TRENDS IN RADICALISATION THAT MAY LEAD TO VIOLENCE

NATIONAL BACKGROUND STUDY
GREECE

By Dia Anagnostou and Dimitris Skleparis

July 2015

With the financial support of the Prevention and Fight against Crime Program of the European Commission, Directorate General Home Affairs. This publication reflects the views only of its authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
Contents

Table of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 3
List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................. 5
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 6

Part I. Legal and Policy Frameworks and Institutional Setting .................................................. 9
I.1. Legal Framework .................................................................................................................. 9
I.1.1. Legislation ..................................................................................................................... 9
I.1.2. Definitions .................................................................................................................. 11
I.1.3. Punishable Offences and Sanctions ............................................................................ 12
I.2. Policy Framework .............................................................................................................. 18
I.2.1. Terrorism and Organised Crime .................................................................................. 18
I.2.2. Hate Speech and Hate Crime ..................................................................................... 21
I.2.3. Hooliganism ............................................................................................................... 21
I.3. Institutional Setting ............................................................................................................ 23

Part II. Trends in Radicalisation .................................................................................................. 27
II.1. Right and Left Wing Radicalisation .................................................................................. 27
II.1.1. Background ............................................................................................................... 27
II.1.2. Ideology and ideas ..................................................................................................... 29
II.1.3. Organisational forms and actors .............................................................................. 33
II.1.4. Repertoire of actions ............................................................................................... 41
II.1.5. Institutional and law enforcement responses ........................................................... 44
II.1.6. Root causes and motivations ................................................................................... 47
II.2. Islamist Radicalisation ...................................................................................................... 49
II.2.1. Background ............................................................................................................... 49
II.2.2. Ideology and ideas ..................................................................................................... 56
II.2.3. Organisational forms and actors .............................................................................. 57
II.2.4. Repertoire of actions ............................................................................................... 59
II.2.5. Institutional and law enforcement responses ........................................................... 60
II.2.6 Root causes and motivations ................................................................................... 62
II.3. Hooliganism .................................................................................................................... 64
II.3.1. Background ............................................................................................................... 64
II.3.2. Organisational forms and actors .............................................................................. 65
II.3.3. Repertoire of actions ............................................................................................... 70
II.3.4. Institutional and law enforcement responses ........................................................... 71
II.3.5. Root causes and motivations ................................................................................... 73

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 75
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 79
ANNEX I – LIST OF INTERVIEWS ............................................................................................. 84
ANNEX II – TABLES ..................................................................................................................... 85
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Anti-authoritarian Movement (Antieksusiastiki Kinisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (Synomosia Pyrinon tis Fotias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAEEV</td>
<td>Directorate for Combating Special Violent Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAV</td>
<td>Permanent Committee for the Treatment of Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRi</td>
<td>European Commission against Racism and Intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKKE</td>
<td>Communist Movement of Greece (Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Kinima Elladas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELA</td>
<td>Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Hellenic Front (Elliniko Metopo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPEN</td>
<td>National Political Union (Ethniki Politiki Enosis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GD</td>
<td>Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFF</td>
<td>Hellenic Football Federation (Elliniki Podosfairiki Omospondia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Islamic Cultural Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEM</td>
<td>Communist Revolutionary Front (Kommounistiko Epanastatiko Metopo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE-es</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece, the European-oriented communists (KKE Esoterikou)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikos Orthodox Synagermos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Muslim Association of Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N17</td>
<td>Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (Epanastatiki Organossi 17 Noemvri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Alignment (Ethniki Parataksis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy (Nea Demokratia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service (Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOPO</td>
<td>Nazist Organisation of Panathinaikos Fans (Nazistiki Organossi Panathinaikon Opadon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKDE</td>
<td>Organisation of Communist Internationalists of Greece (Organossi Kommouniston Diethniston Ellados)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMLE</td>
<td>Organisation of Marxists-Leninists of Greece (Organossi Marxiston-Leniniston Elladas)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPPS – Organisation for the Protection of the Popular Struggle (Organossi Prostasias Laikou Agona)
OSE – Organisation of Socialist Revolution (Organossi Sossialistiki Epanastasi)
PA – Political Spring (Politiki Anoiksi)
PASOK – Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Socialistiko Kinima)
PFLP – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO – Palestine Liberation Organisation
PP – Progressive Party (Komma ton Fileleftheron)
PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party
RN – Revolutionary Nuclei (Epanstatikoi Pyrines)
RS – Revolutionary Struggle (Epanastatikos Agonas)
SR – Sect of Revolutionaries (Sehta Epanastaton)
TOFA – Terrorist Organisation of Friends of AEK (Tromokratiki Organossi Filon AEK)
UL – United Left (Enomeni Aristera)
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1 Classification of Greek right-wing parties.................................................................32
Table 2 Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per year...........................................................45
Table 3 Incidents and Victims of Racist Violence per year.........................................................46
Table 4 Age of Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year..........................66
Table 5 Gender of Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year.......................66
Table 6 Gender of Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per year .........................................85
Table 7 Nationality of Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per Gender................................85
Table 8 Age of Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per Gender ........................................85
Table 9 Gender of Racist Violence Victims per year .................................................................85
Table 10 Top 5 Nationalities of Racist Violence Victims per year ...........................................86
Table 11 Nationality of Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year...............86
Table 12 Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year ................................86

Figure 1. Deployed Police Officers in Sports Events & Arrested Individuals for Sports-related Violence72
Figure 2. Number of Violent Incidents in Football Matches & Fines Paid by Football Teams (in thousand Euros) ........................................................................................................................................73
INTRODUCTION

Over the past fifteen years, the phenomenon of radicalisation has anew emerged as salient in the USA, in Europe and elsewhere. The attacks against the World Trade Centre in New York and in Washington DC in September 2001 rendered dramatically visible the growth of radical Islam militancy and its destructive consequences. However, the forms that radicalisation takes extend well beyond those related to religion-inspired extremism, and their intensity, as well as the responses of governments and state authorities significantly vary across countries. Prompted by increasing incidents of political violence, primarily but not solely linked to Islamist radicalism, scholarly interest in the subject has surged. A wealth of studies explore the motives and causes of radicalisation, as well as the processes whereby individuals and groups come to espouse radical ideas and engage in violent actions. Islamist radicalisation, as well as right-wing extremism have attracted a large amount of research, while left-wing extremism has received far less attention since the 1980s when it began to decline (albeit not disappear) after its heyday in the 1970s.

In the countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe though, the phenomenon of radicalisation has generally been understudied, despite the fact that extremism and political radicalism have been long-standing in most countries in the region. The project RAD MONITOR, of which this report is a part, seeks to address this gap in research and knowledge. The rise of ‘new’ and the resurgence of ‘old’ forms of radicalisation are an emerging issue for policy-makers and there is limited understanding of the threats leading to violence, both within policy circles and academia. Policy-makers and state agencies face significant challenges in devising appropriate strategies to address the factors contributing to extremism and violent radicalisation. There is a clear need for research and evidence-based advice on this issue. Policy debates on how to confront different types of radicalisation have been ongoing in many states in the EU in view of recent global threats. Yet in many member states decision-makers lack the appropriate evidence base to guide policy actions, especially in the field of Islamist radicalisation.

This report focuses on the case of Greece, where the phenomenon of radicalisation has been present throughout the period from the mid-1970s when the country made the transition from a military dictatorship to democracy, until today. Greece displays one of the most persistent problems of terrorism in Europe, raising anew the question of why extremist and revolutionary organisations continue to emerge and be active in democracies (Kassimeris 2013: 132). In the course of the 2000s, and especially since 2010, right-wing and left-wing extremism and radicalisation have intensified. In the past five years, their intensification has taken place in the context of a deepening social and economic crisis linked to the country’s external debt problems and the consequent adoption of austerity policies. Six years (2009-2014) of ongoing and deep recession have led the country’s economy to contract by more than 25%, leading to declining incomes and high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth. These deteriorating socioeconomic conditions have been accompanied by the fragmentation of what used to function as a two-party political system and by a profound legitimacy crisis of the Greek political system as we knew it until then.

Within this context, incidents of sports-related violence (hooliganism) are recording a considerable increase, as young people choose to unload their aggression and feelings of frustration to sports grounds, which they consider to be a suitable place. What is more, far-right and anarchist ideologies, and organised crime have apparently penetrated the terraces of sports grounds, creating in this way a system of ‘communicating vessels’ between organised hardcore fan clubs and extremism. Hooliganism, which emerged after the end of the dictatorship in...
1974, has become in recent years a youth strategy to escape from reality. It has been tolerated and, in some cases, even fomented, directly or indirectly, by the boards of sports clubs and sports federations, which has exposed the weaknesses of the self-regulated institutional setting of sport (predominantly football, and secondarily basketball) in Greece.

Moreover, approximately 25 years after the last recorded international terrorist attack on Greek soil, the country is currently experiencing an increased, mainly background activity of international Muslim terrorists. So far, this activity has been limited to a logistical, recruitment and support basis. However, Greek authorities declare that they are ‘at a heightened state of vigilance’ at the moment, due to the fact that Greece is a Jihadist crossover to and from Syria. The large pool of young male irregular immigrants from Muslim countries, whose presence is not recorded in official data, in combination with their dire living conditions and the lack of formal and monitored places of worship create a fertile environment for Islamist radicalisation.

The intensity and nature of political violence in Greece, as well as the forms that it takes have evolved over time. Levels of political violence originating from far-left groups have remained high in Greece and even rose from the 1970s until the 2000s, as data on number of attacks from the Global Terrorism Database shows (GTD). The GTD records 1169 incidents between February 1973 and December 2014 of far-left political violence in Greece. The number of incidents have hiked in particular years and periods of time, such as in 1977-78, in 1989-1990, and less so in 1998-99, while they saw the highest peak in 2008. Right-wing extremism and violence have also sharply grown since 2010 and they have been substantially connected to the appearance of a far-right political party, the Golden Dawn (GD), which has gained representation in the Greek Parliament. The GTD though, as well as the EUROPOL Terrorism Reports, do not record attacks by far-right groups, largely due to the fact that such data was not recorded by the Greek state itself until 2012.

The main objective of this report is to provide a background study on radicalisation in Greece and the various forms that it takes, as a basis to bridge the aforementioned knowledge gap on the subject. It provides an overview of past and current radicalisation trends (in terms of threats, identification of vulnerable groups; their repertoires of action; and institutional responses). The national background studies are intended to guide further research on indicators and risk factors, as the knowledge base for the design and the pilot application of a radicalisation monitoring tool. The national background studies should aim to first, identify legal and institutional responses to the processes of radicalisation that may lead to acts of violence; and second, to review and analyse trends (ideas, actors, actions, motivations and root causes) in three strands of radicalisation (right and left wing radicalisation, Islamist radicalisation and football hooliganism).

Radicalisation is understood in a broad way as the process whereby individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 10). A radical stance is characterised by a ‘growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798). Actors who adopt such a stance hold “polarizing and absolute definitions of a given situation, and [articulate] increasingly ‘radical’ aims and objectives” (Della Porta and LaFree 2012: 6-7). Under certain circumstances, the espousal of radical ideas may develop into a willingness to directly support or engage in violence. Radicalisation is understood as a dynamic, multi-staged and multifaceted phenomenon that occurs as a result of interaction

---

between individuals who are vulnerable or susceptible to radical ideas on the one hand, and the existence of an enabling environment which may create opportunities for organising and becoming active with militant groups. It is profoundly a context-specific phenomenon. At the other end, the process whereby individuals and groups withdraw from and abandon such a commitment can be seen to manifest the phenomenon of de-radicalisation (Della Porta and LaFree 2012: 5-6).

There is a close association between radical or extremist views and attitudes on the one hand, and the use of violence in action on the other, however, these two do not necessarily go together. A distinction is commonly drawn between radicalisation that leads to violence and non-violent radicalisation. Individuals and groups may espouse radical and extremist views without necessarily deploying aggressive tactics in action. At the same time, involvement in violent acts is not necessarily driven by adherence to radical beliefs and frames of thinking, but it may be motivated by personal loyalty or peer pressure. It follows that one of the main questions posed first, is why, when and how individuals and groups decide to enlist in organisations that advance radical views; and secondly, why, when and how some of these individuals (alone or with others) engage in violent acts that (may) involve physical destruction or threat to the safety and lives of human beings? The causes of radicalisation are commonly sought at different levels: the micro, the meso and macro-levels of analysis.

Focusing on the case of Greece, this background report has the following objectives. In the first place, it seeks to examine the legal, institutional and policy frameworks and mechanisms for countering and preventing radicalisation that may lead to acts of violence. Secondly, the report explores four different manifestations of radical extremism in Greece – right and left wing militancy, Islamist radicalisation and football hooliganism – describes their basic characteristics, their ideas and ideology, their organisational structures and actors, and the motivations and causes that are put forth to explain radicalisation in each of its four forms under focus. This report draws from a wealth of primary and secondary data. It is based on a review of relevant legal and policy documents in the area of criminal law, anti-terrorism legislation, legislation against racism and hate speech, among others. The research for this report also includes a fairly comprehensive review of existing studies and scholarship on the Greek case, as well as review of the conventional and electronic media. Finally, 13 interviews have been conducted with experts on radicalisation, researchers and journalists, sports clubs spokespersons, state officials, retired police officers, prison employees, and NGO representatives. A list of the interviews is provided in the annex at the end of this report.
I.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Greek legislation does not include any provisions specifically referring to radicalisation and its related trends (Left/Right-wing, Islamism, hooliganism). However, it provides for the punishment of terrorism, organised crime, hate crime, hooliganism and violent and non-violent extremism, which capture a broad range of radical acts. Domestic anti-terrorist legislation is accompanied by relevant international laws that have been ratified by statute, and which according to the Greek constitution, prevail under any contrary provisions of national law. Domestic legislation is also shaped by the transposition of all relevant EU laws pertaining to issues of terrorism and organised crime. Laws 2928/2001, 3251/2004, 3691/2008 and 3875/2010, and Articles 187 and 187A of the Greek Penal Code regulate the issue of terrorism and organised crime in Greece.

Law 2928/2001 entitled “Modification of provisions of the criminal code and the code of criminal procedure and other provisions for the citizens’ protection from criminal acts of criminal organisations” was adopted in June 2001, and amended the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Law was presented as anti-mafia, and lacked an explicit legal definition of terrorism. Instead, terrorist groups were included in the definition of ‘criminal organisations’ under Article 187 of the Penal Code, which also defined terrorist and organised criminal acts and their respective sanctions. Law 2928/2001 criminalised the formation of and participation in a terrorist or criminal organisation/gang, and the threat or preparation of using terrorist or organised violence. It also gave the police greater powers in countering terrorism and organised crime (see ‘Policy Framework’), and created Greece’s first-ever witness protection programme. Moreover, it eliminated the use of jurors during trials and replaced them with a three-judge panel, while it transferred the crimes committed by criminal organisations under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court of Appeals.

Law 3251/2004 entitled ‘European Arrest Warrant and Confrontation of Terrorism’ was part of the Greek government’s comprehensive pre-Olympic Games security initiative and an attempt to comply with the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (Borgeas 2013). It amended the earlier counter-terrorism Law 2928/2001 and provided for the first time a definition of terrorism. Additionally, it introduced Article 187A entitled ‘Acts of Terrorism’ to the Penal Code, which added 22 new terrorist crimes and their respective sanctions. Moreover, 3251/2004 sanctioned lone terrorists; increased the statute of limitations on terrorist-related crimes from 20 to 30 years; increased prison terms for terrorist leaders; and heavily sanctioned those who threaten or prepare to commit a terrorist crime.

Law 3691/2008 entitled ‘Prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing and other provisions’ came into force on August 5 2008. Law 3691/2008, as it is in effect after its amendments, aimed to improve the legislation on the prevention and countering

---

2 See Article 28 (1) of the Greek Constitution.
3 Law 3932/2011 (Government Gazette No. 49 A”) entitled ‘On the Authority for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigations’; Law 4021/2011 (Government Gazette No. 218/A/3)
of money laundering and terrorist financing, and to safeguard the financial system from the risks, which accompany such offences. The Law incorporated into the national legislation the provisions of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and the European Council ‘on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing’. Additionally, it incorporated certain provisions of Directive 2006/70/EC of the European Commission and replaced specific provisions of Law 2331/1995. More specifically, Law 3691/2008 defined the actions that are regarded as money laundering and terrorist financing; the natural and legal persons that are obliged to take due diligence measures against their customers; the standard due diligence measures that should be taken; and the relevant sanctions.

Law 3875/2010, entitled ‘Ratification and Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and related provisions’, ratified one of the three Palermo Protocols of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, and amended the earlier Law 3251/2004 and the Penal Code towards a more actionable counter-terrorism approach. More specifically, it introduced the element of collective objective intent, which criminalised individual behaviour on the basis of collective responsibility. It sanctioned groups set up to commit misdemeanours (e.g. obstruction of transport, aggravated damage, etc.) on the grounds of terrorism. It increased the sentences for the leader(s) and facilitator(s) of a group established to commit felonies, and for those who threaten to commit a felony, and, hence, cause terror. Moreover, 3875/2010 abolished the relevant article, which exempted specific felonies from terrorist acts. Furthermore, it strengthened the protection of witnesses by enabling the court to accept testimonies from anonymous witnesses and deny the disclosure of their personal details.

With specific regard to hate crime, the criminal law provisions to counter racism and racial discrimination are included in Law 927/1979 on ‘Combating Race Discrimination’, as it is in effect after its amendments. Law 4285/2014, which was enacted in September 2014, amended Law 927/1979 in order to align national legislation with the EU rules pertaining to hate speech and denial of genocide, and strengthen the existing anti-racism criminal legislation. More specifically, Law 4285/2014 abolished the article on aggravating circumstances, and introduced Article 81A to the Penal Code, which increased the lowest sentences that can be imposed for hate crimes. Furthermore, it included the notion of colour to the list of grounds for hate crimes, and rendered respective sentences non-suspended.


For example, it exempted the attempt to bring on a democratic regime or protect or re-establish it; the attempt to act for freedom; the attempt to exercise a fundamental personal, political, syndicalist or other right.

Law 1419/1984 (Government Gazette No. 28 A’); Law 2910/2001 (Government Gazette No. 91 A’) entitled ‘Entry and Stay of Aliens in Greek Territory. Acquisition of Greek Citizenship by Naturalisation and Other Provisions’; Law 4285/2014 (Government Gazette No. A’ 191) entitled ‘Amendment of Law 927/1979 (A 139) and adapting to the decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (L. 328) and other provisions’.
Professional Sport and other provisions’, and it has been amended 19 times. However, the first sports Law was 75/75, which remained in effect for 24 years and was amended three times, in 1983, 1987 and 1995. Articles 41-41Z of Law 2725/1999 address the major problem of violence in sports events (hooliganism).

Finally, acts of violent and non-violent extremism are punished by a number of different articles in the Greek Penal Code.

I.1.2. DEFINITIONS

Greek legislation provides a definition of terrorism, organised crime, and hate crime. More specifically, Law 3251/2004 entitled ‘European Arrest Warrant and Confrontation of Terrorism’ introduced the definition of terrorism to the Greek Penal Code under Article 187A. According to this definition, terrorist actions

are committed in such a way, to such an extent or under such conditions, that is possible to seriously harm a country or an international organisation, along with the purpose of seriously intimidating a population or illegally forcing a public authority or an international organisation to perform or to abstain from performing an action or with the purpose of seriously harming or destroying the fundamental constitutional, political and economic structures of a country or of an international organisation.


Moreover, Article 1 of Law 4285/2014criminalises public incitement of violence or hate speech:

whoever intentionally, in public, orally, or through the press and the internet, or by any other means or methods, incites, provokes or stirs acts or actions that may lead to discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or a group of persons that are identified on the basis of race, colour, religion, descent, national or ethnic origin or disability, sexual orientation or gender identity, so as to endanger the public order or pose a threat to life, freedom or physical integrity of the above mentioned persons, shall be punished.

Finally, Greek legislation makes an implicit reference to hooliganism, without, however, defining the concept. Paragraph 1 of article 41 of Law 2725/1999 states that ‘every person that

attends or participates in sports activities of sports clubs, departments of paid athletes, and sports incorporated companies must adhere to the laws, rules and regulations of sportsmanship, before, during and after the end of sports meetings’. Moreover, according to paragraph 2 of the same article, ‘any public statement or any other action of athletes, coaches, board members of sports clubs, associations, federations, or referees, that can upset the normal conduct of sports meetings or trigger tension and confrontation among fans, is forbidden’.

I.1.3. PUNISHABLE OFFENCES AND SANCTIONS

I.1.3.1. TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME

Articles 187A and 187 of the Greek Penal Code codify the terrorism and organised crime statutes respectively, and define as terrorist and organised criminal acts specific offences, which are already provided for and punished, in any case, by the Penal Code or by special criminal laws.

More specifically, with regards to terrorism, such offences include: a) intentional homicide, b) causing severe physical injury, c) causing fatal injury, d) abduction and kidnapping of minors, e) causing significant damage to a third party’s property, f) arson, g) arson in forests, h) causing a flood, i) causing an explosion, j) violations with regard to explosives, k) commonly dangerous damage (intentional damage to any public or private property that could affect others), l) revocation of security installations, m) causing a shipwreck, n) contamination of water supplies and food, o) adulteration of food, p) disruption of transport safety, q) disruption of the safety of railways, ships and airplanes, r) the actions specified in Legislative Decree 181/1974 ‘on the protection from ionising radiation’, s) the actions (e.g. aircraft hijacking) specified in the Code of Air Law, t) the actions (e.g. illegal production, possession and use of firearms etc.) specified in Law 2168/1993 entitled ‘Regulation of issues concerning firearms, ammunition, explosives, explosive mechanisms and other provisions’, and u) the actions listed in Law 2991/2002 on the ‘Application of the Convention prohibiting the development, production, storage, use and destruction of chemical weapons’. The punishment provided for the perpetration of the abovementioned actions ranges from three years to life imprisonment.

Regarding organised crime, Article 187 of the Greek Penal Code provides for a sentence of imprisonment of up to ten years for persons who set up a criminal group. It also foresees a similar sentence for individuals who participate as members in a structured group with continuous activity, which is made up of three or more persons and which seeks to commit a wide variety of felonies ranging from forgery and falsification, to abduction and slave trafficking, kidnapping, robbery, murder and physical injury, among several others. The same

---

7Paragraph 1 of Article 8.
9Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 15 and paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 17 of Law 2168/1993.
10Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 of Law 2991/2002.
11These include forgery (articles 207), 208 (circulation of forged money (article 208), falsification (article 216), (falsification and abuse of stamps (article 218), (false testimony, adulteration (article 242), arson (article 264), 265 (arson to forests), 268 (flood), 270 (explosion), 272 (violations relating to explosive materials), 277 (sinking
provision of the Penal Code also foresees sentences for felonies provided for in the legislation on drugs, weapons, explosive materials and protection from materials emitting radiation harmful to people. Apart from the commission of these offences, the Greek Penal Code, also punishes the preparation, threat and/or intention to commit such crimes, by treating them as extenuating circumstances.

Moreover, the formation of, or participation in a terrorist or criminal organisation can be punished with up to ten years of imprisonment, while the directing of such an organisation can be punished with at least ten years of imprisonment. The Penal Code also punishes with a sentence of up to ten years of imprisonment the provision of any kind of assets or financial means, regardless of their mode of acquisition, to a terrorist organisation or lone terrorist. The same sentence is provided for whoever assists in the formation of a terrorist organisation by providing such assets or means, and for whoever assists in the reception, collection or management of any such assets or means with reference to the above. Similarly, whoever assists anyone in becoming a terrorist is punished with up to ten years of imprisonment. It should be noted that the aforementioned offences are punished regardless of the commission of any of the terrorist acts.

In addition, the Penal Code punishes with up to ten years of imprisonment any deliberate provision of substantial information to a terrorist organisation or lone terrorist, which facilitates or supports the commission of a terrorist action, or the commission of theft, robbery, blackmail, or forgery of public documents with the view to perpetrating a terrorist action. In the same manner, providing information or material means to assist a criminal organisation in committing a felony can be punished by a sentence of up to ten years of imprisonment.

According to Articles 187 and 187A of the Penal Code, the manufacture, supply or possession of weapons, explosive materials and chemical or biological materials or materials emitting radiation harmful to people, aiming at serving the purposes of a terrorist organisation, or criminal organisation/gang, or the pursuit of financial or other material gain of their members are aggravating circumstances. Additionally, the serious threats to commit terrorist acts causing in this way terror can be punished with at least two years of imprisonment. Along the same lines, whoever by threat or use of force against judicial functionaries, interrogating or judicial servants, witnesses, experts and interpreters or by bribe to the said persons, attempts to cancel the discovery or prosecution and punishment of organised criminal offences can be punished by imprisonment of up to ten years and a fine.

Moreover, Article 187 of the Criminal Code states that whoever joins another person to commit a felony is punished by imprisonment of at least six months. The culprit is punished by imprisonment of at least three months if the jointly perpetrated act is a misdemeanour that aims at financial or other material gain, or damage to life, physical integrity or sexual freedom. The complicity in the crimes of formation of or participation in a criminal organisation or gang is not punished if the members of the organisation or gang do not seek financial or other material gain. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the provisions of Article 187 regarding criminal organisations are also applicable when the punishable actions were committed abroad by a Greek citizen or were made against a Greek citizen or legal entity with registered offices of ship), 279 (poisoning of springs and food), 291 (disturbance of safety of trains, ships and aircrafts), 299 (intentional murder), 310 (gross physical injury), 322 (abduction), 325 (slave trafficking), 324 (abduction of minors), 327 (involuntary kidnapping), 336 (rape), 338 (abuse to lechery), 339 (child seduction), 374 (gross cases of theft), 375 (defalcation), 380 (robbery), 385 (extortion), 386 (fraud), 386A (computer fraud), 404 (usury). See specific articles in the Greek Penal Code for a detailed description of the aforementioned offences.
in Greece or against the Greek state. They are punishable under Greek law even if they are not punishable under the laws of the country in which they were committed.

