135]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Voluntary return of refugees to their country of origin is considered as the preferred durable solution that under ideal circumstances should occur in line with the UNHCR\u2019s principles governing such returns.[136]<\/sup><\/a> However, in practice these \u201cprinciples of voluntariness, safety and dignity\u201d are not always easy to ensure.[137]<\/sup><\/a> The EU and Turkey could develop a dialogue to put into place a mechanism that ensures that these returns are indeed voluntary, in the sense that they do not violate the precept of \u201cnon-refoulement,\u201d returnees do enjoy some assistance to rebuild their lives and that returns do not cause further internal displacements. However, ensuring their safety from military attacks will remain the greatest challenge.<\/p>\n

\u201cSupporting a safe zone in northern Syria that Erdo\u011fan has long sought from the EU is fraught with political challenges and is widely considered to be a controversial idea.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Supporting a safe zone in northern Syria that Erdo\u011fan has long sought from the EU is fraught with political challenges and is widely considered to be a controversial idea.[138]<\/sup><\/a> Actual Turkish presence in pockets of northern Syria, resulting from a series of military interventions since August 2016, raises question marks about Turkey\u2019s commitment to the territorial integrity of Syria but is also accompanied by the risk of the \u201cGazafication\u201d of such a zone that would be \u201cperennially poverty-stricken and unstable.\u201d[139]<\/sup><\/a> At the same time this presence has also provided a modicum of stability and protection for its inhabitants, averting additional mass displacements, so far.[140]<\/sup><\/a> The northwestern part of Syria\u2019s Idlib region bordering Turkey remains vulnerable to such displacements. For the time being a precarious equilibrium appears to hold but is highly dependent on whether the Syrian regime and its allies decide to mount future military offensives to capture the area from the opposition.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere are 2.7 million displaced people living in this region and, 1.6 million of them are leading precarious lives in 1,374 active IDP sites. It was the prospect of a mass influx of refugees into Turkey that was one of the important factors triggering the border crisis of February 2020. Enabling the flow of adequate humanitarian assistance into this fragile area will be critical to mitigating the risk of mass displacement into Turkey.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

There are 2.7 million displaced people living in this region and, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1.6 million of them are leading precarious lives in 1,374 active IDP sites.[141]<\/sup><\/a> It was the prospect of a mass influx of refugees into Turkey that was one of the important factors triggering the border crisis of February 2020. Enabling the flow of adequate humanitarian assistance into this fragile area will be critical to mitigating the risk of mass displacement into Turkey. Exploring the possibility of making EU funds available for such humanitarian assistance in cooperation with Turkey would help ease the dire conditions there but also strengthen the sense of protection against a potential military attack from regime forces that, in the words of a local council official, \u201cwould double the refugees in Europe\u201d if it were to occur.[142]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, incorporating funds for such assistance would not only be in line with the oft-overlooked Article 9 of the EU-Turkey statement that promised \u201cto improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria\u201d in cooperation with Turkey[143]<\/sup><\/a>, but also help to meet the shortfall in funding for the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) that OCHA depends on for its humanitarian mission. The modalities would have to be arrived at in a manner that ensures that \u201cthe EU could (to a certain extent) stay away from legitimising\u201d Turkish presence there.[144]<\/sup><\/a> All this effort would have to be dependent on the continued extension of UNSC Resolution 2533 permitting cross-border aid into northern Syria expiring in July 2021.<\/p>\n

\u201cOne other area in which cooperation between the EU and Turkey could be expanded is local government.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

One other area in which cooperation between the EU and Turkey could be expanded is local government. Overwhelmingly, refugees, whether Syrian or from other backgrounds, live in urban settings. Municipalities have been at the forefront of managing the presence of Syrian and other refugees. They constitute the front line in managing migration and supporting the integration of forced migrants into their respective communities.[145]<\/sup><\/a> It is especially during the COVID pandemic that some of the municipalities with large refugee populations have distinguished themselves by extending their social assistance services to them too.[146]<\/sup><\/a> Beyond the pandemic, the role of municipalities in assisting the integration of refugees as central to the transition from humanitarian to developmental assistance is appropriately recognized at the \u201cInternational Forum on Local Solutions to Migration and Displacement\u201d that adopted the Gaziantep Declaration.[147]<\/sup><\/a> Their centrality is also amply recognized in the GCR, as well as acknowledged by the EU in its updated strategic concept note for FRIT.<\/p>\n

However, municipalities do face many shortcomings and challenges. Reports from the Union of Municipalities in Turkey (2019), from the UNDP in Turkey (2018) and from the Marmara Municipalities Union (2017) document in considerable detail the challenges they face in performing their services.[148]<\/sup><\/a> It is not the purpose of this report to dwell on them but to suggest that one novel way, beyond the provision of funds, is to develop city-twinning partnerships. This has already been suggested with respect to forced displacement and COVID-19 but could be expanded to the exchange of experiences and knowhow across European cities and Turkish ones with respect to the many faces of managing the presence of migrants in urban environments.[149]<\/sup><\/a> This would also give civil society an opportunity to participate more actively then is currently the case. In the case of Greek and Turkish municipalities it would create forums of dialogue and channels of cooperation on meeting common challenges at a time when state to state relations are tense and difficult. Additionally, these forums might also provide an environment for testing some of the above recommendations and discussing ways of pursuing them.<\/p>\n

The final but possibly trickiest area of cooperation concerns going beyond the current focus on border control that defines the managing of irregular migration. Crossings into Greece via the Aegean Sea are once again down compared to early last year.[150]<\/sup><\/a> Ironically, it is reports of pushbacks of migrants and refugees in the opposite direction that is now attracting growing attention and criticism.[151]<\/sup><\/a> Success in preventing movements of irregular migrants from Turkey into Greece and Bulgaria is transforming Turkey from a transit to a destination country. As their numbers increase and Turkey is unable to send them back to their countries of origin, the pressure to cross into the EU mounts. The EU-Turkey statement did not specifically address this issue and continued construction of removal centers can hardly help resolve the problem in the long run. Moving forward, expanding current limited cooperation between Turkey and the EU in assisting migrants with voluntary and safe returns to their country of origin would be an effective step towards relieving pressure on Turkey.[152]<\/sup><\/a> It would also contribute to a more constructive migration management that goes beyond the EU-Turkey statement.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

\u201c\u2026translating these ideas into policy would require a big and uphill effort. There is an important role for Greece to play, especially if Greece, as a frontline country in migration management, would like[\u2026] to play a role that is not limited to being just \u201cEurope\u2019s \u2018shield\u2019.\u201d A role that has not been particularly benevolent for Greece\u2019s image in terms of human and refugee rights.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Many may rightly think that these policy suggestions are of a tall order and even unrealistic. Yet, apart from propping up resettlement, the other ideas were not covered in the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and could possibly be considered as the \u201cmissing elements\u201d referred to by von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission. Naturally, translating these ideas into policy would require a big and uphill effort. There is an important role for Greece to play, especially if Greece, as a frontline country in migration management, would like, in the words of a migration expert, to play a role that is not limited to being just \u201cEurope\u2019s \u2018shield\u2019.\u201d A role that has not been particularly benevolent for Greece\u2019s image in terms of human and refugee rights.<\/p>\n

Greece, as a member of the European Union and a country with an important stake in the EU\u2019s migration policy, could pursue these ideas through the policy making channels of the EU. This would be very much in line with the Greek Prime Minister\u2019s wish to achieve a \u201cwin-win situation.\u201d However, to get there a process of discussing and distilling these ideas for policy makers would be needed. The Greek think-tank world, and especially ELIAMEP, would be ideally placed to offer and lead forums for intra-EU discussions but also across the Aegean Sea, reminiscent of the TII efforts it led in late 1990s and early 2000s.<\/p>\n

