

Evaluating migration policy effectiveness

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This talk gives an overview of various studies:

- Czaika, M. and de Haas, H., 2013. **The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies**. Population and Development Review, 39(3), 487–508.
- Czaika, M. and de Haas, H., 2014. **The Effect of Visa Policies on International Migration Dynamics**. International Migration Institute Working Paper 89. Oxford: IMI.
- Czaika, M. and Hobolth, M., 2014. **Deflection into Irregularity? The (Un)Intended Effects of Restrictive Asylum and Visa Policies**. International Migration Institute Working Paper 84. Oxford: IMI.
- Czaika, M. and Parsons, C., 2015. **The Gravity of High-Skilled Migration Policies**. International Migration Institute Working Paper 110. Oxford: IMI.
- Czaika, M. and de Haas, H., forthcoming. **Spatial Deflection of Migration Policies**. International Migration Institute Working Paper. Oxford: IMI.

⇒ <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp> (IMI working paper series)

Migration policy pessimists: Borders 'beyond' control

“the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased. Borders are largely beyond control and little can be done to really cut down on immigration”
(Bhagwati 2003: 99)



1,300 MIGRANTS A DAY POUR IN

And a quarter of all births are to foreign mothers

By **Anti-Demar**
ALMOST half a million immigrants booted into the UK last year at a rate of more than 1,300 a day, shock new figures reveal.
The astonishing statistic prompted fears that the country has lost the battle to bring mass immigration under control.
It came as separate figures showed more than a quarter of babies in Britain last year were born to foreign mothers. In some parts of London, immigrant women account for three-quarters of all births.

Ignorance
Campaigners warned the Government was on course to miss its target of slashing net immigration to "tens of thousands" by 2015.
Paul Bristall, deputy leader, said: "These figures show how the simple character of the country is being changed beyond recognition.
The Government must choose: more national about controlling immigration, because these changes are happening without the say of the people."
"Our public services, schools, hospitals and housing cannot support this kind of growth. It is the weakness and ignorance of successive Governments that have let it happen." The figures from the Office for National Statistics.



LONDON 2012 PARALYMPICS
GAMES GIRL KATE CHEERS AS GOLD RUSH BEGINS
SEE PAGES 2-3 AND SPORT




The Duchess of Cambridge yesterday as Sarah Storey, inset, Lakos gold



Migration policy optimists: Borders 'under' control

“There is no major migration control crisis”
(Brochmann & Hammar, 1999)





Fundamental question:

How do migration policies affect the *size, timing, duration, direction* and *composition* (selection) of migration?

Conceptualising substitution effects

Potentially (un-)intended impacts of immigration restrictions:

- **Spatial substitution** (Hypothesis: spatial diversion)
- **Categorical substitution** (Hypothesis: category jumping)
- **Inter-temporal substitution** (Hypothesis: ‘now or never migration’)
- **Reverse flow substitution** (Hypothesis: reducing circulation)


Study on (inter-temporal) visa policy effects (Czaika/de Haas 2014)

- Visa requirements reduce immigration ... and return!
 - ❑ Immigration-reducing effect is partly counterbalanced by lower emigration.
- Visa restrictions decrease circularity
 - ❑ Entry restrictions seem to push migrants into permanent settlement
- Visa requirements partly neutralize business cycle effects
- Asymmetric effects of visa introduction vs. removal
 - ❑ Slow adjustments after introduction (role of networks?)
 - ❑ Rapid adjustment and overshooting after removal ('now or never' migration?)

Study on Migration flows (1973-2011): Inflow – Outflow – Turnover - Net migration


- 38 destination countries: ARG, AUS, AUT, BEL, BGR, BRA, CAN, CHE, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GRC, HRV, HUN, ISL, ITA, LTU, LUX, LVA, MDA, MEX, NLD, NOR, NZL, POL, PRT, ROM, RUS, SVK, SVN, SWE, UKR, URY

Asymmetric policy effects: Slow adjustment after visa introduction



Source:
Czaika/de Haas (2014)

Asymmetric policy effects: 'Overshooting' after visa removal



Source:
Czaika/de Haas (2014)

Study on 'Deflection into irregularity' (categorical substitution) (Czaika/Hobolth 2014)

29 destination countries, 180 origin countries, Observation period: Asylum 2000-11; Irregular 2008-11

- Visa requirements deter asylum seekers and irregular migrants
 - ❑ visa restriction (0/1) => -53% asylum seekers and -57% irregular migrants
- Asylum refusal decreases number of asylum applications but increase the number of irregular migrants
 - ❑ +10% asylum refusal => -0.8% asylum seekers, but +2-7% irregular migrants ('on territory' apprehensions)
- Visa refusals increase both number of asylum applications and number of irregular migrants
 - ❑ +10 % visa refusals => + 0.3% asylum seekers and +6 % irregular migrants ('border apprehensions')
- 'Deterrence' effect of a tightening asylum/visa policy is counterbalanced by a categorical (and potentially spatial) 'deflection dynamics'

Conclusion

- Migration policies are shaped in a political-economic context
- Policy regimes that are typically a *mixed bag of regulations and measures*
- Migrants see these as opportunity structures and are likely to opt for the most convenient legal and geographical migration channel
- Empirical evidence suggests that although policies significantly affect migration, the magnitude of these effects seem to be limited compared to other migration determinants
- Migration policies that intend to work against these structural migration drivers in origin and destination countries are bound to fail

Thank you for your attention