All in all, Greek legislation provides for a comprehensive framework and an exhaustive list of terrorist and organised crimes and related sanctions. Moreover, legislation amendments throughout the years have generally introduced stricter sentences. Indeed, Greek legislation punishes, not only the commission of terrorist or organised crimes, but also the intention or threat to commit such crimes, as well as the support of, complicity or participation in such crimes and organisations. However, an area of improvement could be the introduction of universal geographic application to Greek antiterrorism law. Indeed, in contrast to the organised crime statute, terrorist crimes committed by or against Greek citizens or legal entities abroad are not punished by Greek antiterrorism legislation.

I.1.3.2. HATE SPEECH AND HATE CRIME

With specific regard to hate crime and hate speech, Article 4 of Law 4285/2014 provides for the liability of legal persons or groups of persons when hate crimes or hate speech are committed by a natural person, acting either alone or as a member of the legal person, for the benefit of such a legal person or group of persons. Moreover, according to Article 1 of the same Law,

> whoever intentionally, in public, orally, or through the press and the internet, or by any other means or methods, incites, provokes or stirs acts or actions that may lead to discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or a group of persons that are identified on the basis of race, colour, religion, descent, national or ethnic origin or disability, sexual orientation or gender identity, so as to endanger the public order or pose a threat to life, freedom or physical integrity of the above mentioned persons, shall be punished by a three months to three years imprisonment sentence and a fine of 5,000-20,000 Euros.

If the aforementioned conduct results in the commission of a crime, then the provided punishment is at least six months of imprisonment and a fine of 15,000-30,000 Euros. According to Article 2, the same punishments are provided for those who publically endorse or deny certain crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, the Holocaust, or Nazi crimes that have been established by international court decisions or the Greek Parliament. Public officials or employees who engage in the abovementioned conduct face imprisonment of six months to three years and a fine of 10,000 to 50,000 Euros.

Furthermore, Law 4285/2014 added Article 81A to the Penal Code, which increases penalties for felonies and misdemeanours committed due to hatred bias. More specifically, if an offence is committed due to hatred bias on the grounds of race, colour, religion, descent, national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability of the victim, the minimum custodial sentence is increased by one year for misdemeanours, by three years for felonies and the anticipated minimum fine for any crime is doubled up, while sentences are not suspended.

Finally, it is worth noting that hate crimes and hate speech are investigated and prosecuted ex officio. Hence, there is no need for a report from or an accusation by a victim before the initiation of the investigation and/or prosecution. Additionally, the victim is excluded from paying the relevant fee to the State at the time of the complaint and the trial as plaintiff.
All in all, Greek legislation has established a comprehensive framework for countering hate crime and hate speech. Moreover, the new anti-racism Law, 4285/2014, which was proposed and ratified amidst an unprecedented increase of racist violence, has provided for stricter sanctions with respect to bias-motivated crimes. However, ECRI (2015) has recommended that language and citizenship are included in the list of grounds for hate crime and hate speech in Article 81A of the Penal Code. Additionally, it has proposed the inclusion of insults and defamation on racist grounds, and the public dissemination, public distribution, production, or storage of racist material to the list of relevant offences. ECRI has also proposed the criminalisation of racial discrimination in the exercise of one’s public office or occupation, and the public expression, with a racist aim, of ideologies with a claim of superiority. Furthermore, racist motivation in cases of violent hate crimes could be made a fundamental part of investigation processes and judicial proceedings from the very beginning. At the moment, racist motivation is considered as aggravating circumstance only at the end of a trial, when a decision is made regarding the length of a sentence.

I.1.3.3. HOOLIGANISM

Law 2725/1999 entitled ‘Amateur and Professional Sport and other provisions’ defines penal, disciplinary, and administrative sanctions against sports violence and security infringements. Individuals, sports and fans associations and sports incorporated companies can be held responsible for violence and security infringements conducted before, during or after sports events. More specifically, sanctions can be imposed on the boards, athletes, coaches and fans of sports organisations.

Penal crimes committed in relation with sport are classified as: a) non-authentic and b) authentic (Mavromatis 2006:27; Mavromatis and Gargalianos 2007). Non-authentic crimes can be committed at any time and place and by anyone, regardless of athletic activity. Yet, committing such crimes prior to, during, or after sports activity constitutes a sports crime and it is dealt with more severely as it is considered an aggravating circumstance. Non-authentic crimes are defined either in the Greek Penal Code or in specific penal laws. Authentic sports crimes, on the other hand, are those which are committed before, during or after sports activity, or those which result from it. They are defined either as special crimes, or as variations of other crimes, and the law treats them in a special manner. Hence, authentic sports crimes, which are defined in sport Law 2725/1999, as it is in effect after its amendments, are a) violence in relation with sports activities; b) doping; and c) bribery.

Law 2725/1999 includes what can be characterised as a ‘special criminal provision’ (lex specialis). This provision defines a range of criminal sanctions for those found guilty of a sports crime, unless there is no other chance of successful prosecution for other offence(s). These sanctions are accompanied by a 2-5 years ban from attending sports events in Greece or abroad on sentenced offenders. In case the offender has a record of sports violence, the imposed sanction can be up to 3 years imprisonment.

12For example, assault and bodily harms (Articles 308 – 315), homicide (Articles 299 – 302), insult, defamation and other crimes against honour (Articles 361 – 369), fraud (Article 368), disloyalty (Article 390), forgery and other relevant crimes (Articles 216 – 222), etc. See the Penal Code for a more detailed description of the articles.
13For example, violation of drug laws (law 1729/1987), non-payment of insurance contributions (law 86/1967), violations of tax legislation (law 2523/1997), illegal betting (law 2433/1996), etc.
14This is Article 41ΣΤ, which takes precedence over general Articles.
Whoever intentionally, during a sports activity, inside or outside a sports facility engages in the following acts is sentenced with up to 2 years imprisonment and a fine: a) throw towards the court or anyone else any object that can cause even light bodily harm; b) assault an individual, regardless of the level of bodily harm, or threaten an individual who participates in a sports activity; c) possess or use objects that can cause bodily harm; and d) possess or use fireworks, smoke agents, firecrackers, and flammable materials in general.\(^{15}\)

Law 3057/2002 also defines a series of punishable offences that are sentenced with up to one year of imprisonment and a fine. These offences include: a) irregularly entering the premises where a sports event takes place, before, during or after the sports event, with the intention to upset the normal conduct of the event or cause trouble; b) committing on the pretext of a sports event any of the crimes of the previous paragraph prior to or after a sports event, away from the premises of the event;\(^{16}\) and c) individually, or as part of a team, insulting a third person on the basis of his/her national identity or race, or offending a national anthem, the Olympic symbols or the Olympic Games.\(^{17}\)

With at least six months imprisonment are sentenced those who publically, or through the media, incite, foment, encourage or facilitate individuals or groups in committing sports crimes.\(^{18}\) Furthermore, on the pretext of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens the second paragraph of article 41ΣΤ of Law 2725/1999 was amended by Law 3207/2003 in order to provide for up to 1 year imprisonment and a fine for those who individually, or as part of a team, insult a third person on the basis of his/her national identity or race, or offend a national anthem, the Olympic symbols or the Olympic Games.

Finally, according to Article 41Z, sports federations are empowered to take disciplinary measures against sports teams for the violation of Article 41ΣΤ. Depending on the status of a team as an amateur or professional, and the gravity of the committed sports crime and its consequences, sports teams can be sentenced to conduct (at least) 1 to 5 games without fans when they play at home, and to pay a fine of (at least) 5,000 to 60,000 Euros. Coaches and athletes can be banned from at least 2 games of their team and fined, while members of the board or other representatives of a sports team can be banned from entering sports facilities during sports events, derogated from their office for at least 6 months, and fined at least 20,000 Euros. The disciplinary measures for the fans associations responsible for sports violence include the ban from sports facilities during sports events from 3 months to 2 years.

All in all, despite the lack of an explicit legal definition of hooliganism, Greek legislation provides for a comprehensive list of sports crimes and relevant sanctions, which can be deemed strict. However, the sanctioning of sports teams by sports federations, particularly the Hellenic Football Federation (HFF) (in Greek ‘ΕΠΟ”), has been characterised as ‘gentle’.\(^{19}\) Moreover, sports teams, particularly with regard to football, have been reluctant to implement specific preventive counter-hooliganism measures, which have been provided for by the Greek legislation (see ‘Policy Framework’ section). In this respect, and in an attempt to combat widespread violence and match fixing in Greek football, Deputy Minister of Sport, Stavros Kontonis, proposed a new sports bill to the Parliament earlier this year. Entitled ‘Emergency measures for the confrontation of violence in sports and other provisions’, the proposed bill

\(^{15}\)Law 3057/2002 (Government Gazette No. 239 Α’), Article 7, Paragraph 1.

\(^{16}\)Law 3057/2002 (Government Gazette No. 239 Α’), Article 7, Paragraph 2.

\(^{17}\)Law 3207/2003 (Government Gazette No. 302 Α’), Article 8, Paragraph 15.

\(^{18}\)Law 3262/2004 (Government Gazette No. 173 Α’), Article 6, Paragraph 5.

\(^{19}\)Interview with spokesperson of Greek Super League football club, Athens, May 8, 2015.
empowers Deputy Minister of Sport to take disciplinary measures against sports teams and federations, in an attempt to counter the reluctance of sports federations and sports teams alike to self-regulate the issue of sports-related violence.

I.1.3.4. NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Greek legislation incriminates specific acts of non-violent and violent extremism of social, political and religious nature, despite the fact that it does not provide for a definition of the term ‘extremism’. With regard to non-violent extremism, Greece guarantees freedom of expression under Article 14 of its constitution. Yet, some limitations apply to this Article. Newspapers and other print media can be seized if they are found insulting the President of the Republic, Christianity or any other ‘known religions’, or ‘offending public decency’.

Various provisions related to violent and non-violent extremism, which however, cannot be grouped under terrorism and organised crime, are also scattered in the Penal Code. For example, the Penal Code includes (limited) provisions with regard to non-violent extremism, particularly acts related to the acceptance, confession, or preaching of extreme political, social or religious views. More specifically, Article 157 punishes whoever publicly offends the parliament by at least three months of imprisonment. Article 196 incriminates the incitement of the public by a priest against state authority or other citizens and provides for up to three years of imprisonment. Greek Penal Code also includes blasphemy and religious insult provisions under Section 7, entitled ‘Offenses against Religious Peace’. More specifically, Article 198 punishes any public and malicious blasphemy against God by up to two years of imprisonment, and the public manifestation of a lack of respect for the divinity by up to three months of imprisonment. Finally, Article 199 prescribes up to two years’ imprisonment for whoever publicly and maliciously and by any means offends the Greek Orthodox Church or any other tolerable religion in Greece.

Furthermore, Articles 183-197 of the Penal Code criminalise threats to public order. More specifically, Articles 183-186, 190 and 192 provide for the prevention of non-violent extremism that may lead to acts of violence against the public order. Article 183 punishes by a sentence of imprisonment of up to three years the public incitement to disobey the laws of the Greek state. Article 184 criminalises the public incitement to commit a felony or misdemeanour, while Article 185 criminalises the public glorification, in any way, of a felony that has been committed, endangering in this way public order. The punishment provided for the perpetration of the abovementioned actions is up to three years of imprisonment. Article 186 punishes by a sentence of imprisonment of up to three months the incitement or encouragement, in any form, to commit a felony and the positive response to such incitement/encouragement. Article 190 provides a sentence of imprisonment of up to two years for whoever threatens to commit felonies or misdemeanours, instilling, in this way, terror or uneasiness among the citizens. Article 192 punishes the public incitement of violence among the citizens and the subsequent disturbance of public peace by a sentence of up to two years of imprisonment.

With regards to violent extremism, Articles 157-160 of the Penal Code define sentences for the perpetration of crimes against political bodies and the Government, while Articles 161-166 punish crimes committed in elections. More specifically, Article 157 punishes with a sentence of at least 10 years of imprisonment whoever violently or with the threat of using violence forces the parliament or the government to breach their legal duties. Article 157A criminalises acts of violence against the offices of political parties and provides for a sentence
of imprisonment of at least one year. Whoever violently or with the threat of using violence interferes with voters in elections can be imprisoned according to Article 161.

Articles 167-182 define sentences for offences against state power. More specifically, Article 167 entitled ‘Resistance’ punishes by a sentence of at least one year of imprisonment whoever, violently or with the threat of using violence, forces any authority or its employees to breach their legal duties. Whoever uses violence against or publicly insults the President of the Republic can be punished with a sentence of three months to life imprisonment, according to Article 168. Article 170 incriminates whoever intentionally participates in an assembly that forces any authority or its employees to breach their legal duties. The punishment for these offences is at least six months of imprisonment. According to the same article, whoever provokes these offences, or violently or with the threat of using violence commits these offences, can receive a sentence of at least two years of imprisonment, unless there is no other chance of successful prosecution for other offence(s). Article 171 punishes insolence against authority by a sentence of imprisonment from six months to a year or a fine. Article 181 defines a sentence of up to two years of imprisonment for whoever offends the flag or other emblem of the state as a manifestation of hate or disregard. Article 189 punishes by up to two years of imprisonment whoever participates in a public assembly, which uses violence against persons or things or illegally intrudes on houses or other properties, while it also punishes by at least three months of imprisonment whoever incites the commission of such offences. Finally, according to Article 195, whoever sets up an armed group, which is not aiming to commit crimes, or supplies it with weapons, or directs it or participates in it can be punished by at least six months of imprisonment.

I.2. POLICY FRAMEWORK

I.2.1. TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME

The development of the Greek legal and policy frame related to radicalisation and terrorism bore the imprint of the Greek civil war (1946-49) and its deep influence in the country’s political system and society from the 1950s onwards. It is well-known that the winners of the right-wing forces prevailed against the communist left, in a bloody war that bequeathed a deep rift between the left and the right, which thoroughly permeated the Greek state and politics in the following decades. An elaborate apparatus of surveillance and security, modelled on its counterpart in the USA, was put in place against the ‘internal enemy’. It was directed against communists and those suspected of leftist leanings, who were viewed as ‘internal enemies’ of the state. The surveillance and security measures were reinforced during the junta years (1967-1974), perpetuating the schism between the ‘clean’ nationally-minded Greeks (ethnikofrones) and the rest of the population who were not nationally-minded (communists, leftists, and sympathisers).

20For example, in the post-1949 period, all civil servants were obliged to sign so-called ‘loyalty statements’ and their refusal to do so constituted proof of disloyalty to the state. Other forms of political control, such as the so-called ‘civic-mindedness’ certificates (pistopioitika koinonikon fronimaton), the repentance statements and loyalty oaths to deny one’s past beliefs and activities, were instituted in the name of protecting the country from the ‘ideological contamination’ by communist and other ideas that were labelled as ‘dangerous’ (Samatas 2014: 54-55). The police kept files on all citizens through mass political surveillance that used hundreds of police informers (Samatas 2014: 57).
The Greek governments’ efforts to deal with the phenomenon of political violence that grew after the country’s transition to democracy in 1974, had as their inescapable context of reference the above post-civil war, anti-communist security apparatus. Apart from distorting parliamentary democracy by curtailing the civil rights and liberties of leftists and sympathisers, this security apparatus left a legacy of deeply rooted suspicion and public mistrust against police surveillance. Such suspicion persisted even after the end of the dictatorship, despite the fact that democratisation reforms had eliminated the extensive powers of the security, military and intelligence agencies, and safeguarded civil protection provisions. The military’s internal security functions were also removed and the police was prohibited from entering Greek universities (Borgeas 2013: 164-5). Yet, even as democracy became consolidated in the country in the late 1970s and 1980s, establishing an effective frame of laws and policies to combat political violence and terrorism in Greece, remained highly suspect and unpalatable for the Greek public at large (Samatas 2014: 54).

Even though the phenomena of terrorism and political violence in Greece had emerged in the 1970s, terrorism was not perceived as a serious threat, or as a political priority, until the 1990s (Karyotis 2007: 272). Therefore, the adoption of legal tools in the post-1974 period to deal with terrorist actions became highly contentious and a point of strong disagreement among political parties, especially between the two main parties, the centre-right New Democracy (ND) and the centre-left PASOK. Since the 1970s, Greek policy approach to dealing with terrorism has evolved in three phases, progressively towards the recognition of terrorism as a security threat. During the first phase (1974-1989), Greek political elites and authorities failed to recognise the significance of terrorism and the threat that it posed. The second phase (1989-1999) was characterised by intense political debate and saw the first, albeit largely unsuccessful attempts, to counter it. The third phase (1999 onwards) marked the securitisation of terrorism, namely, its undisputed recognition as a cardinal security threat for the Greek state and society (Karyotis 2007: 276).

In formulating the basic anti-terrorist policy tools, a main issue of disagreement was whether to rely on existing tools of criminal law, which covered crimes such as assault and homicide, in order to deal with terrorist attacks; or, conversely, whether to institute legislation specifically designed to target the phenomenon of terrorism. While ND was in favour of legislation specifically tailored to counter terrorism, PASOK was opposed to special measures on the grounds that they would curtail the civil rights gained through post-1974 democratisation. It was against strong political opposition that the ND government passed Law 774 in 1979, which defined a number of terrorist-related felonies, including those of providing refuge to terrorists, and a financial incentive program for informants, among others. When PASOK came to power in 1981, it repealed Law 774, which, it characterised as ‘undemocratic’ and ‘tyrannical’, and claimed that it reinstated the suppressive policies of the junta (Borgeas 2013: 183-184). The assassination of Pavlos Bakoyannis, chief parliamentary spokesperson of ND and son-in-law of its leader, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, as well as the intensification of European cooperation on issues of terrorism in the TREVI working groups, prompted a new initiative to adopt stricter anti-terrorist provisions. A new anti-terrorist ‘Bill for the Protection of Society against Organised Crime’ (Law 1916/1990) was adopted, which increased police powers, offered protection to judges and their families, and increased the reward offered for police informers, among others. Yet, political opposition to this bill remained widespread (Karyotis 2007: 281-282). The continued failure of Greek authorities to capture organisations like N17 remained a sore point that strained Greek-US relations.

The political and policy approach to terrorism began to be fundamentally re-evaluated in the late 1990s. Law 2928/2001 was the first serious attempt to tighten the relevant legislation. According to the Law, as it is in effect after its amendments, offences related to the operation
of terrorist or criminal organisations enable the use of special investigative techniques by the Hellenic Police, which apply for a limited time, when there is serious evidence that a terrorist/criminal action has been committed, and when the disbandment of the organisation is otherwise impossible. These techniques include, among others, the covert surveillance of a terrorist/criminal organisation, provided that the competent public prosecutor of the magistrate’s court has been notified; controlled deliveries; lifting of secrecy; wiretapping and videotaping; cross-matching/comparing personal data; and DNA analysis. However, these measures were fiercely opposed by the minority parties on the left, which insisted that civil liberties were seriously curtailed due to the legalisation of the surveillance of citizens and the immunisation of secret service agents (Karyotis 2007: 283).

Furthermore, according to Article 187B of the Greek Penal Code, in order for the authorities to obtain the information required for the disbandment of terrorist or criminal organisations, or gangs, ‘lenience’ measures are provided for those participating in such organisations or gangs, if they make it possible to prevent the perpetration of any planned crimes or to disband the organisation or gang. These measures can potentially have a de-radicalisation effect for members of such organisations, although this is not explicitly acknowledged by the legislator. In this case, amnesty is granted to whoever provides such information. If they provide information on a crime which has already been committed with their participation, they are punished with a reduced sentence, or their sentence can be suspended by up to ten years.

Given the fact that the 2004 Athens Olympic Games were the first Games to be organised after 9/11, unprecedented security measures had to be employed. Indeed, the 2004 Athens Olympics was the largest security operation in peacetime Europe (Samatas 2007). Greece created the most extensive and expensive security infrastructure in the history of the Olympic Games and the Greek government signed 38 security agreements with 23 countries (Tsoukala 2006). Hence, the tightening up of the relevant legislation was accompanied by an increase in security spending. Reportedly, Greece invested over 1.5 billion dollars on security for the 2004 Olympic Games (Kollias et al 2009: 791). Large sums of money were invested in police training, infrastructure (including against nuclear, chemical and biological attacks provided by Russia), surveillance (around 255 million dollars was spent on an advanced C4I surveillance system), and the development of intelligence networks (Kollias et al 2009: 791).

In 2000, Greece established a seven nation Olympic Advisory Group, 21 which actively participated in intelligence exchange and the training of Greek security forces in dealing with transnational terrorism (Kollias et al 2009: 798). Within this context, around 50,000 persons received security training. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation agreements on terrorism were signed with many countries, including the US and Turkey. Additionally, the anti-terrorist squad was reorganised following the visits of counter-terrorism experts in Britain and the US for retraining in surveillance techniques and bombing analysis (Karyotis 2007: 285). Even the Greek Army was called on to contribute in domestic security during the Games, the first time that it did so since democracy was restored in the country back in 1974. 22 Finally, NATO provided AWACS planes for air policing and naval vessels for the patrol of Greece’s extraterritorial waters, while the UN International Atomic Energy Agency provided assistance against radiological dispersion devices (Kollias et al 2009: 798). These measures were received

21 Members of the group were the USA, the UK, Germany, Israel, Australia, France and Spain.
by the Greek public opinion with regular, small-scale and generally non-violent protests.\textsuperscript{23} After the end of the Olympic Games, Greece drastically reduced its security infrastructure, while specialised in domestic security officers were transferred from the counter-terrorism unit to other services (Borgeas 2013).

\textbf{1.2.2. HATE SPEECH AND HATE CRIME}

Right-wing extremism and violence are largely directed against immigrants who enter in and/or settle in Greece. Far-right extremists exploit popular fears by propagating views of immigrants as undesirable or as ‘criminals’, and advancing a racist discourse. In view of the rising number of incidents against immigrants since 2010, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice has included the elimination of racism and intolerance in the 2014-2016 National Action Plan. The main goal of the programme has been the ‘prevention and active suppression of endemic racism and xenophobia’ in Greece.

In late 2012, the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection established the Departments and Offices for Combating Racist Violence within the Hellenic Police to monitor and tackle racist violence. They are responsible for receiving anonymous complaints regarding incidents of racist violence, carrying out in-depth investigations into racist attacks, and opening an investigation ex officio. However, in its 2015 report on Greece, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe has criticised the effectiveness of this measure on a number of grounds: the absence of interpreters for the users of the hotline; the lack of assistance to the victims with respect to the reporting process; the exclusion from monitoring and investigation of other forms of discrimination too, such as on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; and the victims’ lack of trust in the staff of these Departments and Offices, which have been recruited from within the Hellenic Police. Indeed, fear of arrest and deportation discourages victims of racist violence, who are irregular migrants in Greece, from reporting incidents to the authorities.

Over the past couple of years, a number of other provisions and policy measures have been adopted to combat far-right extremism and to promote the integration of immigrants in Greek society. A Public Prosecutor for the prosecution of acts of racist violence was appointed in October 2013. In 2013, the Greek Parliament changed the rules for the public financing of political parties, which can now be cancelled in case a party’s leaders, or 10% of its MPs, are found guilty of involvement in a criminal organisation or acts of terrorism, an offence for which the far-right party of the Golden Dawn has been accused and for which it currently stands trial. Finally, Law 3852/2010 provided for the establishment of Immigrant Integration Councils at the local government level. However, such councils are in practice operating in less than five municipalities across the country. These councils can potentially provide a fertile ground for dialogue between different migrant communities and the municipal authorities, and serve as a valuable integration tool. These councils could also play a counter-racism and/or counter-Islamism role, although their establishment was not based on such concerns.

\textbf{1.2.3. HOOLIGANISM}

\textsuperscript{23} ‘More protests in Athens’, \textit{USA Today}. Available at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/summer/athens/2004-03-02-athens-protest_x.htm
During the 1980s and 1990s, the only counter-hooliganism policy measure that was applied was the strong mobilisation of police anti-riot units to control and repress violent behaviour by football fans. This measure has been frequently criticised due to the fact that instead of safeguarding an acceptable level of order during a sports event, it provoked, in several cases, the escalation of violence (Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013: 186). Prior to the 2004 Athens Olympics, Law 2725/1999 introduced the installation of CCTV systems in football stadia. Additionally, Law 3057/2002 and Ministerial Decision 62038/2005 established an ‘e-tickets’ system, which enabled the allocation of registered tickets among supporters and their electronic distribution. The main idea behind the latter measure was the control of ticket allocation in football grounds, and the record of supporters’ personal details, particularly the ‘hard-core’ ones who occupy football ground terraces behind the goalposts.

