


Being Greek, Being Kosovar...

A report on mutual perceptions



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Authors:

Dr. Iannis Konstantinidis, Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Greece

Dr. Ioannis Armakolas, Assistant Professor, Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia & Head, South-East Europe Programme, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece

Shkelzen Maliqi, founder, Gani Bobi Center for Humanistic Studies

Agon Maliqi, researcher, Gani Bobi Center for Humanistic Studies

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Published by:

Kosovo Foundation for Open Society
Imzot Nikë Prela nr. 13, 10 000 Pristina
Kosovo

Table of Contents*

INTRODUCTION: WHY A STUDY ‘BEING GREEK, BEING KOSOVAR’?	5
HOW GREEKS VIEW KOSOVO: THE FINDINGS OF A PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY	11
Introduction	
Methodology of the Survey	
Part I: Knowledge of Kosovo	13
Part II: Attitudes Towards Individuals of Different National Origin	17
Part III: Kosovo’s Relations with Third Countries and the Question of Kosovo’s Status --	23
Part IV: Anti-Americanism as an Explanatory Factor of Greek Public Opinion Vis-À-Vis Kosovo	31
Conclusions	33
HOW KOSOVARS VIEW GREEKS AND OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION	35
Introduction	
Kosovar Outlook on Relations With Greece	42
Kosovar Outlook on Foreign Affairs and the Role of the United States	46
The Kosovo-Greece Divide: Comparing the two Surveys	49
Mutual Misunderstanding and Misinformation	50
Ethnic Attitudes Derived from Historical Legacies	51
Pro-Americanism and Anti-Americanism as the Key Cleavage	53
THE ROAD AHEAD	54
BIBLIOGRAPHY	58
Annex 1: Survey regarding attitudes of the Greek public opinion towards the inhabitants of Kosovo and the issue of its relationships with Greece	59
Annex 2: Survey regarding attitudes of the Kosovar public opinion towards the inhabitants of Greece and region and the issue of its relationships with Kosovo	67

* The questionnaires applied for surveys in both countries are available as Annexes to the electronic copy of the study, downloadable from the websites of the organizations.

INTRODUCTION: WHY A STUDY ‘BEING GREEK, BEING KOSOVAR’?

By Ioannis Armakolas

Greece and Kosovo: A core paradox

A mere two-hours' drive separates Kosovo from Greece, yet the two countries have a complex relationship marred by a core paradox. On the one hand, Greece and Kosovo have close geographic proximity, share cultural affinities and historical references, lack bilateral disputes or history of conflict and animosity, agree on their common European and Euro-Atlantic orientation, and have interest in intensified political and economic relations. On the other hand, the two countries remain largely unknown to each other, multi-level relations are limited and, for Greece, are far weaker than with countries with which Athens has important bilateral disputes; negative stereotypes of one society for the other abound and the potential of increased multi-level relations and collaboration remains unrealized. This situation becomes yet more intensely paradoxical if one takes into account that democratization, economic development, increased regional cooperation and integration into Western institutions are the declared aims of both Greece and the EU as a whole. The realization of these crucial policy objectives will likely be hindered as long as relations between Greece and Kosovo remain limited. There is, thus, an urgent need for the two societies to understand each other and the two countries to start building bridges, which will benefit not only the two countries themselves but also the entire region's progress and development.

Baselining a complex relationship

The present state of relations can be explained by examining the short history of Kosovar-Greek relations. A preliminary study conducted by ELIAMEP's South-East Europe Programme (Armakolas and Karabairis 2012) found that relations between the two sides were built on a problematic foundation due to the different stances on and interpretations of the Yugoslav tragedy of the 1990s. Greek society's reactions to the first phases of the Yugoslav conflicts (1991-1995) played a major role in shaping its interpretation of the subsequent dramatic developments, including the Kosovo war. Many negative media stereotypes about Kosovars appear to have their origins in this dramatic period of the 1990s. Furthermore, the same study found an acute mismatch between the more measured and careful official Greek policy during the Kosovo war and Greek public opinion's overwhelming support for the Serbian side. The study further demonstrated limited knowledge of and familiarity with Kosovo in Greece, even among academic circles. Finally, the study identified legalistic discourses, the Cyprus question and general stereotypical views of Kosovo as the key factors influencing the limited public debate in Greece on the status of Kosovo.

Ambivalent Political Relations

When it comes to political relations, Greece has attempted a careful balancing act (Armakolas and Karabairis 2012). On the one hand, Athens remains one of the five EU member states that have not recognized Kosovo's independence, together with Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus. On the other hand, despite non-recognition, Athens has from the start followed a policy of engagement with Kosovo. This policy has both a bilateral and a European component. In bilateral relations, the Hellenic Republic maintains a Liaison Office in Pristina, which may be considered among the most active diplomatic representations in the country. The former Head of the Liaison Office, Ambassador Dimitris Moschopoulos, in his capacity as European Union Facilitator for the Protection of Serbian Religious and Cultural Heritage in Kosovo, was instrumental in opening channels of communication and collaboration on cultural heritage matters between the Kosovar authorities and the Serbian community. In addition, most observers admit that Greece maintains the most constructive stance towards Kosovo among the five EU member states that have not recognized Kosovo's independence. The agreement between Athens and Pristina for the opening of a Kosovar Trade Representation Office in Athens, which was announced after a meeting between the then Greek MFA Dimitris Avramopoulos and the Kosovar MFA Enver Hoxhaj in Athens, is an example of this policy of engagement. Similarly, Athens has not blocked Kosovo's membership in international organizations and has gradually adopted policies that make Kosovar citizens' travel to Greece easier.²

Similarly, and with regards to Kosovo's relations with the EU, Greek officials have repeatedly made clear that they envision the entire Western Balkans, including Kosovo, within the EU and that Kosovo has a clear European perspective.³ In a recent report focusing on the 2014 Greek European Council presidency published by ELIAMEP's South-East Europe Programme, Greece's relations with Kosovo in the context of Pristina's European aspirations were described as follows:

Greece has decided to accept Schengen visas in passports of Kosovar citizens, and this measure entered into force in March 2014. Also, Greece is expected to support the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo, which is basically viewed as major step towards the gradual normalization and modernization of the country. During his visit to Pristina, Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Venizelos stressed that Kosovo "has a clear European perspective" and that strengthening of EU-Kosovo relations is important for the entire Western Balkan region. He mentioned that talks between Kosovo and Serbia are essential for the integration process and the stability of the region, expressing his "admiration" of

² For more details, see Armakolas and Karabairis 2012.

³ "Kosovo has a clear European perspective, says Deputy PM and FM Venizelos", Greek EU Presidency, 19 February 2014, available at: <http://gr2014.eu/news/press-releases/kosovo-has-clear-european-perspective-says-deputy-pm-and-fm-venizelos>. For more information on Kosovo's EU accession process, see Koktsidis et.al. 2014, esp. pp.40-44; Tuhina and Palokaj 2014;

the “courage and determination” of the leadership of both sides. Finally, Venizelos sent a clear message that reforms, good neighborly relations, and strengthening of the rule of law promote stability and the economic development of the region and pave the way to Europe. As long as Kosovo stays on this track, and keeps on working for the European and Euro Atlantic future, Greece will stand by its side. (Koktsidis et.al. 2014, p.49-50)

Public Attitudes: The Existing Quantitative Evidence

There is a dearth of quantitative data about public perceptions and attitudes between Kosovo and Greece, but the limited available data indicate quite a negative picture. During the 1999 Kosovo war, a staggering 97 per cent of Greeks opposed NATO’s military operation against Serbia. A tiny 2 per cent of Greek public opinion was in favor of NATO’s war, presumably accepting the reasoning that it aimed to stop the bloodshed in Kosovo. The rest of Greek public opinion presumably did not entertain the validity of the Alliance’s claim, despite the fact that the Greek government at the time did not block NATO’s action and even provided military facilitation to the operation. This percentage constituted by far the greatest opposition to NATO action within the Alliance. Even by the 1990s standards of Greek society’s pro-Serbian attitudes, this percentage is astonishing. In most other countries polled, the majority of citizens supported the Western military action, with the highest percentages being in Denmark (70 per cent) and France (68 per cent). Only in Spain, Italy and Austria was opposition higher than support, but with much lower percentages: 48 per cent in Spain, 46 per cent in Italy and 43 per cent in Austria (ICM/The Guardian 1999). In recent years, very few opinion polls in Greece measure aspects of relations with Balkan neighbors. In one such example, however, a majority of 59 per cent viewed Kosovo’s independence as a threat to Greece’s security (Kathimerini 2008).

Similarly, little quantitative evidence exists about Kosovo public opinion’s attitudes towards Greece, but the limited data highlight a similarly negative picture. According to the Gallup Balkan Monitor of 2010, 22 per cent of Kosovars view Greece as the main opponent to Kosovo’s EU accession aspirations (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010). That is despite the fact that the Greek government has included Kosovo in all its initiatives for promoting the accession prospects of the entire Western Balkans since the 2003 Greek EU presidency. To demonstrate the measure of negative attitudes towards Greece, it is important to stress Kosovars’ generally optimistic stance on the issue. In the survey, 65 per cent of Kosovars believe that the people of the EU want Kosovo to join the EU; similarly, Kosovars viewed Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom as being top supporters of Pristina’s accession process by 31, 18 and 15 per cent respectively (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010). In the next year’s Gallup Balkan Monitor, 34 per cent of Kosovars considered Greece to be a country hostile to Kosovo; only citizens of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had higher percentages of perceiving Greece as hostile to their country (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2011).

