



08

Transatlantic Trends



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

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| KEY FINDINGS | 2008 |
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Transatlantic Trends 2008 Partners

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TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Key Findings 2008

In the last year of George W. Bush's presidency, American and European policymakers have maintained a pragmatic tone, setting aside past differences over Iraq to highlight cooperation on common challenges in Afghanistan, Iran, and the global economy. At the same time, the U.S. presidential primaries prompted many to look ahead and ask: What does the November 2008 election promise for transatlantic relations? While their views of Europe may not have been a hot issue, both Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain have spoken about the need to mend relations with America's allies and restore its credibility abroad. Given the widely observed decline in the image of the United States in recent years, it seems likely that the next U.S. president, regardless of who is elected, will have an opportunity to improve transatlantic relations, but he is also likely to ask more of European leaders. What are the areas of potential cooperation with a new U.S. administration, and what areas of conflict are likely to endure? What do the publics want the next American president and European leaders to address in a revitalized transatlantic agenda?

In this year's *Transatlantic Trends*, we explore U.S. and European attitudes toward transatlantic priorities in light of the coming U.S. election. Are there signs that the decline in the image of the United States has become more enduring, or is there evidence of a possible recovery? We analyze trends in international concerns at a time when rising energy prices and economic turbulence have shifted the political agenda away from terrorism in both the United States and Europe. We analyze support for NATO and the mission in Afghanistan in light of increased violence and instability, as well as support for policy options on Iran after the release of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that concluded Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program

in 2003. We continue to follow American and European attitudes toward Russia following the transition last March when Vladimir Putin became prime minister and Dmitri Medvedev became president and in light of concerns surrounding the independence of Kosovo and the recent outbreak of armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. We also explore the attitudes of Americans to understand potential support for a range of policy issues facing a new U.S. president.

We pay close attention to developments in Turkey, where the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), having overwhelmingly won re-election last July, was challenged in the Turkish Constitutional Court over concerns that it would erode Turkey's commitment to secularism. After overturning a law that would have allowed headscarves to be worn at Turkish universities, the court later issued what its spokesman called a "serious warning" but did not ban the party. In the past year, the United States has sought to address Turkish concerns about violence on its border with Iraq, and the European Union launched its Mediterranean Union project under the leadership of French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

KEY FINDINGS OF THIS SURVEY INCLUDE: ¹

- Forty-seven percent of Europeans believed that relations between the United States and Europe will improve if Senator Barack Obama is elected, whereas if Senator John McCain is elected, a nearly identical percentage (49%) believed relations will stay the same.
- Sixty-nine percent of Europeans viewed Senator Obama favorably, compared with 26% who viewed Senator McCain favorably. Twenty percent of Europeans viewed both candidates favorably.
- Modest increases in the percentage of Europeans who felt transatlantic relations should become closer were found in all countries surveyed, with an overall rise from 27% in 2006 to 31%, with significant increases in Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
- Americans and Europeans agreed that international terrorism and international economic problems should be top priorities for the next American president and European leaders, with Europeans also identifying climate change and Americans identifying the Middle East.
- Eighty-four percent of Americans and 72% of Europeans expressed their greatest concern about Russia's role in providing weapons to the Middle East. Sixty-nine percent of Americans and 58% of Europeans expressed concern about Russia's behavior toward its neighbors. Concerns about Russia's role as an energy provider rose three percentage points to 61% in the United States and five percentage points to 64% in Europe.
- Europeans were more willing than Americans to provide security assistance for neighboring democracies like Ukraine and Georgia and to increase support for democratic forces inside Russia, but less willing than Americans to restrict cooperation with Russia in international organizations.
- Fifty-seven percent of Europeans agreed that NATO is still essential to their country's security, an increase of four percentage points since 2007, with increases in eight of the 12 countries surveyed. This halted the trend of declining support for NATO in Germany and Poland for the first year since 2002 and brought French support for NATO back to the level of 2002.
- Among policy options to stabilize Afghanistan, support was found among Americans and Europeans for providing security for economic reconstruction projects (73% and 79%, respectively), assisting with the training of Afghan police and military forces (76% and 68%), and combating narcotics production (70% and 76%). By contrast, 76% of Americans also supported conducting combat operations against the Taliban, compared with 43% of Europeans.
- Climate change was the concern that most divides Americans who favored Senator McCain and those who favored Senator Obama. Americans who viewed Obama favorably are more likely to feel personally affected by global warming (+22 percentage points), while those who viewed McCain favorably are more likely to feel personally affected by international terrorism (+5 percentage points), Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (+8 percentage points), and Islamic fundamentalism (+9 percentage points).
- Among Americans who favored Senator Obama, 56% thought that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, compared with 43% of those who favored Senator McCain.
- Americans who viewed Senator McCain favorably are more likely than those who viewed Senator Obama favorably to be concerned about Russia, including its role as an energy provider (65% to 60%), the weakening of democracy inside Russia (75% to 65%), Russia's behavior toward its neighbors (73% to 66%), Russia's