Law 2403/1989 already provided for the establishment of a CCTV system in stadia, but did not include any details regarding the operation of this system. Law 2725/1999 clarified the technicalities of the system, and stated that it must be installed in all stadia where professional football matches take place. Yet, the measure was not put into effect. In this regard, Law 3057/2002 reintroduced the same clauses and reinforced the application of the measure. It provided for the cancellation of professional matches that take place in football grounds, which were not equipped with the CCTV system. The actual installation of the CCTV system in football grounds did not start before May 2007.24 This was after a consensus was reached with respect to the control of the systems by the police. However, during the last football season (2014-2015), approximately half of the football grounds in the first division (Super League), were either not equipped with the CCTV system, or the system was not operational due to lack of maintenance.25

The ‘e-ticket’ system was introduced at the same time with the CCTV, and its aim was to complement the latter in the fight against hooliganism. The operation of the ‘e-ticket’ system requires each spectator to register his/her name electronically, which allows for the automatic allocation of a numbered seat in the stadium. Thus, each supporter is entitled to a single ticket, which can be purchased only through the registration of the supporter’s ID number and personal details. However, in practice, the ‘e-ticket’ system was particularly complex and non-transparent (Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013: 187). According to the prevailing practice, Greek football clubs allocate a predefined number of low-price tickets behind the goalposts to organised football fans. This habit survived even after the installation of the ‘e-ticket’ system, but the price of these tickets increased in order to cover the clubs’ functional expenses. In reality, though, this economic surplus was distributed among the leaders of supporters’ clubs, creating in this way obscure relations between the clubs’ owners and the organised football fans (Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013: 188). By extension, another consequence of this measure was that it facilitated the gathering of hard-core organised football fans at either ends of football grounds, which practically created hotbeds of violence behind the goalposts. Furthermore, in the previous football season (2014-2015), approximately half of the football grounds in the first division were not equipped with the ‘e-ticket’ system.26 Finally, and most importantly, even in the grounds that the ‘e-ticket’ system is installed, it is not operating in the

24Interview with DEAV official, Athens, May 12, 2015.
25Interview with DEAV official, Athens, May 12, 2015.
way that it should be, as the personal details of the fans on the ticket are not checked against their IDs upon entry into the stadium.\textsuperscript{27}

A third counter-hooliganism preventive measure entails the transformation of the organised supporters’ clubs into supporters’ societies that will operate under the supervision of the football clubs. These societies will be obliged to keep records of their members’ personal details, and check their criminal records, among others. The first, unsuccessful attempt to transform the organised supporters’ clubs was made ten years ago by the Greek Commission of Professional Sports, an auditing body that belongs to the Sports Ministry. Similar attempts have been made in 2008 through Law 3708/2008, and 2012 through Law 4049/2012, yet, both of them have been unsuccessful, as the changes were never implemented in reality. A fourth attempt to transform organised supporters’ clubs into supporters’ societies is being made at the moment of writing this report. Currently, football clubs do not have overt relations with organised supporters’ clubs and deny the existence of any such relations, overt or otherwise,\textsuperscript{28} despite frequent allegations of the opposite.\textsuperscript{29}

Apart from the deployment of anti-riot police before, during and after sports matches, other counter-hooliganism preventive measures, include the case-by-case ban of organised supporters from attending their team’s away games, the police escort of sports teams to and from the match venue, and the employment of private security companies in sports venues. However, the latter measure has received heavy criticism. Football clubs, allegedly, prefer to hire private security guards for the protection of sports venues during matches through the pool of their organised supporters.\textsuperscript{30}

\section*{1.3. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING}

The Council for the Coordination of Analysis and Research operates under the direct supervision of the Minister in the Ministry of Citizen Protection and Public Order and deals with organised crime and terrorism. It is chaired by a public prosecutor and has six senior or high-ranking officers of the Hellenic Police as members. The tasks of the Council include the study and analysis of the forms of organised crime and terrorism; the systematic study and analysis of the elements of such crimes; the elaboration of projects and the provision of directions for the suitable organisation of the prosecuting authorities; the training and further education of the relevant authorities’ personnel in the effective combat of these criminal activities; and the prevention of the import to Greece of such criminal activities from abroad. Furthermore, the Council can have access to all evidence in the briefs with regard to such criminal activities, at any stage of the proceedings (CODEXTER 2012). It cooperates directly with the competent departments of the security services and cooperates continuously with the Director of the Directorate for Combating Special Violent Crimes (in Greek ‘DAEEV’) in order to deal with organised crime and terrorism. Finally, the public prosecutor who chairs the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27}Interview with spokesperson of Greek Super League football club, Athens, May 8, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{28}Interview with spokesperson of Greek Super League football club, Athens, May 8, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{29}Souliotis, G., ‘They were ordering drugs along with match tickets’, \textit{Kathimerini}. [In Greek]. Available at: \url{http://www.kathimerini.gr/453665/article/epikairothta/ellada/mazi-me-ta-eisithria-agwnwn-paraggelnan-kai-narkwtika}.
\item \textsuperscript{30}‘Stadia security – When they place the wolf to guard the sheep’, \textit{To Vima}. [In Greek]. Available at: \url{http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=386627}; Lambropoulos, V., ‘Fights between stewards in the sound of music’, \textit{To Vima}. [In Greek]. Available at: \url{http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=352943}
\end{itemize}
Council, supervises and assists the work of the competent police authorities in countering organised crime and terrorism. S/he is also appointed as national correspondent for terrorist matters at EUROJUST.

DAEEV operates directly under the supervision of the Head of the Hellenic Police. The mission of the Directorate, according to Law 2800/2000, is to counter terrorist and extremist acts that are directed against national security and democratic polity. It includes, among others, the Department for Combating Internal Terrorism; the Department for Combating International Terrorism; and the Department for Combating Other Violent Crimes. According to Presidential Decree 107/2007, the Department for Combating Internal Terrorism is responsible for seeking, collecting, processing and using information about the criminal activities against both domestic and foreign targets of native and foreign persons, and, particularly, of organised groups, while it is also responsible for monitoring such activities. The Department for Combating International Terrorism is responsible for seeking, collecting, processing and using information about the criminal activities of native and foreign persons who reside temporarily in Greece, and of organised groups. It is also responsible for monitoring their activities and relations with other persons/groups abroad and for monitoring criminal acts that are directed against both domestic and foreign targets. Finally, DAEEV is responsible for seeking, collecting, processing and using information about violent extremist persons or groups. It is also responsible for monitoring such acts, for studying the modus operandi of such persons/groups and for devising preventive and/or counter-measures against them.

With specific regard to the financing of terrorism, a new authority has been established according to Law 3932/2011, entitled ‘Anti-money Laundering, Counter-terrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigation Authority’. Its aim is to combat the legalisation of proceeds from criminal activities and terrorist financing, assist in security and sustainability of fiscal and financing stability. The Authority collects, investigates and analyses suspicious transaction reports. The Authority comprises of three independent units reporting directly to the Chairman, who is an acting public prosecutor to the Supreme Court: the Financial Intelligence Unit, which deals with money laundering issues; the Financial Sanctions Unit, which deals with terrorist financing and is responsible, among others, for the freezing of assets of persons or legal entities designated by the competent authorities of the United Nations and the European Union due to their interference with terrorism; the designation of domestic persons and legal entities involved in terrorism, the creation and updating of a relevant list and the freezing of their assets (CODEXTER 2012). The third unit of the Authority is the Source of Funds Investigation Unit.

Furthermore, the Intelligence Management and Analysis Division operates under the auspices of the Hellenic Police. Its mission is to collect, evaluate, classify and disseminate information regarding all kinds of criminality, and particularly terrorism and organised crime. It is also responsible for creating and updating special databases, in which the aforementioned material is stored.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) (in Greek ‘EYP’) is an autonomous public civilian service that comes under the authority of the Minister of Citizen Protection. Within the context of the Constitution and according to Law 3649/2008, the mission of NIS is to seek, collect, process and communicate to competent authorities information about protecting and promoting the country’s political, economic, military and overall national strategic interests; preventing and dealing with activities that constitute threats against the democratic polity, fundamental human rights, the territorial integrity and national security of the Greek state, as well as the country’s national wealth; and preventing and dealing with activities of terrorist organisations and organised crime groups. NIS comprises the Central Service and the Regional Units. The Central Service consists of Directorates, Sub-directorates, Sections, Autonomous
Sections and Autonomous Offices. The Regional Units comprise services, bodies and liaisons established or placed in various areas of Greece or abroad.

With regards to hate speech and crime, Presidential Decree 132/2012 established two Departments for Combating Racist Violence under the Athens and Thessaloniki Subdivisions of State Security of the Divisions of Security, and sixty-eight Offices for Combating Racist Violence under the Subdivisions of Security and their respective Departments across Greece. The aim of the Departments is to prevent and combat criminal acts against persons or groups on the grounds of ethnic or national origin or religion. They collect, process and use information about racist incidents or the preparation of committing racist crimes; they coordinate and guide the Offices for Combating Racist Violence locally; they cooperate with the competent state authorities and civil society actors; they assist other authorities and actors in combating racist violence; they monitor specific areas, where there is high risk for the occurrence of racist violence; they cooperate with international organisations and representatives of vulnerable social groups; they record the incidents of racist violence that they deal with; they inform the victims of racist violence about their rights; they assist victims in receiving health and psychological support when needed; they inform the competent prosecutor about incidents of racist violence; in extreme cases, they inform the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and they compile an annual report about the cases of racist violence that they dealt with, which is submitted to the 1st Department of Social Issues and Combating Racism of the Division of State Security of the Headquarters of the Hellenic Police.

The 1st Department of Social Issues and Combating Racism cooperates with competent state and non-state actors in Greece and the EU. It studies the phenomenon of racist violence in Greece and records incidents of racist violence and evaluates the annual report of the Departments for Combating Racist Violence. It also compiles an annual report regarding the reported incidents of racist violence and represents the Hellenic Police in international conferences and fora with respect to racism and racist violence.

Finally, with regards to hooliganism, Article 41A of Law 2725/1999 established an independent special committee for countering, monitoring and preventing sports crimes: the Permanent Committee for the Treatment of Violence (in Greek ‘DEAV’). The aim of DEAV is to coordinate actions against sports violence. It operates in the premises of the General Secretariat of Sport, and it constitutes the main tool at the disposal of the Greek state in the treatment of sports violence. DEAV monitors the phenomenon of violence in sports events with the assistance of 220 observers across Greece, who compile reports every week, which are submitted to the competent authorities. DEAV can propose, in cooperation with the police and the sport federations, extra public order measures on the pretext of a specific sport event of high risk. Moreover, it is responsible for the study of the phenomenon of sports violence, the monitoring of the implementation of all relevant laws, rules and regulations regarding sports crimes, and for making policy recommendations. Finally, DEAV also has the responsibility to cooperate with the media in order to promote peaceful participation in sports.

Article 20 of Presidential Decree 42/2011 established the Division for the Treatment of Violence in Sports Facilities. It operates under the supervision of the General Police Directorate of Attica. The aim of the Division is to prevent and counter violence in sports facilities, secure the effective protection of sports teams across the country and abroad, and improve the cooperation between the Hellenic Police and sports teams, fans associations, sports federations, and the competent authorities in Greece and abroad, primarily through the exchange of information, opinions and recommendations. The Division is organised in two Departments: first, the Department for the Protection of Sports is responsible for the collection, evaluation and utilisation of information regarding the level of risk of each sports event. Moreover, the
Department is responsible for identifying and arresting sports crimes suspects, and for assisting other police services in preventing and countering violence in sports facilities. Secondly, the Department for the Protection of Sports Teams is responsible for the escort of sports teams in their away games across Greece and abroad, if necessary.

A system of justice in sports exists within the general legal system. It defines two levels of jurisdiction for disputes and cases in sports: first, the jurisdictional body of first instance, that is HFF, which is responsible for any issue related to its organisation and operation. HFF consists of a three-member disciplinary committee appointed by its board of directors for a term of two years. The jurisdiction of the tribunal of first instance is to hear cases concerning bribery in sports, objections to the result of a match and disciplinary violations. Second, the Supreme Council of Dispute Resolution in Sports acts as a ‘court of appeal’ regarding the decisions of the jurisdictional body of first instance. According to article 121 of Sports Law 2725/1999, the judgments of the jurisdictional body of first instance, and the decisions of the sports federations and the disciplinary bodies of sports clubs can be appealed to the Supreme Council of Dispute Resolution in Sports. Furthermore, a special Public Prosecutor is appointed in the districts of Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki, who is competent for the prosecution of sport crimes. Finally, the Courts of Civil Justice are responsible for those disputes, which are of a private law nature, in cases of further demands.

---

31 It is provided for with Law 2725/1999.
II.1. BACKGROUND

In the year 1974, the military regime that had ruled Greece for the preceding 7 years (1967-1974) fell from power. The regime transition that simultaneously ensued marked the establishment of Greece’s contemporary political system, as well as the beginning of a longer-term process of democratic consolidation and political stability. In a referendum held in December 1974, the majority of Greeks (almost 70%) decided in favour of abolishing the monarchy, and a full-fledged parliamentary democracy and its constitutional structures were established. At the same time, the year 1974 also marked the onset of a period of growing political violence both from the far-left and from the extreme right, which continues until today. The nascent regime’s rupture with the pre-1974 political system did not bring a rupture with the political and social legacy of the civil war, which remained vibrant. The grievances, visions and professed goals that animated domestic far-left terrorism, and the individuals and groups who comprised the extra-parliamentary left, were thoroughly linked to the exclusion and persecution that the communist left had suffered in the aftermath of the civil war.

At the same time, the emergence of far-right political violence in the post-1974 period was linked to the pre-1974 construction of a state security apparatus. This apparatus had been established and put in the service of combating communism, and generally in the service of combating anyone who was considered ‘an enemy of the state’. Following the 1974 transition, the conflicts that ensued over the process of clearing up the state bureaucracy, the police apparatus and the political system of junta supporters were central in the constitution of an extreme right-wing space that continued to develop well into the period of democracy.

A critical juncture for the rise of domestic far-left terrorism was marked by the events of November 1973, when a university student movement, in protest against the military regime, occupied the Athens’ Polytechnic School. The student uprising in the Polytechnic did not cause the downfall of the junta, which would soon fall under the weight of other domestic and external factors, but it was suppressed by the military regime’s forces. Their clashes with the students exposed the regime’s brutal methods and encouraged extreme left faith in violent action (Kassimeris 2005: 747-8). The November 1973 occupation of the Polytechnic School exerted a tremendous symbolic influence and opened up a period in which radical communist and revolutionary ideas and debates flourished.

In the immediate months and years following the 1974 transition, the complex dynamics and developments in the left and far-left side of the political spectrum resulted in a critical and deep division between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary left. Soon after the 1974 democratic transition, radical leftist ideas and strategies were espoused by a large number of groups – Trotskyist, Maoist, anarchist. They advanced a rhetoric of social revolution to denounce and seek to subvert the country’s nascent constitutional structures. Maoist and Trotskyist groups were ambivalent about engaging in parliamentary politics, or they simply gained limited electoral support to be able to do so. They believed in the need for a vanguard party that would go to the people to raise their class consciousness and politicise the masses through bold proletariat action such as demonstrations, strikes and other kinds of acts. This, it was believed, would prepare the ground for a revolution to overthrow bourgeois capitalism and
American imperialism, with which the 1967-74 military dictatorship was associated – all on the road to establishing a classless society.

Maoists and Trotskyist groups were critical of the metapolitefsi (the post-74 transition to a multi-party democracy). They also accused the parliamentary Left, namely the communist party KKE, for opting for reformism, namely, for giving up its revolutionary character to embrace social democracy. Being strongly polemical of the centre-right government of Konstantinos Karamanlis, they viewed the multi-party parliamentary system as ‘junta by another name’, mainly because it arguably sheltered junta supporters and continued to bow into American imperialism. The revolutionary left’s space though remained thoroughly fragmented and divided over issues of ideology and tactics, and it was therefore unable to form a united front (Kassimeris 2005: 750-752).

For most part though, the extra-parliamentary left did not resort to a violent type of radicalism, even if its tactics were sometimes disruptive and crossed over the line of legality. While Maoists and Trotskyists accepted extra-parliamentary and semi-legal kinds of action to advance the revolutionary cause, they did not employ militant and violent action, despite the fact that the issue had been thoroughly debated within the various organisations (Kassimeris 2005: 756). By the late 1970s, when it became clear that the modern-day Bolshevik revolution that they dreamed of was not forthcoming, many Maoists and Trotskyists gave up their radical vision. Some of the more militant Marxists though broke away and joined or formed extremist groups that vowed to promote the revolutionary cause through urban terrorism (Kassimeris 2005: 757). It was the radicalisation of those fringe groups that underpinned what would become a long-term and difficult to dismantle phenomenon of ‘red terrorism’ in Greece.

In the same climate of exuberant social movement activism of the 1970s, there was a proliferation of a broader range of leftist and various cultural organisations, as well as groups of university students, in which youth was politicised. They also expressed opposition towards the newly installed democratic government, as well as disappointment with the Communist party’s incorporation in the parliamentary system (Kitis 2015: 6-7). In the 1980s, a punk subculture also rose around music bands, concerts and alternative festivals in Greece, and it became an expression of resistance against authority, the police, the education system, religion, the family and other institutions. The Athens district of Exarchia became the epicentre of this punk subculture, which became increasingly more politicised. It resisted against police clampdowns, and promoted anti-establishment ideas and confrontational practices such as graffiti, drugs, rioting and delinquent behaviour. The emergence of anarchism that provided the ideational background for the second generation of terrorists in the 2000s has its origins in this osmosis between the movements of the extra-parliamentary left and the youth subcultures of the 1980s (Kitis 2015: 8-10).

If the emergence of far-left extremism in post-74 Greece seemed a likely continuity with the earlier struggles against the dictatorship and the anti-communist state, the expectation in regard to far-right extremism was discontinuity. As in the other south European countries like Portugal and Spain, which had experienced long periods of dictatorship until the 1970s, it was

---

32The main Maoist groups were the Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece (Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Kinima Elladas, EKKE), and the Organisation of Marxists-Leninists of Greece (Organossi Marxiston-Leniniston Elladas, OMLE). The main Trotskyist groups were the Organisation of Socialist Revolution (Organossi Sossialisistik Epanastasi, OSE), the Organisation of Communist Internationalists of Greece (Organossi Kommouniston Diethniston Elladas, OKDE), and the Communist Revolutionary Front (Kommounistiko Epanastatiko Metopo, KEM).

33The United Left (Enomeni Aristera, UL) won a high 9.5% of the vote in the 1974 elections. The UL however, soon dissolved into the pro-Moscow communist party (KKE) and the European-oriented communists (KKE-es).
assumed that having lived under a dictatorship would render right-wing extremism aversive to the public. Despite the fact that the possibilities for its emergence were underestimated, post-1974 right-wing extremism became far from extinct in post-junta Greece. It was nurtured in the terrain of conflict and struggle over ‘de-juntification’, namely, the process of clearing up the newly established state structures and the political personnel from individuals associated with the fascist period. While the leftist groups saw the centre-right ND government (in power between 1975-1980) as not making sufficient efforts to achieve ‘de-juntification’, far-right groups sought to preserve the presence of extreme right-wing individuals in the new regime’s state and government structures. In the years following the democratic transition, far right groups perpetrated a number of violent incidents, including bombings (Kassimeris 2005: 750-751).

In the immediate post-1974 period, right-wing extremism was embodied in the political party National Alignment (Ethniki Parataxis, NA), an anti-communist, pro-monarchist and nationally inclined organisation. As it often happens, extremist organisations in each side of the political spectrum (left or right) emerge or conversely fail to appear, largely as a result of the dynamics that develop between the more moderate and the more radical factions and parties. The NA was created through the defection of ultra-conservatives from the centre-right (and governing) party of ND, who were disgruntled by the earlier refusal of ND to support the monarchy. In the 1977 national elections, the NA gained 6.82% of the votes (and 5 seats in parliament) and threatened to weaken ND, which was already losing votes and electoral strength to the rising socialist party of PASOK (Georgiadou 2013: 79). In this antagonistic dynamic, ND managed to absorb the main leaders of the NA into its ranks, without, however, incorporating their political agenda.

At the same time, the ensuing disintegration of the NA led to the appearance of new splinter, right-wing groups, such as the National Political Union (EPEN, Ethniki Politiki Enosis), a nationalist organisation that demanded the release of the imprisoned colonels. Its founding had been announced by the former dictator Georgios Papadopoulos from inside of prison. Even though EPEN registered limited electoral support in the 1980s, it exerted significant political and ideological influence in the extreme right-wing camp. Overall, all right-wing extremist organisations of the post-1974 period, such as NA, EPEN and the Progressive Party (Komma ton Fileleftheron, PP) were political parties and organisations of the ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ kind of right-wing extremism. They maintained close ties to the military dictatorship of the 1967-1974 period, calling for the release of imprisoned junta officials (Psarras 2014: 8). The post-1974 far-right though that had these ties as its main defining element was characteristic of an era that came to an end by the 1990s (Georgiadou 2013: 81). From the 1990s onwards, the rising influx of immigrants into Greece formed a new context and a fertile ground for the rise of a new kind of right-wing extremism.

II.1.2. IDEOLOGY AND IDEAS

Left- and right-wing extremists lack a coherent set of ideas and ideological orientations. To be sure, the ideas that groups in each side of political extremism espouse display a certain degree of affinity. At the same time, they significantly differ in content and in intensity, as well as in the extent to which they deploy violence in discourse and action. The ideological profile of each organisation differs depending on the particular amalgam of ideas that each group holds and promotes. An element that commonly characterises right- and left-wing extremists alike is their profound disillusionment with and critique of the established political system. In this regard, both the radical left and the radical right are presented as alternative political stances,
and as vehicles of protest and uncompromising opposition to the political establishment. The more integrated a political party is in the parliamentary system, the less likely it is to endorse extremist ideas and violent methods. This commonly encountered dissociation between parliamentary politics and radical militancy though, does not apply in the case of the GD.

Post-1974 left-wing extremism and terrorism in Greece is commonly divided into two ‘generations’, which differ in the ideas and ideologies that they espouse, as well as in the tactics that they employ. The first generation of ‘red terrorism’ comprised groups and organisations that held traditional Marxist-Leninist ideas. They believed in the desirability and inevitability of capitalism’s overthrow, the subversion of bourgeois institutions, and in the creation of a classless society through perpetual class struggle. Many of these groups had also a strong internationalist orientation, seeing themselves as part of the global revolutionary movement. The urban guerrilla groups that emerged in 1974 and after, like November 17 (N17) and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas, ELA) – the two most important ones in this category – shared many of the ideas of the Maoist and Trotskyist groups of the extra-parliamentary left described in the previous section. Yet, they differed in one critical respect: they did not only imagine and debate the road of armed struggle, but they actually decided to actively engage in it.

This tipping point in the radical left from ideas and ideology into violent action is a critical threshold that is common to processes of radicalisation more broadly. It was the decision to deploy violence that marked a key division among groups in the extra-parliamentary left, between those that opposed the use of violence (the Maoist and Trotskyist groups described in the previous section) on the one hand, and the militant leftists who believed in the necessity of violent confrontation. Urban guerrilla groups, such as ELA and N17 shared a categorical rejection of reformism, and rejected the possibility to build socialism from within the established system and through peaceful parliamentary processes. They also advanced a sharp critique of the Communist party KKE that had arguably poorly served the interests of the working class (Kassimeris 2005). For the militant far leftist groups, meaningful revolutionary change was seen to require not merely educating the masses, but an armed vanguard of professional revolutionaries to fight against imperialism, capitalism and fascism in all its forms. Traditional Marxism-inspired militants in Greece were following and were influenced by far-left terrorism in Western Europe, such as the Brigade Rosse in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof in West Germany.

The second generation of leftist militant organisations that emerged in the 2000s share a number of commonalities with the first generation, but they are also markedly different from the latter. While the second generation draws ideological inspiration from the traditional Marxist-Leninist ideas of the first generation guerrilla groups, they view themselves not as Marxist, but as ‘anarcho-revolutionaries’. Their goal is not to bring about a proletariat revolution or to establish a classless society, but to express their rejection of and protest against the society’s dominant values more broadly. The vast array of the anarchist press in Greece suggests that the ‘anti-authoritarian’ groups are influenced by and draw from a highly diverse medley of ideas. Apart from Marxism-Leninism and Trotskyism, these encompass post-Marxism and post-colonialism, feminism, May-68, the hippies’ counterculture, the punk subculture, avant-garde art and queer liberation, among others (Kitis 2015: 11). The main defining feature of Greek anarchism is a vague ideology of non-conformism, encompassing the rejection of mainstream society and anything that is considered reformist.

As already indicated in the beginning of this section, the ideas advanced by the ‘old’ right-wing groups and parties of the post-1974 period expressed opposition to communism, as well as support and nostalgia for the monarchy, combined with a strong belief in the supremacy
and homogeneity of the Greek nation. Yet, the ideological profile of right-wing extremism shifted in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Table 1 below shows a classification of far-right parties based on their ideas and ideology, along two axes: old v. new, and radical/populist v. extremist. Scholars like Cas Mudde (2007) have drawn a distinction between radical/populist parties of the far-right that accept and operate within the structures of liberal democracy (even if sometimes they are ambivalent in this regard), and extremist right-wing parties that reject the established system of parliamentary democracy.

In this scheme, the political party of Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikos Orthodox Synagermos, LAOS) that appeared in 2000 can be characterised as an ethno-nationalist and populist party. LAOS championed typical right-wing ideas, such as an emphasis on the Greek nation, which it combined with anti-Semitism and a strong opposition to immigration. While it sought to tone down some of these ideas as it moved into parliamentary politics and government power, significant ambiguity marked the political ideas and style of LAOS. Respect for religion and Orthodox Christianity also featured centrally in LAOS’ ideological arsenal.

On the other hand, the extremist far-right type is embodied in the political party of GD that was the successor of LAOS in 2010. In building itself as an ‘ideological movement’, the GD, unlike LAOS, draws heavily from National Socialism, the symbols of which – such as the swastika – it uses. Its ideological affinity to National Socialism is accompanied by a strong dose of anti-Semitism, along with references to ancient Greece. While officially denying links to fascism, the GD party manifesto of 2012 projects its core belief to be the Greek nation, which is understood in thoroughly racial terms (Psarras 2014: 22). In this notion of the Greek nation defined in terms of ‘race, blood and ancestry’, immigrants are viewed as a threat to its racial homogeneity and national integrity.

Unlike previous extreme right organisations in Greece that displayed close ties to Orthodoxy (i.e. LAOS), the GD has an ambivalence towards religion. While it professes allegiance to Christianity, it also flirts with the ‘followers of the ancient Greek religion’. Along the lines of national socialist ideology, religion is endorsed as long as it does not obstruct the pursuit of national and racial goals (Psarras 2014: 24).

---

34After the 2012 election, most bishops and their presiding archbishop pronounced themselves against the GD and warned their parishes against the GD propaganda. The three Orthodox bishops who have been on the side of the GD are Ambrose of Kalavryta, Andreas of Dryinoupolis, and Seraphim of Piraeus (Psarras 2014: 26).
### Table 1: Classification of Greek right-wing parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right-wing radical or populist parties</th>
<th>Old parties</th>
<th>New Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance <em>(Ethniki Parataksis)</em></td>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPEN</td>
<td>Golden Dawn <em>(Chrysi Avgi)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A distinctive and particularly strong anti-Europeanism permeates the GD’s political discourse and narrative. It surfaces in the claim that the EU is the one to blame for the economic crisis, which arguably imposed the austerity measures in Greece, threatening its national sovereignty. At the same time, in the eyes of the GD, immigrants are ‘enemies of nation’ and the other party to blame for the economic crisis and unemployment in Greece (Georgiadou 2014: 109). Maintaining a racially pure, homogeneous and sovereign nation is the aim of the GD (in reality, establishing such an entity that it did not exist before).