\u201cAmong the policy suggestions the one that would be most impactful in terms of arriving at a \u201cwin-win situation\u201d that best benefits the refugees and the host communities into which they are becoming integrated, would be seeing through the implementation of the \u201ctrade facilitation\u201d idea borrowed from the GCR.\u201d<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Among the policy suggestions the one that would be most impactful in terms of arriving at a \u201cwin-win situation\u201d that best benefits the refugees and the host communities into which they are becoming integrated, would be seeing through the implementation of the \u201ctrade facilitation\u201d idea borrowed from the GCR. However, for this to happen it will be important not to see this idea as a thinly disguised way of circumventing the standstill over the modernization of the EU-Turkey customs union. The idea may also risk being resisted by government circles in Turkey as a sign of a weakening commitment to updating the customs union and prospects of revitalizing the accession process. Instead, \u201ctrade facilitation\u201d should be considered as an \u201cout of the box\u201d idea that deserves exploring in the spirit of co-managing an exceptionally challenging refugee reality in Turkey that, after all, also reflects the broader global refugee situation. Hence, exploring and eventually finding a way of implementing this idea in a manner that ensures the protection of refugee rights could constitute a reference for addressing the broader global refugee picture too. It would also help add to the policy toolbox of the \u201cNew Pact\u201d, an idea that can soften some of the criticisms directed at the externalization logic characterizing the \u201cground level\u201d of the Pact.<\/p>\n

While \u201ctrade facilitation\u201d would be a great tool helping the \u201cinclusion and ultimately settlement of Syrians in Turkey\u201d[153]<\/sup><\/a> to avert crises like the ones from 2015-16 and early in 2020, it is important to recognize that the Turkish government will worry about the public\u2019s reaction. It will be important to articulate well the benefits of mainstreaming the presence of refugees in Turkey into development. The economic gains to the host community as well as the benefits to social cohesion resulting from inclusion, compared to the problems that would emerge from persistent exclusion of refugees, will need an effective communication strategy. This is where the other policy suggestions, ranging from revamped resettlement to exploring avenues of safe return for those interested, as well as funding for humanitarian assistance for the IDPs amassed on the Turkish border, become important. Incorporating these policies into a package deal would help resolve the dilemma of relative gains when seeking a \u201cwin-win\u201d outcome, and it could help the government in developing a constructive and positive narrative.<\/p>\n

\u201cConsidering that the Syrian displacement is entering its tenth\u00a0year with no prospects of the conflict in Syria being resolved, such a package deal would be more than timely.\u201d <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Considering that the Syrian displacement is entering its tenth\u00a0year with no prospects of the conflict in Syria being resolved, such a package deal would be more than timely. Indeed, if this package could be arrived at through genuine cooperation for the benefit of refugees, it would also crown the 70th<\/sup> anniversary of the adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Most importantly, such a deal could also be an important step to help convert last year into an annus mirabilis<\/em>.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Panayotis Tsakonas, \u201cGreek Foreign and Security Policy in 2021,\u201d in 2021 OUTLOOK: Special Edition<\/a><\/em>, (Athens: ELIAMEP, December 31, 2020).<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a>\u201cVideoconference with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen,\u201d Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, January 9, 2021, https:\/\/www.tccb.gov.tr\/en\/speeches-statements\/558\/123508\/videoconference-with-president-of-the-european-commission-ursula-von-der-leyen<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> \u201cStatement of the Members of the European Council,\u201d March 25, 2021, Brussels, https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/media\/48976\/250321-vtc-euco-statement-en.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> \u201cEvaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union,\u201d Report No. 85830-TR, (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 2014), https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/content\/dam\/Worldbank\/document\/eca\/turkey\/tr-eu-customs-union-eng.pdf<\/a> .<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Sinan \u00dclgen, \u201cTrade As Turkey\u2019s EU Anchor,\u201d Carnegie Europe Paper<\/em>, December 13, 2017;\u00a0 https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/2017\/12\/13\/trade-as-turkey-s-eu-anchor-pub-75002<\/a>; Nathalie Tocci and Dimitar Bechev, \u201cEU should keep Turkey close and Erdo\u011fan even closer,\u201d Politico<\/em>, July 17, 2018 ,\u00a0 https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-should-keep-turkey-close-recep-tayyip-erdogan-even-closer\/amp\/<\/a>; Doruk Aybay, \u201cThe Modernization of the European Union’s Customs Union with Turkey,\u201d SWP (CATS) Working Paper<\/em>, No. 05,\u00a0 September, 2020, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/fileadmin\/contents\/products\/arbeitspapiere\/CATS_Working_Paper_Nr_5_Doruk_Arbay.pdf<\/a> and Panayotis Tsakonas and Athanasios Manis, \u201cModernising the EU-Turkey Customs Union: The Greek Factor,\u201d\u00a0 ELIAMEP Policy Paper,<\/em> No. 35, December 2020, https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/Policy-paper-35-Tsakonas-Manis-06.07-final-1.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> \u201cEU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016,\u201d European Council, March 18, 2016, https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2016\/03\/18\/eu-turkey-statement\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> \u201cThe EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey,\u201d European Commission, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/news_corner\/migration_en<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> UNHCR defines a protracted situation as one when refugees have been displaced without a durable solution (such as voluntary return to their home countries following the resolution of conflicts, resettlement, or local integration) for more than five years, \u201cConclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations No. 109 (LXI) \u2013 2009,\u201d UNHCR Executive Committee 61st session, Extraordinary Meeting, December 8, 2009, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/en-us\/excom\/exconc\/4b332bca9\/conclusion-protracted-refugee-situations.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> For the remarks of the Greek PM see Helena Smith, \u201cGreece hopes EU-Turkey talks will ease tension over refugee crisis,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, March 16, 2020, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2020\/mar\/16\/greece-hopes-eu-turkey-talks-will-ease-tension-over-refugee-crisis<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> \u201cSpeech by Vice-President Schinas on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum,\u201d European Commission, September 23, 2020, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/speech_20_1736<\/a>. \u201cProposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003\/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX\/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund],\u201d European Commission, Brussels, 23.9.2020, COM(2020) 610 final, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/info\/sites\/info\/files\/proposal-regulation-asylum-migration_en-1.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> The text of the GCR can be accessed from \u201cPart II Global Compact on Refugees,\u201d General Assembly Official Records Seventy-third Session Supplement No. 12, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/gcr\/GCR_English.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System<\/em>, (London: Allen Lane, 2017), pp. 133-4.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> \u201cGlobal Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019\u201d, (UNHCR, 2020), p. 23, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/5ee200e37.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> \u201cPart II Global Compact on Refugees,\u201d p. 14.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> \u201cTurkey Fact Sheet,\u201d February 2021, UNHCR, Ankara, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2021\/03\/Bi-Annual-Fact-Sheet-2021-02-Turkeyf.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Jennifer Rankin, \u201cMigration: EU praises Greece as ‘shield’ after Turkey opens border,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, March 3, 2020, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2020\/mar\/03\/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> \u201cPresident Erdo\u011fan Addresses the UN General Assembly,\u201d Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, September 20, 2019, https:\/\/www.tccb.gov.tr\/en\/news\/542\/52361\/president-Erdo\u011fan -addresses-the-un-general-assembly<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Berkay Mand\u0131rac\u0131, \u201cSharing the Burden: Revisiting the EU-Turkey Migration Deal,\u201d Commentary<\/em>, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group, March 13, 2020, https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/europe-central-asia\/western-europemediterranean\/turkey\/sharing-burden-revisiting-eu-turkey-migration-deal<\/a><\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> \u201cAs north-west Syria violence reaches \u2018horrifying\u2019 new level, UN relief chief says ceasefire is only option,\u201d UN News<\/em>, February 17, 2020, https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2020\/02\/1057551<\/a> and \u201cHumanitarian Update Syrian Arab Republic,\u201d Issue 08, January 28, 2020, OCHA, https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/syrian-arab-republic\/humanitarian-update-syrian-arab-republic-issue-08-28-january-2020-enar<\/a><\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> \u201cAk Parti Geni\u015fletilmi\u015f \u0130l Ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 Toplant\u0131s\u0131nda Yapt\u0131klar\u0131 Konu\u015fma,\u201d Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, September 5, 2019, https:\/\/www.tccb.gov.tr\/konusmalar\/353\/109531\/ak-parti-genisletilmis-il-baskanlari-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma<\/a><\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> \u201cTurkey’s Erdo\u011fan\u00a0 threatens to send Syrian refugees to Europe,\u201d Reuters<\/em>, October 10, 2019, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-syria-security-turkey-europe\/turkeys-Erdo\u011fan -threatens-to-send-syrian-refugees-to-europe-idUSKBN1WP1ED<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> For a discussion of his narrative and link to domestic politics see Rabia Karakaya Polat, \u201cReligious solidarity, historical mission and moral superiority: construction of external and internal \u2018others\u2019 in AKP\u2019s discourses on Syrian refugees in Turkey,\u201d Critical Discourse Studies<\/em>, Vol. 15, issue 5, (2018) and Asli Selin Okyay, \u201cTurkey’s post-2011 approach to its Syrian border and its implications for domestic politics,\u201d International Affairs<\/em>, Vol. 93, No. 4, (July 2017).<\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> M. Murat Erdo\u011fan, Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research<\/em>, (Ankara: Hacettepe University Migration Policy Research Center, December 2014), p. 66.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> \u201cP\u0130AR anketi: AKP’lilerin y\u00fczde 33’\u00fc merkez sa\u011fda yeni bir parti istiyor,\u201d T24<\/em>, July 19, 2019, https:\/\/t24.com.tr\/foto-haber\/piar-dan-siyasi-gundem-arastirmasi-akp-lilerin-yuzde-33-u-merkez-sagda-yeni-bir-parti-istiyor,8276\/20<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> Dogachan Dagi, \u201cThe EU\u2013Turkey Migration Deal: Performance and Prospects,\u201d European Foreign Affairs Review<\/em>,<\/p>\n