¹ Unless otherwise noted, Europe-wide percentages refer to the E12, except where we discuss long-term trends that compare the same countries over time and questions where we examine the opinions of current EU members.

role in providing weapons to the Middle East (89% to 81%), and Russia's role in the Balkans (56% to 49%).

- In the past year, Turkish feelings warmed slightly toward the European Union by seven degrees to 33 and toward the United States by three degrees to 14, halting a trend of cooling toward both since 2004.
- Turkish views of transatlantic relations do not appear to differ markedly with religious practice. For example, there is little difference in the desirability of EU

leadership among those who pray five times a day regularly (21%), sometimes (23%), or never (24%), nor in the desirability of U.S. leadership among those who pray five times a day regularly (6%), sometimes (9%), or never (7%).

- Forty-eight percent of Turkish respondents felt that, on international matters, Turkey should act alone, compared with 20% who felt it should act with the countries of the European Union, 11% who felt it should act with the countries of the Middle East, 3% who felt it should act with the United States, and 1% who felt it should act with Russia.




TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section One: The Bush Administration's Legacy and Coming U.S. Elections

This year's *Transatlantic Trends* allows us to create a portrait of public opinion in the United States and Europe during the George W. Bush presidency, as well as to assess American and European expectations for transatlantic relations with a new U.S. president in 2009. Despite recent improvement in relations at the policymaking level, European public opinion has remained critical toward the United States. The decline in the image of the United States has been documented by this survey and others in past years, yet what legacy of public opinion on transatlantic relations will the next U.S. president inherit? Do we see signs of whether recent changes in public opinion are driven by fundamental shifts in transatlantic relations likely to endure or by the policies of the Bush administration? What do Europeans and Americans expect for U.S.-European relations if Senator Barack Obama becomes president or if Senator John McCain becomes president? Have views toward the European Union been affected by this shift in views of the United States?


IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES UNCHANGED IN SECOND BUSH TERM

Europeans' critical views of U.S. leadership in world affairs have remained virtually unchanged since 2004. Whereas in 2002, 64% of Europeans viewed U.S. leadership in world affairs as "desirable," and 31% as "undesirable," these proportions reversed by 2004 and have remained virtually constant since then. In 2008, 36% of Europeans viewed U.S. leadership in world affairs as "desirable" and 59% viewed it as "undesirable." The steepest declines among countries surveyed since 2002 were found in Poland, where the percentage of respondents that viewed U.S. leadership as desirable fell from 64% in 2002 to 34% in 2008, and in Germany, where the percentage of respondents that viewed U.S. leadership as desirable fell from 68% in 2002 to 39% in 2008. (See chart #1)



EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO BE MORE CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT THAN OF UNITED STATES

Since 2002, Europeans have continued to distinguish their views of U.S. leadership in world affairs from their views of President Bush. In 2002, 64% of Europeans viewed U.S. leadership as "desirable," while 38% approved of President Bush's handling of international policies. This approximately 20 percentage point gap has remained nearly constant as views toward the United States and President Bush became more critical. In 2008, 36% of Europeans viewed U.S. leadership favorably, compared with 19% who approved of President Bush's handling of international policies. In the United States, 37% approved of President Bush's handling of international policies while 59% disapproved, figures almost unchanged from last year. (See chart #2)




MODEST INCREASE IN EUROPEANS WHO WANT CLOSER RELATIONS

While the largest percentage of Europeans continued to feel that Europe should take a more independent approach from the United States in security and diplomatic affairs,

modest increases in the percentage of those who felt relations should become closer were found in all countries surveyed. The overall percentage who felt relations should become closer increased from 27% in 2006 to 31%, with the largest increases in Bulgaria (+13 percentage points), the Netherlands (+9 percentage points), and the United Kingdom (+7 percentage points) (See chart #3). The percentage of Europeans who felt that Europe should be more independent declined from 52% in 2006 to 46%, and the largest percentage of Americans (47%) continued to feel that the partnership should become closer.