In recent years, the GD has shifted from an emphasis on traditional nationalist right issues, combined with racism and violent activities, to a new anti-immigration and pro-security agenda (Dinas et al. 2013: 10). It has also sought to moderate its ideological profile and to discard the neo-Nazi image that the party had previously projected. However, even this watered-down ideological profile is significantly more extreme than that of most right-wing parties in Europe. The strong emphasis that the GD continues to place on National Socialism and its strong ideological affinity to Nazism have differentiated it but also alienated it from other right-wing parties in Europe. Its ideological extremism lies in the fact that, unlike these parties, the GD adopts a biological conception of nationalism reminiscent of Nazi ideology (Ellinas 2015: 4).

The second characteristic that differentiates and alienates the GD from other right-wing parties in Europe is its close association with violence, which is not confined to the party base but also involves the party’s leadership. Violence is glorified by the GD. It is not only a means that the GD uses to pursue its ends, but it is an inherent feature of its ideology and main slogans such as “*Aima, Timi, Chrysi Avgi*” (Blood, Honor, Golden Dawn). Violence is not only deployed as a means of confrontation with perceived enemies, but it also glorified as a symbol of power to attract supporters and voters (Ellinas 2013: 7).

---

35 Adopted from Georgiadou (2013: 84).
II.1.3. ORGANISATIONAL FORMS AND ACTORS

II.1.3.1. FAR-LEFT RADICALISATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Many far-leftist militant groups have made their appearance since the mid-1970s, but few have exhibited regular activism and a long-term presence. There is no comprehensive or reliable data on the number of far-leftist militant groups that exist, or how many are their members. Only between June 2002 and December 2014, data collected by former U.S. diplomat in Greece Brady Kiesling records nearly 100 leftist militant groups that have engaged in violent attacks in Greece. A large number of attacks is not claimed by any group. The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents shows that out of the 701 recorded terrorist incidents predominantly by far-leftist or anarchist groups that occurred in Greece between 1974 and 2010, four out of ten did not have a known perpetrator (42.08%). Another 40% of the attacks are claimed by a large number of groups (over 100), which engaged in a violent act only once or twice and in a few cases up to five times. Only five organisations claimed responsibility for more than 10 attacks each, and only 3 organisations had engaged in more than 25 recorded attacks each (the ELA, N17, and Revolutionary Struggle).

Even though it is not comprehensive, and possibly not fully reliable, the above data shows the overall organisational contours of the far-left militant landscape in Greece: a highly fragmented space, populated by numerous groups, many of which never claim responsibility for an act of violence that they commit (and thus do not become publicly visible), and many that appear with a violent incident only once or twice. Many of the perpetrators of the large number of violent attacks are possibly factions or fronts of other larger and more established organisations. Moreover, in terms of the demographics profile of those who comprise the aforementioned actors, recent statistics provided by the Hellenic Police show that arrested individuals for terrorist acts are usually male, Greek nationals, 25-34 years old (see ANNEX II, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8).

The amount of political violence originating from far-left groups has remained high and even rose from the 1970s until the 2000s, as data on number of attacks from the GTD. The GTD records 1169 incidents between February 1973 and December 2014 of far-left political violence in Greece. The number of incidents has hiked in particular years and periods of time, as in 1977-78, in 1989-1990, less so in 1998-99, while saw the highest peak in 2008. The GTD though, as well as the EUROPOL Terrorism Reports, do not record attacks by far-right groups, largely due to the fact that such data was not recorded by the Greek state itself until 2012.

The two most prominent and active far-left militant groups of the first generation with a long-term presence were the ELA and N17. Belief in the necessity of armed struggle, and consequently in the use of violent tactics is what differentiated these groups and led them to break away from the rest of the extra-parliamentary left of the post-74 period. The ELA was the first militant leftist group to emerge in 1974-75. Until the 1990s, it carried out hundreds of non-lethal, low-level bombings directed at symbolic targets, such as US military and business

36Kiesling’s data is on file with the authors of this report.


facilities (i.e. IBM, American Express), European Community and United Nations offices, and foreign embassies (Kassimeris 2005: 758-9). However, and despite its violent rhetoric, the ELA was unwilling to step up its moderate level of violence, which included more symbolic strikes rather than actions aimed to cause bloodshed.

In fact, in 1978, the ELA appeared to be ready to de-escalate its violent tactics and to concentrate on education and propaganda activities through its publication Andipliroforisi (counter-information). It could be conjectured that the use of violent tactics was an issue of ongoing conflict and disagreement among the groups and individuals who comprised the ELA, as its hitherto and subsequent record of actions suggests. In the late 1970s, a hard-line group, the “June ‘78” broke away from the ELA, and went on to assassinate a retired intelligence officer of the junta. However, “June ‘78” vanished after that assassination and did not claim any further actions (Kassimeris 2005: 759-760). The ELA also allied with the group ‘May 1st’ (Proti Mai), and they would later jointly claim responsibility for a 1994 attack against a bus carrying riot policemen, in which one officer died and other sustained serious injuries (Xenaki 2012: 441-2).

By far, the most notorious and deadliest far-left terrorist organisation in post-74 period was N17, self-described as a Marxist-Leninist organisation. N17 made an impressive entry into the leftist militant scene by murdering in 1975 the CIA station chief in Athens. In the next two and a half decades, N17 went on to kill another 22 individuals (including five U.S. embassy employees), in addition to carrying out numerous bombings and a number of bank robberies. The organisation picked its targets on the basis of their perceived connection to the forms of imperialism and corruption – Greek, U.S., British, Turkish, or NATO – against which N17 professed to fight (Xenaki 2012: 442).

As a clandestine group, N17 was organised as a small urban cell and it was armed with pistols, incendiary devices and rockets. Modelled along the lines of democratic centralism, N17 operated through a series of cells consisting of 4-5 members each, with each electing a leader who functioned as a liaison with other cell leaders and the N17 leadership. It had two governing bodies, the ‘Assembly’, which decided the group’s overall strategic direction, and the ‘Executive Secretariat’, the operational branch which decided the actions to be taken by the core cell membership (Abranowicz 2013: 1-2). As outlined by N17 operative Patroklos Tselentis, the group’s recruitment process unfolded in 3 stages, which aimed to secure total secrecy and security of the group: first, courting of a prospective member by an existing member and a first appraisal of his/her ideological potential; secondly, a positive vote by the group to accept the new member in a trial period; and thirdly, only after successful completion of the trial period, a new recruit would join a cell and enter the official hierarchy. As stated, ‘this method of intense secrecy and scrutiny made infiltration of N17 impossible’ (Abranowicz 2013: 2).

The ELA and N17 remained active until the early 2000s, when Greek authorities finally managed to make arrests and start to dismantle them organisationally. N17 began to unravel in June 2002 when a bomb accidentally exploded in the hands of a group member, Savvas Xiros. Eventually, the investigation led to charges levied against 19 groups for membership in N17. In 2003-2005, several individuals were accused of membership in the ELA and put on trial, and about 6 of them were convicted and received prison sentences (Xenaki 2012: 442). The factors, apart from sheer luck, that enabled the Greek authorities to capture N17 after more than 25 years of violent activism have been thoroughly analysed elsewhere (Borgeas 2013). Central among those factors were major shifts in anti-terrorist law and policy after 2000.

The dismantling of violent extremist leftist groups such as the N17 and the ELA in the early 2000s did not signal the end of far-left terrorism. In fact, in 2007 a new round of attacks
was made by a new generation of extremist leftist groups that newly appeared on the scene. After each cycle of arrest, far-left terrorist groups apparently mutated, with non-apprehended members forming new groups that continued along the path of radical violence. For example, it has been questioned whether the capture of suspected members of N17 in 2002 signalled the total dismantling of the notorious organisation; the file of N17 was reopened in 2009 to search for more members who were thought to have evaded arrest. Similarly, it is questioned whether the arrest of the ELA in 1995 marked its end. A year later, in 1996, a new organisation emerged under the name of Revolutionary Nuclei (Epanastatikoi Pyrines, RN), which carried out dozens of low-level bombings of symbolic targets in the second half of the 1990s. Similarities in its operations and in the language of its proclamations led the police to believe that the RN had been formed by former members of the ELA (Xenaki 2012: 453).

While the ideological profile of the second generation of far left militants who appeared in the 2000s reflects a certain degree of continuity with the first generation of ‘red terrorists’, it is also shaped by substantial differences. The new generation of far-left militants was offspring of distinctive conditions of youth socialisation and politicisation that prevailed in the 1980s and in the 1990s. Since the 1980s and the 1990s, the anti-authoritarian movement in Greece expanded. It did so through the creation of self-managed community spaces, such as squatters and social centres, which were often established as a result of occupation of public buildings. In those community spaces, youth found an easy outlet of socialisation, anarchist ideas have freely disseminated, and loyalty and collective identity have been created and reproduced (Kitis 2015: 10-11). The groups and networks that formed became the basis for the emergence of a largely non-violent movement known as the anarchist or anti-authoritarian milieu (choros) in Greece. This movement has its origins in both the extra-parliamentary left and in youth subcultures, and it comprises an infinite number of collectives and action groups (Kitis 2015: 17).

Unlike the traditional Marxist-Leninist guerrillas of the first generation, anarchists do not favour a hierarchical organisation intended to mobilise the masses. Rather they have formed fluid and egalitarian collectives that are based on small groups of friends, social networks of acquaintances but also groups, in which, however, there is no formal membership, but which depend on ties of personal friendships, trust and feelings of common identity (Kitis 2015: 18). Some of those anarchist collectives have arguably become more organised and permanent, with their members and activists participating in mainstream society in parallel to their activism (Kitis 2015: 19). In the spaces that make up the anti-establishment bloc, young people become politicised through their participation in concerts and other activities, but also through acts of committing vandalism, protesting and rioting (Kitis 2015: 18). Through their involvement as such, young people develop various degrees of activist commitment, ranging from thrill-seeking youth with low levels of political awareness, to highly dedicated activists. The ‘vague anarchist ethos’, which they share, is expressed through aggression against the police, rejection of mainstream politics, gravitation to the Exarcheia district, and delinquent behaviour (Kitis 2015: 21).

Among the second generation of anarchist terrorists, four organisations have gained high visibility and prominence due to the frequency and seriousness of their attacks: the Revolutionary Struggle (Epanastatikos Agonas, RS), the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (Synomosi ton Pyrinon tis Fotias, CCF), Sect of Revolutionaries (Sehta Epanastaton, SR), and to a lesser extent, the Organisation for the Protection of the Popular Struggle (Organossi Prostasias Laikou Agona, OPPS). The police have speculated that there may be connections amongst these groups, especially between the CCF and the SR, which may have been led by the same individual (Xenaki 2012: 447). RS and CCF were formed by sub-groups that broke away from the larger non-violent movement in order to become ‘entrepreneurs of violence’.
Organisations like the RS and the CCF have elaborated a distinctive (from the traditional Marxist-Leninist groups of the first generation) frame of revolutionary rhetoric and they have systematically deployed clandestine violence (Kassimeris 2013: 137).

In his study on the subject, which focused on the period between 2008 and 2012, Michaletos estimates the number of ‘radicalised’ persons belonging to far-Leftist groups in Greece at 3,000 people, most of them young, and concentrated in Athens and Thessaloniki. Out of these, 350 to 500 are suspected by the local authorities to have taken part either directly or indirectly in urban guerrilla-style attacks. A hardcore nucleus of 50 people (still at-large) is suspected of being regular and full-time operatives for terrorist groups. Another 44 have been arrested over the past four years and are either incarcerated or pending trial. Michaletos also reports that Greek radicals have ties with similar groups in Italy, Spain and France, as well as with extremists in other countries. Their operational capabilities cannot be reliably assessed as they depend on factors that fluctuate over time, such as arrests, changes within the ranks of these extremist networks, finances and access to arms.39

The December 2008 events both reflected and in turn had a profound influence on the post-N17 radical and militant left scene, by creating a near-revolutionary atmosphere of extended rioting and aggression. In December 2008, the killing of a teenager, Alexis Grigoropoulos, by a policeman prompted the eruption of demonstrations in Athens, which spread throughout Greece. They lasted a couple of days and they were accompanied by acts of looting, violence and terrorism. Hundreds of people, youth especially, were involved in those events, many among them from the anarchist and extreme leftist movements (see Economides and Monastiriotis 2009). The revolt was both spontaneous but also organised in a decentralised manner through the quick spread of mobile phone and internet messages calling for ‘revenge’ for the killing of the teenager (see Pagoulatos 2009). The hundreds (if not thousands) of people who engaged in extensive acts of violence, raiding stores, setting banks on fire, etc., included hood-wearing youngsters from affluent suburbs, who arguably make up the majority of membership of anarchist groups, poor from the marginalised districts of Athens, hooligans, and destitute immigrants (Pagoulatos 2009: 48).

The December 2008 riots were not unprecedented – on the contrary, they followed on a long path of frequent student demonstrations in the preceding years. What was unprecedented was the level of intensive and massive scope of violence that characterised them. The 2008 events marked a new wave of guerrilla-style attacks directed against the police, businesses, political offices and other institutions. Each year since then, at the commemoration of Grigoropoulos’ shooting in December, leftist and anarchist groups organise protests and demonstrations in Athens and elsewhere.

The RS was the first of the new generation to appear in 2003. Reminiscent of the first generation terrorists such as the N17, more so than the other groups of the 2nd generation, the RS has proclaimed itself to be a far-left revolutionary organisation opposing capitalism, U.S. hegemony and exploitative elites. A series of high power attacks, that include bombing of a courthouse in Athens, a fire rocket that hit the U.S. Embassy in Athens in 2007, shooting of police buses and a policeman on duty, and bomb that killed the Head of Security at the Greek Citizen Protection Ministry in 2010, have earned it the reputation of being the most violent militant group (Xenaki 2012: 447). Its leader, Nikos Maziotis, has been arrested and

imprisoned several times since the 1990s, the last one in 2014 after he had completed the maximum 18 months of detainment in custody and released in 2011.

The CCF was the second far-leftist militant group that appeared for the first time in January 2008, claiming responsibility for a barrage of firebomb attacks against banks, luxury car dealerships, and Public Power Company vehicles in Athens and Thessaloniki. While it has expressed admiration for the N17, it does not claim to represent any social class. Instead it defines itself as ‘anarcho-revolutionary’ and it has developed its discourse through attack communiqués and announcements. Since its appearance, it has claimed responsibility for several arsons against police vehicles, city hall offices, private security firms, and other facilities. The CCF has also claimed responsibility for some high profile attacks such as the detonation of a bomb outside the Greek Parliament in June 2010, and the attempt to send parcel bombs to French president Nikola Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as to several foreign diplomats in Athens (Kassimeris 2012: 636-8). In the latter incident, two CCF militants with bullet proof vests and pistols were arrested. Overall, the CCF has claimed responsibility alone or together with other groupuscules (such as ‘Nihilist Faction’ and ‘Guerilla Team of Terrorists’) for numerous arsons and bombings (Xenakis 2012: 448).

The CCF militancy is driven by a rejection of the mainstream values of Greek society. It is directed against the state mechanism, Greek parliamentary democracy and political reformism in general, as well as finance capitalism. It also expresses its disgruntlement and resentment for the economic austerity measures since 2010. Unlike its predecessors and similarly to other far-left extremists in Italy, Germany and France, the CCF has had a prison sector, with its imprisoned members who see themselves as continuing their resistance against the system from inside of prison by engaging in hunger strikes and other forms of protest (Kassimeris 2012: 645). In July 2011, a total of nine suspects accused of membership in the group were put on trial, and six of them were convicted, with the court handing down what were viewed as heavy sentences. Nonetheless, the CCF’s loose, horizontal structure of individual cells arguably makes it hard to dismantle, as new cells pop up after arrests.

The SR emerged in the aftermath of the December 2008 events, and it has been speculated that the group was formed by disgruntled members of the RS. It has been responsible for firing shots at police stations, threatening violence against the police and prominent figures of the Greek establishment (journalists, businessmen, politicians, etc.) and throwing explosive devices, and killing of one policeman and a journalist. SR has espoused anti-capitalist, anarchist principles, it has voiced criticisms against consumerism, elitist government structures, and their supporters among the middle classes. At the same time, it has rejected a structuralist analysis of the economic system, while in its public statements, it has shown a preference for targeted lethal violence, which has led many anarchists to disavow it (Xenaki 2012: 449-450). A notable difference from the first generation of terrorists, is that groups of the 2nd generation of far-left extremists have developed significant transnational connections. They have also forged organisational affiliations with criminal networks, who supply them with weaponry and with whom they have committed bank robberies (Xenaki 2012: 451).

II.1.3.2. FAR-RIGHT RADICALISATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The spectrum of Greece’s right wing extremism is a highly diverse scene, comprising of different factions, groups and organisations that espouse different ideas and ideologies. Actors comprise political parties, formal organisations, both legal and illegal, as well as a large number of informal groups that are variably connected to formal organisations and political parties. In
the immediate post-74 period, far-right groups, comprising a number of formal organisations and informal groups, engaged in a series of violent attacks. Some individuals, including Nikolaos Michaloliakos (who would later become the leader of the GD) were arrested for involvement in those attacks (Xenaki 2012: 440). Extreme right-wing political parties in post-1974 Greece were not electorally successful, though. Despite rising nationalism and xenophobia during the 1990s, there was still no room in the political arena for far right politics. Ultranationalists, pro-monarchists and supporters of the former military junta had tended to cast their vote for the centre-right ND (Georgiadou 2013: 76).

In the 1990s, the rapid growth of immigration had a profound impact on Greek society. This was reflected in the Eurobarometer surveys that showed a stunning growth of xenophobic attitudes among Greeks in the 1990s, which were above the European average (Psarras 2014: 9). The rise of nationalist sentiment among the Greek public was further boosted by the mass campaign against the purported usurpation of the name of Macedonia by the neighbouring former Yugoslav republic, which had declared its independence. This rising nationalist sentiment was initially captured by the newly founded political party of Political Spring (Politiki Anoiksi, PA), a splinter party of the centre-right ND, established by Antonis Samaras. PA however, received low levels of electoral support in the 1993, and 1996 Greek elections, and it dissolved by 2000. While PA emphasised Greek national identity, it was a political party of the centre, and it did not adopt an extremist agenda on the issue of immigration (Psarras 2014: 11).

The first political party of the new wave of right-wing extremism was LAOS that made its appearance in 2000. Being a far right-wing party of the ‘new’ kind in Greece, LAOS formed as a splinter party of the centre-right party of ND. In the 1990s, ND had sought to accommodate some issues of interest to right wing nationalists and extremists, such as the controversy surrounding the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). After 2000 though, ND sought to differentiate itself from the far right fringe and to move towards the centre-right of the political spectrum (Georgiadou 2013: 82). It is in this context that the ethno-populist LAOS managed to capture the far right space, increasing its electoral support to 5.6% in the 2009 elections and getting 15 seats in the Greek Parliament.

Even though it did not espouse a national socialist ideology, LAOS formed a hub where neo-Nazis, right-wing extremists and populists, as well as more acceptable members of the right-wing spectrum gathered. Under its leader, Mr. Karatzafiris, LAOS sought to appeal to and bring together monarchists, individuals with connections to the dictatorship and old Nazis, disappointed party officials from the National Political Union (EPEN), the Political Spring (PA) and the socialist PASOK, as well as members of right-wing extremist splinter groups known only to insiders, such as the GD (Psarras 2014: 12-13). LAOS’ appearance in politics created new political opportunities for the entire far-right scene and filled a longstanding gap in the Greek political spectrum (Georgiadou 2013: 84). The party had managed to build a network of priests and bishops, and to win the trust of former Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens.

LAOS registered significant electoral victories in the course of the 2000s and managed to gain parliamentary representation in the Greek and in the European Parliaments. Its parliamentary success encouraged right-wing extremist groups to join it, such as the Hellenic Front (EM) whose chair, Makis Voridis, had personal contacts with Le Pen and Carl Lang (Psarras 2014: 12). LAOS’ contacts with non-parliamentary groups who also depicted immigration as a national threat, enabled LAOS to strengthen its political position until 2010 (Psarras 2014: 13).
However, the party’s ambition to play a pivotal role in parliament between the centre-left PASOK and the centre-right ND, and to gain power in government, cast in doubt its extremist and radical underpinnings. Following the collapse of the PASOK government in 2011 when it was forced to ask for financial support from the IMF, the EC and the EU, LAOS entered into an interim government coalition government with PASOK and ND led by the technocrat Loukas Papadimos. LAOS’ participation in this government signalled its status as a party of the parliamentary establishment, but it also weakened its perceived radical character, soon leading to its demise.

The vacuum created in the far right of the political spectrum by the collapse of LAOS was soon filled by the political party of the GD. In the June 2012 elections, the GD made its spectacular entry into the Greek Parliament, after having received 6.92% of the national vote and 18 seats (in the 2009 elections, it had only received 0.29% of the national vote). The GD existed since the 1980s in the form of an organisation by the name People’s Association – Golden Dawn, and it also published a journal. The emergence of the GD was the offspring of right wing groups and individuals with ties to the pre-1974 dictatorship. Some of the leading figures (such as the chair of GD, Mr. Michaloliakos) had a record of engagement in violent action. Since the 1980s, the GD’s National Socialist ideology and the swastika were promoted through its magazine and other publications. In the mid-1980s, Michaloliakos went on to become leader of the youth organisation of EPEN, the right-wing party founded by the former dictator Georgios Papadopoulos, who had also appointed Mr. Michaloliakos as its leader.

The GD is organised in a strict hierarchical and semi-military structure, in which the ‘supreme Fuhrer’ has the ultimate authority and decision-making powers. Those below the leader who challenge or pose a threat to his autocratic rule are expelled from the organisation (Psarras 2014: 18). The party proclaims that it is has a military model, departmentally organised along the lines of the Greek military. GD members but also its top leadership, including elected MPs, profess themselves to be ‘soldiers’ who have absolute faith in their leader, whose orders they blindly obey. Party members are called to show obedience to ‘hierarchy and discipline’ while at outdoor events members often wear camouflage and boots, carry flag-bearing sticks and march in military order (see also Georgiadou 2014). The supreme position of the leader is independent of the party statute, even in the process of recruiting new members, whom the party leader must approve. This thoroughly hierarchical structure explains why the regional and local organisations as well as the youth, women’s and green movements the party set up after 2012 are not granted any official role in decision-making processes (Ellinas 2015: 7).

Besides acquiring parliamentary representation, the GD has also successfully built a large network of organisations and groups at the grassroots level, an explicit strategy pursued to enhance its power (Dinas et al. 2013: 5). According to its official website, the party’s local organisation comprises 59 offices in various cities around Greece and 3 offices in cities with a sizeable Greek diaspora abroad (Melbourne, New York, and Montreal) (Sakellariou 2015: 8). Alongside its extensive network across Greece and abroad, the GD has also focused its grassroots initiatives in particular areas of Athens, especially in the 4th and 6th districts of Aghios Panteleimonas and neighbouring vicinities, where its stronghold is found. It was in Aghios Panteleimonas where the GD established its headquarters, acquired strong local presence and strong visibility (Dinas et al. 2013: 6). What is distinctive about these areas of Athens is that they are areas where large numbers of legal and irregular immigrants settled.

---

Michaloliakos was arrested in 1976 for physically assaulting several journalists at the funeral of the former junta torturer, the police officer Evangelos Mallios; and he was arrested in 1978 for supplying explosives to right-wing extremist groups that were responsible for a series of bomb attacks in 1977 and 1978. See Psarras (2014: 15).
Unsurprisingly, they are also the areas, in which the GD recorded massive electoral gains (Dinas et al. 2013: 3).

In the run-up to the 2010 municipal elections, the GD concentrated its efforts and its militant activities in Athens in those areas, where its network of groups and organisations were highly active (Georgiadou 2013: 89). In the context of the economic crisis since 2010, the rise in xenophobia and extremist right-wing rhetoric fuelled into growing intimidation of and attacks against immigrants and their property. In May 2011, right-wing extremists largely connected to the GD engaged in pogroms and attacks against immigrants in the Athens city centre. The creation of a local, grassroots network in downtown Athens enabled the GD not only to elect members in the city’s municipal council but also to dramatically expand its electoral appeal at the national level too, increasing its votes from 20,000 in 2009 to 440,000 in the 2012 parliamentary elections (Georgiadou 2013: 90).

While prior to 2009 the GD enjoyed marginal support, since 2010 it witnessed unexpected but substantial electoral success at the local, national and European level. It managed to elect one member in the municipal council of Athens in 2010, and in the 2012 parliamentary elections, it received 6.92% of the vote and secured 18 seats in the Greek parliament. In the Athens municipal elections of May 2014, the GD obtained a high of 16.12% of the vote and elected 4 members in the city’s municipal council, while in the EU parliament elections in the same month and year, it got 9.39% and elected 3 Members in the European Parliament (MEP). Two political factors help explain the rapid and stunning electoral gains of the GD by 2012: first, a broader trend in the political system defined by massive voter shift away from the centre and further to the left and further to the right of the political spectrum; and secondly, the decline of the radical populist LAOS, the chief competitor, whose place the GD captured (Georgiadou 2013: 90).

As is typical of fascist movements in the past, the GD has also developed a special relationship with young people. Similarly to the British far right and neo-Nazi parties of the 1970s and 1980s, the GD has built upon the skinhead culture, which is marginalised in Greece. Already in the late 1990s, the GD created a youth division with its own magazine Antepithesi (Counter-Attack). It encourages and supports the growth of White Power music through youth festivals that the party organises. Young men take part in various camps in which they practice military training, including shooting, wrestling, boxing, and basic self-defence and survival skills. Young supporters of the GD seem to have strong ideological bonds with the party related to nationalism, racism and authoritarianism. More recently, the GD has sought to attract young people by organising history courses for children in the party’s premises. It also has a presence in the school environment through the Nationalist Front of School Teachers who are party members (Sakellariou 2015: 7-8).