Vol. 25, Issue 2 (2020), p. 212 and Suat K\u0131n\u0131kl\u0131o\u011flu, \u201cSyrian Refugees in Turkey: Changing Attitudes and Fortunes,\u201d SWP (CATS) Comment<\/em>, No. 5, February 2020, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/fileadmin\/contents\/products\/comments\/2020C05_Kiniklioglu.pdf<\/a> . For a rich discussion of the impact of Syrian refugees on public attitudes and electoral behavior see M. Murat Erdo\u011fan, \u201c\u2019Securitization from Society\u2019 and \u2018Social Acceptance\u2019: Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees\u201d, Uluslararasi Iliskiler<\/em>, Vol. 17, No. 68, (2020).<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> Pinar Tremblay, \u201cAre Syrians in Turkey no longer Erdo\u011fan \u2019s \u2018brothers\u2019?\u201d Al-Monitor<\/em>, July 29, 2019, https:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/originals\/2019\/07\/turkey-syria-refugees-are-no-longer-Erdo\u011fan s-brothers.html<\/a> and \u201cTurkey Forcibly Returning Syrians to Danger,\u201d Human Rights Watch, July 26, 2019, https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2019\/07\/26\/turkey-forcibly-returning-syrians-danger<\/a> .<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> \u201cPresident Erdo\u011fan Addresses the UN General Assembly.\u201d<\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> GDP growth \u201cannual %\u201d \u2013 Turkey, World Bank, https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=TR<\/a><\/p>\n

[29]<\/a> \u201c\u0130\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fc \u0130statistikleri, Aral\u0131k 2019,\u201d Haber B<\/em>\u00fc<\/em>lteni<\/em>, TUIK, March 10, 2020,\u00a0 https:\/\/data.tuik.gov.tr\/Bulten\/Index?p=Labour-Force-Statistics-December%202019-33783<\/a>. For a discussion of the persistence of unemployment in Turkey and its relationship to Syrian refugees see G\u00f6k\u00e7e Uysal, Hande Paker, and Selin Pelek, \u201cLabor Market Challenges in Turkey,\u201d in Asaf Savas Akat and Seyfettin G\u00fcrsel (eds.), Turkish Economy at the Crossroads: Facing the Challenges Ahead<\/em> (World Scientific, 2021).<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> \u201cK\u00fcresel M\u00fclteci Forumu\u2019nda Yapt\u0131klar\u0131 Konu\u015fma,\u201d Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, December 17, 2019, https:\/\/www.tccb.gov.tr\/konusmalar\/353\/113993\/kuresel-multeci-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma<\/a> .<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a> Kristina Jovanovski, \u201cOn Turkish-Greek border, desperate migrants find confusion and chaos,\u201d NBC News<\/em>, March 5, 2020, https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/turkish-greek-border-desperate-migrants-find-confusion-chaos-n1150501<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/a> \u201cStatement of the Foreign Affairs Council,\u201d European Council, March 6, 2020, https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2020\/03\/06\/statement-of-the-foreign-affairs-council-on-syria-and-turkey\/<\/a> and \u201cWhy did Turkey open borders for refugees to Europe?\u201d TRTWorld<\/em>, March 2, 2020, https:\/\/www.trtworld.com\/turkey\/why-did-turkey-open-borders-for-refugees-to-europe-34240<\/a> .<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a> \u201cBakan Soylu 150 bin, BM 347 dedi,\u201d M\u00fclteci Medyas\u0131<\/em>, April 9, 2020, https:\/\/multecimedyasi.org\/2020\/04\/09\/bakan-soylu-150-bin-bm-347-dedi\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[34]<\/a> \u201cSharing the Burden: Revisiting the EU-Turkey Migration Deal.\u201d<\/p>\n

[35]<\/a> \u201cThe EU\u2013Turkey Migration Deal: Performance and Prospects\u201d. A similar point is raised in Angeliki Dimitriadi, \u201cRefugees at the gate of Europe<\/a>,\u201d ELIAMEP Policy Brief<\/em>, No. 112, April 22, 2020.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> \u201cStatement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel, following their meeting with the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan,\u201d European Commission, March 9, 2020, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/statement_20_429<\/a><\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> Patrick Kingsley, The New Odyssey: The Story of the Twenty-First Century Refugee Crisis<\/em>, (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017.)<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System<\/em>, p. 93.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> \u201cD\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Say\u0131n Ahmet Davuto\u011flu\u2019nun Bulgaristan D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 \u0130le Yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ortak Bas\u0131n Toplant\u0131s\u0131,\u201d Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2013, http:\/\/www.mfa.gov.tr\/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-bulgaristan-disisleri-bakani-ile-yaptigi-basin-toplantisi_-26-ekim-2013_-ankara.tr.mfa<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> \u201cTurkey Has Spent Nearly $8 Billion Caring For 2.2 Million Syrian Refugees,\u201d Huffington Post<\/em>, September 18, 2015, https:\/\/www.huffpost.com\/entry\/turkey-syrian-refugees_n_55fbd728e4b08820d9183073<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[41]<\/a> Erdo\u011fan, Syrians in Turkey:,<\/em> p. 68.<\/p>\n