FEWER EUROPEANS FEEL RELATIONS HAVE GOTTEN WORSE

While the largest percentage of Europeans (46%) continued to feel that relations between the United States and Europe have remained the same over the last year, the percentage who felt that relations have gotten worse declined from 34% in 2007 to 29%. Significant declines were found in Italy from 43% in 2007 to 29% and in France from 32% in 2007 to 22%. At the same time, the percentage of those who felt that relations have improved increased in France from 17% in 2007 to 33% and in Romania from 19% in 2007 to 30%. Ten percent of Americans felt relations have improved, 41%



felt relations have stayed the same, and 43% felt relations have gotten worse.

MAJORITIES OF EUROPEANS FAVOR OBAMA

Sixty-nine percent of Europeans viewed Senator Obama favorably, compared with 26% who viewed Senator McCain favorably. The highest favorability ratings for Obama were found in France (85%), the Netherlands (85%), and Germany (83%), and the highest favorability ratings for McCain were found in Portugal (35%), the Netherlands (33%), Spain (33%), and the United Kingdom (33%). Twenty percent of Europeans viewed both candidates favorably.

IF OBAMA ELECTED EUROPEANS FEEL RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE


Forty-seven percent of Europeans believed that relations between the United States and Europe will improve if Senator Obama is elected, 29% believed that relations will stay the same, and 5% believed relations will get worse. If Senator McCain is elected, 11% believed that relations will improve, 49% of Europeans believed relations will stay the same, and 13% believed that relations will get worse. (See chart #4) Among Europeans who felt that U.S. leadership in world affairs is undesirable, 50% believed that relations will improve if Obama is elected and 10% believed that relations will improve if McCain is elected.

EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS HAVE ENOUGH COMMON VALUES TO COOPERATE

Fifty-seven percent of Europeans and 67% of Americans agreed that the United States and the European Union have enough common values to be able to cooperate on international problems, while 37% of Europeans and 23% of Americans felt that the United States and the European Union have such different values that cooperating is impossible. These percentages are almost unchanged since 2004, when 60% of Europeans and 71% of Americans felt the United States and the European Union have enough common values to cooperate and 34% of Europeans and 21% of Americans felt that cooperation was impossible.

EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS REMAIN SUPPORTIVE OF EU LEADERSHIP

European support for EU leadership remained high at 75% in 2008. The highest support for EU leadership was found in Germany (86%), Italy (83%), and the Netherlands (81%). Support for EU leadership declined over the past year from 71% to 60% in the United Kingdom and from 76% to 69% in Poland. Support for EU leadership rose over the past year from 66% to 71% in Bulgaria. Support remained high among Americans as well, with 68% who viewed EU leadership as “desirable” in 2008, including 75% of Democrats and 65% of Republicans.







TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Two: Views of Transatlantic Priorities and Challenges

What are the issues the American and European publics want the next American president and European leaders to address? The situation in Iraq, the top issue in American foreign policy, is largely absent from the transatlantic agenda. Combating international terrorism remains a concern, but rising energy costs and economic turbulence have shifted the focus of transatlantic debates over the past year. In response to a spike in violence in Afghanistan, American and European leaders sparred over troop commitments and burden sharing within NATO. The United States and the European Union continued efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, although

a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003. In recent months, the United States shifted its long-held stance on diplomacy with Iran and sent a senior representative to negotiations in Geneva which failed to produce further agreement. Amid its change in political leadership, Russia has remained on the transatlantic agenda with continued concerns over its role as an energy supplier and threats of intervention in Kosovo, as well as the outbreak of armed conflict between Russia and Georgia (which took place after this year's polling was conducted).





SHARED CONCERNS OVER ENERGY AND ECONOMY


Americans and Europeans agreed that energy dependence and international economic problems are among the threats by which they are most likely to be personally affected, differing somewhat over climate change and international terrorism. Americans felt most likely to be personally affected by energy dependence (87%), a major economic downturn (87%), and international terrorism and Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (69%); Europeans felt most likely to be personally affected by global warming (82%), energy dependence (82%) and a major economic downturn (78%). Sixty-two percent of Europeans felt likely to be personally affected by international terrorism, and 67% of Americans felt likely to be personally affected by global warming. Concerns about international terrorism declined by five percentage points among Americans and four percentage points among Europeans, while concerns about international economic problems rose by seven percentage points among Americans and 13 percentage points among Europeans. (See chart #5)

TERRORISM AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS TOP TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA

Americans and Europeans agreed that international terrorism and international economic problems should be among the top priorities for the next American president and European leaders, with differences over climate change and the Middle East. Forty-two percent of Americans identified international terrorism as one of the top two priorities, followed closely by 39% who identified international economic problems, and 33% who identified easing tensions in the Middle East. Among Europeans, 43% identified international terrorism as one of the top two priorities, followed by 41% who identified climate change, and 37% who identified international economic problems. (See chart #6)

EUROPEANS PREFER TO ADDRESS THREATS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH UNITED STATES

Large majorities of Europeans (67%) continued to feel that the European Union should address international threats in partnership with the United States, rather than independently. The highest support for this view was found in



Italy (73%), Romania (71%), and Germany, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands (68%). Seventy-five percent of Americans agreed that the United States should address international threats in partnership with the European Union, including 82% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans.