Needless to say, the long-standing name dispute easily explains such negative attitudes in the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In a poll conducted by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies in 2012, Kosovars view Greece as the third least friendly country to Kosovo after Serbia and Russia (Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2012). In a subsequent poll, however, and perhaps as a result of Greece's policy of engagement with Kosovo and/or the activism of Ambassador Moschopoulos, less than 20 per cent of Kosovars think that relations with Greece are 'bad' or 'very bad' (Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2013).

Knowledge Gap and its Implications

The above-described delicate nature of relations between Kosovo and Greece, acrimony due to divergent interpretations of the Yugoslav crisis and, finally, the severe lack of reliable opinion polls and scholarly analyses on Greek-Kosovar relations have produced a striking knowledge gap. Without exaggerating, there is today very little scientific knowledge and objective analysis upon which attempts to improve relations between Greece and Kosovo could be built. Instead, public perceptions of each society towards the other are heavily influenced by lack of knowledge, mutual misunderstandings, national and societal fears, media propaganda, historical traumas and similar issues. This predicament could have significant implications for the state of relations between the two countries: the inability to base future political, economic, and civil society relations on mutual understanding and likely the continuation of a level of relations that is too insignificant for two partners that are in close geographic proximity and share common European integration objectives.

A Project Measuring Public Attitudes

Given the above complex and hardly optimistic picture, the Athens-based South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Pristina-based Gani Bobi Center jointly implemented the research project "Building new bridges in the Balkans: Understanding misconceptions between Greece and Kosovo", which was funded by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS). The project aimed to analyze relations between Kosovo and Greece by providing hard evidence of the public attitudes, stereotypes and misconceptions. This was accomplished by conducting thorough and methodologically rigorous opinion polls in both countries, with the aim to quantitatively establish the quality and level of popular attitudes and (mis)perceptions. The ambition of the project partners was that the dissemination of survey findings would contribute to filling the existing knowledge gap and stimulating academic research in key areas of Kosovar-Greek relations. The survey data would enable more and better scholarly work on these complex and largely under-studied relations.

Furthermore, a wider objective can be discerned. By contributing to better understanding of perceptions and misperceptions between Greece and Kosovo, the project partners may also contribute to building bridges of good relations and understanding between two countries that remain largely unknown to one another. By implication, the project partners thought that they could also contribute to the objective of improving regional relations and, eventually, helping the entire Western Balkan region join Western institutions, as is the declared intention of Greece and the EU as a whole. The project findings will point towards misconceptions, stereotypes and problematic factors that can be addressed through stronger links in civil society and academia in the future. Societal-level synergies between Greece and Kosovo can become a pilot and best-practice example for other more complex and difficult to resolve problems that stand in the way of the entire region finally integrating into the EU and other Western institutions.

HOW GREEKS VIEW KOSOVO: THE FINDINGS OF A PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

Dr. Iannis Konstantinidis

Dr. Ioannis Armakolas

Introduction

The general aim of this survey was to measure Greek attitudes towards Kosovar society and politics.⁴ More specifically, the survey aimed to investigate how the Greek public views the people of Kosovo as well as the question of Kosovo's international status and relations with Greece. The design of the survey included a number of questions that the researchers believed could offer plentiful data for a comprehensive analysis of the above issues. The questionnaire used for this survey was structured in three parts:

Part I aimed to identify the level of information about Kosovo that the Greek public has access to and whether this information corresponds to the actual situation on the ground. The rationale for this cluster of questions was based on the assumption that positions on the issue of Kosovo's status and also attitudes towards residents of Kosovo are filtered through the information available on the issue.

Part II aimed to examine the Greek public's attitudes and potential stereotypes towards individuals of different national origin, including residents of Kosovo. This cluster of questions was intended to provide comparative evidence of Greeks' attitudes towards Kosovars as well as potential explanatory factors for public opinion on the question of relations between Greece and Kosovo.

Part III included questions relating to the international position of Kosovo and aimed to measure perceptions of respondents regarding Kosovo's relations with third countries. It also aimed to correlate these and other data with responses to the question of whether Greece should recognize Kosovo's independence. Finally, the survey aimed to identify factors that would help explain the respondents' positions on Kosovo's international status as well as the implications of these positions for the preferred level of relations between Athens and Pristina.

⁴ The authors would like to thank Alexandros Nafpliotis, Katherine Poseidon and Klaudio Llusku for assistance provided towards the translation and copy editing of the text.

Methodology of the Survey

The survey was conducted during the period 15-19 April 2013 via telephone interviews using a structured questionnaire and with a sample of 1013 people across the country. The method of multi-stage sampling with proportional representation of all regions in the first stage of stratification was employed, while maintaining the ratio between urban and rural areas in the second stage of stratification. The survey data were weighted for gender and age because of the empirically-proven difficulty in contacting men aged 18-34 years through telephone interviews. The maximum estimation error is $\pm 2.5\%$.

The survey was conducted at a time that was neutral to the issue under investigation. The main topics in public debate while the survey was conducted were: a) the risk of collapse of Cypriot banks and the crisis in relations between the European Union and Cyprus, and b) the mass escape of prisoners from Trikala prison, which was followed by robberies and attacks on citizens -crimes which were attributed to ethnic Albanian prisoners. These two issues could be related to the attitudes expressed in this survey. More specifically they could have negatively affected the positions of Greeks towards the people of Kosovo, to the extent that it is known that Kosovo consists of a majority of ethnic Albanians and its appeal for independence is supported by the majority of European countries. These associations, however, cannot be substantiated.

Part I: Knowledge of Kosovo

In the first part of the questionnaire, an attempt was made to record the extent of information the Greek public has on issues related to Kosovo. The rationale for this cluster of questions is based on the assumption that the positions on the issue of Kosovo's recognition of independence and also the attitudes towards Kosovo's citizens are filtered through the information available to the Greek public. The survey shows that the degree of information the Greek public has about the neighboring country is low. In response to the survey question about whether Kosovo has declared independence, only 42% of the sample gave a positive answer, while 15% gave a negative answer, and 43% refused to respond or declared they did not know the answer (Figure 1). The percentage of those who claim ignorance surpasses 50% in the younger age groups (up to 34 years old), women, and residents of rural areas (villages or towns of less than 20,000 inhabitants), i.e. the categories that traditionally demonstrate low political interest.




Figure 1

The percentage of the sample that has correct information regarding the history of Kosovo is even lower. The survey asked respondents about the constitutional status of Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation – admittedly a difficult question for the average respondent. Only 28% of the sample responded that Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia during the time of the Yugoslav Federation, while 34% of the sample said that it was a republic of the Yugoslav Federation (Figure 2). It is noteworthy that this statistically significant difference

between percentages of incorrect and correct responses to this question permeates all categories of respondents, indicating that lack of information can be observed for a wide part of the population, regardless of age, place of residence or educational level.

Subsequently, the respondents were asked the key question specifying knowledge of the national composition of Kosovo, namely the national origin of the majority of its inhabitants. The percentage of the sample that responded correctly to this question is slightly higher than previous questions. 47% of the sample claimed that the majority are ethnic Albanians, 31% believed the majority is of Serbian origin, while 22% said they did not know (Figure 3). Interestingly, the percentage that answered incorrectly (i.e. those who responded that the majority of the inhabitants are ethnic Serbs) was higher (and represented the majority) in the age groups that demonstrate lower interest in politics, i.e. 18-24 years and 25-34 years, in the category of graduates of compulsory education, and in the category of residents of villages or towns. Older respondents, university graduates and residents of Athens and Thessaloniki seem to have better information on the subject, although in these categories as well, the percentage of correct answers was only marginally above 50%; this does not come as a surprise since these segments of the population are generally better informed and have better access to print and electronic media in their daily lives.




Figure 2




Figure 3



PART II: Attitudes Towards Individuals of Different National Origin

In the second part of the questionnaire the survey attempted to record the attitudes and stereotypes of the Greek public towards individuals from other Balkan nations. The answers to questions in this section are considered both as evidence of Greeks' attitudes towards the people of Kosovo as well as explanatory factors for Greek attitudes on the issue of relations between Greece and Kosovo. In one question, respondents were asked whether they would accept an individual of different national origin in ever-wider circles of association. The structure of the question is as follows: the interviewee first asks the respondent whether he/she would accept an individual of certain Balkan nationality as member of his/her family. If the respondent's answer is negative then the interviewee asks a question about the same nationality but this time about acceptance in the circle of friends. In case of negative answer the interviewee asks subsequent questions about acceptance as 'neighbor', 'co-worker', 'citizen of one's country with equal rights' or as 'visitor to Greece' until a positive response is elicited. The same process is then followed for individuals belonging to other Balkan nations. The logic of the question is that the higher the level of acceptance in closer circles of association (from 'member of family' to 'visitor'), the higher the levels of tolerance and positive attitudes towards certain nationals.