[42]<\/a>\u00a0 \u201cEU-Turkey joint action plan,\u201d European Commission, October 15, 2015, https:\/\/europa.eu\/rapid\/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[43]<\/a> Matteo Garavoglia, \u201cThe EU-Turkey dirty deal on migrants: Can Europe redeem itself?\u201d, Brookings Institution, March 14, 2016, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/order-from-chaos\/2016\/03\/14\/the-eu-turkey-dirty-deal-on-migrants-can-europe-redeem-itself\/<\/a> and \u201cEU Turkey Summit: EU and Turkish leaders deal death blow to the right to seek asylum,\u201d Amnesty International, March 8, 2016, https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/latest\/news\/2016\/03\/eu-turkey-summit-reaction\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[44]<\/a> Emanuela Roman, Theodore Baird, and Talia Radcliffe, \u201cWhy Turkey is Not a \u201cSafe Country,\u201d Statewatch Analysis, February, 2016, https:\/\/www.statewatch.org\/media\/documents\/analyses\/no-283-why-turkey-is-not-a-safe-country.pdf<\/a> and Bill Frelick, \u201cIs Turkey Safe for Refugees?\u201d Policy Review<\/em>, Human Rights Watch, March 22, 2016, https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2016\/03\/22\/turkey-safe-refugees<\/a><\/p>\n

[45]<\/a> \u201cEU-Turkey deal: who is responsible? Not the EU, says the Court of Justice,\u201d Statewatch, March 1, 2017, https:\/\/www.statewatch.org\/news\/2017\/march\/eu-turkey-deal-who-is-responsible-not-the-eu-says-the-court-of-justice\/<\/a> and Julia Roberts, \u201cThe EU-Turkey Statement \u2013 Questions on Legality and Efficiency,\u201d Denver Journal of International Law and Policy<\/em>, March 15, 2018, https:\/\/djilp.org\/the-eu-turkey-statement-questions-on-legality-and-efficiency\/<\/a>. For an article taking a somewhat opposite view see Daniel Thym, \u201cWhy the EU-Turkey Deal Can Be Legal and a Step in the Right Direction,\u201d EU Immigration and Asylum Law Blog<\/em>, March 11, 2016, https:\/\/eumigrationlawblog.eu\/why-the-eu-turkey-deal-can-be-legal-and-a-step-in-the-right-direction\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[46]<\/a> Maximilian Steinbeis, \u201cThree legal requirements for the EU-Turkey deal: An interview with James Hathaway,\u201d March 9, 2016, https:\/\/verfassungsblog.de\/three-legal-requirements-for-the-eu-turkey-deal-an-interview-with-james-hathaway\/<\/a> and Nils Muiznieks, \u201cStop Your Backsliding, Europe,\u201d New York Times<\/em>, March 14, 2016, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2016\/03\/15\/opinion\/stop-your-backsliding-europe.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[47]<\/a> Figures obtained from https:\/\/data2.unhcr.org\/en\/situations\/mediterranean\/location\/5179<\/a>. Subsequently, irregular crossings picked up reaching almost 60,000 in 2019 before dropping in 2020 to less than 6,000 due to the COVID pandemic.<\/p>\n

[48]<\/a> \u201cEU Facility for Refugees in Turkey List of projects committed\/decided, contracted, disbursed,\u201d March 15, 2021, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/sites\/near\/files\/facility_table.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[49]<\/a> \u201cFourth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey,\u201d European Commission, Brussels, April 30, 2020, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/sites\/near\/files\/fourth_annual_report_on_the_facility_for_refugees_in_turkey.pdf<\/a> and 2019 \u201cMonitoring Report 3RP Turkey Chapter,\u201d (3RP, September 2020), https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/turkey\/2019-monitoring-report-3rp-turkey-chapter-2019<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[50]<\/a>\u00a0 Ay\u015fen \u00dcst\u00fcbici, \u201cThe impact of externalized migration governance on Turkey: technocratic migration governance and the production of differentiated legal status,\u201d Comparative Migration Studies<\/em>\u00a0Vol. 7, Issue 1, (December 2019) and Beken Saat\u00e7io\u011flu, The European Union\u2019s refugee crisis and rising functionalism in EU-Turkey relations,\u00a0Turkish Studies,<\/em>\u00a0Vol. 21, No. 2, (2020).<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a> Ahmet \u0130\u00e7duygu and Ay\u015fen \u00dcst\u00fcbici (2014) \u201cNegotiating Mobility, Debating Borders: Migration Diplomacy in Turkey-EU Relations,\u201d in Helen Schwenken and Sabine Ru\u00df-Sattar (eds), New Border and Citizenship Politics<\/em>, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and Sibel Karada\u011f, \u201cExtraterritoriality of European borders to Turkey: an implementation perspective of counteractive strategies,\u201d\u00a0Comparative Migration Studies, <\/em>Vol. 7,\u00a0Issue 1, (2019).<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a> James Hathaway, \u201cThe Global Cop-Out on Refugees,\u201d International Journal of Refugee Law<\/em>, Vol. 30, Issue 4, (December 2018), p. 10.<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a> UNHCR Turkey Operational Update January 2021, https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/sites\/reliefweb.int\/files\/resources\/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-January-2021.pdf<\/a> and \u201cGlobal Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019,\u201d p. 15.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a> Maribel Casas-Cortes, Sebastian Cobarrubias and John Pickles \u201c\u2018Good neighbours make good fences\u2019: Seahorse operations, border externalization and extra-territoriality,\u201d European Urban and Regional Studies<\/em>, Vol. 23, No. 3, (2016) and Dimitriadi, \u201cRefugees at the gate of Europe\u201d.<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a> \u201cExit Strategy From The ESSN Program,\u201d (Frit Office of the Presidency of Turkey and Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, December 2018), p. 4, https:\/\/www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr\/media\/3725\/essn-exit-strategy-1.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[56]<\/a> M. Murat Erdo\u011fan<\/u>, Syrians Barometer 2019: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrian in Turkey<\/em>, (Ankara: Orion Kitapevi, 2020), p. 165.<\/p>\n

[57]<\/a> G\u00fcnter Seufert, \u201cRefugee Crisis: For Rationality in Relations with Turkey,\u201d SWP Comments<\/em>, March 11, 2016, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/en\/point-of-view\/refugee-crisis-for-rationality-in-relations-with-turkey\/<\/a> and Asli Okyay and Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani, \u201cThe Leverage of the Gatekeeper: Power and Interdependence in the Migration Nexus between the EU and Turkey,\u201d\u00a0The International Spectator<\/em>,\u00a0Vol. 51, No. 4, (2016).<\/p>\n

[58]<\/a> Dagi, \u201cThe EU\u2013Turkey Migration Deal: Performance and Prospects,\u201d p. 211.<\/p>\n

[59]<\/a> Jorgo Valero, \u201cEU postpones announcement on Turkey sanctions to \u2018de-escalate\u2019 tensions,\u201d EurActiv<\/em>, July 15, 2019, https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/global-europe\/news\/eu-postpones-announcement-on-turkey-sanctions-to-de-escalate-tensions\/<\/a> and \u201cEU leaders back sanctions on Turkey over gas drilling,\u201d DW<\/em>, December 11, 2020, https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/eu-leaders-back-sanctions-on-turkey-over-gas-drilling\/a-55900747<\/a><\/p>\n

[60]<\/a> Dagi, \u201cThe EU\u2013Turkey Migration Deal: Performance and Prospects,\u201d p. 210.<\/p>\n

[61]<\/a> \u201cTurkey 2020,\u201d Financial Tracking Services, OCHA, https:\/\/fts.unocha.org\/countries\/229\/summary\/2020<\/a><\/p>\n