As is typical of right-wing parties elsewhere in Europe, men vote in far larger numbers for the GD than women, with 75% of the GD’s 2012 supporters being men, and women being only 25% of its voters (Georgiadou 2013: 94). The vast majority of GD voters are from the younger age cohorts (below 44 years of age). Youth vote for the GD was extremely high, higher than the party’s national average percentage, and it far outstripped that of its predecessor LAOS (Sakellariou 2015: 9). In terms of occupation, a large segment of GD supporters are primarily unskilled workers, people in precarious employment or unemployed, but they also belong to a

---

41 The Network for Documenting Racist Violence had registered 87 attacks against immigrants and their property (shops, homes) by October 2012, a significant increase on the 63 registered cases the year before. Fifty of the victims suffered from serious injuries, and 30 from light injuries (Psarras 2014: 20).

variety of other categories (Psarras 2014: 34-35). The GD drew voters from almost every position of the left-right axis, a remarkable phenomenon given the party’s highly ideological profile (Georgiadou 2013: 92). It is notable that the GD has maintained good relations with the police and the military, as well as the judiciary and the Greek Church. Members of the GD have managed to infiltrate to a large extent the Greek Police (ELAS), which is reflected in the large electoral support that it has enjoyed among police officers.\(^{43}\)

Despite its ties to members and followers of the junta, as well as monarchists, the GD clearly differentiated itself from other groups and personalities of the extreme right in Greece on two main grounds. In the first place, the GD retained its neo-Nazi characteristics and was not willing to compromise on those or water them down. Secondly, potential allies from the extreme right conflicted with the GD’s open predisposition to use violence, which remains a central characteristic of it to this day (Psarras 2014: 16). In the 1990s, the GD has sought to establish connections with extremist right-wing parties in Europe such as the neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic organisation CEDADE in Spain, the Front National in France, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) under the leadership of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the German NPD, and other extreme right organisations across Europe. Yet, even though the GD claims to be part of a broader nationalist movement in Europe, nearly all extremist right-wing parties have cut ties with it, including the FN under the leadership of Marine LePen, and the German NPD.

II.1.4. REPertoire oF ACTIONS

A very large number of extremist far-leftist organisations and splinter groups have deployed violent tactics as a means to achieve their political goals. Between February 1973 and December 2014, extremist far-leftist groups were responsible for over 1,000 incidents of violence and aggression. The majority of those incidents were bombings and explosions (678 incidents), attacks on facilities and infrastructures (i.e. banks) (312 incidents), armed assaults (102 incidents) assassinations (70 incidents), as well as smaller numbers of incidents of unarmed assault, kidnapping, hostage taking and hijacking (26 incidents altogether).\(^{44}\) Apart from such violent acts, far-left and anarchist groups communicate their ideas and messages to the public through texts that they publish in various internet sites, the attack communiqués that they send to the press (usually to left-leaning newspapers), as well as through actions from inside of prison, such as hunger strikes. A well-known website of anti-authoritarian and anarchist groups is the ‘Indymedia’.\(^{45}\)

Unlike the ELA, N17 operationally deployed far greater levels of violence and aggression (Kassimeris 2013: 135). This had earned it the reputation of being the deadliest terrorist group. Violence was a way to wake up public disaffection with the regime, overlooking, however, that armed struggle and revolution had little support among the Greek public at large (Kassimeris 2013: 136). In the course of its existence that lasted over 25 years, the operational campaign of N17 evolved in 3 stages. They are distinguished by researchers on the basis of the level of intensity of attacks, the nature of their targets, and their texts and statements in attack

\(^{43}\)It is estimated that between 45-59% of the Athens police officers voted for the GD in the 2012 parliamentary elections (Psarras 2014: 34).


\(^{45}\)Available at: https://athens.indymedia.org/
communiqués, letters to the media and journalists. In the first phase of its operation (1975-1980), N17 sought a place for itself in the political landscape, seeking to gain credibility as a militant organisation and to mobilise popular sympathy. Its strategy was to inflict violence on former members of the military junta and on American targets as ‘acts of revenge on perpetrators of oppression against Greeks’ (Abranowicz 2013: 4).

The second phase (1981-1990) was characterised by escalating intensity in the violence it used, with the new strategic aim to wage a terrorist campaign against PASOK-type parliamentary socialism and U.S. imperialism. In this phase, N17 used more sophisticated car-bomb and firearm attacks against conservative media publishers, Greek police, prominent industrialists, U.S. officers, government establishments, as well as Greek judges (Abranowicz 2013: 6). The third phase (1991-2000) was characterised by increased intensity of violent acts but apparently reduced public tolerance for it, undermining whatever political influence or tacit support the group might have enjoyed in earlier phases. By the time of their capture in 2002, N17 had carried more than 100 attacks without losing a single member, and without having fallen victim to penetration by security forces or informers.

The violent tactics of rioting, arsons, throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails among others, are usually deployed by members and activists (who are covered with hoods) of anarchist and anti-authoritarian groups (antieksousiastes) on the margins of mass demonstrations (Kitis 2015: 14). What happens though is that such acts trigger spontaneous violent attacks, in which a much larger number of individuals (estimated to be a few thousands) than those who are members of clandestine organisations, engage. The extemporaneous participation in violence that breaks out in mass demonstrations is a characteristic of Greek radicalism in the 2000s, and it was most dramatically evidenced in the events of December 2008 (Xenaki 2012: 443). It is often directed at the police, at banks, state institutions and other properties, and it draws the participation of individuals who may not even be politically motivated.

The new generation of anarchist terrorists have presented violence not primarily as a means to strike at their powerful capitalist or imperialist opponents, but they have directed it mainly at symbolic targets to arouse popular protest and create revolutionary impetus. They have also projected violence as the symbolic underpinning of a community of activists (Kassimeris 2013: 138). Their radical revolutionary ideology advocates spontaneous, as opposed to strategically targeted, violent action (Kitis 2015: 12). A characteristic of anarchist militant organisations like the CCF is its generalised and unrestrained advocacy of indiscriminate violence (against the state, the police, etc.), which it encourages anarchists to use. This is what makes security officers think that the CCF poses a greater security risk than the militant organisations of the first generation, whose acts of violence were carefully planned and had clear targets. Not all anarchists believe in the use of violence or employ it though; in fact, some are strongly opposed to it. There has been considerable debate and controversy among anarchists in the Anti-authoritarian Movement (Antieksousiastiki Kinisi, AK) who express their opposition to militant actions, including attacks against property (Xenaki 2012: 444).

The repertoire of actions employed by extremist right-wing groups and organisations have involved actions to propagate their views and ideas, such as publishing, TV programs, and over the past ten years the internet. It has also included participation in mass rallies, as in the nationalist rallies of the 1990s around the name of ‘Macedonia’ and in the late 1990s and early 2000s around the inclusion of religious affiliation in the ID cards. Regarding political parties of the far-right, such as LAOS, their repertoire has included actions aimed at attracting a maximum number of supporters and voters.
Resort to aggressive tactics and violence though has largely been associated with the GD, well before the party’s electoral breakthrough in 2010 and especially in 2012. The GD has deployed direct actions at the local level, which have exacerbated social tensions and divisions. In the first place, the GD has organised anti-immigrant protests, in which it mobilised local residents committees against the presence of immigrants in the Athens neighbourhoods where it is dominant, purporting to ‘reclaim’ the neighbourhood from foreigners who settled in it (Dinas et al. 2013: 6). GD members have played with residents’ underlying, even if unreasonable, fears, through vigilant-type activities against foreigners (Ellinas 2015: 14).

While the use of direct militant actions was in the 1990s primarily focused on foreign issues, they subsequently shifted domestically. GD has boasted of its involvement in the Yugoslav wars in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, on the side of Serbian nationalist militants. Their degree of their involvement was never investigated or clarified by the Greek parliament or the Greek courts (Psarras 2014: 29). Since the 2000s, the GD has targeted immigrants in the centre of Athens with its members perpetrarting a series of violent assaults (Georgiadou 2013: 88). Physical assaults, intimidation, and destruction of property have all been used by the GD against immigrants, whom it perceives as the ‘criminal foreigners’ and from whom it vowed to ‘clean’ from the public squares of the city of Athens (Psarras 2014: 19).

Significantly, the racist attacks that were recorded by the Network for Registering Incidents of Racial Violence (Dyktio Katagrafis Peristatikon Ratsistikis Vias) of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), saw a sharp increase after May and June 2012. It was during that period that the GD made a massive electoral breakthrough gaining 6.92% of the national vote in the June 2012 elections. Its entry into the national Parliament arguably legitimated racist discourse and encouraged racist rhetoric by the GD but also by other groups. The GD is said to have been involved in a large number of the reported racist attacks, whose victims were Egyptians, Moroccans, Algerians, Roma, Albanians and others. The vast majority of the attacks were reported in the Athens areas where the GD is strong, and where, it is suggested, there exist organised militia groups with permanent presence. Violent acts and criminal offences are committed by individual members of the organisation. At the same time, the GD also hires paramilitary groups on a regular basis to commit its crimes (Psarras 2014: 18).

Secondly, GD members and their local organisations have engaged in reactionary and divisive social work and social activism, reminiscent of the right-wing extremists’ actions in Germany and the ‘Rights for Whites’ campaign of the British BNP in the 1990s. In a ‘Solidarity for Greeks Movement’, GD members have delivered food and clothes to ‘Greeks only’. In 2012, the party started setting up medical centres under a programme called ‘Greek doctors’ and it planned to establish childcare centres. Through other programmes, such as ‘Jobs for Greeks’, the GD attempts to convince employers to replace their foreign employees with Greeks (Ellinas 2015: 14).

At the local level, GD members have also engaged in providing escort and security services to Greek nationals, purportedly to protect them from ‘criminal immigrants’ who are depicted to be threatening individual and national security (Georgiadou 2014: 110). In this way, they filled in an abhorrent way an existing gap created by weak state mechanisms of public order in the run-down neighbourhoods of Athens. Thirdly, the GD local chapters and its

---


47 The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The phenomenon of racist violence in Greece and how it is combated’, Athens, September 2013.
members have engaged in actions in a context of ‘interactive extremism’, that is confrontational incidents and protests against leftist pro-migrant groups among local inhabitants.

Glorification and use of violence always had a central place in the repertoire of actions deployed by the GD, despite the fact that the party’s official statements deny it. Since the early 1990s, the GD members targeted leftist activists and engaged in various kinds of intimidation and violence in Athens and elsewhere in Greece.\(^48\) They have exhibited thorough contempt for law and legality, systematically and purposefully infringing the law. Generally, the violent attacks, in which GD members have engaged, tend to be not spontaneous but determined, collective and premeditated. Violence is employed in the initiation rituals of new recruits: new members have to commit violent acts to prove their determination to protect the organisation. The glorification of violence and the pressure to commit it makes all members into an accomplice and creates a climate of solidarity and secrecy, which obstructed investigation and judicial proceedings (Psarras 2014: 18).

II.1.5. INSTITUTIONAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES

The responses of Greek security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in combating left-wing political violence were thoroughly ineffective until the late 1990s and 2000s. Attesting to their ineffectiveness was how the most notorious group, November 17, evaded on numerous incidents capture by the police, and engaged in violent attacks for more than 25 years (from 1974 until 2002). A number of reasons have been put forth to explain why the Greek authorities were unable to identify and apprehend the members of N17 for nearly two and a half decades. Some argue that the delay in the group’s apprehension was due to the diligence and professional care with which law enforcement agencies were gathering enough evidence against suspects in order to ensure convictions (Xenakis 2012: 452). Others pointed to the inherent difficulties in uncovering a highly secretive, small and tight-knit group of terrorists (Xenakis 2012: 453). A combination of factors, central among which was a decisive shift in anti-terrorism law and policy after 2000, eventually led to the capture of N17. Yet, as was previously mentioned, terrorist activities did not stop with the capture of N17. In this respect, the Hellenic Police have arrested 79 individuals for terrorist acts in the last 7 years (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrested Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015*</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^48\)In 1998, the second-in-command of the GD at the time, Antonios Androutsopoulos, was charged with the attempted murder of 3 young leftist activists after a GD rally. The court established that this incidence was a case of organised crime in which ten other members of the GD had participated (Psarras 2014: 17).
Greek police regularly makes arrests during demonstrations and riots when violent incidents occur, however, the vast majority of rioters who are taken to the police are soon released without charges. Over the course of the 2000s, and especially since 2007-2008, accusations have constantly been levelled against Greek law enforcement officers, especially those on the front line, for allegedly using excessive and unjustifiable amounts of violence to deal with protesters from the far left and the anarchist circles. Such charges have specifically directed against the armed riot police known as the ‘MAT’, who arguably use without restraint tear gas and clubbing, as well as against the Special Guards, who have been criticised for their alleged aggressiveness (Xenaki 2012: 445). It was a Special Guard who shot a 15-year old boy, Alexis Grigoropoulos (discussed earlier in this report) in the Athens district of Exarcheia in December 2008.

It has been argued that the excessive use of force by the police against far-left protesters, in tandem with the perceived impunity accorded to the growing levels of aggression from far-right groups, has arguably itself been a trigger of further radicalisation. Excessive police force and suppression arguably escalates and reproduces the cycle of political violence between far-leftist groups and the state, which is further compounded by allegations about close cooperation between far right groups and police officers (Xenaki 2012: 445-6).

In contrast to the allegedly excessive use of force that the Greek police is seen to employ against left-wing protesters who commit aggressive acts, the responses of law enforcement officers to right-wing violence by the GD has arguably been lenient, and thoroughly ineffective. In fact, the violence perpetrated by the GD was never investigated or prosecuted until 2013 (Psarras 2014: 17). In September 2013, the leader of the GD along with several of its MPs were arrested on charges of setting up a criminal organisation (Ellinas 2015: 1). Their arrest came after the assassination of a young leftist artist, Pavlos Fyssas, by members of the GD in the working class neighbourhood of Keratsini in Attika. It was the first time that the GD leader and MPs were prosecuted for some of the violent acts, in which there was sound evidence that they engaged. Prosecutors accused dozens of party functionaries of setting up a paramilitary organisation with a strict hierarchy, military camps for training in Attika, and hit squads that take direct orders from the top party leadership (Ellinas 2015: 6).

Despite the revelations that came to light concerning the GD’s extensive involvement in violent acts, their arrest did not significantly undermine popular support for it. A few months following the arrest of the GD leader, MPs and party functionaries, two members of the GD were killed in Athens, an incident that the GD has exploited to gain public sympathy. In the local, regional and European parliament elections in May 2014, the GD managed to significantly increase its share of the vote (Ellinas 2015: 1). The trial of the GD leadership is still ongoing (as of July 2015), even as most of the imprisoned members have been released on remand.

Throughout the post-1975 period, Greek authorities had failed to collect data on and to prosecute far-right political and racially-motivated violence. As it is pointed out, Law 972/1979 for the ‘punishment of acts or conduct aimed at racial discrimination’ was not applied even in a single legal case until 2010 (that is for a full thirty years) (Xenaki 2012: 454). Even after
2010, the response of Greek state authorities, and of the Greek Police (ELAS) in particular, to the dramatic increase of incidents of racial violence has been slow and in part ambivalent. In the first place, according to the 2013 Greek Ombudsman’s special report on racial violence, police officers were involved in about 1/6 of the reported incidents of racial violence in 2011-2012.\textsuperscript{49} When they intervened in racial attacks, it was primarily to arrest the immigrants, and not the perpetrators of violence. It could also be argued that the ELAS has unintentionally instilled or condoned the view of immigrants as ‘criminals’ by engaging in 2012-2013 in the so-called ‘sweep operations’, in the course of which it indiscriminately arrested and detained immigrants (many of whom had legal residence permits) in the centre of Athens.\textsuperscript{50} Secondly, close connections between Greek police officers and far-right organisations have long been suspected. While such suspicions may well be exaggerated, it is well-known that police officers vote for the GD in higher numbers than the general population of Greek voters, as the analysis of electoral centres where police officers vote shows.\textsuperscript{51}

Since 2012, the Greek Police (ELAS) is obliged to record incidents in which there is an alleged racial motive, and to refer the respective cases to the prosecutor. In the first four months of 2013, these offices of ELAS had investigated only 16 incidents, which they referred to the prosecutor. Presidential Decree 132/2012 created four specialised bodies within the ELAS to deal with the increased number of incidents of racial violence. A number of problems obstruct the effectiveness of these bodies to record racial incidents, among which is the lack of provision for some level of protection to victims who do not have legal papers or a residence permit.\textsuperscript{52}

According to the Greek Ombudsman’s report, the ELAS exhibits low levels of alertness to racist motives in attacks against immigrants and foreigners. In fact, the data collected by the ELAS (both in the year 2012 and in 2013, see Table 3) reports a lower number of racist incidents (109 incidents and 101 victims in 2013) than those reported to the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) (166 racist attacks and 320 victims in 2013), set up by a group of NGOs together with the National Human Rights Commission and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Most of the victims were male immigrants and refugees, mostly Muslims, predominantly from Pakistan (see ANNEX II, Table 9 and Table 10 for a detailed description of the gender and nationality of the victims).\textsuperscript{53} The majority of attacks (well over 50\%) are believed to be associated with members of the Golden Dawn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>107*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>101**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Incidents and Victims of Racist Violence per year

\textsuperscript{49} The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The phenomenon of racist violence in Greece and how it is combated’, Athens, September 2013.

\textsuperscript{50} The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The phenomenon of racist violence in Greece and how it is combated’, Athens, September 2013.

\textsuperscript{51} Lambropoulos, V., ‘More than 50\% of police officers voted for the Golden Dawn!’,\textit{To Vima}. [In Greek]. Available at: \url{http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=599952} (last accessed 20 July 2015).

\textsuperscript{52} The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The phenomenon of racist violence in Greece and how it is combated’, Athens, September 2013.

\textsuperscript{53} This data is reported in ECRI (2015: 24).
II.1.6. ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

Radicalisation is a phenomenon that has multiple causes and many factors at different levels – macro, meso and micro level – contribute to it. At the macro-level, researchers and commentators have highlighted socio-economic, political and cultural-ideational factors. In the first place, the dire social-economic prospects facing Greek youth has been seen by many researchers as a salient macro-context that breeds desperation and anger among the younger generation, which is confronted with very high levels of unemployment. While levels of unemployment are indeed high among Greek youth at present, they were not always high in the post-1974 period, during which political violence continued unabated. A second aspect of the macro-context that is viewed to promote radicalisation is the ineffective political system that is defined by high levels of corruption and unresponsiveness to the interests and needs of Greeks, and of the young generation in particular.

Both macro-level socio-economic and political factors have been put forth to explain both left-wing and right-wing radicalisation. For example, voters’ support for the GD is arguably driven by a strong desire to protest against and punish the established political system. This is considered by researchers who have studied the GD as a cardinal motive that pushed protest voters to support the far right and cast their vote for the GD. The second fundamental motive behind the voters’ decision to support this party is arguably the widespread resentment against the austerity measures (known as ‘the memorandum’) that were adopted since 2010 in return for financial assistance from the IMF, the EU and the European Central Bank (the so-called ‘troika’) (Georgiadou 2013: 93). Most supporters of the GD though do not become radicalised beyond the point of passively accepting or tolerating far-right political violence.

Radicalisation and the high incidence of political violence in Greece has also been attributed to deeply entrenched, cultural-historical ideas that extol militant violence, and which are reproduced in the educational system, in the media and in the official political discourse (Psychogios 2013). Similarly, in understanding why violent radicalisation, left- or right-wing, is more prominent and persistent in some countries like Greece and less so in others like Italy and Spain, which also experienced a wave of red terrorism and an oppressive dictatorial regime, respectively, Kassimeris (2013) puts forth a political-cultural explanation that dwells upon a historically shaped reservoir of ideas and ideologies of revolution and radical utopianism, of which the first generation of terrorist organizations were their vectors. Ideas justifying violence, which have been sustained by extreme leftist traditions, have shaped and facilitated the political actions and strategies of the new left extremist groups (Kassimeris 2013). Among the next generation, new and frustrated groups of youth draw from these radical ideas and belief in violent and direct action in order to express their grievances and disillusionment with what they perceive as an unresponsive political system (Kassimeris 2013: 141).

However, while macro-level factors, political or socioeconomic, affect and disgruntle broader segments of the society, only some groups and individuals respond by endorsing
extremist views and even fewer by adopting a militant stance to social conflict. In the same vein, many more Greeks are exposed to deeply held, cultural ideas that glorify militant violence, than those who actually become radicalised. Therefore, it is essential to move beyond the macro-level of analysis and to search for factors and causes at the meso and even the micro level, which lead some individuals to become radicalised and to deploy violence. In exploring the factors that led to the high levels of electoral support that a formerly marginal group like the GD managed to amass since 2010, researchers rebut the argument that the rise of the GD was caused by exogenous factors related to the country’s debt crisis and the imposition of austerity measures (Dinas et al. 2013). The economic crisis since 2010 and the resulting sharp decline in incomes and salaries did not in and of themselves lead a growing number of people to turn to far right extremism and support parties like the GD. Instead, the conditions of increasing poverty and the accompanying social tensions created a fertile ground for latent extremist potential to come to the surface. Whether under the cloak of anti-capitalist rhetoric, anti-globalisation or Euro-scepticism, far-right ideas and attitudes emerged as resonant among many people and voters from across the political spectrum.

Paying special attention to the fact that the breakthrough of the GD came in the 2010 municipal elections in Athens (before the economic crisis set in), in contrast to earlier local electoral contests in which it had gained miniscule vote shares, the study by Dinas and others (2013) focus on the local and grassroots network that the party has built. While the context of the economic crisis and rising influx of irregular migrants created a fertile ground, Dinas and colleagues (2013) argue that explanations for the party’s rising electoral strength should be sought at the meso level, and specifically in its tactical shift towards a grassroots strategy and local organisation. The GD leadership explicitly focused its activities and presence at the local level in the Athens 6th district and in neighbouring districts in an attempt to penetrate the local population, recruit activists and assume the role of protection provider in the neighbourhoods of Athens that are populated by large numbers of immigrants. The shift of the GD’s strategy was successful and bore fruits. The interplay between violence, protection and grassroots activity shaped the success of the GD (Dinas et al. 2013: 10). In regard to left-wing radicalisation, significant meso-level factors are possibly closely linked to the existence of spaces of action and networks of groups and individuals, in particular locales, in schools and in universities, as well as inside prisons, and the possibilities that they create for young people to socialise and to become active in groups.
II.2. ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

II.2.1. BACKGROUND

The literature on Islam and Muslims in Greece is quite extensive. Both native and immigrant Muslim communities have been studied in terms of their settlement and immigration patterns, numbers and demographic characteristics (e.g. Antoniou 2003). Moreover, research has been conducted on the attitudes (tolerance vs. discrimination) of public opinion and stakeholders towards both communities (e.g. Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009; Triandafyllidou and Kokkali 2010; Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2013). Furthermore, a number of studies have focused on the origins and history of Muslim communities in Greece and the evolution and current state of minority and immigration law (e.g. Ktistakis 2006; Tsitselikis 2012). The autochthonous Muslim community has been also studied within the context of minority rights and integration (e.g. Anagnostou 2001; 2005). Research has been conducted on the organisation of Islamic profession among Muslim immigrants in Greece (e.g. Kassimeris and Samouris 2012), while the issues of Islamism and Islamophobia have also been explored (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012).

However, despite extensive research on Muslim communities in Greece, the issue of radicalisation in relation to Muslims in the country has been under-studied, with only a limited number of studies existing on the subject (e.g. Kostakos 2007; 2010; Giannoulis 2011). In the same manner, the issue of international terrorism in Greece has been persistently ignored by the relevant literature.54

Greece’s autochthonous Muslim community resides in Western Thrace, a region in the North-eastern part of the country. Its estimated population ranges from 85,000 (Tsitselikis 2004a: 109) to 120,000 (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 345), and some put it as high as 140,000 people (Giannoulis 2011: 6). They have lived together with a Christian majority for the past seven centuries predominantly in the cities of Komotini and Xanthi and the areas of Western Thrace around these cities. A small number of native Muslims also reside in some islands of the Dodecanese in the Eastern Aegean, mainly the islands of Rhodes and Kos (Giannoulis 2011: 6).

The majority of native Muslims tend to identify themselves with the moderate Hanafi, Sunni and Alevi traditions of Islam (Giannoulis 2011: 6; Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 349). In terms of ethnic origin and identity, they are divided in three categories: the Muslims of Turkish ethnicity, the Slav-speaking Pomaks, and the Roma (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 343-345). The Turkish Muslim population originates from the Turkmens and Tatars that moved to the Ottoman Thrace in the middle of the 14th century. They currently constitute 45-50% of the total native Muslim population of Greece (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 343-345). Pomaks are the second largest group comprising 30-35% of the total native Muslim population. Their origins are a bone of contention between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. However, research shows that Pomaks are currently divided in terms of their self-identification. Approximately half of them tend to identify themselves with Greece, while the rest tend to adopt the neo-Ottoman identity (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 343-345). Finally, the Roma constitute 20-22% of the total native Muslim population in Greece. It is believed that

---

54The study by Kaminaris (1999) is an exception.
they originate from people who emigrated from the Indian sub-continent between the 11th and 14th centuries (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 343-345).

Native Muslims enjoy a special status in terms of religious and cultural rights. In this special status of community rights, Islamic law (Sharia) is recognised as valid in family and inheritance matters, rather than Greek Civil Law that applies to Greeks in general (Basiakou 2008; Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012; Triandafyllidou 2010; Tsitselikis 2004a; 2004b). In general terms, the native Muslim community is an insular minority, with relatively low human and social capital (Triandafyllidou 2010: 318; see also Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007). Native Muslims are mainly employed in agriculture, especially in the tobacco and cotton farms of the area, while they have also worked in the past (prior to the arrival of immigrants) as seasonal harvesters across Northern Greece (Triandafyllidou 2010: 318). Finally, there is a small elite of professionals among the native Muslim community, which, until the 1990s, received its university education in Turkey, due to the limited access of the population to the Greek academia until 1996 (Triandafyllidou 2010: 318).