The responses to these questions demonstrate a generally open attitude towards members of other Balkan nations. Table 1 displays the rather open attitude of Greeks towards residents of neighboring countries, as more than two thirds of the respondents said that they would accept people of other origin (Turkish, Serbian, ethnic Slav citizens of FYROM and Albanian) as family members or friends. The percentages of those who argue that individuals of other Balkan origin are unwanted in Greece do not exceed, in any case, one tenth of the sample. It is worth noting that the difference in the distribution of responses toward people of different origins is very limited and is mainly related to respondents' positive attitude towards people of Serbian origin (who would be accepted as family members by most respondents) rather than a more negative attitude towards people of different origin. This difference can be attributed to factors such as Serbia's more positive coverage in Greek media, the public discourse of Greek-Serbian traditional friendship or the presence of number of positive public Figures of Serbian origin in Greek society, most notably successful sports professionals. In other words, this is a case of positive discrimination towards Serbs rather than negative discrimination towards people of other national origin.

TABLE 1: Responses to question “would you accept an individual of different ethnic/national origin as...”

	Turkish	Serbian	Slavic, citizen of FYROM	Albanian
Member of your family	49	68	51	46
Friend	27	19	18	21
Neighbor	7	5	3	3
Co-worker	1	1	9	10
Citizens of your country with equal rights to yours	2	1	2	3
Visitor to Greece	7	4	6	7
I would not accept his/her presence in Greece	7	2	8	10

It should be noted that the presumed variation across different age and education groups was confirmed, especially in the case of attitudes towards ethnic Albanians. Younger and more educated respondents appeared clearly more tolerant towards ethnic Albanians, whereas the percentage of respondents aged 65 years or older and graduates of compulsory education who rejected the presence of ethnic Albanians in Greece reached 16%. It is also worth mentioning that the respondents who are placed on the ethnocentric and socially conservative end of the two relevant spectrums appear clearly less tolerant towards ethnic Albanians. More specifically, only 20% of those who, on an ‘ethnocentrism – cosmopolitanism’ scale, self-identify as the most ethnocentric and 15% of those who, on a ‘social conservatism - social progressivism’ scale, self-identify as the most conservative would accept ethnic Albanians as a member of their family. The survey findings, however, do not indicate prevalence of negative stereotypes towards Albanians in relation to members of other Balkan nations. Interestingly, these conclusions do not seem to have noteworthy geographic variation. Moreover, self-identification with a left- or right-wing ideology does not seem to provide a basis for variation of attitudes. However, it is worth noting that individuals identifying with the far left and far right appear less tolerant towards Albanians. 16 per cent of those identifying with the far left and 10 per cent of those identifying with the far right would not accept the presence of Albanians in Greece.

The survey subsequently attempted to explore further prejudices towards Albanians through the use of two hypothetical questions about the likelihood of the respondent hiring an Albanian or Kosovar as a seasonal employee in their small business. The majority of the respondents again appeared without negative stereotypes against the people of those countries. In particular, over 60% of the sample responded that hiring an Albanian or a Kosovar as a seasonal employee would be likely or very likely. On the other hand, 36%-37%

of the sample answered that doing so would be rather or completely unlikely (Figure 4). This corresponds with the percentage of those who had replied to the previous question that they were not ready to accept a person of Albanian origin as a family member or friend; i.e. those who wanted to maintain a certain social distance from people of such origin.




Figure 4

Younger respondents were more likely than the elderly to hire a Kosovar. Moreover, ideological orientation impacts responses: ethnocentrism and social conservatism are strongly linked to hesitant and negative responses to the hypothetical question of hiring an Albanian or Kosovar as a seasonal employee – interestingly, Left-Right identification did not return a variation in responses. More specifically, 61% of those placed on positions 1 and 2 of the seven-degree scale of ethnocentrism-cosmopolitanism (i.e. those who agree completely or mostly with the phrase ‘our national culture is superior and I have difficulty accepting the habits and values of other cultures’) were found to be completely or rather unlikely to hire an Albanian or Kosovar in their business. The corresponding Figure was just 23% among those at the opposite end of the scale (positions 6 and 7), i.e. those who fully or mostly agree with the phrase ‘human culture is single and I easily adapt to the habits and values of other cultures’. Similarly, those placed in positions 1 and 2 of the seven-point scale of social conservatism-progressivism (i.e. those who completely or mostly agree with the phrase ‘individuals should be fully subordinated to the traditional and dominant values of a society’) were more hesitant towards people of different origin, in comparison to the average respondent. Half of these respondents said they were completely or very unlikely to hire an Albanian or a Kosovar in their business, while that view is expressed by only 29% of those in points 6 and 7 of the scale (i.e. completely or mostly agreed with the phrase ‘individuals

should be free to choose their own lifestyle even if that deviates from the dominant values in society'). In a nutshell, ideological orientation seems to color attitudes towards people of different origin, as ethnocentrism, as well as social conservatism, are often associated with negative predispositions towards foreigners. However, these two orientations were not recorded as a majority in this survey, which explains the preponderance of positive attitudes towards people of non-Greek origin ('I would accept him / her as a family member or friend' or 'I would hire him / her as a seasonal employee') in the entire sample.

Interestingly, no significant statistical differences were observed between the responses for Albanians and those for Kosovars, which indicates that the Kosovars are not viewed differently than the citizens of Albania. This finding, though, does not prove that Kosovars are completely identified with Albanians, for, as previous answers have shown, a third of the sample believes that the majority of Kosovars are of Serb origin. In relation to this specific point, of particular interest is the slight differentiation noted in answers to the question about the possibility of hiring a Kosovar as a seasonal worker. The 34% of respondents who think that there is a Serb majority in the country found it unlikely or highly unlikely to hire a person from Kosovo, whereas the respective percentage for those who think that most Kosovars are of Albanian origin was higher than 40%. This is the first instance where signs appear of a direct correlation between the perception of Kosovars, and Greeks' idea of Kosovars' and Albanians' common ancestry.

To explain the lack of variation in the attitudes towards Albanians and Kosovars, especially given the fact that a significant portion of the respondents erroneously believe that Serbs make up the majority in Kosovo, we could identify two plausible explanations. First, the current high unemployment rates in Greece make all respondents more reluctant to admit that they would hire a foreigner. Secondly, most educated respondents gave similar responses for Albanians and Kosovars irrespective of their knowledge about the actual demographics of the latter. This is linked to tolerance, which as a significant value among educated people, reduces the role played by knowledge of the actual national composition. For those respondents who had lower educational attainment, the differences in responses are significant between those who thought that the majority of Kosovars are Albanians and those who thought that they are Serbs. However, even among those less educated who believe that most Kosovars are Serbs about 30 per cent views hiring a Kosovar unlikely.

Subsequently, the survey attempted to ascertain the existence of strong stereotypes towards members of other Balkan nations. The respondents were asked to identify people of a certain national origin with a distinctive attribute. The fact that a considerable percentage of those asked (29% in the case of Kosovo) chose not to give a specific answer proves that a portion of public opinion does not follow particular stereotypes vis-à-vis people from neighboring states. This is further illustrated by the fact that the majority of those who did choose one of the proposed attributes or professions preferred the rather less charged option of the 'worker.' The negatively charged option of the 'criminal,' in relation to Albanians, was

chosen by a mere 18% of the sample, the highest percentage noted among people of other nationalities (Figure 5). This finding is interesting especially due to the fact that for more than two decades the Greek public has been exposed to frequent media stereotyping of Albanians and their strong association with rising criminality. It should also be noted that the survey took place in a period when one of the two dominant news stories involved a prison break and subsequent criminal activities by inmates of Albanian origin.

As far as people from Kosovo are concerned, 47% of the respondents identified them with workers, 10% with criminals, 6% with tourists, 5% with students and 3% with business partners. This breakdown follows a different pattern from both the one associated with Serbs and the one with Albanians; more specifically, most Greeks associate Serbs with tourists, students and business partners, whereas people from Albania are usually considered more likely to be workers or criminals. Stereotypes associated with the citizens of Kosovo are more closely linked to stereotypes about citizens of FYROM.




Figure 5

The most negative stereotypes towards the people of Kosovo (but also towards other Balkan people) were expressed by respondents from older age groups and those who belong to the ethnocentric and conservative end of the spectrum described above. For example, 18% of respondents 65 or older associated Kosovars with criminals, whereas a mere 5% of young adults aged 18-25 made the same association. Likewise, 19% of those who position themselves near the ethnocentric end of the spectrum and 24% of those closer to social conservatism associated Kosovars with criminals, with only 6% of more cosmopolitan and socially progressive respondents doing the same. Moreover, there is a slight variation

in responses about Kosovars depending on whether respondents have correct or false information about Kosovo's demographics. Those who think that the majority of Kosovars are Serbs more frequently select the labels 'worker' (57%) or 'student' (8%), while those who think that they are Albanians more often choose the label 'criminal' (14%). Overall, however, the variation is not sizeable.

Moreover, the option of the 'worker' was also selected by the large majority of Greeks who do not know which country is Kosovo's 'closest friend' or 'biggest enemy', and also by those who answered 'Don't know' to the question concerning Greece's recognition of Kosovo's independence (see next section). In conclusion, it could be said that stereotyping people from other countries is clearly related to the general ideological orientation of the respondents. Nevertheless, the survey shows that the ideological orientation associated with negative stereotypes does not reflect the dominant Greek public opinion. Moreover, the relatively higher association of certain segments of the population (older, ethnocentric, conservative) with the more negative attributes is not isolated with reference to Kosovars, but extends also to attitudes about other nations.