CONCERN OVER NUCLEAR IRAN DECLINES

Overall concern about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons declined seven percentage points in Europe, with drops of eight percentage points in France and the United Kingdom, and 14 percentage points in Germany. Americans and Europeans agreed that diplomatic pressure should be increased if diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons fail but differ over whether the option of using military force should be maintained. Forty-seven percent of Europeans favored increasing diplomatic pressure but ruling out the use of military force, compared with 21% who favored increasing diplomatic pressure but maintaining the option of using force. In contrast, 49% of Americans favored increasing diplomatic pressure but maintaining the option of using military force, and 27% favored increasing pressure but ruling out the use of force.

AMERICANS SLIGHTLY LESS WILLING TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE EVEN IF ENERGY PRICES RISE

When asked which approach they favor for ensuring a stable supply of energy, the largest percentage of Americans (48%, a decline of six percentage points from 2007) continued to favor reducing energy dependence on other countries, even if energy prices would rise sharply at home. Europeans continued to be divided in their support for increasing cooperation with energy-producing countries even if their governments are undemocratic (35%) and reducing energy dependence on other countries (35%).

CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA SHARED AND RISING

Eighty-four percent of Americans and 72% of Europeans continued to express their greatest concern about Russia's role in providing weapons to the Middle East, increases of five percentage points in the United States and seven percentage points in Europe since 2007. Concern about Russia's role as an energy provider rose three percentage points to 61% in the United States and five percentage points to 64% in Europe, with increases of 12 percentage points in Romania, nine percentage points in France, and

eight percentage points in the United Kingdom. Sixty-nine percent of Americans and 58% of Europeans expressed concern about Russia's behavior toward its neighbors (percentages almost unchanged since last year), with the highest concern in Poland (71%), the United Kingdom (69%), and Germany (68%). There was also no change in concern about the weakening of democracy inside Russia among Europeans (58%) and a decline among Americans of five percentage points to 70%. The lowest concern was expressed over Russia's role in the Balkans, among 51% of both Americans and Europeans. (See chart #7)


GERMANY MOST CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIA

Aggregating questions expressing concern about Russia's role as an energy provider, the weakening of democracy inside Russia, Russia's behavior toward its neighbors, Russia's role in providing weapons in the Middle East, and Russia's role in the Balkans, Germany showed the highest concern at 64 on a scale of 0 to 100 (where 100 represents most concerned), followed by Italy and the United Kingdom

at 62, with the United States at 60. The lowest concern was found in Bulgaria at 40, followed by Slovakia at 45 and Turkey at 49.

EUROPEANS LESS WILLING TO ISOLATE RUSSIA

Europeans are more willing than Americans to provide security assistance for neighboring democracies like Ukraine and Georgia (67% to 58%) and to increase support for democratic forces inside Russia (65% to 61%), but they are less willing than Americans to support restricting cooperation with Russia in international organizations (38% to 47%). The highest approval in Europe for increasing support for democratic forces inside Russia was in Germany (79%), Spain (78%), and the Netherlands (75%). The highest approval for providing security assistance to neighboring democracies was in Spain and Portugal (80%) and Italy and the Netherlands (79%). The highest approval for restricting cooperation with Russia was in Portugal (51%), Italy (49%), the United Kingdom (45%), and Spain (45%). (See chart #8)



NATO AND AFGHANISTAN

In the past year, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned that NATO risked becoming a “two-tiered” alliance and expressed his concern that many Europeans “have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan, and do not understand the very different—for them—the very different kind of threat.”² European leaders reacted cautiously, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel warning of the “limits” of Germany’s contribution in Afghanistan, although Germany also announced an additional 1,000 troops would be sent this fall.³ French President Sarkozy sent an additional 700 troops to eastern Afghanistan following the NATO summit and subsequently announced that France would rejoin the military wing of NATO.