Immigrants constitute the second Muslim community in Greece and they predominantly live in urban areas. Their estimated population is a matter of dispute. According to the Muslim Association of Greece (MAG) it ranges between 200,000 and 300,000 people. Some other sources bring the total number of Muslim migrants in the greater Athens region to 120,000-200,000 people (Evergeti and Hatziprokopiou 2010). Finally, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life estimates that the total number of Muslims (native Muslims included) in Greece is 527,000, or else, 4.7% of the total population. However, the calculation of the total number of Muslim immigrants in Greece is highly problematic: the censuses document only regular immigrants, and they record only the nationality, not the religious beliefs of the respondents.

Muslim immigrants and refugees made their first appearance in Greece in the 1950s, when a small number of Egyptians came to the country in order to escape from the Nasser regime. In the 1970s, a small number of Palestinians migrated to Greece due to the war with Israel. During the same period, the first Asian communities also made their appearance, when a number of Pakistanis (5,000-10,000 people) came to Greece to work in shipyards following a bilateral agreement (Tonchev et al 2007: 15). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the first Albanians started to migrate to Greece. Yet, Albanians, who are the largest immigrant group in Greece (over 0.4 million), are not particularly devout Muslims, due to their socialisation for over 50 years in a totalitarian Communist regime (Triandafyllidou 2010: 314). Bangladeshis, Arabs (mainly for Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine), Kurds and other Turks, Iraqis, Afghans, and Iranians started settling in Greece in the 1990s (Tsitselikis 2004b). Their numbers though rose only recently in the 2000s, when the first African communities started to form in Athens (e.g. Somalians). The vast majority of Muslim migrants residing in Greece are Sunnis (approximately 90%), while there is a small number of Shiites (mainly from Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan), and Salafists (predominantly Arabs, Kurds, Iraqis and Somalians).


57 According to Triandafyllidou (2010), the total number of immigrants in Greece is 1.1 million, or 10% of the total population.
Southeast Asian Muslim immigrants are mainly male (over 90%), and are typically looking for employment in blue-collar jobs, such as in agriculture, construction, transport and catering industries (Triandafyllidou and Marouf 2009). A number of them have managed to regularise their status during the Greek regularisation programs in 1998, 2001 and 2005 (Triandafyllidou 2010: 324). Asian Muslim immigrants are particularly active in the small business sector in Athens (Tonchev et al 2007; Kolios 2004). Bangladeshis are mainly employed in restaurants in Athens, while a number of Pakistanis have set up corner shops that provide long-distance phone calls, ethnic food and other types of small trade (Triandafyllidou 2010: 325). Self-employed Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who run their own small business (e.g. minimarkets, wholesale shops, call centres) and are economically independent become the leaders of the respective Islamic associations (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 181). In general terms, Asian and Arab Muslim immigrants in Greece have relatively few skills and are employed in specific niches of the informal Greek labour market (Triandafyllidou 2010: 325). More specifically, Pakistanis, Iraqis and Afghans are predominantly employed in the construction and agriculture sections, and they tend to take up manual jobs that require little experience or expertise (Tonchev et al 2007). Finally, Albanians constitute a nominal but not practicing Muslim migrant community. The majority belongs to the Bektashi order (Zhelyazkova 2000). Yet, Albanian immigrants do not comprise an organised group, they do not identify themselves as Muslim, and they have not raised any claims with regard to the satisfaction of their religious needs (Triandafyllidou 2010: 326). In fact, religion is not a distinguishing characteristic of the lives of Albanians in Greece (Tsitselikis 2004b).

Lastly, one should not ignore the still small, but growing, community of Greek converts to Islam. Papageorgiou and Samouris (2012: 378) note that Greek converts constitute a distinct third category of Muslims in Greece. They are probably a few hundreds, although their real numbers cannot be accurately calculated, due to the lack of official data and the hesitance of the subjects to reveal their conversion. The majority of Greek converts to Islam are women who are married to Muslims; Greek students who socialised with Muslims during their studies abroad; 2nd or 3rd generation Greeks who are raised in Western countries, where the numbers of converts are much higher and the act of conversion is common; and Greeks, who learned about Islam and decided to convert on their own in order to satisfy their spiritual needs (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 378). Greek converts are predominantly Sunnis and Salafists (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 378).

II.2.1.1. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC DENOMINATION(S) IN GREECE

Two main ideological trends can be identified among Muslim immigrants in Greece. First, there are the missionary movements and the Sufi groups, which perform grassroots awareness work about Islam. They include the Tablighi Jamaat, Dawat-e-Islami and the Sufi neo-brotherhoods, which focus on the reform of the individual and abstain from open engagement in politics (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 378). The second main ideological trend is embodied in associations and mosques that have politicised the Islamic profession, and are associated with Islamic political parties abroad (e.g. Egypt, Pakistan, etc.) (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 178). They are related to the Islamic Forum of Europe and the Minhaj ul-Quran, which are trying to develop a more structured social project with ‘political’ foundations (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 178).

The vast majority of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims who belong to these groups are moderate. The president of the ‘Greece-Pakistan Cultural Association’ belongs to the moderate Sufi group Minhaj ul-Quran. However, there is a small number that adopts the radical ideology
and supports the Pakistani Islamic party Jamaat e-Islami, which aims to establish the Sharia law and resurrect the Islamic state. The head of the Greek department of the Islamic Forum of Europe, Abul Basar, who run as a candidate in the 2010 Municipal and Prefectural elections, allegedly has ties with the Jamaat-e-Islami party. Additionally, among Sunni Afghans in Greece, it is believed that there is a small minority who supports the Taliban. Arab Muslims are predominantly Sunnis that follow the ‘middle path’, while a large number of them supports the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 371). Naim El-Ghandour, the president of Muslim Association of Greece (MAG), and his wife Anna Stamou, a Greek convert to Islam, have been both associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 371).

Finally, apart from the Sunni Arabs who are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, there is also a growing number of Salafists within the Arab Muslim community (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 375). Moderate Salafism calls for the return of Muslims to a ‘real Islam’, the ‘orthodox Islam’, free from the influences of other religions. The main preoccupation of moderate Salafists is to preach the ‘real Islam’, and to debunk through Da’wah the myths, distorted opinions, understandings and habits that have been adopted by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Salafists in Greece tend to criticise other Islamic trends and their followers (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 376). More specifically, they criticise particularly their Sunni co-nationals on religious grounds, and they blame them for purportedly trying to dominate the Muslim community in Greece through the formation of relationships with the Greek state. It is apparent that these two fractions of Islam are involved in an unholy struggle over the control of the Greek Muslim community (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 376). The main figure of Salafists in Greece is Ahmad Eldin, a quite vocal young man, who is also very active online.

With regard to the native Muslims of Thrace, there are three local Muftis, in Komotini, Xanthi and Didymoticho. The Muftis are appointed by the Greek state and are usually (and unofficially) pre-approved by the local community and enjoy its support (Giannoulis 2011: 13). The Muftis act as local spiritual leaders, interpreters of the Sharia law, and judges in cases and disputes that are related to family or inheritance law (Law 1920/1991) (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 346). All formal mosques that exist in Greece are found in Thrace, while a couple of mosques can also be found in the islands of Rhodes and Kos (Giannoulis 2011: 7). All in all, the region of Thrace has approximately 290 mosques.

Regarding Muslim immigrants, the most common type of institution that they establish in Greece is the ‘cultural association’. It is a legal form that allows them to maintain a place of worship – a makeshift mosque – where to practice their religion. According to Greek law, the


60This process is known as Jihad al-nafs, or else, ‘struggle against the self’.

61Da’wah is an Arabic term, which means the proselytising or preaching of Islam. Literally, it means ‘invitation’.

62He appears to be the administrator of at least two websites with Islamic content (including interpretations of the Quran, Islamic bibliography, news with respect to Muslims in Greece, and personal stories of converts to Islam, among others): ‘Ahmad Eldin – Thoughts and opinions of a Greek Muslim’, Available at: http://ahmadeldin.org/; and ‘Orthodox Islam with an Orthodox Understanding – The Real Islam of the Righteous Muslim predecessors (Salaf us Salih)’. Available at: http://islamforgreeks.org/.

requirements for establishing a place of worship are demanding and immigrants find them difficult to fulfil.\(^{64}\) Thus, ‘cultural associations’ constitute a means to bypass the bureaucratic and other actual obstacles (see Pavlou and Christopoulos 2004: 279–80). In this respect, Muslim immigrants set up cultural centres, friendship associations (aiming to strengthen the social and cultural ties between the countries of origin and settlement), and non-profit organisations. They do so together with Greeks or naturalised migrants, who are essential for the foundation and legal recognition of such institutions, according to Greek legislation.

In practice, only few ‘cultural associations’ preserve their original character, as most of them are used as a cover for Islamic institutions (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 177). Hence, warehouses or underground apartments are usually transformed into informal worship places, or else informal mosques, where prayer, Da’wah, and other Muslim rituals are exercised, and where leading figures of Islamic associations can give Quranic classes (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 177). Moreover, informal mosques also provide for the education of Muslim children through language classes (e.g. Arabic, Urdu, Bengali etc.) (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 359). Informal mosques are also used as regular hangouts, where Muslim migrants come to socialise with their co-nationals, meet new people, discuss their problems etc. (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 359). In many cases, informal mosques provide hospitality and support to Muslim newcomers, who lack the resources and acquaintances to accommodate their needs (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 359). Informal worship places also organise the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca and the celebrations for the Muslim holidays (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 177). Additionally, they perform charitable work, mainly through the collection of alms, and develop ties with other Islamic associations of the same trend abroad (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 177).

The administrative and religious duties in informal mosques are distinct and they are taken up by different people (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 181). Responsible for the everyday matters of the mosque, which include maintenance, contacts with state authorities and abroad etc., is usually a single individual or a small council, which is appointed by the headquarters of the association abroad (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 181). The ‘imams’ are responsible for the prayer, Khutbah,\(^{65}\) Da’wah and other rituals. However, this does not mean that the imams have received formal education in religious schools. Usually, the appointed imams have hands-on experience in religious matters and rituals, which has been acquired in the mosques of their countries of origin, and includes the reading of the Quran, the explanation of passages from other religious books, and the performance of rituals. Only a handful is appointed full-time, and even fewer receive a regular stipend (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 181).

The first informal mosque was established in 1985 in Athens by a Sudanese scientist. Up to 1993 the number of informal worship places had increased to 4 (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 358). In the beginning of 2009, 67 informal mosques in total were operating in Athens.\(^{66}\) Currently, there are about 100 informal mosques operating in the broader Athens area (Giannoulis 2011: 16). However, their total number cannot be accurately calculated as these facilities operate largely unmonitored. Moreover, informal mosques are established and

---

\(^{64}\) E.g. the submission of an official request from at least 50 families living in the area, consulting the Greek Orthodox Church, etc.

\(^{65}\) Khutbah is an Arabic term, which means the primary formal occasion for public preaching that usually takes place at the noon congregation prayer on Fridays.

organised following the ethnicity and/or nationality, and the religious and ideological background of their founders (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 360). Subsequently, informal mosques tend to be characterised as ‘Pakistani’, ‘Bangladeshi’, ‘Egyptian’ and so on, while, at the same time, they are identified as Sunni, Shia, Salafist, etc. More specifically, the vast majority of informal mosques in Greece (approximately 90%) follow Sunni Islam, while there are also a couple of Shia and Salafist worship places (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 361). About one third of the total number of informal mosques in Athens, including the two Shia mosques, has been established by Pakistani Muslim migrants (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 361). Approximately 20 informal mosques have been founded by Bangladeshi Muslim migrants. Hence, about half of the informal mosques in Athens are controlled by these two nationalities (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 361). The other half is dominated by Sunni Arabs, mainly Egyptians and Syrians, while there is also a small number of Salafist informal mosques established by Afghans, Kurds, Somalians and Senegalese (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 361). It should be noted that the influence of Sufi neo-brotherhoods on Muslim migrant communities in Greece is quite limited (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 366).

Pakistani Muslims, who are approximately 80,000 in Greece, are in their vast majority Sunni (80%), and they operate about 10 different associations and 40 informal mosques in Athens.\(^67\) One third of the Pakistani informal mosques in Athens are linked to the Minhaj ul-Quran; 5-6 are controlled by the Tabligh Jamaat; 4 are operated by the Dawat-e-Islami; another 4 are run by Sufi groups (the Sultan Bahu Trust, the Karam Foundation and Mehria Naseeria); 2 are associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami structures in Europe; and the rest claim to be free of specific influences, although they are mostly related to the Tablighi Jamaat, Minhaj ul-Quran and Sufi groups (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 178). Bangladeshi Muslims are approximately 25,000 in Greece, they are predominantly Sunnis, and run about 30 informal mosques in Athens.\(^68\) Over 80% of these mosques belong to the Tablighi Jamaat movement, while the rest are linked to the Bangladeshi branch of the Islamic Forum of Europe (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 178). Afghan Muslims, are approximately 15,000 in Greece, and the vast majority (about 70%) are Shiites who left Afghanistan in order to escape from the Taliban.\(^69\) One Afghani mosque is located in the premises of the Cultural and Artistic Association ‘Noor’. Yet, no further information is available with respect to the number and location of the informal mosques that they control.

Furthermore, there are about 30 Arab informal mosques in Athens, which are predominantly controlled by Sunni Muslims who follow the ‘middle path’. More specifically, they are run mainly by Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians who have become naturalised, and by Greek converts to Islam (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 371). Arab informal mosques usually operate under the auspices of umbrella organisations, such as the Muslim Association of Greece (MAG), which was established in 2003 by its president Naim El-Ghandour with the aim to ‘unite all Muslims in Greece’. His wife, Anna Stamou, a Greek convert to Islam, is a member of the board of advisors of the organisation. MAG and the informal mosques that operate under its auspices are influenced by the ideas of (and are sometimes linked to) the Muslim Brotherhood (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 371).

The Greek-Arabic Cultural Centre, or else the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC), established in 2001 in central Athens, constitutes another umbrella organisation with links to the Muslim Brotherhood in Greece (Giannoulis 2011: 10-11). The Centre controls the informal mosque

\(^{67}\) Banoutsos, A., ‘Mapping Muslim Communities in Greece’, \textit{Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe}.

\(^{68}\) Banoutsos, A., ‘Mapping Muslim Communities in Greece’, \textit{Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe}.

\(^{69}\) Banoutsos, A., ‘Mapping Muslim Communities in Greece’, \textit{Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe}.
‘Al-Farouq’, which in 2007 was transferred to a 1,800m² old textile factory building that was bought at the price of €2.5 million by a Saudi businessman (Giannoulis 2011: 10-11). The mosque serves as a semi-formal worship place and has a capacity of 3,000 worshipers. Since 2005, the Centre expanded its activities to Thessaloniki (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 371). Indeed, apart from MAG and ICC members, Shadi Ayoubi, a Lebanese journalist and correspondent of the Al Jazeera in Athens has set up an online platform for the Muslim Brotherhood in Greece. Finally, a growing number of Egyptian, Kurdish, Iraqi, and Somali migrants follow Salafism (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 375). There is at least one informal mosque in Athens controlled by Salafists, the Salaf-us-Salih (former Ar-Rahman).

The internet is used as a medium of disseminating knowledge and awareness about Islam. Papageorgiou and Samouris (2012: 376-377) state that MAG and the Salafists use their own websites, where they upload personal stories of Greek converts to Islam in order to attract new followers. This form of indirect Da’wah has positive impact on people with spiritual needs, as they learn about the new religion from the personal experiences of those who have already made the journey to Islam. The Salafists are particularly active online, creating websites that explain Islam to Greeks, supporting groups for new followers, and creating blogs and forums, in which new and old followers discuss about Islam-related issues. Moreover, they organise and participate in meetings for new converts to Islam, both in Greece and abroad, that aim to support and expand the network of new converts (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 379). Converts also focus on making Islam more appealing to Greeks, who are cautious towards it, as they tend to associate it with Turkey and the traditionally troubled Greek-Turkish relations (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 379). Hence, converts tend to conduct indirect Da’wah by emphasising the Islamic approach to global problems, such as the environmental, economic etc., rather than strictly religious matters (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 380). Finally, Greek converts to Islam who live abroad have also been very active in recruiting new followers. However, they tend to adopt a more radical approach to their Da’wah, which focuses on blaming the West for oppressing the Muslims across the world (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 380).

The representatives of Islamic associations in Greece have stressed that their aim is to promote the true Islam of peace and justice (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 187). Moreover, they have asserted that immigrants are willing to conform to the norms and rules of the country (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 187). Indeed, all representatives interviewed by Kassimeris and Samouris agreed that the real jihad is jihad al-nafs, while the missionary movements disapprove violent jihad even in Muslim territories that are considered as occupied by non-Muslims. Yet, they admitted that they cannot stop everybody from radicalisation, claiming that if a person is predisposed to follow this path, he/she will eventually find a way through (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 187).

---


71 'Islam.gr’. Available at: www.islam.gr

72 E.g. ‘Male and Female Greeks that converted to Islam’. Available at: http://islamforgreeks.org/converts-testimonies/(last accessed 20 July 2015).

73 E.g. ‘Orthodox Islam with an Orthodox Understanding – The Real Islam of the Righteous Muslim predecessors (Salaf us Salih)’. Available at: http://islamforgreeks.org/(last accessed 20 July 2015).


75 I.e. The internal struggle, or else, the struggle to change one’s own self.
II.2.1.2. ISLAMIC EDUCATION

In terms of education of the native Muslim population, the three muftis in Western Thrace must be graduates of Muslim Studies in theology and law, usually from the cities of Mecca or Medina, and be versed in the old Ottoman language (Ziaka 2013: 129). Moreover, there are approximately 400 spiritual leaders (imam, hatib, muezzin) in the region, for whom there is no official/formal provision of education and training in religious teaching (Ziaka 2013: 129).

Native Muslims of Western Thrace have been given the right to establish and operate educational institutions in any language of instruction, according to Articles 40 and 41 of the Treaty of Lausanne (Ziaka 2009: 166). Turkish and Greek are the main languages of instruction in these institutions, while Pomak and Roma are underemphasised (Evergeti, Hatziprokipiou and Prevelakis 2014: 360). The Muslim instructors of these institutions are trained at a two-year programme at the Greek state’s Special Academy of Thessaloniki. The use of Turkish as one of the main languages of instruction in these institutions has undoubtedly been facilitated by Turkey, since late 1960s. In response, the Greek state in fear of a potential ‘Turkification’ of the native Muslim population has tended to endorse education in Pomak to counter-act the weight of Turkish (Oktem 2010). Muslim minority education includes only elementary and high schools, which leads Muslims to attend public Greek-language kindergartens. Moreover, the limited number of minority high schools (just two) leads pupils to either attend Greek high schools or emigrate to Turkey in order to complete their secondary education (Evergeti, Hatziprokipiou and Prevelakis 2014: 361). Since the 1990s, native Muslims’ rates of access to tertiary education have increased thanks to the establishment of a 0.5% admission quota at universities and institutions of higher and technical education for the minority (Ziaka 2009: 149). However, it still is hard for native Muslims to enter higher education institutions in Greece, particularly due to ‘socio-economic and language issues’ (Evergeti, Hatziprokipiou and Prevelakis 2014: 361).

All of the above, however, do not apply to Muslim migrants in Greece, who do not enjoy any special religious legal status, and they are subject to Greek law that apply to all immigrants, without any exception (Ziaka 2013). Consequently, Muslim immigrants do not enjoy the special education rights that apply only to the native Muslim minority. Hence, according to the introductory report for the Law on Multicultural Education prepared by the Greek Parliament’s Scientific Council in 1997, modern multicultural education does not necessarily support religious difference, but focuses on ‘strengthening the ethnic identity of the various groups of foreigners living in the country’ (Ziaka 2013: 133). Thus, the children of all immigrants, no matter their religion, study alongside Greek children in public schools, from kindergarten to high school, without any exception. Within this context, Greek schools were largely unprepared in the 1990s, particularly with respect to language training for foreign students and the management of multiculturalism (Ziaka 2013: 133). Their adjustment to the requirements of new reality started in 1996 with the creation of the so-called intercultural or multicultural schools.

II.2.2. IDEOLOGY AND IDEAS

Papageourgjou and Samouris (2012) have identified Salafist and neo-Salafist ideologies as more prone to the adoption of a radical (militant) version of Islam. Yet, a quick look at the
relevant Salafist and neo-Salafist Greek websites does not indicate any signs of radical (militant) Islamist ideas, apart from the preaching of a conservative version of Islam. Indeed, at first sight, Salafism in Greece demonstrates moderate characteristics.

However, Papageorgiou and Samouris (2012) identify various potential risks that emanate from the expansion of this version of orthodox Islam in Greece. More specifically, they argue that the spread of conservative orthodox Islam among native Muslims is a potential danger, taking into account that the Sharia law is applicable in the region (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 350). It should be noted though, that the spread of such ideas among native Muslims in Western Thrace is rather improbable taking into account that there is no physical contact between native Muslims and Salafists. In fact, the dissemination of Salafist ideas is limited to urban areas, and more specifically to Athens, where the relevant informal mosque operates. Moreover, native Muslims have been, and still are, preoccupied with issues related to their ethnic, rather than their religious identity (see Kokkas 2008).

Moreover, Papageorgiou and Samouris (2012: 384) note that the arrival of fundamentalists in Greece increases the risk of expansion of a Salafist Jihadist ideology among both native and migrant Muslim communities. The presence of Jihadist militants that have gained combat experience and status in conflict zones facilitates the transition from ideas to actions for those who have already adopted the neo-Salafist ideology (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 384). One must admit that this is a valid argument, at least with respect to the expansion of such ideas among the migrant Muslim population in Greece. There is enough evidence to argue that Greece has been used by Jihadists as a transit country to and from the battlefields in Middle East. Additionally, there are sufficient reasons to believe that Greece would be a suitable place for the settlement of radical Islamists who would undertake particular low-key activities in the country (see “Root Causes and Motivations” section below).

Yet, one must also acknowledge that there is still no evidence for the profession and dissemination of radical (militant) Islamist ideas in the aforementioned fashion in Greece. In this regard, there are two factors that would hinder the spread of such radical (militant) ideas among the migrant Muslim population in Greece. First, the dominant and decisive role of MAG among migrant Muslims, which, by extension, means that the more moderate versions of Islam prevail. And second, the organisation of migrant communities not on a religious, but on a strictly ethnic basis, which, by extension, means that the majority of migrant Muslims would be unaffected by the potential settlement of radical Islamists in Greece. However, it must be noted that both reasons do not constitute excuses for not closely monitoring the phenomenon.

II.2.3. ORGANISATIONAL FORMS AND ACTORS

It is not possible to provide and discuss information about the organisational structures associated with Islamist radicalisation in Greece as no acts of such kind have been perpetrated in the country, little research has been undertaken and the work of intelligence and law enforcement structures is associated with prevention rather than reaction.

As early as 2009, the former US Ambassador to Greece, Mr. Daniel Speckhard, had noted the danger of the formation of Islamist cells and the use of the country as a crossroad to and

76 e.g. ‘Ahmad Eldin – Thoughts and opinions of a Greek Muslim’. Available at: http://ahmadeldin.org/; and ‘Orthodox Islam with an Orthodox Understanding – The Real Islam of the Righteous Muslim predecessors (Salaf us Salih)’. Available at: http://islamforgreeks.org/.
from the Middle East. Six years later, it is estimated that approximately 2,000 jihadists have used Greece in the last two years to reach Iraq and Syria from Europe. Thus, the Greek authorities are at a heightened state of vigilance, exchanging intelligence with the US, Britain, France and other countries. Allegedly, the large Muslim immigrant community in Athens is in a position to provide jihadists and similar groups with housing and help them keep a low-profile. According to some other sources, there are indications that militants have already started setting up logistical, recruitment and financial support cells in Greece in order to facilitate the movement of Jihadists to and from Syria. It is believed that there are about 200 people in Greece with links to Jihadist groups, such as ISIS and Al Nusra Front.

Kostakos (2007), argues that Greece has likely become a transit and entry point for Jihadists who camouflage their activities and movements in civil society. According to the same author, networks of NGOs, charities and cultural centres linked to Saudi Arabia have financed and built a number of mosques in Greece. More specifically, Kostakos (2010: 4) argues that this semi-legal web spreads across five different entities, including: mosques and local Muslim communities; humanitarian organisations and NGOs; Islamic cultural centres in Greece and abroad; foreign political, economic and religious elites; and international Islamist terrorist organisations. The key members of this network are known as ‘The Union of Mosques’ or ‘The Union of Imams’, and have military training, combat experience, and international connections with terrorist groups, foreign governments and the Muslim diaspora in Europe (Kostakos 2010: 4). Through criminal activities, such as passport forging, arms trafficking, people smuggling and drugs trafficking, and through a well-developed internal structure they support fundraising, recruitment and counter-intelligence activities (Kostakos 2010: 4). However, these allegations are impossible to be verified, as the Hellenic Police are operating under top secrecy regarding the issue of Islamist terrorism in Greece. Yet, certain assumptions can be inferred from recent arrest of suspects by the Greek authorities (see ‘Institutional/ Law Enforcement response’ section below).

According to some reports, Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organisations have extended in the past their network to many countries in Europe, including Greece (Kostakos 2007). According to Kostakos (2010: 4), arrests of Islamist radicals in Europe ‘will often trigger changes in the everyday routines of some members of the network in Greece’. The same author argues that members of the network were advised to alter their appearance, shave their beards, move to a friendly country and avoid talking openly when meeting in mosques or other public places. Moreover, according to the same source, the network was forced to change its modus operandi right after the London and Madrid bombings. Yet, again these allegations are impossible to be verified.