PART III: Kosovo's Relations with Third Countries and the Question of Kosovo's Status

The third part of the survey includes questions relating to the respondents' perception of Kosovo's relations with third countries; the researchers aimed to correlate these questions with the issue of whether Greece should recognize Kosovo's independence. The chosen phrasing was to identify the 'closest friend' and 'biggest enemy' of Kosovo, with respondents given six different options to choose from. In response to the 'closest friend' question, 24% of the sample gave no answer – a similar percentage to that of people who are shown (throughout the survey) to have no knowledge of the issues discussed. From the remaining options, Albania was chosen most frequently (32%), followed by Serbia (16%) and USA (12%) (Figure 6). It is obvious that a part of the sample has the wrong impression about the actual relations between the countries of the region. This erroneous understanding has an impact on perceptions of the citizens of said countries: for example, those who wrongly believe that Serbia is Kosovo's 'closest friend' view Kosovars more positively (less frequently identifying them with criminals) in relation to those who choose Albania (or the US) as Kosovo's 'closest friend'. More specifically, only 6% of the respondents who think Serbia is Kosovo's 'closest friend' associated Kosovars with criminals, whereas the percentage was significantly higher for those who answered Albania or the US (13% and 15% respectively).

To the question on Kosovo's 'biggest enemy,' 27% of the sample gave no answer, 33% chose Serbia, 13% the US and 12% Albania (Figure 7). The options of 'enemy' and 'friend' are correlated in the majority of the respondents, in the sense that two thirds of those who claim that Albania is Kosovo's 'closest friend' chose Serbia as 'biggest enemy', and two thirds of those who said that Serbia is Kosovo's 'closest friend' chose either Albania or the US as 'biggest enemy'. Apparently the latter group of respondents have an inaccurate impression of coalitions in the Balkans and of the demographics of Kosovo itself (also demonstrated by the current study, as those who chose Serbia as Kosovo's 'closest friend' were also those who answered that the majority of Kosovars are of Serb origin). By further examining the answers to this particular question, we come to the conclusion that the respondents with incomplete information are younger people (up to 35 years of age), whereas respondents aged 35-64, university graduates, and people from Thessaloniki have a better insight into Kosovo's relations with the countries mentioned above. As an indication, young adults (aged 18-25) are most likely to wrongly consider Serbia as Kosovo's 'closest friend' (27%) and more likely to answer that the US is Kosovo's 'biggest enemy' (24%). Generally, age groups 35-64, higher education graduates, residents of Thessaloniki have better knowledge of the 'geography of friends and enemies' of Kosovo.

Nevertheless, the survey shows that there is a consistency in the answers of those who do not have the correct information about Kosovo's relations with third countries (they represent one third of the sample). More specifically, they believe that Kosovo is mostly inhabited by people of Serb origin and for that reason they think Serbia is its main ally and neighboring Albania its enemy. Equally consistent are the other third of the sample who

are right about Kosovo's demographics and, consequently, about its friendly relations with Albania and its hostile relations with Serbia. It is worth mentioning that in both cases - i.e. irrespective of whether respondents have the right information about Kosovo's relations with Albania and Serbia – the majority clearly distinguishes US support for Albania.




Figure 6

The question of whether Greece should recognize Kosovo as an independent state was included in the same section of the survey. It is noted that, in phrasing the question, the information that Kosovo has declared independence and that most European countries have recognized it, was given to respondents. This was deemed necessary for ensuring that all respondents have a minimum of information about the current situation of the Kosovo question before they respond to the question. Figure 8 illustrates the breakdown of answers, from which we can infer that Greek public opinion is essentially divided (Figure 8) – with the exception of the portion which expresses ignorance on the issue and coincides in size with the segment of the population that is unable to provide a specific answer to previous questions (27%). 38% of respondents agreed with the statement that Greece should recognize Kosovo as an independent state, whereas 35% said Greece should not do so. The three-percentage point difference is clearly within the margin of sampling error (whose range is approximately 5%); this means that it is not possible to determine whether a relative majority of Greek public opinion clearly supports one of the two options.




Figure 7




Figure 8

This distribution of respondents presented variation in specific subgroups of those polled, for instance according to age or ideological orientation (as reflected on scales of ethnocentrism versus cosmopolitanism as well as social conservatism versus social progressivism). Correlation between age and the percentage of those who favored Greek recognition of Kosovo can be observed: 50 per cent of young people hold that Greece should proceed with recognition, compared with only 31 per cent of those over 65. With regards to ideological orientation, we found a positive correlation between acceptance of Kosovo's independence and cosmopolitanism and social progressivism. More specifically, individuals who identify with the highest values in cosmopolitanism and social progressivism also on average favored the recognition of Kosovo's independence.

Clearly, the correlation between different perspectives on Kosovo's recognition and estimations of Kosovo's national composition as well as Kosovo's relations with neighboring states have to be investigated. Given that a significant proportion of those polled had either incomplete or incorrect perceptions of both Kosovo's national composition and the country's relations with its neighbors, it is reasonable to assume that such inaccurate information makes the measurement of these attitudes also fairly unreliable. By cross-tabulating the answers to the question of the Kosovar population's composition and the question on Kosovo's closest ally or greatest enemy with the answers on the Greek position towards Kosovo's independence, we can safely draw the conclusion that inaccurate information has influenced the 'pro-recognition' responses in the survey. More specifically, the percentage of responses that favor Kosovo's independence has significantly benefited from the fact that a noteworthy portion of public opinion considers Kosovo to be a region inhabited by Serbs and antagonized by Albania and/or the United States. As a result, these incorrect views combined with the Greek public's confirmed positive attitude towards Serbs- see previous questions with reference to the respondents' attitudes towards Balkan countries' inhabitants- led a segment of those polled to opt for the recognition of Kosovo's independence by Greece. Table 2 explains this situation by offering the respective percentages of those for and against recognition of Kosovo's independence and itemizing them according to the responses to the question about the national composition of Kosovo. Table 2 also offers information about the appeal of the different options to different age groups and ideological orientations.

Given that about half of those who feel positively toward the prospect of Greece recognizing Kosovo also view it as a Serb-majority province that is threatened by Albania, it would be wise to estimate that the pro-recognition percentage is lower by about 15 per cent. Therefore, we can safely assume that the percentage of those favoring the recognition of Kosovo's independence is well below the percentage of those opposing this prospect. However, it is worth noting that a significant part of respondents aged 18-24, regardless of their correct or incorrect response to the national composition question, seem to favor Kosovo's independence. From this we can draw the conclusion that age is one of the factors explaining variation in attitudes towards the question of recognition of Kosovo's independence.

The respondents were also asked to give reasons why they believe that Greece should or should not recognize Kosovo's independence. Among respondents who favor Kosovo's recognition, no single reason stands out. 32 per cent of the respondents believed that Greece should join the EU member states that have already recognized Kosovo. 27 per cent adopted a rather neutral argument suggesting that Greece-Kosovo relations will be established as a result of recognition and, finally, 23 per cent argued that recognition would serve as a deterrent to the expansion of Turkey's influence in the region (Figure 9). Moreover, the reason of following the policy of other EU member states on the recognition of Kosovo was mentioned more frequently by younger respondents and the more cosmopolitan and socially progressive, whilst elderly respondents with ethnocentric tendencies tended to attribute their choice to the role of Turkey in the region. Interestingly, the Left-Right ideological position did not produce variation in opinions on the issue.

TABLE 2: Attitudes on the position that Greece should have regarding recognition of Kosovo and estimates about Kosovo's national composition – demographic and ideological characteristics of respondents

	Greece <u>should</u> recognize Kosovo	Greece <u>should not</u> recognize Kosovo	DK
Albanian majority	<p>Option 1: 33 %</p> <p>Highest percentages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age: 35-44 - Residents of Thessaloniki - Cosmopolitans (point 7 in ethnocentrism-cosmopolitanism scale) - Progressives (points 6-7 in conservatism-cosmopolitanism scale) 	<p>Option 2: 44 %</p> <p>Highest percentages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age: 45+ - University education - Residents of Attica - Ethnocentric and moderate cosmopolitans (points 1-4 in ethnocentrism-cosmopolitanism scale) - Conservatives and moderate progressives (points 1-5 in conservatism-cosmopolitanism scale) 	23 %
Serbian majority	<p>Option 3: 47 %</p> <p>Highest percentages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age : 18-34 - Primary education - Residents of villages - Moderate cosmopolitans and cosmopolitans (points 5-6 in conservatism-cosmopolitanism scale) 	<p>Option 4: 27 %</p>	26 %

Interesting observations can be made based on the above data, especially regarding the respondents with correct information about Kosovo’s demographics. Both options are well supported by the economically most active and dynamic segments of society, with the pro-independence option having a slightly younger support base. Thessaloniki residents are more supportive of Kosovo’s independence compared to residents of Athens. Kosovo’s recognition attracts the most cosmopolitan and progressive segments of society. Non-recognition is supported by those with more education, ethnocentrists and moderate cosmopolitans and the conservatives and moderate progressives. Non-recognition has, thus, wider and more varied acceptance when it comes to ideological and socio-political orientation.