[62]<\/a> \u201cThe Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): Offering a lifeline to vulnerable refugees in Turkey,\u201d European Commission, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/echo\/essn_en<\/a> and \u201cHelping refugee children in Turkey go to school: Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE),\u201d European Commission, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/echo\/field-blogs\/videos\/conditional-cash-transfer-education-ccte-programme-refugee-children-turkey_en<\/a><\/p>\n

[63]<\/a> P. Facundo Cuevas et al, \u201cVulnerability and Protection of Refugees in Turkey,\u201d (The World Bank and the World Food Programme, 2019), p. 3, https:\/\/openknowledge.worldbank.org\/handle\/10986\/31813<\/a><\/p>\n

[64]<\/a> Hannah Ring, Victoria Rothbard, David Seidenfeld, Francesca Stuer, and Kevin Kamto, \u201cProgramme Evaluation of the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) for Syrians and Other Refugees in Turkey Final Evaluation Report,\u201d (Washington DC: American Institutes for Research, September 2020), https:\/\/www.air.org\/sites\/default\/files\/UNICEF-Turkey-CCTE-Evaluation-Report-September-2020.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[65]<\/a> For a breakdown of international funds tracked by 3RP and accruing to Turkish public agencies see, \u201cSupport to Public Institutions by 3RP Partners and International Financial Institutions as of March 2021,\u201d https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/turkey\/support-public-institutions-3rp-partners-and-international-financial-institutions<\/a><\/p>\n

[66]<\/a> \u201cMid-Year Trends 2020,\u201d UNHCR, p 2, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/en-us\/statistics\/unhcrstats\/5fc504d44\/mid-year-trends-2020.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[67]<\/a> Calculated from https:\/\/en.goc.gov.tr\/international-protection17<\/a><\/p>\n

[68]<\/a> UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet, February 2021, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2021\/03\/Bi-Annual-Fact-Sheet-2021-02-Turkeyf.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[69]<\/a> M. Murat Erdo\u011fan, \u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019deki Suriyeliler: 9 Y\u0131l\u0131n K\u0131sa Muhasebesi,\u201d Perspektif<\/em>, February 28, 2020, https:\/\/www.perspektif.online\/turkiyedeki-suriyeliler-9-yilin-kisa-muhasebesi\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[70]<\/a> The English translation of the law can be reached from https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2017\/04\/LoFIP_ENG_DGMM_revised-2017.pdf<\/a>. For a discussion of how this law relates to Syrian refugees see Meltem Ineli-Ciger, \u201cProtecting Syrians in Turkey: A Legal Analysis,\u201d\u00a0International Journal of Refugee Law<\/em>, Vol. 29, Issue 4, (December 2017).<\/p>\n

[71]<\/a> \u201cConvention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,\u201d https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/3b66c2aa10.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[72]<\/a> \u201cGe\u00e7ici Koruma Y\u00f6netmeli\u011fi,\u201d Resm\u00ee Gazete<\/em>, No. 29153, October 22, 2014. The description of the terms of the temporary protection regulation in English can be seen at \u201cTemporary Protection Regime – Turkey\u201d Asylum Information Database and European Council of Refugees and Exiles,\u00a0 https:\/\/www.asylumineurope.org\/reports\/country\/turkey\/content-temporary-protection<\/a> and \u201cGeneral Principles of Temporary Protection,\u201d Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management, https:\/\/en.goc.gov.tr\/general-principles-of-temporary-protection<\/a>.<\/u><\/p>\n

[73]<\/a> Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kiri\u015fci, \u201cWhat Turkey\u2019s open-door policy means for Syrian refugees,\u201d Brookings Institution, July 8, 2015.<\/p>\n

[74]<\/a> \u201cFacility for Refugees in Turkey Updated Strategic Concept Note,\u201d https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/sites\/near\/files\/updated_facility_strategic_concept_note.pdf<\/a> and \u201cTurkey: 3RP Country Chapter – 2021\/2022,\u201d (3RP, February, 2021), https:\/\/data2.unhcr.org\/en\/documents\/details\/85061<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[75]<\/a> \u201cThe Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Interactive projects map,\u201d https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/news_corner\/migration_en<\/a> and \u201cTurkey Information Hub,\u201d http:\/\/www.refugeeinfoturkey.org\/<\/a>. UNHCR too has digital platform offering detailed information on projects funded by both programs, http:\/\/www.refugeeinfoturkey.org\/goodpractices.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[76]<\/a> \u201cSyria\u2019s Frozen Conflict,\u201d Hold Your Fire (podcast), International Crisis Group, January 28, 2021, https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/middle-east-north-africa\/eastern-mediterranean\/syria\/syrias-frozen-conflict<\/a><\/p>\n

[77]<\/a> Erdo\u011fan<\/u>, Syrians Barometer 2019:,<\/em> pp. 176-7.<\/p>\n

[78]<\/a> \u201cBakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n Faaliyetleri ve G\u00fcndemdeki Konulara \u0130li\u015fkin Bas\u0131n Bilgilendirme Toplant\u0131s\u0131 D\u00fczenlendi,\u201d Ministry of Defense Press Conference (podcast), https:\/\/www.msb.gov.tr\/SlaytHaber\/27122019-04384<\/a>. According to this source 380,000, 135,000, and over 65,000 Syrians returned to the Euphrates Shield, Peace Spring Shield and the Olive Branch operation zones respectively (figures cited at 4:59; 5:45 and 10:11 minutes into the podcast.)<\/p>\n

[79]<\/a> Cited in \u201cT\u00fcrkiyedeki Suriyeli Say\u0131s\u0131 \u015eubat 2021,\u201d Haber B\u00fclteni<\/em>, M\u00fclteciler Derne\u011fi, February 24, 2021, https:\/\/multeciler.org.tr\/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi\/<\/a> and Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions, https:\/\/data2.unhcr.org\/en\/situations\/syria_durable_solutions<\/a><\/p>\n

[80]<\/a> \u201cUNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2021,\u201d UNHCR, p. 74, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/protection\/resettlement\/5ef34bfb7\/projected-global-resettlement-needs-2021.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[81]<\/a> UNHCR \u2013 Turkey, Operational Update November 2020, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2020\/12\/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-November-FINAL.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[82]<\/a> UNHCR \u2013 Turkey, Operational Update November 2019, https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/14\/2020\/01\/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-November-2019.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[83]<\/a> \u201cEU-Turkey Statement Four years on,\u201d March 2020, p. 2, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/home-affairs\/sites\/default\/files\/what-we-do\/policies\/european-agenda-migration\/20200318_managing-migration-eu-turkey-statement-4-years-on_en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[84]<\/a> Beatriz Godoy Rivas and Laura Batalla Adam, \u201cA Fresh Start on Migration? The New Pact and Its Implications for EU-Turkey Cooperation,\u201d Policy Note<\/em>, Istanbul Political Research Institute, https:\/\/d4b693e1-c592-4336-bc6a-36c134d6fb5e.filesusr.com\/ugd\/c80586_9a8a9adb0e7d4fc6bcc3cb3b80c28708.pdf<\/a> .<\/p>\n

[85]<\/a> \u015eebnem K. Ak\u00e7apar and Do\u011fu\u015f \u015eim\u015fek, \u201cThe politics of Syrian refugees in Turkey: A question of inclusion and exclusion through citizenship\u201d, Social Inclusion<\/em>, Vol. 6, No 1, (2018).<\/p>\n

[86]<\/a> \u201cT\u00fcrkiyedeki Suriyeli Say\u0131s\u0131 \u015eubat 2021\u201d.<\/p>\n

[87]<\/a> Erdo\u011fan, \u201c\u2019Securitization from Society\u2019 and \u2018Social Acceptance\u2019:,\u201d p. 89.<\/p>\n

[88]<\/a> Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, \u201cUnderstanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework,\u201d Journal of Refugee Studies<\/em>, Vol. 21, Issue 2, (June 2008).<\/p>\n