More specifically, according to French intelligence dating back to the pre-9/11 era, former radical Arab groups have been used by Al Qaeda and other fundamentalist networks

80 Lister, T., and Mantzikos, I., ‘Add this to Greece’s list of problems: It’s an emerging hub for terrorists’, CNN.
81 Interview with Islamist terrorism expert, Athens, April 21, 2015.
82 Lister, T., and Mantzikos, I., ‘Add this to Greece’s list of problems: It’s an emerging hub for terrorists’, CNN.
(Kostakos 2007). Greek intelligence dating back to 1993, had already identified this trend (Kostakos 2007). Recent reports suggest that weapon smuggling networks operate in Greece on behalf of ISIS, transferring weapons from Albania to Syria. Moreover, international terrorist cells in Greece had also established ties in the past with domestic extreme left terrorist groups, such as the N17, and the ELA. These ties entailed common training in guerrilla tactics, bomb-making, and weapon improvisation techniques, and logistical and financial support and joint ventures in terrorist planning and attacks. Furthermore, even more recently, in 2009 and 2010, 25-30 Greek nationals linked to domestic terrorist organisations travelled to the Middle East to receive training on practices and weapons operation, probably by Hezbollah operatives (Giannoulis 2011: 20).

II.2.4. REPERTOIRE OF ACTIONS

Despite the various views and reports about the existence of radical Islamist liaisons, described in the previous section, no verified Islamist terrorist attack has ever taken place in Greece. However, the country has a history of imported international terrorism originating mainly from Muslim countries (see Kaminaris 1999). Historically, international terrorist acts have been committed in Greece by Arab, usually Palestinian groups, against American and Israeli targets, and Kurdish organisations against Turkish targets (Kaminaris 1999: 36). These groups/organisations included the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as well as the Palestinian May 15 Organisation, Abu Nidal group, Popular Struggle Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and Black September, and also Lebanese Shiite groups, among others.

At the end of the 1960s, Middle-Eastern and Arab terrorist groups imported their activities into Greece. They sought to use hijackings and hostage-taking in order to attack their enemies, achieve international publicity, and bargain the release of their captured comrades from Greek jails (Kaminaris 1999: 36). In August 1973, two members of the PLO’s ‘Black September’ killed 3 people and wounded 55 at the Athens airport using machine guns and grenades. In February 1974, three gunmen hijacked the Greek freighter Vory in Karachi, Pakistan, threatening to blow up the ship and kill the hostages if the Greek government did not free the Arab terrorists of the previous attack, who were sentenced to death after their arrest. The Greek government conceded to their demands, reduced the terrorists’ sentences to life imprisonment, and later pardoned them and deported them to Libya in May 1974.

During the ‘Metapolitefsi’ years (1974-1981), sporadic Palestinian terrorist attacks continued to occur. In June 1976, seven PFLP commandos hijacked an Air France airbus shortly after it took off from Athens, and diverted it to Entebbe airport in Uganda. The episode ended with a spectacular rescue operation by the Israeli forces. From 1981 to 1989, international terrorist activities increased. In April 1984, the Jordanian Abdallah Fuad Shara, a

---


85 International terrorism is defined as acts performed by individuals of foreign nationality in Greek territory seeking victims or symbolic targets that represent a foreign state.
member of the May 15 terrorist organisation, was arrested by British and American agents during a raid in his apartment in Athens. The Greek authorities reacted, as the mission was interpreted as a violation of international law and Greek sovereignty, and then released the suspect, providing him with safe passage to Algeria. In June 1985, Lebanese gunmen hijacked a TWA jetliner carrying 153 people, shortly after it had taken off from Athens airport. The episode led to an intense crisis in Beirut, which ended with the death of one American sailor. Finally, during the 1990s, the main incident of international terrorism occurred in April 1991, when members of the Islamic War Holy Movement prematurely detonated a bomb aimed at the British consulate in Patras, which, instead, destroyed the offices of a Greek company, killing seven people, including the Palestinian carrier of the bomb. All in all, the friendly attitude of PASOK towards Palestinians and the PLO after it came to power in 1981, presumably played an important role in encouraging international terrorists to use Greece as a basis for their attacks.

In recent years, Greece has encountered an increased, mainly background, activity of international Muslim terrorists (Giannoulis 2011: 22). So far, this activity has been limited to a logistical, recruitment and support basis. The pool of irregular immigrants in the country has created a hub of individuals, whose presence is not recorded in official data and evades the knowledge of authorities. They facilitate the movement of Muslims through Greece to and from Asia and Middle East, and attempt to recruit Muslim radicals for operations outside of Greece (Giannoulis 2011: 22).

Apart from the aforementioned cases of international terrorism, which cannot, however, be classified under the banner of Islamist terrorism, a limited number of religiously motivated acts of violence have also been recorded in Greece. The native Muslim population of Thrace has not been involved in any serious incidents of religiously motivated social unrest in the country. Yet, in November 2004, a TV crew that was shooting a scene in the village of Echinos for the purposes of a TV series, was attacked by members of the local Muslim community. The incident started when the leading actress walked into a Mosque during shooting, which led to the vituperation and stoning of the TV crew. The riots, which lasted 1-2 days, resulted in the arrest of four people, and the conviction of two, who were punished with a 9-month imprisonment with deferment in 2007. It should be noted that this religiously motivated violent incident constitutes an isolated case, and that the native Muslim community in Greece has not demonstrated any signs of Islamist radicalisation. The potential radicalisation of the native Muslim community on an ethnic basis is beyond the scope of this report. Moreover, incidents of social unrest with the participation of Muslim immigrant communities have occasionally taken place in Greece. However, it definitely cannot be argued that these incidents have occurred in the name of radical Islam.

II.2.5. INSTITUTIONAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES

A number of arrests performed during the last decade by the Hellenic Police seem to validate the argument that Greece has likely become a transit and entry point for Jihadists. In September 2005, Anwar Mazrar, a Muslim terrorist from Morocco who was wanted by the French and Moroccan authorities for participation in a North African extremist organisation

86 ‘The prosecutor ordered an investigation for the Echinos incident’, In. [In Greek]. Available at: http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=581303(last accessed 20 July 2015).
affiliated with Al Qaeda was arrested by the Greek authorities. Moreover, in 2005, 28 Pakistani migrants were kidnapped and tortured by Greek and British agents, eight days after the 7/7 London bombings. In 2006, a Pakistani imam wanted for terrorist attacks and homicide was arrested at the Athens airport flying from the UK in order to conduct a series of religious seminars among the Pakistani community in Greece. Moreover, from 2001 to 2006, 20 Arab fundamentalists had been arrested by British, Italian, Portuguese, French and Dutch authorities for having in their possession forged Greek passports. In July 2009, Abu Sanjat, an Iraqi wanted by Interpol for participation in terrorist attacks in Baghdad associated with Al Qaeda, was arrested by the Greek authorities, having crossed the borders irregularly. Up to 2011, the Greek authorities had approximately 40 individuals suspected for connections with Al Qaeda, under surveillance, while 500 persons were under relaxed monitoring by the authorities.

In February 2011, Ghaleb Taleb, a Lebanese-Palestinian member of Fatah-al-Islam was arrested in the suburbs of Athens. Taleb had not conducted an attack yet, however, it is believed that he was sent to Greece in order to finance, equip and accommodate other operatives, and to use the country as a base to provide fake IDs to smuggling networks. In the first few months of 2014, the Greek authorities had detected 6 ISIS recruits traveling through the country, including a 23 year old French carrying a memory stick with instructions for making bombs, and a 43 year old Russian French for trying to drive a truck carrying weapons to Syria. In the first nine months of 2014, Greece had deported 300 Syrians and Iraqis suspected for terrorism-related activities. In January 2015, the Greek authorities arrested a 33 year old Algerian, whose extradition was requested by Belgium in connection with recent terrorist attacks. Moreover, in 2015, three young Belgians were arrested at Charleroi airport as they prepared to fly to Greece and then travel to Syria in order to participate in acts of terrorism. Recently, an 18 year old was arrested by the Greek authorities at the Greek-Albanian border and was deported to Albania for participating in terrorist acts abroad. Finally, a 47 year old German

88 ‘Ruling backs Greek abduction case’, BBC. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil/europe /4763777 .stm (last accessed 20 July 2015).
90 Michaletos, I., ‘Radical Islam passing through Greece’, Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe.
96 Lister, T., and Mantzikos, I., ‘Add this to Greece’s list of problems: It’s an emerging hub for terrorists’, CNN.
97 Lister, T., and Mantzikos, I., ‘Add this to Greece’s list of problems: It’s an emerging hub for terrorists’, CNN.
and a 56 year old Turk were also recently arrested by the Greek police under the European Arrest Warrant for participation in terrorist acts.  

II.2.6 ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

According to a senior intelligence official, the threat level originating from Islamist radicalisation in Greece is ‘very low’. Along the same lines, none of the representatives of the Islamic associations in Greece consider Islamist radicalisation as an existing issue in the country (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 187). Yet, Greek authorities are at the moment ‘at a heightened state of vigilance’, due to the fact that the country is a Jihadist crossover to and from Syria.

Indeed, Greece was not a major player in the ‘war on terrorism’, as the country did not deploy any troops in Iraq, while the troops in Afghanistan participated mainly in low visibility and risk engineering and medical activities as well as training missions (Kostakos 2010: 3). Moreover, Muslims hold a positive view of Greece, which is an ancient civilisation that coexisted with the Islamic one, and did not have any involvement in the colonial wars (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 189). Furthermore, Greece has long-term good relationships with the Arab world, which started to develop in the early 1980s, when the socialist PASOK party came to power.

However, there are various reasons to believe that Greece would be an appealing potential target of Islamists, despite the fact that it lacks the symbolism and strategic interest that such groups seek for. Indeed, there are expectations that radical Islamist groups could participate in low-risk assignments and psychological operations (such as recruitment, funding, propaganda and training) (Kostakos 2010: 4). According to other reports, some of these are already happening. The truth is that Greece has a geographical proximity to countries that export radicalism. It also has a Muslim migrant community, which has gradually grown due to the country’s porous borders and the existence of extensive smuggling networks. Moreover, it has a past and present of social unrest, economic downslide and anti-immigrant attitudes, which provide a fertile ground for the development or adoption of such radical ideas and behaviours. In the same manner, Naim El-Ghadour, president of MAG, has argued that police crackdowns, discrimination against Muslim migrants, migrant unemployment, and persistent delays in the construction of an official mosque and Muslim cemetery in Athens indirectly foment the radicalisation of the Muslim migrant community.

Additionally, all primary targeted countries are present in Greece, in the form of embassies, companies, and other institutions. Furthermore, a number of domestic terrorist networks are already present in the country.


102 This fear has been also expressed by the former Ambassador of the US to Greece, Mr. Daniel Speckhard, in one of his leaked communiqués in 2009.

103 Lister, T., and Mantzikos, I., ‘Add this to Greece’s list of problems: It’s an emerging hub for terrorists’, CNN.

104 ‘Muslim Protests: Linked to Police Crackdowns’, Wikileaks.
Finally, the presence of a free press in Greece would also enable the maximum visibility of such an attack, which is the main consideration of all terrorist groups.

Nevertheless, the native Muslim community in Thrace does not show any signs of Islamist radicalisation, despite the fact that it mobilises politically on a Turkish ethnic basis. However, Papageorgiou and Samouris (2012: 350) argue that the spread of conservative orthodox Islam among native Muslims is a potential danger, taking into account that the Sharia law is applicable in the region. Indeed, the arrival of fundamentalists in Greece increases the risk of expansion of a Salafist Jihadist ideology among both native and migrant Muslim communities (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 384). The presence of Jihadist militants that have gained combat experience and status in conflict zones facilitates the transition from ideas to actions for those who have already adopted the neo-Salafist ideology (Papageorgiou and Samouris 2012: 384).

Naim El-Ghadour, President of MAG, has argued that the more transient and less integrated Pakistani, Afghan, and Somalian immigrants are more vulnerable to radicalisation. Moreover, in May 2009, El-Ghadour characterised the Pakistanis, Afghans, and Bangladeshis who participated in the riots as ‘young kids, maybe 19, 20 years old, without jobs, and facing hunger’ on a daily basis. Along the same lines, the leaders of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Islamic associations in Greece have expressed their concerns about the new Muslims who come to Europe ‘unprepared’ for the ‘un-Islamic’ way of life of the West, and with little knowledge of their own religion (Kassimeris and Samouris 2012: 182). Finally, Scott McCracken, Director for Refugee Ministries at Helping Hands, a local faith-based NGO, has confirmed that the risk of radicalisation has grown, as Pakistani, Afghan, and Somalian young men and families who regularly attended faith-based and government-run food kitchens in past years, have stopped coming, following the guidelines of some imams and leaders of certain Muslim ethnic groups to avoid associating with Christians or Greek authorities.

105 ‘Muslim Protests: Linked to Police Crackdowns’, Wikileaks.
106 ‘Muslim Protests: Linked to Police Crackdowns’, Wikileaks.
107 ‘Muslim Protests: Linked to Police Crackdowns’, Wikileaks.
II.3. HOOLIGANISM

II.3.1. BACKGROUND

Over the last three decades, research on hooliganism in Greece has followed two main analytical pathways. On the one hand, from the 1980s until the early 2000s, a number of scholars, following different theoretical approaches, have attempted to explain the causes of supporters’ violent behaviour (e.g. Courakis 1988; 1997; 1998; Chliaoutaki 1996; Kotaridis 2005; Tsouramanis 1988), to identify the profile of hard-core fans (e.g. Astrinakis and Stylianoudi 1996), and to map the public’s perception of the phenomenon (e.g. Panousis 1990). Over the past fifteen years though Greek scholars stopped being concerned with the study of the causes of supporters’ violent behaviour, accepting the fact that it is a consequence of various interdependent social, economic, political, symbolic, psychological and sports-related factors (see Zaimakis 2005). This turn in academic research coincided with the increase in the number of incidents of hooliganism inside and outside Greek sports venues. Recent studies instead tend to focus on media representations of hooliganism (e.g. Tsoukala 2011), and especially, on the various political and police counter-hooliganism responses (e.g. Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013; Samatas 2007; 2008; 2011). This new wave of studies highlights the different aspects and stakes related to counter-hooliganism policies, the outcomes and effects of these policies, and their impact on the rights of supporters and citizens more broadly.

Hooliganism, as an organised form of violent behaviour inside and outside sports venues, first emerged in Greek football at the end of 1970s, only seven years after the dictatorship, and by the 1990s it had spread to basketball and volleyball. The birth of the phenomenon coincided with the commercialisation and professionalisation of sports, the intensification of competition between sports clubs, and the emergence of organised fan clubs (Zaimakis 2005: 2). Up to that time, the chants in stadiums were sarcastic and humorous and their aim was to degrade the presence of rival fans and not to insult or humiliate them. However, they did not include the element of symbolic violence that is inherent in modern chants (Papageorgiou 1998). Incidents of organised violence were rare and were occurring only in cases where there was a widespread feeling among supporters that the match is fixed (Papageorgiou 1998: 50-51).

Throughout the 1980s, hooliganism was on the rise. It took various forms, from intergroup clashes and fights with the police, to pitch invasions, missile-throwing and broad-scale acts of vandalism (Courakis 1988). The extremity of such incidents led to the deaths of three football fans in 1983 and 1986, several hundred injuries and considerable material damage (Tsoukala 2011: 603). From the late 1980s onwards, incidents of hooliganism started occurring more frequently, both inside and outside sports venues, before and after the matches, and they involved several hundred supporters at a time (Tsoukala 2011: 603). The escalation of incidents of hooliganism continued in the 1990s, with two more deaths of supporters in 1991 and 1993, a dozen severe injuries, several hundred minor injuries and important material damage.109

108 One of the few exceptions in the current academic research trend has been the study of Koukouris and Stavros (2009), which attempts to explain the causes of hooliganism through interviews with Greek basketball referees.

From the mid-1990s onwards, the intensification of counter-hooliganism measures during matches pushed incidents of sports-related violence outside sports venues. Hence, in 2007, a supporter was murdered during an outdoor fight right before a female volleyball match (Tsoukala 2011: 603). Incidents of hooliganism continued to occur frequently, both inside and outside sports venues, throughout the 2000s and 2010s. The last victim of sports-related violence was a 49 year old who was murdered in September 2014 during a lower division football match in Crete.

Despite the rising number of incidents of hooliganism from the late 1970s onwards, the Greek press adopted a highly soft stance and sought to uncover the causes of the phenomenon (Tsoukala 2011). During that period, journalists often referred to the first academic study of the phenomenon in 1988 (i.e. Courakis 1988), to point out that violent organised supporters are going through a temporary ‘process of transition from adolescence to adulthood which might occasionally take the form of violent behaviour’ (Tsoukala 2011: 603). Thus, far from stigmatising organised hard-core fans as responsible for the escalation of sports-related violence, the Greek media presented hooliganism as a relatively natural, youth-specific, phenomenon, an adverse side effect of the transformation of the post-dictatorial Greek society (Tsoukala 2011: 603).

However, this indulgent stance started to change in the mid-1990s. During that period, the press’ depictions thoroughly shifted and advanced the image of ‘dangerousness’ with respect to hooliganism. They relied on deviance-amplification techniques (e.g. ‘Us vs. Them’ dichotomy) and adhered to a binary representation of hooligans (i.e. Manichaeanist understanding of hooliganism as intrinsically evil) (Tsoukala 2011: 604). Sports-related violence was described as a ‘pathological’ behaviour and a form of criminality that is eroding the foundations of Greek society, costing taxpayers vast amounts of money (Tsoukala 2011: 604).

II.3.2. ORGANISATIONAL FORMS AND ACTORS

It is widely accepted that the main actors of hooliganism in Greece are the members of organised fan clubs that associate themselves with sports teams, and particularly football clubs. Zaimakis (2005) sketches the “hooligan’s” profile, based on police statistics on apprehended individuals for sports-related acts of violence in 2000-2002. Out of 238 apprehended individuals, the majority was between 18 and 25 years old (78%) and the rest were minors (22%). The majority of the acts of hooliganism were committed in Athens (55%) and Thessaloniki (22%), while the perpetrators were predominantly males (only six were females). Courakis (1998) also sketches the demographic profile of organised hard-core fans, which is in accord with Zaimakis’ description. Along the same lines, Courakis argues that the average organised hard-core fan is a single male, approximately 20 years old, born and raised in one of the large cities (Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki). However, a careful look at recent statistics (2008-2014) reveals that 25-34 year olds are equally involved in acts of hooliganism nowadays (see Table 4). Furthermore, it verifies that hooligans are predominantly males, yet, it also uncovers that a considerable share of hooligans, 1 in 10, is female (see Table 5). Hence, it appears that hooliganism has recently broken down barriers across demographics strata. Additionally, Table 11 (see ANNEX II) demonstrates that about 14% of those who were arrested or prosecuted for hooliganism in the past 7 years are not Greek nationals, which suggests that sports-related violence has penetrated the immigrant community in Greece too.
Table 4 Age of Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>7-17</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45+</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security

Table 5 Gender of Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrested Individuals Male / Female</th>
<th>Prosecuted Individuals Male / Female</th>
<th>Total Male / Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>204 / 33</td>
<td>124 / 11</td>
<td>328 / 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>276 / 2</td>
<td>264 / 12</td>
<td>540 / 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>246 / 8</td>
<td>73 / 13</td>
<td>319 / 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>199 / 8</td>
<td>100 / 6</td>
<td>299 / 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>95 / 4</td>
<td>69 / 3</td>
<td>164 / 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>243 / 63</td>
<td>55 / 11</td>
<td>298 / 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>198 / 110</td>
<td>49 / 12</td>
<td>247 / 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1461 / 228</td>
<td>734 / 68</td>
<td>2195 / 296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security

Courakis has also provided invaluable detailed information about the socioeconomic profile of organised hard-core fans, which is based on preliminary data. More specifically, seven out of ten organised hard-core fans were in employment, mainly in the private sector (38%), and secondarily as skilled/unskilled workers (22%). Despite being employed in higher numbers than the rest of the population, they earned slightly less than the average worker of the same age, while only one third had steady jobs. Moreover, there were fewer university/college students and more secondary school pupils and graduates among them compared to their peers in the broader area of the capital, while half of them admitted that they had problems with their teachers. Additionally, it is argued that their family’s social position was working class, while the interviewees’ average joint income was about one third higher than the average joint income of the general population. Accordingly, we can surmise that there was limited parental supervision at home due to the amount of time spent at work. Indeed, approximately one third of the organised hard-core fans who were interviewed admitted that their relationships with their families were problematic. One fifth of the interviewees also admitted that one or both of their parents had had dealings with the police or the courts, due to some sort of criminal act or public disturbance.

Before discussing the organisation and structure of organised fan clubs, it is also worth taking a look at the reasons why some fans decide to join such a club. According to Courakis’ (1998: 297) study, 41% of the interviewees argued that they had joined these clubs in order to support their team ‘more directly and more dynamically’, while 17% stated that they felt the
urge to socialise with people who ‘believed’ in the same team. Approximately half of the participants stated that they were members of organised fan clubs for longer than two years (Courakis 1998: 297). Additionally, it is common for organised hard-core fans to get together at certain ‘hangouts’ at least two or three times a week (61%), read mainly sports newspapers that support their team (56%), support their team at away matches ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ (58%), and go to their team’s home matches (89%), even when they are televised (Courakis 1998: 297).

Moreover, according to the same study, back in 1988, there were many individuals who could be characterised as ‘rockers’ (34%), ‘freaks’ (16%), and ‘pill poppers’ or ‘junkies’ (14%) among the members of a typical organised fan club (Courakis 1998: 298). Indeed, approximately half of the participants in that study admitted that they had tried addictive toxic substances, such as drugs, stimulants and pills, while 83% admitted that they knew somebody who had tried such substances in the past (Courakis 1998: 298). Neo-Nazis (5%) and anarchists (10%) also appeared to have penetrated the organised fan clubs (Courakis 1998: 298).

Following the trend in Western Europe, the first organised fan clubs emerged in Greece 40-45 years ago and were initially associated with football clubs. Currently, there are approximately 270 official organised fan clubs associated with more than 50 teams from all divisions across all sports.110 The majority of these fan clubs are associated with the most popular Greek teams: Panathinaikos, Olympiacos, AEK and PAOK.

In the late 1970s, the first organised fan clubs with neo-Nazi affiliations emerged in the country and continued to proliferate throughout the 1980s. These first groups, such as the Naziist Organisation of Panathinaikos Fans (NOPO) and the Terrorist Organisation of Friends of AEK(TOFA), combined elements of nationalist discourse, and the skinhead and heavy metal cultures, with a passion for the ‘timeless values of the local team’.111 By organising rituals with nationalist symbolisms, and participating in fan clashes, these groups tried to dominate the terraces, however, unsuccessfully.112 These groups ceased to exist in the early 1990s, due to the low penetration of extreme-right ideas in the Greek society, on the one hand, and the willingness of football clubs owners to support a consumer-based, non-political base of supporters, without banning organised hard-core fans from the terraces, though.113 Since the early 2000s, nationalist organised fan clubs were strengthened in all Greek popular teams, and the Greek national team too. The ‘Red Nationalists’ and the ‘Misfits’, organised fan clubs affiliated with Olympiacos; the ‘Getto’ (sic) which is affiliated with AEK; and the ‘Azure Army’, which is affiliated with the national team. The ‘Azure Army’ was founded by Golden Dawn members, emerged during the early 2000s and is still active, participating in various racist and sports-related violent acts.114


During the same period, the ‘Antifa’ (short for ‘Anti-fascist’) movement, which is closely affiliated with the Anarchist milieu in Greece, was also strengthened in Greek stadiums. Various ‘Antifa’ organised fan clubs, such as the ‘Autonomous’, fans of Heracles, the ‘Fedayeen’, fans of Atromitos, and the ‘Navajo’, fans of Panahaiki, either emerged or were strengthened in the early 2000s. Various other Antifa organised fan clubs have emerged among supporters of football teams such as Panaitolikos, PAS Giannena, PAOK, Panionios and Panathinaikos. A number of these groups have been involved in incidents of sports-related violence, primarily against the police. They have also participated in marches against the austerity, and in actions for solidarity with migrants, refugees and imprisoned women, among others.

Organised hard-core fans in Greece are linked to a number of foreign hard-core fan clubs. For instance, Olympiacos’ fans are traditionally connected with the Serbian Red Star hard-core fans, the ‘Delije’, while PAOK fans have close ties with the Serbian Partizan hard-core fans, the ‘Grobari’. In recent years, ‘Delije’ fans have been arrested by the Hellenic Police for participation in acts of violence against Panathinaikos hard-core fans, the traditional rival of Olympiacos. Even the organised fan clubs of smaller Greek teams have international links. The ‘Autonomous’, an Antifa fan club of Heracles, a second division Greek team, is connected with antifascist hard-core fans of the Spanish Rayo Vallecano, the Italian Atalanta, and the German Mainz. Additionally, there are also cases where hard-core fans of foreign teams, such as the Italian Hellas Verona, have declared their support through banners and flags during matches to the Greek neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn. Yet, it should be mentioned at this point, that these international links between hooligans of specific teams are not homogeneous, and they often form on an opportunistic basis. For instance, AEK hard-core fans, the ‘Original’, had very close ties with the Partizan ‘Grobari’, which, however, ended in 2002, due to the infiltration of individuals with neo-Nazi background in the ‘Grobari’. Moreover, despite the traditional links between the Red Star and Olympiacos fans, certain hard-core fans of Panathinaikos are connected with the leader of the ‘Delije’, who is known for his far-right ideas.

---


118 Koutsi, K., ‘Stronghold of antifascist movement’, Enet.


120 ‘Red Star fans were ready for war at OAKA’, Proto Thema. [In Greek]. Available at: http://www.protothema.gr/sports/article/335025/opadoi-tou-eruthrou-astera-itam-etoimoi-gia-polemo-sto-oaka/(last accessed 20 July 2015).

121 Koutsi, K., ‘Stronghold of antifascist movement’, Enet.


124 Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, Enet.
Organised fan clubs, particularly those that are affiliated with far-right groups or parties, have a military-type structure. Each fan club has a leader, a person with significant influence upon the members of the club, who acts like the ‘shepherd’. The leaders of the clubs have connections with the members of the team’s board, and indirectly receive pay checks by the team’s board members for offering their services as stewards during matches. Moreover, a number of organised fan clubs’ leaders are also members of the GD and they offer their services to the party too. However, the leaders of all organised fan clubs, even rival ones, know each other, and in some cases their relationships are close, despite the fact that they are associated with rival teams. Yet, this does not apply to the leaders of organised fan clubs with rival ideologies.