Figure 9

Furthermore, among those respondents who opposed recognition, 23 per cent offered as reason the good relations between Greece and Serbia, while 27 per cent associated their position with the question of Cyprus, and more specifically, that recognition of Kosovo could become a precedent for international recognition of the Turkish-occupied northern part of the Republic of Cyprus. 40 per cent of those who argued that Greece should not recognize Kosovo’s independence offered a number of other explanatory reasons. For instance, the fear of setting a precedent that would encourage minority secessionism was mentioned, with sporadic reference (7-8 per cent) to the threat of a potential separatist movement in the Greek region of Thrace. Another 3-4 per cent mentioned the imperative for respect of international law and for preserving stability in the Balkan region. Furthermore, 6 per cent

responded that non-recognition is a strategic move on the part of Greece, in an effort to dissuade influence from and interests of countries like Albania and Turkey.

The responses to the question of whether Greece should recognize Kosovo's independence were cross-tabulated with the respondents' knowledge about the national composition of Kosovo leading to very interesting findings. A majority of 45 per cent of those who responded that Greece should recognize Kosovo mistakenly think that the majority of the Kosovo population is of Serbian origin. These respondents included those of younger age, graduates of primary education, people from the provinces, but also those who identify with cosmopolitanism. In contrast, those respondents who were aware of Kosovo's national composition and who favored recognition were considerably fewer with 33 per cent, belonging to the 35-54 age groups and identifying with cosmopolitanism and progressivism; residents of Thessaloniki made up a large percentage within this group. For those respondents who correctly responded as to the national composition of Kosovo and who are not in favor of Kosovo's recognition (44 per cent), we found that this group includes mostly individuals over 45, with university education, mostly residents of Attica (the wider Athens area), and those who identify mostly with ethnocentrism and conservatism. Finally, fewer respondents (27 per cent) do not agree with the recognition of Kosovo and erroneously think that the majority of Kosovo's population is ethnically Serb.

If we were to codify the correlations between correct/incorrect knowledge about Kosovo's demographics (i.e. Albanian or Serb majority), with opinions on whether Greece should recognize Kosovo as an independent state and the explanation that the respective majorities offer for these positions, we could create the following matrix:

TABLE 3: Attitudes on the position that Greece should have on the recognition of Kosovo and estimates about Kosovo's national composition – majority of respondents' explanation for selected position

	Greece <u>should</u> recognize Kosovo	Greece <u>should not</u> recognize Kosovo
Albanian majority	<i>Majority explanation:</i> Conform with the majority of the EU member states	<i>Majority explanation:</i> Ties with Serbia
Serbian majority	<i>Majority explanation:</i> Avert Turkey's influence in the region	<i>Majority explanation:</i> Potential precedent for the Cyprus question




Figure 10

The survey asked those who were against the recognition of Kosovo's independence a subsequent question to identify attitudes towards relations between Greece and Kosovo despite non-recognition. Responses to this question show that public opinion makes a distinction between the question of recognition and that of bilateral relations between the two sides. More specifically, 68 per cent of respondents said that Greece should seek the best possible relations with Kosovo but without recognizing its independence, while only 26 per cent suggested that Greece and Kosovo should have no relations whatsoever (Figure 10). The latter opinion was expressed mostly by those respondents who identify with ethnocentrism and social conservatism: they are against relations with Kosovo by 30 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. It's also worth noting that those most negative towards Kosovo's recognition are those respondents who believe that the United States is the closest ally of Kosovo. Among them, the opinion that Greece should have no relations with Kosovo reached 50 per cent. This finding suggests the importance of anti-Americanism as an explanatory factor for Greek public opinion towards Kosovo.

PART IV: Anti-Americanism as an Explanatory Factor of Greek Public Opinion Vis-À-Vis Kosovo

It has been well documented in the relevant literature that Greek public opinion has a clearly negative perception of the role that the United States had in domestic politics in Greece, particularly in the post-Greek Civil War period (1950s-60s). This feeling is often intensified in the wake of American interventions in the internal affairs of other states. One such occasion was 1999 when the United States, leading an alliance of NATO states, engaged in a military air campaign against Serbia. It is a well-known fact that this campaign was negatively received by the Greek public and this fact is reaffirmed in our survey. More specifically, 92 per cent of those polled stated that the 1999 campaign was intended to promote American geopolitical interests, in contrast to the 2 per cent who supported the view that the intervention's only aim was to end the war. Insofar as the response to this question was largely expected, the survey posed the additional question as to whether the United States' role in international politics is always negative or positive or whether it is sometimes negative and sometimes positive. When clarifications were requested by respondents the following thesis were provided: the role of the United States is always negative because "the United States is the only power that systematically evades international law for advancing its own interests" or the role of the United States is always positive because "the United States is the only power that can discipline regimes that threaten international peace and security". The answers to the aforementioned question are telling in that a large portion of respondents, i.e. 44 per cent, is willing to reconsider a more balanced perspective, and does not consider negative the role of the as always United States. In contrast, 48 per cent is adamant that the American role is always negative (Figure 11). It's worth noting that variation in anti-American sentiment was identified in different socio-demographic strata; more specifically, those in the age group 45-54 and residents of Thessaloniki tend to view the American role as more negative. Interestingly, anti-Americanism is not necessarily correlated with any particular political ideology ("left" or "right") and seems to extend to the wider political spectrum. Still, respondents positioned on the two ends of the political spectrum tend to show slightly higher proportions of negative attitude towards the United States (53 per cent – 55 per cent).

Attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy were correlated with opinions about the course that Greek diplomacy should follow vis-à-vis Kosovo's recognition. Among those who tended to view the U.S. role negatively, only 36 per cent favored recognition; among those who viewed the U.S. role positively 61 per cent favored Kosovo's recognition. These rates however should be viewed in the context of the scope of the erroneous perception that part of the Greek public has about Kosovo's population composition and its relations with neighboring states, the U.S. and the European Union. For instance, those who hold an unfavorable view of the U.S. may still support Kosovo's recognition, in view of harming U.S. interests if they erroneously believe that Kosovo is not a friendly country to the Americans. In any case,

there are clear indications that the majority of the Greek public associates the U.S. with Kosovo and Albania and as a result projects the negative feelings towards the U.S. also on to Kosovo. It is also worth noting that no statistically significant difference was found between the group that views the U.S. role as always negative and that which views it as sometimes positive and sometimes negative.

Having said that, it is important to stress that anti-Americanism does not affect the attitude that Greeks hold towards Kosovar residents per se. When asked the hypothetical question of whether they would hire a Kosovar in their business, no variation was detected based on opinions about the international role of the United States. This finding is very important as it demonstrates that while anti-American sentiments affect the public’s attitudes on foreign policy issues they do not as such influence deeper attitudes towards nations that maintain good relations with the U.S. In contrast, the factor that has the greatest effect on sentiments towards residents of Kosovo seems to be respondents’ values, and more specifically self-identification on the ethnocentrism-cosmopolitanism scale. Indicatively, only 33 per cent of ethnocentrists who view the U.S. role as always negative would hire a Kosovar, while the relevant Figure for cosmopolitans reaches 73 per cent. Similarly, while only 25 per cent of those who view the American role as always negative and are ethnocentric declare that Greece should recognize Kosovo, the percentage surpasses 51 per cent among the cosmopolitans. In comparative terms, however, the variation of responses based on self-identification on the ethnocentrism-cosmopolitanism scale is greater when it comes to hiring a Kosovar. This is probably due to the fact that anti-Americanism is widespread among those who identify with the Left or Centre-Left.




Figure 11

Conclusions

Whether due to ignorance or persisting misconceptions, Kosovo's history and current politics remain a big question mark for a significant part of the Greek public, regardless of age, place of residence and level of education. Misconceptions typically relate to Kosovo's history and political status, but extend also to demography (with a good part of respondents holding the opinion that Kosovo has a Serbian majority) and Kosovo's relations with neighboring states (often holding the belief that Kosovo is politically closer to Serbia rather than to Albania), which we estimate as factors that influence Greek public opinion. This lack of knowledge affects the validity of our survey's findings on the attitudes towards Kosovars and the question of Kosovo's recognition; a good part of the public probably offered responses that would not necessarily represent their actual attitudes had they been completely or correctly informed.

Despite these limitations, we argue that a number of important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the survey data. We argue that the majority of the Greek public does not have negative attitudes towards Kosovars. Successive questions attempting to identify attitudes and potential stereotyping were asked and they illustrated that attitudes towards Kosovars are largely positive and by and large similar to attitudes towards other Balkan people. The only exception is 10 per cent of respondents who tend to negatively view not only Kosovars but also most other neighboring peoples as well. Unsurprisingly, more socially progressive and cosmopolitan respondents tend to hold more positive attitudes towards both Kosovars and members of other Balkan nations. The same applies to most ideological orientations, with the exception of the far left and far right respondents who appear to be less tolerant. Moreover, geography (i.e. place of residence) does not appear to be a major factor influencing attitudes on these issues. Generally, our survey found that negative stereotyping of people from neighboring states is strongly associated with certain worldviews and ideological orientations, but it remains a minority stance within Greek public opinion. Moreover, the relatively higher association of certain segments of public opinion with more negative attributes is not isolated to Kosovars, but rather extends also to attitudes about other nations.