[89]<\/a> Luis Pinedo Caro, \u201cSyrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market,\u201d ILO Office, Turkey, February 2020, p. 12, https:\/\/www.ilo.org\/wcmsp5\/groups\/public\/—europe\/—ro-geneva\/—ilo-ankara\/documents\/publication\/wcms_738602.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[90]<\/a> Emre Erdo\u011fan and P\u0131nar Uyan Semerci, \u201cAttitudes towards Syrians in Turkey-2017,\u201d German Marshall Fund Discussion on Turkish Perceptions of Syrian Refugees, Ankara, Turkey, March 12, 2018, https:\/\/goc.bilgi.edu.tr\/media\/uploads\/2018\/03\/12\/turkish-perceptions-of-syrian-refugees-20180312.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[91]<\/a> Erdo\u011fan, Syrians Barometer 2019:,<\/em> p. 82.<\/p>\n

[92]<\/a> Doruk Cengiz and Hasan Tekguc, \u201cIs It Merely A Labor Supply Shock? Impacts of Syrian Migrants on Local Economies in Turkey,\u201d Working Paper<\/em>, February 2018, PERI, University Massachusetts Amherst, https:\/\/www.peri.umass.edu\/component\/k2\/item\/1050-is-it-merely-a-labor-supply-shock-impacts-of-syrian-migrants-on-local-economies-in-turkey<\/a> and Norman Loayza, Gabriel Ulyssea and Tomoko Utsumi, \u201cInformality and the Labor Market Effects of Mass Migration: Theory and Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Turkey,\u201d February 2018, https:\/\/events.barcelonagse.eu\/live\/files\/2352-gabrielulyssea61349.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[93]<\/a> \u201cMainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A handbook for policy-makers and practitioners,\u201d (The Global Migration Group (GMG), 2010), p. 96, https:\/\/publications.iom.int\/system\/files\/pdf\/gmg2010.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[94]<\/a> \u201cTurkey: 3RP Country Chapter – 2021\/2022,\u201d p. 88.<\/p>\n

[95]<\/a> \u201cMonitoring Report 3RP Turkey Chapter,\u201d p. 49.<\/p>\n

[96]<\/a> Ibid., pp. 49-50.<\/p>\n

[97]<\/a> Bastien Revel, \u201cTurkey\u2019s Refugee Resilience: Expanding and Improving Solutions for the Economic Inclusion of Syrians in Turkey,\u201d (Washington DC:, Atlantic Council, July 2020), https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/Turkey%E2%80%99s-Refugee-Resilience-Expanding-and-Improving-Solutions-for-the-Economic-Inclusion-of-Syrians-in-Turkey-Report.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[98]<\/a>Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System<\/em>, p. 175.<\/p>\n

[99]<\/a> GDP per capita (current US$) \u2013 Turkey, World Bank, https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TR<\/a>. For discussion of these structural problems see Akat and G\u00fcrsel (eds.) Turkish Economy at the Crossroads: Facing the Challenges Ahead<\/em>.<\/p>\n

[100]<\/a> \u015eenay Aky\u0131ld\u0131z, \u201cHow has COVID-19 affected Turkey\u2019s labor market?\u201d Evaluation Note, (Ankara: TEPAV,\u00a0 September 2, 2020), https:\/\/www.tepav.org.tr\/en\/haberler\/s\/10170<\/a><\/p>\n

[101]<\/a> \u201cTurkey – Impact of COVID-19 on Refugee Populations Benefitting From the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) \u2013 Assessment Report,\u201d p. 8, https:\/\/data2.unhcr.org\/en\/documents\/details\/76274<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[102]<\/a> 3RP Turkey Consolidated 2020 Appeal Review, June 2020, https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/sites\/reliefweb.int\/files\/resources\/77350.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[103]<\/a> Ring, Rothbard, Seidenfeld, Stuer, and Kamto \u201cProgramme Evaluation of the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) for Syrians and Other Refugees in Turkey Final Evaluation Report,\u201d p. 54.<\/p>\n

[104]<\/a> Jonathan Spicer and\u00a0 Ali Kucukgocmen, \u201cFear and poverty in Turkey as pandemic hits Erdo\u011fan ‘s base,\u201d Reuters<\/em>, September 15, 2020, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/health-coronavirus-turkey-poverty-analys\/fear-and-poverty-in-turkey-as-pandemic-hits-Erdo\u011fan s-base-idUSKBN2611B5<\/a> and Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise, Round 4, January 2020, Turkey, WFP, p. 16, https:\/\/docs.wfp.org\/api\/documents\/WFP-0000112161\/download\/?_ga=2.22156667.1119451145.1614280126-1240475520.1614280126<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[105]<\/a> Revel, \u201cTurkey\u2019s Refugee Resilience:\u201d, p. 29.<\/p>\n

[106]<\/a> Dimitriadi, \u201cRefugees at the gate of Europe\u201d.<\/p>\n

[107]<\/a> Paula Garc\u00eda Andrade, \u201cEU cooperation on migration with partner countries within the New Pact: new instruments for a new paradigm?\u201d EU Immigration and Asylum Law Blog<\/em>, December 8, 2020, http:\/\/eumigrationlawblog.eu\/eu-cooperation-on-migration-with-partner-countries-within-the-new-pact-new-instruments-for-a-new-paradigm\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[108]<\/a> Hein de Haas, \u201cMigration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective,\u201d International Migration Review<\/em>, Vol. 44, No. 1, (2010); Catherine W. Wenden, \u201cMigration and development,\u201d Ethnic and Racial Studies<\/em>, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2017 and Kathleen Newland, \u201cMigration, Development, and Global Governance: From Crisis toward Consolidation,\u201d (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019). On policy literature see \u201cThe Contributions of Migrants and Migration to Development – Strengthening the Linkages,\u201d (IOM, 2017), https:\/\/eea.iom.int\/publications\/contributions-migrants-and-migration-development-strengthening-linkages<\/a> and \u201cHuman Mobility, Shared Opportunities: A Review of the 2009 Human Development Report and the Way Ahead,\u201d (UNDP, October 2020), https:\/\/www.undp.org\/content\/undp\/en\/home\/librarypage\/democratic-governance\/Human-Mobility-Shared-Opportunities-A-Review-of-the-2009-Human-Development-Report-and-the-Way-Ahead.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[109]<\/a> Maegan Hendow, \u201cBridging refugee protection and development: Policy Recommendations for Applying a Development-Displacement Nexus Approach,\u201d (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, January 2019),\u00a0 https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/sites\/reliefweb.int\/files\/resources\/EN_Bridging_Refugee_Protection_and_Development_EN_WEB_FINAL.pdf<\/a> and \u201cDevelopment Approaches to Migration and Displacement 2016-2018,\u201d (UNDP, October 2019), https:\/\/www.undp.org\/content\/undp\/en\/home\/librarypage\/crisis-prevention-and-recovery\/development-approaches-to-migration-and-displacement.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[110]<\/a> Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, \u201cNo Refugees and Migrants Left Behind\u201d in Homi Kharas (ed.), Leave No One Behind: Time for Specifics on the Sustainable Development Goals<\/em> (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019) and Michael Clemens, Cindy Huang, and Jimmy Graham, \u201cThe Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access,\u201d Working Paper 496, (Washington DC: Center for Global Development, October 2018),\u00a0https:\/\/www.cgdev.org\/sites\/default\/files\/economic-and-fiscal-effects-granting-refugees-formal-labor-market-access.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[111]<\/a> \u201cWorld Refugee Day: Global attitudes towards refugees,\u201d Ipsos, June 2019, https:\/\/www.ipsos.com\/sites\/default\/files\/ct\/news\/documents\/2019-06\/World-Refugee-Day-2019-Ipsos.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[112]<\/a> Sophia Hoffmann and Sahizer Samuk, \u201cTurkish Immigration Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis,\u201d SWP Working Paper<\/em>, March 2016, p. 9, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/fileadmin\/contents\/products\/arbeitspapiere\/Working_paper_Hoffmann_Turkish_immigration_policy.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[113]<\/a> Ramon Mahia , Rafael de Arce, Ahmet Ali Ko\u00e7 and G\u00fclden B\u00f6l\u00fck, \u201cThe short and long-term impact of Syrian refugees on the Turkish economy: a simulation approach,\u201d Turkish Studies<\/em>, Vol. 21, No. 5, p. 678 and Erdo\u011fan, \u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019deki Suriyeliler: 9 Y\u0131l\u0131n K\u0131sa Muhasebesi\u201d.<\/p>\n

