{"id":28135,"date":"2017-06-26T06:07:00","date_gmt":"2017-06-26T03:07:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eliamep.lncdoo.com\/h-dr-eleni-panagiotarea-analyei-ton-tropo-pou-vlepoun-oi-ellines-tin-ee-se-keimeno-tis-gia-to-chatham-house\/"},"modified":"2024-08-28T11:04:49","modified_gmt":"2024-08-28T08:04:49","slug":"h-dr-eleni-panagiotarea-analyei-ton-tropo-pou-vlepoun-oi-ellines-tin-ee-se-keimeno-tis-gia-to-chatham-house","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/h-dr-eleni-panagiotarea-analyei-ton-tropo-pou-vlepoun-oi-ellines-tin-ee-se-keimeno-tis-gia-to-chatham-house\/","title":{"rendered":"Dr Eleni Panagiotarea discusses the EU reputation in Greece in a Chatham House analysis"},"content":{"rendered":"

In Greece, the sovereign debt crisis and its subsequent management by the country\u2019s European partners have tarnished EU membership and watered down a previously overwhelming level of support for European integration. Often portrayed as a \u2018special case\u2019, Greece sees the EU as failing to deliver the goods, be they economic growth or, more recently, solidarity vis-\u00e0-vis unprecedented migration flows. The Greek political class understands the benefits of continued membership – even if this becomes multi-speed – but lacks the tools and the credibility to influence the EU\u2019s future direction according to the national interest. Unable to provide a positive narrative or endgame for the European project, it is left with a public struggling to associate the EU with political stability and economic prosperity. There is no roadmap to economic recovery, unemployment remains disproportionately high and approximately half a million Greeks, primarily the youngest and brightest, have emigrated since 2008.<\/p>\n

A major survey conducted by Chatham House and Kantar Public in 10 European countries offers interesting insights into Greek attitudes toward the EU. Predictably, 67% of Greeks consider austerity as the EU\u2019s greatest failure, a percentage that singles Greece out from every other country in the survey and betrays the effects of the three bailout programmes on Greek society\u2019s perception of the EU. \u2018Economic crisis\u2019 is the phrase most strongly associated with the EU (62%), followed by \u2018loss of national power\u2019 (44%, double the survey\u2019s average). Reflecting the same undercurrent, 39% \u2018strongly disagree\u2019 with the statement that \u2018people like you have benefited from being a member of the EU\u2019. Yet, prior to the crisis, Greece was a net recipient of the EU budget, a fact that has been lost in public debate. More recently, hundreds of billions of euros of mostly EU funds have been committed to keep the economy afloat, admittedly with stringent conditions attached. Rather than explain this to the public, Greek political leaders have used the crisis to scapegoat the EU and divert attention from their own failures.<\/p>\n

Stuck in the eurozone\u2019s straightjacket of fiscal discipline, and unable to will the EU tools that could replenish the sovereignty lost at national levelGreeks feel overwhelmingly \u2018uneasy\u2019 (74% versus 38% survey average) and \u2018pessimistic\u2019 (60% versus a 40% average) about the EU. Populists of all persuasions tap into this deep-seated frustration, pitting patriots against foreigners and quislings and invoking national determination against the implementation of reforms imposed \u2018from above\u2019. They also tap into the strong and rising anti-German undercurrent in Greek politics. The survey shows that a significant number of Greeks see German interests as defining the solution parameters to the the Greek crisis with over 80% (compared to the sample average of 27%) thinking that Germany plays a negative role in the EU.<\/p>\n

Greek leaders and European elites developing policy approaches to re-legitimize core aspects of integration and bring the Greek people \u2018on board\u2019 should consider a number of important results reported in the survey:<\/p>\n

– An overwhelming number of Greeks (80%) think that \u2018within the next 10 years other member states will decide to leave the EU\u2019. The price tag of membership may prove increasingly highfor Greece and a number of other countries, given the EU\u2019s continuing inability to balance national interests equitably or rein in members that openly defy European values and EU commitments. It is worth noting that with regard to \u2018Britain\u2019s vote to leave\u2019, 73% of Greeks believe that it will weaken the EU, 3% more than the British (70%). At the same time, for a majority of Greeks (60%), maintaining a good relationship with the UK in the future should not come at the cost of compromising the EU\u2019s core values.<\/p>\n