The survey further found that Greek public opinion tends to be negatively predisposed towards the diplomatic aspects of the Kosovo problem. At first glance Greek public opinion appears to be divided over the issue of Kosovo's recognition with the percentages of the 'yes' and 'no' camps being very close. However, the picture changes if knowledge about Kosovo's demographics and geography of friends and enemies are factored in; it becomes clear that the anti-recognition camp is well ahead of the pro-recognition one. Still one third of respondents who held correct information about Kosovo's demographics were in favor of Kosovo's recognition. The highest percentages among these were in the age group 35-44, residents of Thessaloniki, cosmopolitans and progressives. In contrast, 44 per cent of those with correct information about Kosovo's demographics opposed the recognition of Kosovo

with the highest percentages being among those aged above 45, well educated, residents of Athens/Attica, ethnocentrists and social conservatives. Generally, non-recognition has wider and more varied acceptance when it comes to ideological and socio-political orientations. Interestingly, a significant part of respondents aged 18-24, regardless of their correct or incorrect response to the national composition question, seem to favor Kosovo's independence.

Interesting conclusions are also drawn from the explanations respondents gave for either position on recognition. Among respondents with good knowledge of Kosovo's demographics, the pro-recognition positions were justified mostly as conformity with the majority of the EU member states and the anti-recognition stance as mostly based on pre-existing strong ties with Serbia. Among those who do not have good knowledge of Kosovo's demographics, the pro-recognition group rationalizes its position mostly by reference to the threat of Turkish influence in the region and the anti-recognition camp mainly by reference to a potential negative precedent for Cyprus. Responses to the question about Greece's future relations with Kosovo show that public opinion makes a distinction between the question of recognition and that of bilateral relations between the two sides. A large majority of respondents favor improved relations with Pristina and, interestingly, this view extends even to the majority of those who object to Kosovo's recognition.

The survey, finally, highlights anti-Americanism as a powerful explanation for the public's negative attitudes towards Kosovo's recognition; this is because the majority of respondents view the United States as a supporter of Kosovo. The influence of anti-Americanism however does not seem to affect attitudes towards Kosovars per se. The exception to this rule are the negative attitudes that are found among those segments of the population which are typically more amenable to stereotyping, such as the older generation, the social conservatives and ethno-centrists.

HOW KOSOVARS VIEW GREEKS AND OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION

By Agon Maliqi

Edited by Scott Abrams

Introduction

Five EU Member States—Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain—as well as two of Kosovo’s neighbors—Bosnia and Serbia—do not officially recognize Kosovo’s independent statehood. This undermines Kosovo’s EU perspective and its ability to become a full-fledged member of the international community. It cannot enter into a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU without the unanimous approval of every EU Member State. Abolishing the restrictive visa regime, which severely limits Kosovars’ ability to travel, requires unanimous approval in Europe. As a result, these 7 countries exhibit enormous sway over Kosovo’s domestic reform processes and its engagement with EU approximation process.

This survey seeks to collect and analyze the public perceptions that Kosovars have vis-à-vis other nations in its immediate region (and beyond), with a particular focus on one of the non-recognizing EU Member States: Greece. The results, it is hoped, should help Kosovars and Kosovar decision makers better understand the context in which Kosovars create their opinions on Greece and its foreign policy, perceptions behind that reasoning, the potential origin of such attitude, and the readiness of the Kosovars towards strengthened and advanced cooperation ties with Greece.

The survey was conducted in May 2013 with a representative sample of 998 persons. The sample was representative of the population in Kosovo in terms of demographic characteristics such as: age, gender, educational attainment, profession and place of residence.

Like any survey of this kind, this inquiry has its limitations. The subjective answers of the respondents related to sensitive questions, such as those on ethnic groups, could limit the ability of researchers to make precise inferences or to claim that such answers represent objective truths. Experience from a host of countries has demonstrated that, in social contexts where certain values are deeply entrenched in the public discourse, surveys could face a high degree of what political scientist Timur Kuran dubbed as “preference falsification”.

This means that people may tell pollsters what they *think* they should say, because it is highly unpopular or even embarrassing to express their true beliefs. This may have been exemplified by the massive failure of polls in Switzerland to predict referendum result which banned the construction of minarets. In a country where “tolerance” and respect for


diversity are the uncontested norms in public discourse, it is often difficult to publicly admit what is perceived as an “intolerant position”. Nonetheless, despite such potential challenges, surveys constitute the best method available to understand public perceptions. According to the findings of this particular survey, Kosovars have expressed that they have both a great interest in and knowledge of the Western Balkans region. An overwhelming 83% of respondents affirmed this. Interest and knowledge in the region is highly correlated with the level of educational attainment. The survey found that 95% of those who have completed university responded positively to the question, compared to 70% of those who only finished primary school.

This survey finds that most common destination for Kosovars is Albania, and Greece is the least visited of countries in the region, not exceeding 4 % of people surveyed. Very few Kosovars have visited Greece, despite its geographical proximity. As Table 1 illustrates, those who have visited Greece have done so mostly for tourism purposes (32% and 39), whereas a much smaller share indicated that they had visited the country for shopping, business or family visits.

Table 1: “Have you ever visited any of the following countries in the region and, if so, what was the purpose of those visits?” (Total responses)


	Albania	Turkey	Ex-Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	Greece
% of country visits	50%	13%	27%	7%	4%
of which:					
Vacations	55%	39%	32%	32%	32%
Touristic visits	30%	34%	34%	39%	39%
shopping	2%	6%	3%	6%	6%
business	2%	11%	16%	23%	23%
Family visits	11%	10%	15%	1%	1%

The fact that the majority of Kosovars who have traveled to Greece have done so for tourism purposes most likely explains why their impressions of the country are overwhelmingly positive (See Figure 1).



The survey also found that older age groups (45-54 and 55-64) have better impressions of their visits to Greece than younger ones. There is likely an element of nostalgia at play here. These age segments are more likely to have visited the country for summer holidays during the more prosperous period when Kosovo (then part of Yugoslavia) enjoyed a visa-free travel regime with Greece. During that period Greece was a frequent travel destination for Kosovo's then-emerging urban middle class.

Although few Kosovars have visited in the past, the survey finds that many would like to visit Greece primarily for tourism and leisure. (See Figure 2). The survey data seems to indicate that, in the case of visa liberalization for Kosovo, Greece would not be a major migration destination. Most Kosovars merely view Greece as just another tourist destination like Albania, Montenegro and Turkey.



One facet of this survey was to assess the degree to which Kosovars were open to accepting persons from other regional ethnicities as members of their immediate families or social circles (co-workers, friends, guests, etc.). The underlying logic in asking this question was to understand the level of openness towards other ethnicities in social functions. This helps to reveal how comfortable or culturally close people feel towards neighboring ethnic groups, which also has implications on political attitudes.

The data suggests that Kosovars seem to value ethnic and cultural homogeneity when it comes to their immediate family and social environments, but are nonetheless welcoming towards others – with Serbs being the noted exception - in other social capacities. In this regard, the survey finds that Kosovars are very open to colleagues, friends, workers of other ethnicities, but reserved to maintaining ethnic homogeneity within their immediate family (see answers in Table 2 below).

When asked about Greek, the survey generated similar responses, as well. The largest share says that they would accept Greeks in various social capacities: visitors to Kosovo (24.8%), co-workers (15.2%) friends (12.2%), first neighbors (8.8%) equal citizen of Kosovo (7.1%). Family's ethnic homogeneity has predominated in the Greek's case as well, as only about 1% of respondents have shown openness to having a Greek as member of the family.


Among others, a segment of this question offered the respondents the opportunity to state if there are members of ethnic communities from the region whom they would not welcome neither as the visitor to Kosovo. This kind of rejection seems to be stronger for the Serbs (56.9%), followed by Romanians (40.5%), and Roma (30.4%). A quarter of respondents though, did express such lack of openness towards Greeks (25.7%) who are almost as welcome as Montenegrins (23.1%). The findings of the above question seem to indicate a high degree of ethnic conservatism among Kosovo Albanians, particularly in the family domain.

5. WOULD YOU ACCEPT A MEMBER OF THIS ETHNIC COMMUNITY TO BE:

	Turk	Greek	Serb	Roma	Bosniak	Montenegrin	Romanian
A Member of your family	18.8	1.1	0.3	1.4	2.7	0.5	0.3
Your friend	33.8	12.2	1.5	3.3	10.3	6.2	4.3
Your first neighbor	13.1	8.8	5.8	8.4	12.5	8.1	4.7
Co-worker	10.8	15.2	7.2	6	13.1	10.9	7.1
Equal citizen of Kosovo	7.1	6.6	10.2	26.3	23.8	14.6	6.4
A visitor to Kosovo	10.3	24.8	11.6	16.2	18.7	26.4	26.9
To never visit Kosovo	3	25.7	56.9	30.4	11.9	23.1	40.5
Ref/Pp	3	5.5	6.4	8	6.8	10.1	9.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


In order to delve deeper into the attitudes that Kosovars have towards foreigners, the survey also measured the respondent's general degree of openness towards other cultures and values by asking how open they were to influence from them, allowing respondents to choose within a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 being very closed and 7 being very open). The purpose of this exercise was to categorize Kosovo's society into broad clusters, based on degrees of openness towards others, while also understanding the size of each cluster within society and – through cross-tabulation – discerning whether there were any significant differences in opinion between these groups on particular issues. Respondents who answered in the range of 1-2 were marked as “socially conservative”, those who answered 3-5 were marked as “socially moderate”, whereas those who answered 6-7 were classified as “socially liberal”. As Figure 3 shows, using this type of categorization, 40% of Kosovars may be classified as conservative, 39% as moderate and 21% as liberal.