[114]<\/a> \u201cExit Strategy From The ESSN Program,\u201d also emphasizes importance of employment \u201cto increase the social cohesion of the SuTP,\u201d p. 4 and p. 13.<\/p>\n

[115]<\/a> \u201cOn Birinci Kalk\u0131nma Plan\u0131 (2019-2023),\u201d (Ankara: T\u00fcrkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, Strateji ve B\u00fct\u00e7e Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, July 2019), pp. 168-9, https:\/\/www.sbb.gov.tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/OnbirinciKalkinmaPlani.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[116]<\/a> \u201cOn Birinci Kalk\u0131nma Plan\u0131 (2019-2023), D\u0131\u015f G\u00f6\u00e7 Politikas\u0131 \u00d6zel \u0130htisas Komisyonu Raporu, Kalk\u0131nma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 2018,\u201d pp. 69-70, https:\/\/sbb.gov.tr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/04\/DisGocPolitikas%C4%B1OzelIhtisasKomisyonuRaporu.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[117]<\/a> For a sample see \u201cWorking Towards Self-Reliance: Syrian refugees\u2019 economic participation in Turkey,\u201d Durable Solutions Platform and IGAM Research Center on Asylum and Migration, March 2019, http:\/\/dsp-syria.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2019-05\/Working%20towards%20Self-Reliance_English.pdf<\/a>; \u201cEconomic Inclusion and Livelihood Development of Young Refugees in the MENA,\u201d 12-13 September 2019, Istanbul, Turkey, https:\/\/www.isdb.org\/news\/prospects-a-conference-on-economic-inclusion-and-livelihood-development-of-young-refugees-in-the-mena-region<\/a>; \u201cGe\u00e7ici Koruma Alt\u0131ndaki Suriyeliler ve T\u00fcrk Vatanda\u015flar\u0131 \u0130\u00e7in \u0130stihdam Deste\u011fi Projesi A\u00e7\u0131l\u0131\u015f Toplant\u0131s\u0131 Ankara\u2019da Yap\u0131ld\u0131,\u201d Turkish Employment Agency employment project launch event January 28, 2019, https:\/\/www.iskur.gov.tr\/haberler\/gecici-koruma-altindaki-suriyeliler-ve-turk-vatandaslari-icin-istihdam-destegi-projesi-acilis-toplantisi-ankara-da-yapildi\/<\/a> and \u201cEmployment and Skills Development Project – Component 1,\u201d UNDP Turkey, https:\/\/www.tr.undp.org\/content\/turkey\/en\/home\/projects\/_stihdam-ve-beceri-gelitirme-projesi-.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[118]<\/a> \u201cPart II Global Compact on Refugees,\u201d paragraphs 70-71.<\/p>\n

[119]<\/a> Jeffery A. Frankel and David Romer, \u201cDoes Trade Cause Growth?\u201d American Economic Review<\/em>, Vol. 89, No. 3, (1999) and R. Warziarg and K. H. Welch, \u201cTrade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence,\u201d NBER Working Paper<\/em> No. 10152, (2003), Cambridge, MA, NBER.<\/p>\n

[120]<\/a> \u201cPresidency progress report on key elements of a European Migration and Asylum policy and the way forward,\u201d p. 4, https:\/\/www.eu2020.de\/blob\/2427378\/79ff059a5f9cea1ed904aaf5cc15fa36\/12-15-pm-viko-jha-fortschrittsbericht-en-data.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[121]<\/a> \u201cTechnical Assistance to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, Final Report,\u201d (European Commission, October 2018), p. 12 and p. 85, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/neighbourhood-enlargement\/sites\/near\/files\/updated_needs_assessment.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[122]<\/a> From 2014 to 2018, agricultural exports to the EU fluctuated between 4 and 5 billion euros per year. Compared to Turkey\u2019s overall exports to the EU, which amounted to roughly 70-80 billion euros per year during the same period, this is a particularly weak performance, calculated from \u201cAgro-Food Trade Statistical Factsheet,\u201d European Union \u2013 Turkey, March 15, 2019, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/agriculture\/sites\/agriculture\/files\/trade-analysis\/statistics\/outside-eu\/countries\/agrifood-turkey_en.pdf<\/a> and \u201cTurkey-EU – international trade in goods statistics,\u201d Eurostat, March 2019, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/eurostat\/statistics-explained\/index.php?title=Turkey-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[123]<\/a> \u201cTurkey: Syrian Refugees and Resilience Plan 2018-19,\u201d (FAO, 2018), p. 5 and p. 9, http:\/\/www.fao.org\/3\/I9240EN\/i9240en.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[124]<\/a> \u201cTurkey: 3RP Country Chapter – 2021\/2022,\u201d p. 40.<\/p>\n

[125]<\/a> \u201cVirus or Poverty: the Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak on Crop Production and Seasonal Migrant\u00a0Agricultural Workers and Their Children in Turkey,\u201d (Ankara: Development Workshop, 2020), http:\/\/www.ka.org.tr\/dosyalar\/file\/virus%20or%20poverty.pdf<\/a>. For a discussion of precarious employment conditions among Syrian agricultural workers in general see Sinem Kavak, \u201cSyrian refugees in seasonal agricultural work: a case of adverse incorporation in Turkey,\u201d New Perspectives on Turkey<\/em>, No. 54 (2016).<\/p>\n

[126]<\/a> \u201cQualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan and Egypt: Background and Issues for Congress\u201d, Congressional Research Service, US Congress, August 2013, CRS Report R43202.<\/p>\n

[127]<\/a> \u201cTurkey: Extension of EU humanitarian programmes supporting 1.7 million refugees receives green light,\u201d European Commission, July 10, 2020, https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/IP_20_1324<\/a> and\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cStatement of the Members of the European Council,\u201d p. 6, March 25, 2021,\u00a0 https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/media\/48976\/250321-vtc-euco-statement-en.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[128]<\/a> Quoted in David M. Herszenhorn and Jacopo Barigazzi, \u201cEU leaders meet Erdo\u011fan to resolve fight over refugees,\u201d Politico<\/em>, March 9, 2020, https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/Erdo\u011fan -meeting-brussels-eu-leaders-refugees-fight\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[129]<\/a> \u201cProposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration,\u201d p. 7 and p. 14.<\/p>\n