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR NATO IMPROVES


Fifty-seven percent of Europeans agreed that NATO is still essential to their country’s security, an increase of four percentage points since 2007. Increases were found in eight of the 12 countries surveyed, with increases of 11 percentage points in Spain, seven percentage points in Germany, and seven percentage points in France. This halted the trend of declining support for NATO in Germany and Poland for the first year since 2002 and brought French support for NATO back to the level of 2002. In the United States, 59% agreed that NATO is still essential for their country’s security, a figure nearly unchanged in recent years. (See chart #9)

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY AND FINANCIAL BURDEN SHARING

A majority of Europeans (57%) agreed that all NATO countries should contribute troops if the alliance decides to take military action, and 58% agreed that all NATO countries should share in the financial costs of a NATO military action even when they do not contribute troops. The highest support for contributing troops was found in the United Kingdom (82%), the Netherlands (82%), and

² <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/world/asia/09gates.html>

³ http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,3508727,00.html



Portugal (68%), and the highest support for sharing in the financial costs of a NATO military action were found in the Netherlands (82%), the United Kingdom (80%), and Romania (67%). In the United States, 82% agreed that all NATO countries should contribute troops if the alliance decides to take military action and that all NATO countries should share in the financial costs of a NATO military action even when they do not contribute troops.



SUPPORT FOR NON-COMBAT OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Among policy options to stabilize Afghanistan, support was found among Americans and Europeans for providing security for economic reconstruction projects (73% and 79% respectively), assisting with the training of Afghan police and military forces (76% and 68%), and combating narcotics production (70% and 76%). In contrast, 76% Americans also supported conducting combat operations against the Taliban, compared with 43% of Europeans. (See chart #10) The highest support for combat in Europe was found in the Netherlands (69%), the United Kingdom (64%), and Portugal (53%).

SMALL POLICY DIFFERENCES AMONG EUROPEANS

There were only modest differences on many policy issues in the views of Europeans who viewed Senator McCain favorably and those who viewed Senator Obama favorably. For example, 65% of Europeans who favor McCain felt that NATO is essential to their country's security, as did 61% of those who favor Obama. Support for policy options in Afghanistan were nearly identical on non-combat options and differed by three percentage points on combat, with

49% of Europeans who favor McCain also supporting conducting combat operations against the Taliban, as well as 46% of those who support Obama. (See chart #11) Europeans who favored Obama included majorities of both those who identified themselves as being on the left (82%) and on the right (64%); Europeans who favored McCain included 31% of those who identified themselves as being on the right and 21% of those who identified themselves as on the left.





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Section Three: U.S. Voters Ahead of Presidential Election

In this year's *Transatlantic Trends*, we look closely at the American public's expectations for transatlantic relations and whether views of the candidates also reflect differences in attitudes toward policies on the transatlantic agenda. Both Senator John McCain and Senator Barack Obama recognize the decline in the image of the United States abroad in recent years and call for mending relations with allies. They also agree that the United States should address climate change, reject torture, and close the detainment facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Yet, they disagree over strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan and whether the United States should negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program, among other issues. Do American supporters of Senator Obama or Senator McCain have different views of international threats or of the priorities a new president and European leaders should address? Do they see the European Union or NATO similarly? Do they differ on energy dependence, a reassertive Russia, or the use of force, which runs through many of the challenges on the transatlantic agenda?

FAVORABLE VIEWS OF CANDIDATES REFLECT STRONG PARTY SUPPORT

In the United States, majorities of Americans viewed both Senator McCain and Senator Obama favorably, with strong support for each candidate within his respective party. Fifty-six percent of respondents viewed McCain favorably (with 89% of Republicans and 27% of Democrats), and 54% viewed Obama favorably (with 82% of Democrats and 27% of Republicans). Twenty-four percent of Americans viewed both candidates favorably.

FEWER AMERICANS BELIEVE RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE IF OBAMA ELECTED

Fewer Americans (40%) than Europeans (47%) believed that relations between the United States and Europe will


improve if Senator Obama is elected, whereas if Senator McCain is elected, a nearly identical percentage of Americans (52%) and Europeans (49%) believed relations will stay the same. Significant differences by party were found among Americans who felt relations would improve if Obama is elected (66% of Democrats and 20% of Republicans), while the difference was smaller among those who felt relations would stay the same if McCain was elected (50% of Democrats and 57% of Republicans).