Figure 3: "Should we value our own culture and values, or should we also be open towards influence from other cultures and values?"



Returning to the question on acceptance of other ethnicities in social functions, it is interesting to note that there is no difference between those who are classified as socially conservative, moderate or liberal when it comes to accepting Greeks within their family circle. As the chart in Figure 4 illustrates, only 1% of designated liberals would accept having a Greek as a family member. Nonetheless, liberals are more likely than conservatives and moderates to accept Greeks in the second most intimate social environments – namely, as friends (18%), neighbors (11%) or co-workers (19%). Conservatives, unsurprisingly, are far less likely to even accept Greeks visiting Kosovo (31%).

Figure 4: “Would you accept a member of this ethnic community to be...” (cross-tabulation)



The relatively small differences in the answers between the three societal categories, which one might have expected to vary more when it comes to openness to others, illustrates a high degree of homogeneity within Kosovar society when it comes to attitudes towards neighboring ethnicities and cultures. This seems to be characterized by deep ethnic conservatism in the family domain - especially in relation to those nations that are also culturally different and with which there exist historical disputes (ex. Greeks and Serbs) – and otherwise general openness in other social domains (again, with exceptions).

The survey also measured the dominant stereotypes that Kosovars have about neighboring ethnicities and nations, which once again may indicate the presence of negative attitudes towards them. The data in Table 3 indicate that the majority of respondents in Kosovo stated that when they heard or read that a Greek person has visited Kosovo, their first impression was that they are tourists (34.7%) or businessperson (34.5%). However, a small but still sizable share of the respondents (11.5%) say that they believed the visitor might have been engaging in illicit activities.

Table 3: “When you hear or read that a person from one of these countries has visited Kosovo, what’s the first thing that crosses your mind about the status of this visitor?”

	ALBANIA	MACEDONIA	GREECE	TURKEY
Worker	32.7	15.8	8.6	8.9
Criminal	1.9	7.8	11.5	0.3
Student	13.1	16.5	3.3	1.9
Tourist	34.6	25.3	34.7	28.9
Businessperson	15	28	34.5	56.2
Don’t know / NA	2.7	6.6	7.4	3.8
Total	100	100	100	100

Kosovar Outlook on Relations with Greece


Kosovo’s recent history has ensured that foreign affairs remain a major topic of public interest and discussion among Kosovars. Awareness of international affairs has intensified since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, as Kosovars have been exposed to a course in world geography while eagerly awaiting—and lobbying for—other countries to recognize their statehood.

This survey attempted to empirically assess public awareness on the recognition process, with a particular focus on the three regional countries (Greece, Romania and Bosnia-Herzegovina) that have not recognized Kosovo, as well as the dominant public perceptions regarding Greece’s position and Kosovo’s relation to it.

As illustrated by Figure 5, 72.1% of Kosovars are aware that Greece has not recognized Kosovo’s independence. Interestingly, Kosovars are aware of Greece’s non-recognition more than they are aware of Romania or Bosnia’s non-recognition (59.3% and 53.1% respectively). As illustrated by Annex 4, the demographic characteristics (level of educational attainment, gender, etc.) of those who say they are aware of Greece’s non-recognition do not differ significantly from the demographic characteristics of the entire population.


One possible explanation for these varying degrees of awareness on the three countries could be the fact that Greece and Romania’s non-recognition have had much higher public visibility than Bosnia’s non-recognition. Greece and Romania have been the subject of more intensive public discussion and lobbying efforts due to expectations by policy elites that their position might change. In the case of Bosnia there has been little public visibility, as it has been widely accepted among policy elites that Serbia’s veto power (through its influence on Republika Srpska) makes Bosnian recognition virtually impossible and, thus, lobbying efforts are futile.

Figure 5: Do you know which regional countries have not recognized Kosovo's independence?" (% of those who responded Yes to the respective countries)




One of the biggest developments in recent years has been the agreement reached in Brussels between Kosovo and Serbia on what was dubbed as a “normalization of relations”. The survey attempted to assess what Kosovars thought would be the impact of this agreement on the recognition process. As Figure 6 illustrates, an overwhelming majority (73.6%) stated that the agreement will bring forth new recognitions, whereas 16.9% said that it would not. As indicated by the cross-tabulated data in Annex 6, pessimism is only slightly higher than average for those aged 25-34 (22.1%) and university graduates (23.2%).


Figure 6: Since Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement to normalize relations, do you think it will increase the number of countries that will recognize Kosovo's independence?"



On the other hand, the majority of Kosovars are optimistic that Greece will recognize Kosovo's independence. As illustrated by Figure 7, 67.9% of survey respondents think that this will be the case, whereas 22.8% think that Greece will not recognize Kosovo. Cross-tabulated data (in Annex 7) illustrate that skepticism about Greece's recognition is highest among those over 65 years old (33.3%) and university graduates (32.1%).




The majority of those who said that Greece will recognize Kosovo think that it will do so because of insistence by other EU member states. As Figure 8 illustrates, 59.4% of respondents think that the EU’s insistence will be the cause of recognition. On the other hand, 33.1% of respondents say that Greece will recognize Kosovo in order to develop better relations with it. Only 4.7% of respondents think that Greece will recognize Kosovo in order to reduce Turkey’s influence in the region.




On the other hand, among those who think that Greece will not recognize Kosovo, the dominant belief is that Greece will not do so in order to maintain good relations with Serbia. See Figure 9.

Figure 9: Why do you think Greece will not recognize Kosovo's independence?"



Cross-tabulations (Figure 10) reveal that those who were classified as social conservatives are significantly more likely to believe that the main reason for Greece's non-recognition is its relationship with Serbia. What most probably explains this difference is the fact that these more conservative segments of society (whether on a nationalist or religious basis) are more likely to view regional affairs from the prism of classical and traditional Balkan alliances and to disregard any other potential information that might be influencing the issue.

Figure 10: "Why do you think Greece will not recognize Kosovo's independence?" (cross-tabulation)



As far as Kosovo's future relations with Greece are concerned, despite the existence of a certain degree of reservation for the country among various segments of the population, Kosovars nonetheless seem to want to establish friendly relations with Greece. As Figure 11 illustrates, an overwhelming 91.7% of respondents said that Kosovo should develop friendly

relations with all countries. When asked about the kind of relations that Kosovo should develop with Greece, only 5.4% said that Kosovo should not develop good relations.


Importantly, among those who are skeptical towards Greece there is a much higher predominance of men (64.8%) compared to women (35.2%), something that could perhaps be explained by the higher tendency of former to ascribe to traditionalist and nationalist discourse. Unsurprisingly, preference for not developing good relations with Greece is slightly higher than average among social conservatives (8%), although even among this group it remains rather low. On the other hand, a positive / peaceful outlook on the world is correlated with higher levels of education. For example, those who have college degree have a higher than average preference for Kosovo to have good relations with all countries (97%).

Kosovar Outlook on Foreign Affairs and the Role of the United States

The survey went beyond questions related to the region in order to assess broader dimensions of the Kosovar outlook on regional and international affairs. Particular focus was given to the role of the United States – one of Kosovo's most steadfast supporters and sponsors of independence. It is noteworthy that this is a subject area that Kosovars, and Albanians in general, have markedly different views about than most of the other nations in the region, and more broadly across Europe.

Respondents were first of all asked who they thought was Kosovo's greatest friend in the international arena. They were allowed to select only one of five given options. The names of the selected countries are unsurprising, albeit the order in which the two top places are ranked raises interesting points for discussion. See Figure 12.

Figure 12: "Who do you think is Kosovo's greatest friend?"




While it is widely known that Kosovo is one of the most pro-American countries in the world, the fact that the US is listed as the greatest friend by a majority of the respondents, even more than its ethnic brethren in Albania, confirms the belief even empirically. Nevertheless, the stated belief on US's friendliness illustrates the sheer degree of the impact that the US-led NATO intervention in 1999 and the sponsorship of Kosovo's independence has had on Kosovar society (see Figure 15). The existence of a heavy dose of pro-Americanism, often reaching the point of adulation, is further supported by the respondents' answers to questions on the role of the US in the world (to be discussed later).

However, at this point it is worthy to note an interesting trend which is revealed by demographic cross-tabulations to the question on who is Kosovo's greatest friend. And this is the finding that the friendly attitude towards the US may be waning just slightly. The survey finds that older generations have a considerably higher preference for the United States than younger age-groups. The US is considered to be Kosovo's greatest friend by 72.7% of those aged over 65 but by only 48.8% of those between the ages of 25-34. The latter age group is not only the one where preference for the US is the lowest, but also the one where preference for Albania is the highest (44.2%).

One possible explanation for this could be the fact that for younger generations – whose more pressing challenges are low economic development and rampant unemployment, and not liberation from Serbia - the US is seen with less adoration and as less important than for the older generations, whose view of the US was heavily shaped by the NATO intervention in 1999 and subsequent support for independence.

Nonetheless, Kosovo remains a heavily pro-American country. This is confirmed by the answers that survey respondents gave when asked about the role of the United States in global affairs. The respondents were asked to answer on a scale whether the role of the US was: a) always positive; b) sometimes negative, sometimes positive; c) always negative.