– Regarding the EU\u2019s future path, 53% disagree that \u2018the EU should become a US of Europe with a central government\u2019, an unexpected result considering that the Greek\u00a0public was, prior to the crisis, among the most\u00a0pro-integrationist in the EU. Greeks no longer link integration with the possibility of real convergence to the EU average but with sub-optimal concessions on national sovereignty which disrupt political stability and the social fabric. At the same time, even though Greeks today are living in more precarious situations compared to other country samples (31% had to \u2018go without needed medication and 48% had to \u2018borrow money to pay for life essentials\u2019 compared to European averages of 19% and 22%), 44% are \u2018moderately\u2019 satisfied with their life, mirroring the extent to which they have \u2018some control\u2019 (43%) over it.<\/p>\n

– Trust in the EU\u2019s rules of the game and its ability to deliver benefits for citizens is in doubt, as reflected in the fact that Greeks are evenly divided on whether the EU is moderately democratic (41%) or not democratic (40%). Greeks see a Europe characterized by asymmetries over the sovereign debt crisis and more recently the refugee crisis. Regarding immigration, many have negative views, with 68% rejecting the idea that \u2018immigration has been good for the country\u2019 and 58% believing that \u2018all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped\u2019. Greeks appear ambivalent as to whether EU enlargement has gone far enough and whether new countries should be able to join the EU. Interestingly, although 67% oppose Turkey joining the EU, this is less than in Germany, Belgium, France (73%) and Austria (82%).<\/p>\n

What are the implications of these findings for the Syriza-Anel government? The current administration and any future government elected in 2019 must promote difficult reforms at home before it can have a meaningful say in reform at EU level. An important reservoir of public support stands unutilized. 47% agree that \u2018people should take responsibility for themselves rather than expect the state to provide for them\u2019. This marks an important shift from state reliance to self-reliance. Provided that this can be tapped and a credible roadmap to growth can be paved, the Greek political class can adopt a number of strategies to re-energize support for the EU, and help address its contested legitimacy. In a country where many feel that sovereignty has been eroded by the EU and the IMF, Greek political leaders should view multi-speed Europe as an opportunity. Deepening integration and cooperation in key domains for the Union such as the eurozone and the Schengen area can only come with the creation of necessary tools to manage this, a fiscal capacity and\/or eurozone budget or the reform of the Dublin system for managing refugees. These would provide significant policy space, and potentially generate mechanisms for financial and operational support. The same could apply for foreign and defence policy. Obviously, in areas where the national or even level performs better, political leaders will need to balance their approach with the recognition that 66% of Greeks think that \u2018the EU should return some of its powers to individual member states\u2019.<\/p>\n

Greece along with the countries that have shouldered the burden in the refugee crisis, could promote solidarity as an organizing principle in future EU policy. Greeks (68%) followed by Italians (66%) and Germans (62%) top the list among European publics in believing that \u2018every EU member state should have to accept the same proportion of refugees according to their population\u2019.<\/p>\n

Finally, in order to repair the EU\u2019s reputation in Greece, Greek leaders must communicate a positive narrative around the EU\u2019s \u2018greatest achievements\u2019. In Greece, the highest of these \u00a0are considered to be \u2018freedom to live and work across the EU\u2019 (56%), followed by 41% who value \u2018removing borders between states (i.e. the Schengen area)\u2019 \u2013 predictably, only 19% vouch for \u2018the euro currency\u2019. The sense of European belonging that emerges in this survey cannot be discarded. 43% are proud to be Greek and European, while 66% (the highest percentage in the group) consider nationalism \u2018a danger to peace and stability in Europe\u2019. It is this valued existence of a common space that can propel Greek political leaders to contribute to initiatives where a collective European response brings benefits. Besides terrorism and migration, mechanisms will be needed to share the tasks and costs associated with the management of unemployment, health and social security, and environmental protection at the EU level.<\/p>\n

Author: Dr Eleni Panagiotarea\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: Chatham House<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In Greece, the sovereign debt crisis and its subsequent management by the country\u2019s European partners have tarnished EU membership and watered down a previously overwhelming level of support for European integration. Often portrayed as a \u2018special case\u2019, Greece sees the EU as failing to deliver the goods, be they economic growth or, more recently, solidarity […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":28136,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[492],"tags":[],"program":[17],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28135"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28135"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28135\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":44627,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28135\/revisions\/44627"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/28136"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28135"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28135"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28135"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.eliamep.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=28135"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}