DIFFERING CONCERNS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL THREATS

Climate change is the concern that most divides Americans who favor Senator McCain and those who favor Senator Obama. Americans who viewed Obama favorably were more likely than those who viewed McCain favorably to feel personally affected by global warming (+22 percentage points), while those who viewed McCain favorably were more likely to feel personally affected by international terrorism (+5 percentage points), Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (+8 percentage points), and Islamic fundamentalism (+9 percentage points). There were no differences in their concerns about energy dependence and an economic downturn. (See chart #12)

DIFFERING EMPHASIS ON TRANSATLANTIC PRIORITIES

While Americans agreed overall on the top priorities for the next American president and European leaders, their rankings of these priorities differed with their views of the candidates for U.S. president. Among Americans who favor Senator McCain, 50% identified international terrorism as one of the two top priorities for the next American president and European leaders, followed by 36% who identified international economic problems, 31% who identified eas-



ing tension in the Middle East, and 21% who identified the spread of nuclear weapons. Among Americans who favor Senator Obama, 44% identified international economic problems as one of the two top priorities for the next American president and European leaders, followed by 38% who identified international terrorism, 35% who identified easing tensions in the Middle East, and 28% who identified climate change. (See chart #13)


MORE OBAMA SUPPORTERS WANT CLOSER RELATIONS

Among Americans who viewed Senator Obama favorably, 56% said that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, compared with 43% of those who viewed Senator McCain favorably. Those who favor Obama were more likely to think that relations have gotten worse in the last year (48%), while those who favor McCain

were more likely to think that relations have stayed the same (45%).

GREATER SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN OPTIONS AMONG MCCAIN SUPPORTERS

Americans who viewed Senator McCain favorably showed greater support for policy options in Afghanistan, although support is above two-thirds for both groups on all options. Seventy-eight percent of those who favor McCain supported providing security for economic reconstruction projects (compared with 73% of those who viewed Obama favorably), 80% supported assisting with the training of Afghan police and military forces (compared with 74% of those who viewed Obama favorably), and 75% supported combating narcotics production (compared with 67% of those who viewed Obama favorably). Eight-four percent of those who viewed McCain favorably also supported conducting combat operations against the Taliban (compared with 73% of those who viewed Obama favorably).



MCCAIN SUPPORTERS MORE WILLING TO CONSIDER FORCE ON IRAN

Should diplomatic options fail to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, 34% of those who favor Senator Obama and 25% of those who favor Senator McCain felt the United States and Europe should increase diplomatic pressure, but rule out the use of military force. Forty-one percent of those who favor Obama and 54% of those who favor McCain felt the United States and Europe should increase diplomatic pressure and maintain the option of using force. Only small percentages of Americans who favor Obama (5%) and those who favor McCain (3%) were willing to accept that Iran may develop nuclear weapons.


MORE CONCERN ABOUT RUSSIA AMONG MCCAIN SUPPORTERS

Americans who viewed Senator McCain favorably were more likely than those who viewed Senator Obama favorably to be concerned about Russia, including its role as an energy provider (65% to 60%, respectively), the weakening of democracy inside Russia (75% to 65%), Russia's behavior

toward its neighbors (73% to 66%), Russia's role in providing weapons to the Middle East (89% to 81%), and Russia's role in the Balkans (56% to 49%). There was also slightly higher support among those who viewed McCain favorably than those who viewed Obama favorably in increasing support for democratic forces inside Russia (66% to 61%), providing security assistance to neighboring democracies (63% to 59%), and restricting cooperation with Russia in international organizations (51% to 47%). (See chart #14)

HIGHER SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AMONG MCCAIN SUPPORTERS

Thirty-eight percent of Americans agreed that it should be the role of the United States to help establish democracy in other countries, compared with 56% who said it should not. Thirty-two percent of Democrats and 54% of Republicans agreed, compared with 63% of Democrats and 39% of Republicans who did not. These percentages are almost unchanged from the past year, and this is the first year since 2005 in which support for democracy promotion has not declined. Among Americans who viewed Senator



McCain favorably, 47% agreed that it should be the role of the United States to promote democracy, as did 33% of Americans who viewed Senator Obama favorably.

SOFTENING AMONG AMERICANS THAT WAR IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY

Nearly three-quarters of Americans have agreed since 2003 with the statement that “under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice” (74% in 2008), compared with 29% of Europeans. Over this period, the intensities of agreement

have shifted, with fewer Americans who agree strongly and more who disagree strongly. The percentage of Americans who agreed strongly declined from 55% to 40% in 2008, and the percentage of Americans who disagreed strongly increased from 7% to 16%. Among those who viewed Senator McCain favorably, 82% agreed that under some conditions war is necessary to achieve justice, and 47% agreed strongly. Among those who viewed Senator Obama favorably, 68% agreed and 29% agreed strongly.