The facilities of organised fan clubs are used as headquarters and regular hangouts of hard-core fans. A former hooligan has admitted that organised supporters usually use the fan clubs’ facilities for drug use and for organising the clashes and ambushes to rival fans, as they are equipped with all sorts of weapons, from Molotov cocktails, to clubs and brass knuckles. Access to the facilities of the club is restricted to members only, while all cheap tickets for the ‘Kop’ of the stadium are distributed through the fan club’s facilities. Finally, in many cases, organised fan clubs and their members are used by drug traffickers and extorters.

Organised fan clubs constitute pools of recruitment for extremist and/or terrorist organisations too, and some of these clubs have openly demonstrated their solidarity to arrested members of terrorist organisations. Moreover, in recent years, the social networks of nationalist fans have been strengthened. Affiliated with extreme-right political groups and parties, these networks have managed to recruit young people by taking advantage of their need to belong somewhere and to invest their fervour to a team or group. Roversi (1991) has already argued that neo-fascist theories and fascist symbols increase their appeal among hard-core supporters during periods of economic crises, as they are connected with rebellious, unconventional, and masculine attitude. Notably, in 2012, the GD elected three MPs in the

125 ‘The underworld is hidden in stadiums (too)’, Sentragoal. [In Greek]. Available at: http://www.sentragoal.gr/article.asp?catid=10770&subid=2&pubid=128783639(last accessed 20 July 2015).
127 Lambropoulos, V., ‘Fights between stewards in the sound of music’, To Vima.
129 Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, Enet.
130 Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, Enet.
131 ‘Kop’ is a colloquial term, which describes a number of terraces and stands at sports stadiums attended by hard-core fans. Usually, they are located behind the goalposts, at either ends of the stadium.
132 Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, Enet.
133 ‘The underworld is hidden in stadiums (too)’, Sentragoal.; Souliotis, G., ‘They were ordering drugs along with match tickets’, Kathimerini.
Greek parliament, who used to belong to organised fan clubs affiliated with three different teams.\footnote{Georgakis, G., ‘When Nazism kills football too’, To Vima.[In Greek]. Available at: http://www.tovima.gr/sports/article/?aid=511718(last accessed 20 July 2015).}

However, organised fan clubs that are affiliated with extreme-right organisations and parties do not overtly use fascist discourse in order to recruit new members among organised hard-core fans.\footnote{Zaimakis, G., ‘Fans and Nazi Cells in Football’s micro-society’, Enthemata.} They approach potential new members by promoting aggressiveness and the use of force in dealing with rival fans, the ritualistic character of symbolic violence, and the semi-militarised structure of far-right groups and parties.\footnote{Zaimakis, G., ‘Fans and Nazi Cells in Football’s micro-society’, Enthemata.} In this respect, the Internet is a key mechanism in the recruitment process. Potential new members are exposed to videos of clashes among fans or between fans and the police combined with images of national pride.\footnote{Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, Enet.} Yet, sometimes, the recruitment of new members in extremist organisations takes place more covertly and invisibly when extremist organisations or parties operate informally within the facilities of organised fan clubs.\footnote{Tzavella, A., “When fascism ‘plays football’”, Enet.} Indeed, according to a former hooligan, there are many leaders of organised fan clubs, who are members of the GD.\footnote{Tzavella, A., “When fascism ‘plays football’”, Enet.} Finally, new members of organised fan clubs are recruited by far-right extremist organisations or parties through the promise of ‘jobs’. A former hooligan has admitted that a number of hard-core fans ‘have disappeared from the terraces’, as they were offered certain ‘jobs’ by GD members.\footnote{Tzavella, A., “When fascism ‘plays football’”, Enet.}

### II.3.3. REPertoire of Actions

Violence among supporters has a symbolic and ritualistic character. It includes role-playing and reflects particular social practices. At a first level, violence among supporters is harmless, since the main aim of hard-core supporters is to symbolically humiliate the fans of the rival team, and to a lesser extent, exercise physical violence upon them. Inside organised supporters’ communities there are mechanisms of control and management of aggression that limit the devastating effects of violence (Zaimakis 2005: 8).

There is a clear distinction between the attitudes of hooligans, hard-core supporters and the mere supporters of a team with respect to their involvement in incidents of violence. However, all of these categories of supporters argue that they like to challenge and provoke rival fans and that it is important to demonstrate decisiveness and belligerence towards their rivals (Astrinakis and Stylianoudi 1996: 433, 539). More specifically, hard-core fans feel the obligation to support primarily the team of their place of origin, and secondarily, the team of the place where they reside (Astrinakis and Stylianoudi 1996: 383). The consumption of alcohol, hallucinogens and soft drugs is a common habit among hard-core fans, even inside sport venues (Astrinakis and Stylianoudi 1996: 438), while they consider listening to heavy metal music as a manifestation of masculinity and being hard-core (Astrinakis and Stylianoudi 1996: 475).
During the 1980s, new repertoires of action among organised hard-core supporters emerged in Greece, such as the organised marches; the mass tours to away games; the consumption of alcohol and drugs; the destruction of cars and shop windows; racist and sexist chants; and the extensive use of physical violence (Zaimakis 2005: 16). At certain points or occasions during a match, such as the halftime break, or after a goal of the favourite team, organised hard-core fans demonstrate particular verbally or symbolically aggressive behaviour. For instance, in such occasions, they direct swearwords to the rival team and supporters, sing chants or anthems that manifest joy and enthusiasm, and pretend to fight with each other by pushing each other or by falling violently on each other (Zaimakis 2005: 3). This last kind of behaviour is known as ‘schizophrenia’ and it has a symbolic character, which highlights the readiness of organised hard-core fans to fight their rivals (Zaimakis 2005: 3).

Apart from non-violent acts, organised hard-core fans frequently adopt violent attitudes too. Physical violence in the form of hand-to-hand combat, throwing plastic seats, flares and/or rocks, or even, in extreme cases, the use of weapons or knives is commonly used by organised hard-core fans, outside and inside sport venues, in order to humiliate the police, rival fans, or just for the fun of it (Zaimakis 2005: 4). In the past, physical violence was usually taking place in the terraces of stadiums. However, during the last decades, the expansion of counter-hooliganism measures inside sports venues has pushed incidents of violence outside stadiums too, such as in train stations, supporters’ haunts, highways etc. (Zaimakis 2005: 4).

The members of organised fan clubs always go as a group to attend a match or to participate in clashes with rival fans and/or the police. When the date for a fight between rival fans is fixed, mobile phones, leaflets, even coded ads in sports press are used in order for all the members of the club to be informed. Often, the Internet is avoided in these kinds of communication due to fear of being detected by the Greek Police Cybercrime Unit. In-person communication is still the most widely used method of communication in these cases. This form of communication takes place either in the stadium during a match, or in the facilities of the fan club.

Although outdated, the findings of a 1988 research project on football hooliganism in Greece, are quite revealing regarding hooligans’ repertoires of action. In particular, almost half of the hard-core fans that participated in that project admitted their past personal involvement in fist fights or in throwing objects onto the field (Courakis 1998: 297). Thirty five percent (35%) of the respondents admitted that they would be determined to participate in actual fighting with rival fans, while 17% would provoke the police and 9% would cause damage to private property (Courakis 1998: 297). Approximately two thirds of the interviewees said that they had been involved quite frequently in fights or in causing damage on their way to or from the sports venue, while almost all of them had witnessed acts of hooliganism or vandalism (97%), or knew someone who had participated in such acts (94%), or who had been tried and sentenced for them (85%) (Courakis 1998: 298). Yet, only a small percentage of the interviewees admitted to having been convicted for one (7.5%), two or more (7%) acts of sports-related violence, or for other offences unrelated to sports (14%) (Courakis 1998: 298).

II.3.4. INSTITUTIONAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES

Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, Enet.

‘The underworld is hidden in stadiums (too)’, Sentragoal.

‘The underworld is hidden in stadiums (too)’, Sentragoal.
During 2013-2014, 143,887 police officers in total were deployed in the 6,000 sports events that took place in Greece, as a mechanism of control and repression of supporters’ violent behaviour. This number, which is the highest mark in a 5-year period, is slightly higher compared to the 137,832 police officers that were deployed in all 5,840 sports events that took place in the country in 2012-2013. Moreover, 502 individuals were arrested in 2013-2014 for acts of sports-related violence, which constitutes the highest mark in a 5-year period. All in all, Figure 1 demonstrates a steady increase in the numbers of deployed police officers in sports events during the last 5 years. This steady rise, though, has not been accompanied by a similar increase in the numbers of apprehended individuals for sports-related violence.

However, with specific regard to football hooliganism, it appears that the increase in the numbers of deployed police officers in sports events, has not only reduced the frequency of violent incidents in football matches. It has also resulted in fewer fines paid by football clubs for the violent behaviour of their supporters (see Figure 2). It is worth mentioning that in 2013-2014, Greek Super League teams paid in total 800,000 Euros in fines for the involvement of their fans in acts of sports-related violence, which is the lowest mark in a 6-year period, following a steady decline in the last 4 years.

---

147 The numbers of arrested individuals for sports-related violence provided in Figure 1 differ from those provided in Table 12 (see ANNEX II), due to the fact that they refer to sports seasons, not calendar years.

148 The highest professional football league in Greece.
II.3.5. ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

Hooliganism in Greece emerged in the late 1970s within the context of professionalisation and commercialisation of sports, the resulting intensification of competition between teams, the establishment of organised fan clubs, the emergence of private television and the birth and multiplication of sports newspapers (Papageorgiou 1998: 39). A narrow understanding of hooliganism in Greece attributes the phenomenon to a small number of organised hard-core fans who go to sports venues in order to create trouble and unload their aggressiveness. Yet, the majority of the actors who are involved in the management and control of hooliganism tend to agree that the phenomenon is more complex. Apart from organised hard-core fans, less hard-core supporters, reputable citizens, and members of the board of sports clubs have been involved in acts of sports-related violence.

The literature on hooliganism in Greece has shed light on a number of social and economic factors that have contributed to the birth and perpetuation of the phenomenon in the country. Courakis (1998: 302), for instance, states that the stress of the daily lives, the lack of long-term aims and values, and the exclusion of young people from actively participating in social life are factors contributing to the emergence and perpetuation of the phenomenon in the country. In the same direction, Koukouris and Stavros (2009) suggest that work and family pressures make young people frustrated, pushing them, in this way, to unload their aggression in the sports ground, which they consider to be a suitable place. Zaimakis (2005: 26) adds that the high levels of social inequality, poverty and unemployment, which are observed in certain urban areas, are also important explanatory factors. This situation becomes even worse for social outcasts or deviants, such as former and current drug users and convicts (Courakis 1998: 302).

Moreover, newspaper interviews with former hooligans reveal that thrill, status and power seeking, as well as repressed or frustrated feelings lead organised hardcore fans to commit sports-related violent acts. It is also worth mentioning at this point, that hard-core

---


150 Psarra, A. ‘Money, drugs, violence, and Greek championship’, *Enet.*
fans themselves attribute sports-related acts of violence to the provocative behaviour of the opposing team’s fans, the ‘unjust’ decisions taken by the referees, and the presence of and/or provocative attitude of police officers during matches (Courakis 1998: 300).

Referees and the police can indeed contribute to the occurrence of incidents of hooliganism. Referees often make wrong or seemingly wrong decisions, on purpose or accidentally, since their objectivity partly depends on their psychological state during the match (Courakis 1998: 301). Moreover, police officers entrusted with maintaining order in sports venues are also sometimes responsible for the occurrence and escalation of violent acts. Too much or too little repressive force on their part, and/or a too early or too late response to such incidents, can contribute to the aggravation of a latent climate of violence, annoyance and injustice (Courakis 1998: 301). Indeed, ‘the counter-hooliganism practices and methods implemented in the Greek context by the stakeholders are to a great extent the causes of perpetuation of the phenomenon’ (Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013: 184). Suffice it to say, however, that hard-core fans see the police as the main representative of an unjust and ineffective state, and as a symbolic enemy, with whom they search for a pretext to clash (Zaimakis 2005: 17).

Sports ministers and officials can also be held responsible for incidents of sports-related violence, because they have arguably failed to draw up and implement a substantially preventive policy to cope with hooliganism (Courakis 1998: 301). Additionally, members of the board of sports teams quite often contribute to the eruption of sport-related acts of violence (Courakis 1998: 301) by publicly inciting hate, fanaticism, and/or feelings of injustice among the supporters of their teams. Furthermore, board members avoid conflicts with the organised hard-core fans of their team, since they consider them as an important pressure group in the safeguard of their financial interests. Occasionally, members of the board of sports teams themselves have participated in acts of violence.151

A large share of the responsibility for violent incidents goes to the media too (Courakis 1998: 300). Sports press in Greece, particularly fan press, frequently expose their readers to sensational and large front page titles. They often carry provocative statements from sports officials, or sexist and/or racist puns that aim to increase their sales through the excitement of emotional fervour and fanaticism of the supporters. Additionally, the reproduction of acts of sports-related violence through the media may encourage young fans to indulge in provocative behaviour ‘simply to bask in the limelight and add, in this way, to their status within their fan clubs or acquaintances’ (Courakis 1998: 301). According to a study, nine out of ten Greek hooligans admitted that they would turn on the television to watch violent incidents in which they were involved, and that by watching these incidents they would feel ‘anticipation’, ‘interest’, ‘pleasure’, and ‘recognition’ (Courakis 1998: 301). Another 87% of the interviewees stated that they would feel ‘socially important’ in case a third person commented on these incidents (Courakis 1998: 301).

The traditional rivalries between specific teams is yet another factor that can potentially cause sports-related violent acts. These rivalries usually reflect broader social inequalities among and between cities, areas and/or neighbourhoods (Zaimakis 2005: 26). Moreover, these rivalries can have a strictly sports-related history (Zaimakis 2005: 21). A typical example of such rivalry is between the teams of Athens and Thessaloniki, which is based on a sense of

151 ‘Giannakopoulos swearing at Spanoulis video causes turmoil’, Lifo. [In Greek]. Available at: http://www.lifo.gr/how/sport/65510 (last accessed 20 July 2015); ‘Chaos at the board meeting of Super League - fight between Marinakis and Alafouzos’, In. [In Greek]. Available at: http://sports.in.gr/football/article/?aid=1231388010 (last accessed 20 July 2015).
widespread injustice against the second largest Greek city, and it also has social, economic and sports-related characteristics. In any case, these rivalries have marked the collective conscience of sports fans, creating in this way a fertile ground for acts of hooliganism.

Finally, one should not ignore the fact that sports venues are not simply loci that reproduce pre-existing violent behaviours and rivalries in the society; rather, they are spaces where, under certain circumstances, particular models of violence, aggressive behaviour and masculinity are produced (Zaimakis 2005: 13). Aggressive and/or violent behaviour is part of a collective context of action, in which the supporter does not act as a lone actor, but as part of an ‘imagined’ community, which connects its members through ties of solidarity, devotion and faith in the team’s ideals (Zaimakis 2005: 14). Hence, the code of conduct of organised supporters demands the protection of the team’s honour and ideals, sometimes through the use of violence, as the insult or injustice against one’s favourite team is perceived as an aggressive act that should not be left unopposed or without response (Zaimakis 2005: 14). Thus, the likelihood of committing acts of violence during a match increases in the following circumstances: when there is prevalent fanaticism among opposing teams; when the rating of the match is critical for either or both of the teams; when there is a prevalent rumour that the match is fixed; and when the referee makes a bad or wrong decision, which provokes tension among the supporters (Courakis 1998: 299).

The study of football hooliganism in Greece that was conducted in 1988 is the only source of information, albeit outdated, about the level of radicalisation and vulnerability associated with football hooliganism (see Courakis 1998). This study suggests that there is a fanatically obsessed nucleus, approximately 7 to 15% of hard-core supporters, who are the most violent, and who have already been convicted in the past for provocative and aggressive behaviour (Courakis 1998: 298). A much larger segment among hard-core fans, approximately 40-50%, is prone to becoming involved in violent acts of minor importance, such as throwing objects, or even serious ones, such as hand-to-hand combats, ‘especially if they are induced by the anonymity and swayed by the emotional outbursts of the crowd’ (Courakis 1998: 298). Finally, an equally large group of organised hard-core fans are satisfied with the experience of the exhilarating atmosphere of the stadium, without feeling necessary to do more than a ritualistic show of violence, which includes obscene chants, symbolic ‘fights’ with fellow supporters, and charges against rival fans (Courakis 1998: 298).

**CONCLUSIONS**

Since the 1970s, Greece exhibits a rich record of militant extremism and violence perpetrated by the far-left and the far-right. Violence has also originated by groups of hooligans who are not on the surface motivated by political beliefs but who often espouse or are motivated by extremist ideas. The persisting and high levels of political violence is a remarkable phenomenon if we consider the fact that the period since the 1970s and 1980s has also marked the country’s consolidation of democracy. At least until 2010, it has also coincided with the country’s longest period of political stability, economic affluence and social peace. Until 2010-2012, radicalisation and political violence was primarily from the far-left, involving individuals and organisations espousing various amalgams of traditional Marxist and anarchist ideas and ideologies. Since 2010-2012, far-right extremism and violence have also grown, and they have largely been directed against immigrants.
Terrorist violence from the far-left have largely taken place in urban centres, and in Athens in particular. Young people, starting from teenage, are by far the most vulnerable and at high risk of radicalisation into violent or non-violent far-left extremism. But processes of radicalisation are closely linked to particular spaces and locales, such as schools, universities, community or self-managed centres, and bars or clubs in Athenian districts like Exarcheia, which individuals frequent or where they socialise. Demonstrations and protests are also events, which nurture the anger, and aggressive opposition that people may exhibit towards the state, and which also make them prone to extremism. It is in such space and events where individuals become acquainted with extremist ideas, become members of formal and informal groups, and may eventually decide to engage more actively and to perpetrate acts of violence. The number of youth who are committed hard-core militants is not very large – it is probably in the range of tens of people. However, what is more disconcerting is that the number of young people who support and justify violent extremism, and even occasionally and spontaneously engage in such violence, is significantly larger, in the range of hundreds and perhaps even a few thousands. A longstanding tradition and ideas of far-left militancy and revolutionary struggle have been uninterruptedly reproduced over time through the creation, mutation and re-emergence of clandestine groups, a few more visible and lasting, and many that appear once and then decline.

Far-right radicalisation and violence were limited and less visible until 2010, when it started to rapidly rise and expand at the national and local level. Instrumental in this process of growing extreme right radicalisation has been the creation of the political party GD. The GD played a key role both in capturing and giving expression to the widespread but for a long time latent extremist attitudes towards immigrants, and in propagating them under a racial kind of nationalism inspired by National Socialist ideas. Even though the political party of the GD does not officially espouse or admits to deploying militant methods, its local chapters, and militia groups, and other formal and informal groups that are connected to it have done so. Their involvement in incidents of racial and other kinds of violence has taken place with knowledge of the party leadership, and even with the participation of its Members of Parliament themselves. Youth is also at high risk for far-right extremism and radicalisation, especially from the lower socioeconomic backgrounds, and areas most disaffected by the economic crisis. Prime spaces of far-right radicalisation processes are schools, neighbourhoods (especially in the districts of Athens where the GD is strong and dominant), residents’ committees, and GD party structures. A large number of GD supporters accept or tolerate as legitimate or necessary the violence perpetrated by groups connected to it, as the ongoing high levels of electoral support for the GD after the prosecution of its leadership for creating a criminal organisation, show.

The causes and motivations of far-left and far-right extremism are complex and must be sought at different levels. This report has reviewed some arguments about such causes, which we need not reiterate here. It is important though to make note of a key dynamic that seems to be not a root cause, but a factor that has over time perpetuated, polarised and ‘hardened’ the salience and resilience of far-left extremism and radicalism – this is the apparently inappropriate responses and often excessive use of force used by the Greek law enforcement officers against rioters and demonstrators. Such force is perceived by radicalised individuals to give credence to their beliefs that they are suppressed by the state and that they are in an armed struggle with it. In turn, the levels of far-left terrorist violence have been used to justify excessive use of force by the police. The apparent lenience that law enforcement showed to extreme right violence since 2010 and until 2013 when the GD leadership was arrested, intensified this polarisation between the far-left and the police, leading many far-left extremists and anarchists to perceive, and possibly exaggerate, whatever connection exists between right-wing
extremism and the police. What has occurred over time is a self-perpetuating, vicious cycle of opposite extremisms and the violent confrontation between the two, which is not easy to break.

With specific regard to hooliganism, a peculiar system of ‘communicating vessels’ between organised fan clubs and extremism has been established in recent years. Organised fan clubs emerged 40-45 years ago and were initially associated with football clubs. The birth of these clubs coincided with the end of the dictatorship, the professionalisation and commercialisation of sport, and the gradual occurrence of organised sports-related violence. The first organised fan clubs with neo-Nazi and far-right affiliations made their appearance in the late 1970s and continued to proliferate throughout the 1980s unopposed, taking advantage of the Left’s traditional trivialisation of the social dynamics that can develop in sports grounds. Yet, these fan clubs ceased to exist naturally in the early 1990s, due to the low penetration of extreme-right ideas in the Greek society.

Since the early 2000s, however, nationalist organised fan clubs made their reappearance, while the first ‘Antifa’ organised fan clubs were born, which are closely affiliated to the Anarchist milieu. During the same period, incidents of sports-related violence have recorded a considerable increase, both inside and outside sports venues, with the participation of both far-right and anarchist organised fan clubs, among others. Moreover, organised hard-core fans have been increasingly connected with incidents of far-right and anarchist violence.

It should be noted, however, at this point, that organised fan clubs with an ideological affiliation, either far-right or anarchist, are a minority. The majority of organised fan clubs comprises young (18-34 years old) male individuals, who are passionate about their team and want to support it more directly and dynamically. Among them, only 7-15% are the most violent, and who have already been convicted in the past for provocative and aggressive behaviour. A much larger segment of this population, approximately 40-50%, is prone to becoming involved in violent acts of minor importance, such as throwing objects, or even serious ones, such as hand-to-hand combats. These dynamics, in combination with the demographics profile of organised fans, render organised fan clubs an actual pool of recruitment for far-right, and organised criminal networks and organisations. For the Anarchist milieu, organised fan clubs seem to constitute just one more social space, where confrontational politics ought to be established.

The tolerance of sports clubs’ owners and sports federations to the delinquent behaviour of organised supporters, who are perceived as the heart and soul of teams, further foments such phenomena. All in all, state preparedness for monitoring, fighting and preventing hooliganism has been persistently hampered by the weaknesses of the self-regulated institutional setting of sport (predominantly football, and secondarily basketball) in Greece.

Finally, regarding Islamist radicalisation, Greece is currently facing two interconnected challenges: the external and the internal. On the one hand, approximately 25 years after the last recorded international terrorist attack, the country is experiencing an increased, mainly background activity of international Muslim terrorists. So far, this activity has been limited to a logistical, and support basis, as Greece is a Jihadist crossover to and from Syria. On the other hand, the country is also facing an internal challenge, as the large pool of young male irregular immigrants from Muslim countries, whose presence is not recorded in official data, in combination with their dire living conditions and the lack of formal and monitored places of worship create a fertile environment for Islamist radicalisation. Background research conducted for this report suggests that the more transient and less integrated Pakistani, Afghan, and Somalian immigrants are more vulnerable to radicalisation. Moreover, Salafists, who tend to criticise other Islamic trends and their followers, and who exhibit a growing community of converts, also appear to be prone to radicalisation. All in all, communities and/or individuals,
who are putting Islam to use for political purposes, could be more easily radicalised. However, according to a senior intelligence official, the threat level originating from Islamist radicalisation in Greece is ‘very low’.

Within this context, and regarding the external Islamist threat, the Hellenic Police are at a heightened state of vigilance, exchanging intelligence with the US, Britain, France and other countries. In this respect, the Greek authorities have performed a number of arrests and deportations of suspected Islamist terrorists in recent years. With specific regard to the internal Islamist threat, however, the level of institutional preparedness for monitoring, fighting and preventing Islamist radicalisation is low. Indeed, still very little is known about the size, demographics, socioeconomic profile and religious characteristics of the Muslim immigrant community in Greece.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Anagnostou, D. (2005). Deepening democracy or defending the nation? The Europeanisation of minority rights and Greek citizenship. West European Politics, 28(2), 335-357.


Oktem, K. (2010). ‘New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans’. European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.


## Annex I – List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
<th>Actor / Organisation</th>
<th>Form of Contact</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Left-wing Terrorism Expert</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>02/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>16/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Islamist Terrorism Expert</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>21/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Investigative Journalist</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>24/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Prison Psychologist</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>27/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Prison Social Worker</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>28/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Prison Guard</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>28/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Prison Guard</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>28/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Prison Guard</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>30/04/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Crime Reporter</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>05/05/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Greek Super League Football Club Spokesperson</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>08/05/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>DEAV</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>12/05/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Retired Police Officer</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>13/05/2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Gender of Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per year

* Up to 20/06/2015.

Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Nationality of Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per Gender

Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Age of Arrested Individuals for Terrorist Acts per Gender

Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Gender of Racist Violence Victims per year

Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012*</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013**</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014***</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85
In the 49 incidents for which there is available data.

** In the 70 incidents for which there is available data.

*** In the 62 incidents for which there is available data.

*Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nationality (Number of Victims)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2012* | Pakistan (48)  
          Afghanistan (5)  
          Bangladesh (5)  
          Albania (4)  
          Egypt (4)  
          Greece (4) |
| 2013**| Pakistan (25)  
          Albania (8)  
          Bangladesh (7)  
          Africa (sic) (7)  
          Nigeria (5) |
| 2014***| Pakistan (14)  
          Greece (11)  
          Albania (10)  
          Bangladesh (5)  
          Egypt (4) |

*Table 10* Top 5 Nationalities of Racist Violence Victims per year

* In the 48 incidents for which there is available data.

** In the 62 incidents for which there is available data.

*** In the 61 incidents for which there is available data.

*Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2183</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 11* Nationality of Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year

*Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security*
### Table 12: Arrested or Prosecuted Individuals for Hooliganism per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrested Individuals</th>
<th>Prosecuted Individuals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1689</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hellenic Police, Directorate of State Security*