[130]<\/a> \u201cFact Sheet: President Biden to Sign Executive Actions Restoring America\u2019s Place in the World,\u201d The White House, February 4, 2021, https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/statements-releases\/2021\/02\/04\/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-actions-restoring-americas-place-in-the-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[131]<\/a> Sema Buz, Fulya Memi\u015fo\u011flu, Hande D\u00f6nmez, and Simon Verduijn, \u201cDestination Unknown: Afghans on the move in Turkey,\u201d Mixed Migration Centre, Middle East Research Report, June 2020, http:\/\/www.mixedmigration.org\/resource\/destination-unknown-afghans-on-the-move-in-turkey\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[132]<\/a> Eric Reidy, \u201cFleeing worsening war, Afghans find narrowing options in Turkey,\u201d New Humanitarian<\/em>, September 28, 2020, https:\/\/www.thenewhumanitarian.org\/news-feature\/2018\/09\/24\/fleeing-worsening-war-afghans-find-narrowing-options-turkey<\/a> and \u201cThe Return of Thousands of Afghans from Turkey back to Afghanistan is Cause for Alarm\u201d, (Washington DC: Refugees International, May 7, 2018), https:\/\/www.refugeesinternational.org\/reports\/afghanrefugeesinturkey<\/a><\/p>\n

[133]<\/a> Alexander Casella, \u201cManaging the \u201cBoat People\u201d Crisis: The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees,\u201d Desperate Migration Series No. 2, International Peace Institute, 2016, https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/sites\/reliefweb.int\/files\/resources\/1610-Managing-the-Boat-People-Crisis.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[134]<\/a> Dawn Chatty, \u201cCommentary: When Hospitality turns into Hostility in Prolonged Forced Migration,\u201d International Migration<\/em>, Vol. 58, Issue 3, (2020).<\/p>\n

[135]<\/a> Godoy Rivas and Batalla Adam, \u201cA Fresh Start on Migration?\u201d.<\/p>\n

[136]<\/a> UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),\u00a0Handbook – Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection<\/em>, January 1996, https:\/\/www.refworld.org\/docid\/3ae6b3510.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[137]<\/a> Jeff Crisp and Katy Long, \u201cSafe and Voluntary Refugee Repatriation: From Principle to Practice,\u201d Journal of Migration and Human Security<\/em>, Vol. 4, Issue 3, (September 2016).<\/p>\n

[138]<\/a> Asli Ayd\u0131nta\u015fba\u015f, \u201cA new Gaza: Turkey\u2019s border policy in northern Syria\u201d, Policy Brief<\/em> (London: ECFR, May 2020), https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/a_new_gaza_turkeys_border_policy_in_northern_syria\/<\/a> and Sinem Adar, \u201cRepatriation to Turkey\u2019s \u201cSafe Zone\u201d in Northeast Syria: Ankara\u2019s Goals and European Concerns,\u201d SWP Comment<\/em>, January 2020, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/en\/publication\/repatriation-to-turkeys-safe-zone-in-northeast-syria\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[139]<\/a> Ayd\u0131nta\u015fba\u015f, Ibid. On the area resembling Gaza see also Fabrice Balanche, \u201cIdlib May Become the Next Gaza Strip,\u201d Policy Watch No. 3288, March 26, 2020, https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/idlib-may-become-next-gaza-strip<\/a><\/p>\n

[140]<\/a> Carlotta Gall, \u201cIn Turkey\u2019s Safe Zone in Syria, Security and Misery Go Hand in Hand,\u201d New York Times<\/em>, February 23, 2021,\u00a0 https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/02\/16\/world\/middleeast\/syria-turkey-Erdo\u011fan -afrin.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share<\/a> and<\/p>\n

[141]<\/a> \u201cRecent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation Report No. 25 – As of 26 February 2021,\u201d OCHA, https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/sites\/reliefweb.int\/files\/resources\/nw_syria_sitrep25_20210226.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[142]<\/a> Quoted in \u201cIn Turkey\u2019s Safe Zone in Syria, Security and Misery Go Hand in Hand\u201d.<\/p>\n

[143]<\/a> Nienke van Heukelingen, \u201cA new momentum for EU-Turkey Policy Brief cooperation on migration,\u201d Clingendael Policy Brief<\/em>, February 2021, p. 6, https:\/\/www.clingendael.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2021-02\/Policy_brief_EUTurkey_cooperation_migration_February_2021_0.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[144]<\/a> Ibid, p. 6.<\/p>\n

[145]<\/a> Rabia Karakaya Polat and Vivien Lowndes, \u201cWhy are Municipalities So Important for Syrian Refugees in Turkey?\u201d Panorama<\/em>, November 24, 2020, https:\/\/www.uikpanorama.com\/blog\/2020\/11\/24\/why-are-municipalities-so-important-for-syrian-refugees-in-turkey\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[146]<\/a> G\u00fcven Sak and Omar Kadkoy, \u201cAlleviating COVID-19 Misery of the Forcibly Displaced: G20 Action,\u201d Evaluation Note<\/em>, (Ankara: TEPAV, December 2020), p. 5, https:\/\/www.tepav.org.tr\/upload\/mce\/2020\/notlar\/alleviating_covid19_misery_of_the_forcibly_displaced_g20_action.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[147]<\/a> https:\/\/www.municipalforum2019.org\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[148]<\/a> Emre Dedeoglu, Sefa Pamuksuz and Emre Koyuncu, \u201cSyrian Refugees and Municipalities in Turkey: A Financial Impact Analysis,\u201d (Union of Municipalities of Turkey, March 2019); Strengthening Municipal Resilience in Response to the Impact of the Syria Crisis in Turkey, October 2018, https:\/\/www.tr.undp.org\/content\/turkey\/en\/home\/library\/syria_programme\/tuerkiye-boelgesel-muelteci-ve-dayankllk-plan–3rp–kapsamnda-ka.html<\/a> and \u201cUrban Refugees from \u201cDetachment\u201d to \u201cHarmonization\u201d Syrian Refugees and Process Management of Municipalities: The Case of Istanbul,\u201d\u00a0 Marmara Municipalities Union, January 2017, https:\/\/mmuratErdo\u011fan .files.wordpress.com\/2016\/06\/mmu-urban-refugees-report-2017_en.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[149]<\/a> \u201cAlleviating COVID-19 Misery of the Forcibly Displaced:\u201d, p. 9.<\/p>\n

[150]<\/a> \u201cAegean Islands Weekly Snapshot 15 – 21 February 2021,\u201d UNHCR Greece, https:\/\/data2.unhcr.org\/en\/documents\/details\/85060<\/a><\/p>\n

[151]<\/a> Anthee Carassava, \u201cUNHCR, EU Slam Greece Over Migrant Pushbacks, Abuse,\u201d VOA<\/em>, November 21, 2020, https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/europe\/unhcr-eu-slam-greece-over-migrant-pushbacks-abuse<\/a> and \u201cEU official urges Greece to investigate reports of asylum-seeker pushbacks,\u201d Reuters<\/em>, March 29, 2021, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-europe-migrants-greece-lesbos\/eu-official-urges-greece-to-investigate-asylum-seeker-pushbacks-idUSKBN2BL231?edition-redirect=in<\/a><\/p>\n

[152]<\/a> For an ongoing project in this area see \u201cThe European Union assists 3500 migrants in returning home voluntarily in partnership with IOM and DGMM,\u201d April 16, 2019, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, https:\/\/www.avrupa.info.tr\/en\/pr\/european-union-assists-3500-migrants-returning-home-voluntarily-partnership-iom-and-dgmm-9435<\/a><\/p>\n

[153]<\/a> Dimitriadi, \u201cRefugees at the gate of Europe\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

You may read the Policy Paper by Professor Kemal Kiri\u015fci,\u00a0Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Vice-President of IGAM-Academy in pdf here. In contrast to early last year, marked by a \u201cborder crisis\u201d that erupted after the Turkish President finally put into action his long-standing threat to \u201copen the border\u201d for Syrian refugees, the year 2021 had […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":28809,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[492,104],"tags":[],"program":[22,24],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28808"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28808"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28808\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":44997,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28808\/revisions\/44997"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/28809"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28808"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28808"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28808"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=28808"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}