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
Section Four: Turbulent Turkey

In recent years observers have expressed concerns about Turkey turning away from the Western alliance after a crisis in relations with the United States surrounding the war in Iraq in 2003 and tensions with the European Union. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) was re-elected in June 2007 with 47% of the popular vote, yet within months the Turkish Constitutional Court agreed to hear a case proposing to ban the party for violating the secular basis of the Turkish constitution. The European Union warned that closing the AKP could jeopardize EU membership negotiations, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared, “We’re going to continue to work with this government ... with which we share common values.”⁴ Subsequently, the Constitutional Court struck down a law passed by the AKP that would have permitted the wearing of headscarves at universities but chose not to ban the party itself, instead issuing a “serious warning.” In the past year, U.S.-Turkish relations improved at the official level with the Bush administration’s designation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as an “enemy” and support for Turkish military strikes against the PKK inside of northern Iraq. The European Union launched its Mediterranean Union initiative under the leadership of French President Sarkozy, a project initially feared by Turkey as a way of blocking EU membership but the launch of which was eventually attended by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

TURKEY SLIGHTLY WARMER TOWARD OTHERS

On a 100-point thermometer scale, Turkey continued to view itself at 80 degrees, nearly 40 degrees “warmer” than all others. Over the past year, Turkish warmth toward the European Union increased seven degrees to 33 degrees and

toward the United States three degrees to 14 degrees, halting a trend of cooling toward both since 2004. Turkish warmth toward Iran increased two degrees to 32 degrees. Americans continued to view Turkey at 47 degrees, and Europeans viewed Turkey at 43 degrees. (See chart #15)



⁴<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/105690.htm>


TURKEY STILL MOST CRITICAL OF U.S. AND EU LEADERSHIP, NATO

Turkish respondents continued to have the most critical views of U.S. and EU leadership in world affairs. Only 8% of respondents viewed U.S. leadership as “desirable,” and 22% viewed EU leadership as “desirable.” Only 8% of respondents viewed President Bush’s handling of international affairs favorably, although the percentage who viewed him unfavorably declined 12 percentage points to 71%. Turkey also had the lowest percentage of respondents who saw NATO as essential at 38%, although this was an increase of three percentage points and halted a declining trend since 2004.

RELIGIOSITY DOES NOT SHAPE VIEWS OF TRANSATLANTIC TIES

Turkish views of transatlantic relations did not differ markedly with religious practice as measured by whether respondents pray five times a day regularly, sometimes, or never.⁵ For example, there was little difference in the desirability of EU leadership among those who pray five times a day regularly (21%), sometimes (23%), or never (24%), nor in the desirability of U.S. leadership among those who pray five times a day regularly (6%), sometimes (9%), or

⁵ In the Turkish population as a whole, 35% reported praying five times a day regularly, 44% sometimes, and 18% never.



never (7%). Additionally, there were small differences in the percentages of those who viewed EU membership as a good thing among those who pray five times a day regularly (41%), sometimes (41%), or never (45%) and in those who felt NATO is essential among those who pray five times a day regularly (34%), sometimes (39%), or never (40%). (See chart #16)

LARGE MAJORITY OPPOSES BANNING HEADSCARVES AT UNIVERSITIES

Seventy percent of Turkish respondents disagreed with the statement that wearing a headscarf at university should be banned. This was true for 80% of those who pray five times a day regularly, 72% who sometimes pray five times a day, and 52% of those who never pray five times a day.

DECLINING THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN TURKEY

Turkish respondents felt most likely to be personally affected by an economic downturn (72%), global warming (70%), and international terrorism (65%). Threat perceptions declined across the board in Turkey in the past year. Fewer respondents felt likely to be personally affected by global warming (-14 percentage points), international terrorism (-14 percentage points), Islamic fundamentalism (-10 percentage points), an economic downturn (-9 percentage points), and energy dependence (-5 percentage points). (See chart #17)

TURKEY FEELS IT SHOULD ACT ALONE IN INTERNATIONAL MATTERS

The largest percentage of Turkish respondents (48%) felt that, on international matters, Turkey should act alone, compared with 20% who felt it should act with the countries



of the European Union, 11% who felt it should act with the countries of the Middle East, 3% who felt it should act with the United States, and 1% who felt it should act with Russia. Those who said that Turkey should act alone on international matters, however, have differing views of EU membership: 36% also saw EU membership as a good thing, 38% saw it as a bad thing, and 26% saw it as neither good nor bad. (See chart #18)

EUROPEANS AND TURKS AGREE TURKEY IS NOT PART OF THE WEST

Fifty-seven percent of Europeans and 55% of Turkish respondents agreed that Turkey has such different values that it is not really part of the West, with the highest agreement in Germany (76%), France (68%), and Italy (61%). Americans did not share this view, with the largest percentage of respondents (41%) who felt that Turkey has enough common values with the West to be part of the West.

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP DIMINISHES

Turkish and European views toward Turkey's EU membership remained unchanged, with the largest percentages of Turkish respondents who saw it as a good thing (42%) and of Europeans (45%) who saw it as neither a good nor bad thing. Among Americans, the percentage who viewed Turkey's EU membership as a good thing declined eight percentage points to 32%. The largest percentage of Americans (46%, +10 percentage points from 2007) viewed Turkey's EU membership as neither a good nor bad thing. Sixty percent of Europeans and 48% of Americans thought it is likely that Turkey will join the European Union, compared with only 26% of Turkish respondents.





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Section Five: Conclusion

Transatlantic Trends creates a compelling portrait of the image of the United States in Europe during the George W. Bush presidency, showing a sharp decline in views of U.S. global leadership, figures that have remained low since 2004. While other public opinion polls showed an uptick in the image of the United States during the primary elections in early 2008,⁶ the lack of change in our survey conducted in June suggests that this improvement was temporary. At the same time, this survey has also shown consistently that critical views of President Bush do not appear to have hardened into anti-Americanism, as Europeans continue to separate their views of the United States from their views of the president's policies.

Managing expectations for a new president on both sides of the Atlantic will be essential regardless of who is elected. If Senator Obama is elected, Europeans may expect him to act more multilaterally than any American president is likely to act. Although fewer Europeans may expect relations to improve if Senator McCain is elected, he has declared that if elected one of his "top priorities will be to revitalize the transatlantic partnership."⁷ Americans may expect Europeans to reverse their criticisms of the United States overnight, which is also unlikely. It may have been relatively easy in the second term of the Bush presidency for both sides to honor a tacit agreement not to press each other over

Iraq, but the next American president is almost certain to seek renewed help in addressing a range of global challenges including stabilizing Afghanistan and managing relations with Russia.

Americans and Europeans do not appear to have fundamentally different world views of international threats and priorities, but policy differences remain. While Europeans may favor Senator Obama, our findings suggest that this does not necessarily translate into agreement with policies favored by his American supporters, such as committing troops to combat the Taliban in Afghanistan. This is especially important at a time when questions remain about the European Union as a global actor after Ireland's rejection of the Lisbon Treaty on institutional reform. Turkey has pulled back from the brink of a crisis with the decision of its Constitutional Court not to ban the governing Justice and Development Party, a decision that offers the potential for progress in its candidacy for EU membership.

Public opinion following the upcoming November election in the United States will offer the chance to assess many of the findings in *Transatlantic Trends* since 2002, perhaps most of all whether recent changes will prove enduring or transient. The prospects for recovery in the image of the United States and renewed transatlantic cooperation will continue to be shaped by global challenges beyond how Americans and Europeans feel about each other. Observers on both sides of the Atlantic and in other parts of the world will be watching closely.

⁶ See the BBC poll from January 2008 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7324337.stm> and ARD Deutschland poll from April 2008 at <http://www.infratest-dimap.de/?id=39&aid=160#ue3>

⁷ <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86602-p30/john-mccain/an-enduring-peace-built-on-freedom.html>



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Notes

METHODOLOGY

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews. In each country, a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, was interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 4, 2008, and June 24, 2008.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample (n=12022), the margin of margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. The average response rate for all 13 countries surveyed was 20.4%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, comparative data are reproduced from *Transatlantic Trends* 2003–2007 and/or from *Worldviews* 2002 (www.transatlantic-trends.org).

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the time of printing, data for years 2002 through 2007 are available through ICPSR. For more information please consult the ICPSR catalog at www.icpsr.umich.edu.

NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part of the EU9, and the E10 average is listed as part of the E12. For additional information on the composition of the European averages, please consult the table below.

TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

| YEAR | AVERAGE | COUNTRIES |
|-----------|---------|---|
| 2002 | EU6 | France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and The United Kingdom |
| 2003 | EU7 | Same as the EU6 with the addition of Portugal |
| 2004–2006 | EU9 | Same as the EU7 with the addition of Slovakia and Spain |
| 2004–2005 | E10 | Same the EU9 with the addition of Turkey |
| 2006 | E11 | Same as EU9 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania |
| 2006–2008 | E12 | Same as E10 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania |



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www.transatlantictrends.org

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