As illustrated by Figure 13, a slim majority of Kosovars, 53.5% of them, think that the role of the United States in international politics is always positive. A significant share, 42.1%, have a more ambivalent view and state that the role of the US is sometimes positive and sometimes negative. Only 0.9% of the population believes that the role of the US is always negative.



Perceptions of the role of the US do have some minor but still interesting demographic dimensions. There is once again the same difference between age groups that was discussed earlier, as those between 25-34 are somewhat more skeptical towards the role of the US in global politics. The respondents in this age group think that the US's role is always positive almost 10 percentage points less (44.2%) than the total population (53.5%). Similarly, they think that the US's role is sometimes positive and sometimes negative almost ten percentage points more often (51.2%) than the total population (42.1%). On the other hand, those who have the most positive views of the US's role, stating that it is always positive, belong to the 65+ age group (71.2%).

Most interestingly, and quite differently from most countries in the world, perceptions of the role of the US are quite homogeneous and similar for respondents across all ideological lines. As Figures 14 and 15 illustrate, the role of the US is seen as "always positive" by both social conservatives and liberals, and even by those who ascribe to the economic left. Unsurprisingly, the only somewhat more visible difference is the slightly higher than average positive assessment of the US among those who ascribe to the economic right (60.4%)

THE KOSOVO-GREECE DIVIDE: COMPARING THE TWO SURVEYS

By Agon Maliqi
Edited by Scott Abrams

Serious analysis and discussions on relations between Kosovo and Greece – whether in academia, the media or among political elites – have so far been rare and marginal in both countries. Even when they have occurred, they have mostly touched upon surface level issues that are most visible in public discourse. In this sense, the relations between Kosovo and Greece have generally been analyzed from the prism of the historic and geopolitical context of the Balkans; the implications of Kosovo's independence on regional politics and international law, in particular the issue of Cyprus; the weak to inexistent economic ties between the two countries; or in the case of sensationalist media, they have most often been discussed from the prism of traditional ethnic stereotypes or prejudices produced by nationalist discourses. So far there have been no endeavors to understand the bilateral relations between the two peoples from a more in-depth socio-cultural perspective – namely, to empirically assess the very public perceptions, which actually shape public discourse and the policy orientations of elites.

The quantitative surveys conducted in both countries – with a similar methodology that was adjusted to the context of each country - attempted to fill this particular knowledge gap by generating empirical data on how Kosovars and Greeks view each other in particular, and the world around them in general. The survey data provide an opportunity to determine the current situation in the mutual perceptions between the peoples of Kosovo and Greece and thus the baseline from which the impact of any future developments could potentially be measured. In addition, they helped to identify not only the key differences between the two societies and the points of contention that would need to be addressed in order to enhance cooperation in the future, but also the potential similarities or entry points that could be used to achieve this end.

One of the main and most important conclusions that can be drawn from a comparison of the data from the two studies is that there is a considerable gap and divide in the relations between Kosovars and Greeks which is highly disproportionate to the physical proximity of the two countries. This divide is caused by a web of interrelated factors, but which nonetheless can be clustered into three main categories:

- a) the generally **high level of mutual misinformation and misunderstanding** that exists in both societies, which largely results from the current state of poor ties and communication, or in some cases from historically embedded prejudices and misinterpretations;

b) the difference in ethnic attitudes, which results from the different trajectories of social and economic stratification as well as the influence of political legacies and media discourses;

c) the radically different strategic outlook on global affairs, with the strong sentiments of pro-Americanism in Kosovo and anti-Americanism in Greece representing the central cleavage that has ripple effects on all political attitudes, including bilateral relations.

Mutual Misunderstanding and Misinformation

While it does not take more than two hours to drive between the nearest border points of the two countries, travel restrictions and a low degree of economic interactions have created a situation whereby in the mind of most Kosovars, Greece somehow feels like a faraway country. Even the dramatic economic and political developments that have shaken Greece and the global economy over the last couple of years have been generally experienced as global and not regional events. Unlike the case of Albania, which has a vast migrant population in Greece and has strong economic ties to it, in Kosovo the Greek crisis had almost no direct impact in everyday lives.

On the other hand, travel constraints have created a situation in which only a limited number of Kosovars have actually visited Greece and have gained first-hand impressions of the country. The poll highlighted that impressions from such visits are mostly positive, but this is mostly because visitors are middle class tourists who have not experienced, for example, the broad spectrum of challenges and cultural/ethnic frictions that are usually associated with life as migrant workers. This particular dimension of Greek-Albanian relations has been transmitted to Kosovo only through indirect channels, namely through the narrative of Albanians from Albania

The low degree of communication and direct interaction means that public perceptions on Greece and Greeks in Kosovo are largely the product of the discourse produced and disseminated by the media and by political elites. The discourses are in turn heavily influenced by ethnocentric historiography, which generally portrays Greece as a historical archrival of Albanians and as part of an Orthodox-axis of neighbors that share anti-Albanian feelings. The fact that Greece has not recognized Kosovo's independence provides further traction to this schematic argument of traditional alliances, as the largest share of Kosovars (62 per cent) believe that Greece has not recognized Kosovo in order to preserve what is perceived as an alliance with Serbia.

Nevertheless, the data from the poll conducted in Greece demonstrate that this perception held by Kosovars is somewhat simplistic and that it projects the feelings of a smaller part

of Greek society (the more ethnocentric and social conservative) as being dominant and determining the motives behind non-recognition. As such it does not reflect the complex set of motives leading most Greeks – especially the progressive and urban section of society - to object to Kosovo's independence. The greatest number of those who said that they objected to recognition in the Greek poll listed other reasons for their position: implications for Cyprus, precedent in international law, etc. Only 23 per cent outlined the alliance with Serbia as the main argument for non-recognition.

Just like Kosovars seem to misinterpret or simplify the motives of Greeks due to lack of knowledge on the internal dynamics of Greek society, the position of Greeks in relation to Kosovo is also influenced by a cloudy image of what the place called Kosovo is and what it means. This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the Kosovo issue draws little public attention in Greece, and is certainly a subject of much lower importance than Greece's non-recognition is for Kosovars (72 per cent of Kosovars are aware of the non-recognition). The Greek poll shows that most Greeks lack basic information about Kosovo's history or recent important developments: the ethnic composition of the country, the declaration of independence in 2008 and its status in the former Yugoslavia. Survey data confirmed that information is particularly scant among those that were too young when Kosovo was a global headline due to the NATO bombings of Serbia. This lack of essential information influences the current position of many people vis-à-vis the status of Kosovo, as many of those who think that Kosovo's independence should be recognized think that it has a Serb-majority.

Ethnic Attitudes Derived from Historical Legacies

According to the two surveys, Greek and Kosovar societies have divergent levels of acceptance of the ethnic other in different social functions within their societies. One key difference is that Kosovars – regardless of where they stand on the social conservatism/progressivism scale - are much more reserved towards inclusiveness of other ethnicities in, above all, the family domain and, to a lesser extent, in other social functions. This picture extends towards all ethnicities measured in the survey, except the Turks. More specifically, a tiny 1.1 per cent of Kosovars would accept a Greek in the family domain, while 12.2 per cent and 8.8 per cent would accept a Greek as a friend and first neighbor respectively. One in four Kosovars (25.7 per cent) would not accept Greeks as visitors in Kosovo. However, Kosovars tend to accept Greeks in various social functions more than they do Serbs or Roma.

In contrast, Greek society is according to the survey more open towards other ethnicities, including Albanians. 46 per cent of Greeks would accept an Albanian in their family. With the exception of ethnocentric and socially conservative Greeks, Albanians as well as other Balkan ethnicities are generally accepted in most social functions. Only 10 per cent of Greeks would not accept Albanians even as visitors in Greece.

Differences can similarly be observed to the patterns of ethnic perceptions. Kosovars are more open to Greeks than they are to Serbs and Roma, but less open to Greeks than they are to Turks, Bosniacs or Montenegrins. Greeks are generally open towards other ethnicities, such as Albanians, Bulgarians and Slav-Macedonians, but maintain a comparatively more positive attitude towards Serbs. Unsurprisingly, when it comes to ethno-centric and social conservative sections of society the tolerance towards ethnic others is much lower.

Social attitudes towards other ethnicities can in a way serve as a proxy indicator for political closeness or distance. The causality can go both ways and can be cyclical as ethnic perceptions may generate political frictions and vice versa. For the differences in ethnic attitudes detected in the two surveys one can identify several potential explanations, including the different historical trajectories and patterns of social stratification in the two countries.

Greece is the oldest independent state and one of the most economically developed countries in the region, more industrialized and urbanized, with larger and more populous urban centers, including metropolises like Athens and Thessaloniki. The country has a longer history of interaction with other cultures, especially due to its tourism industry and, more recently, inflows of migration. These factors might, among others, explain higher levels of ethnic tolerance and more diversity in terms of ideological viewpoints and social values.

Kosovo on the other hand is one of the smallest countries and economies in the region, characterized by a dense web of small cities, towns and villages. Kosovar society has experienced considerable isolation from the outside world as a result of political turmoil and war and, thus, also persistent lags in social and industrial development. These factors are among those explaining the observably more ideologically homogeneous character of the Kosovar society, especially in terms of the attitudes and beliefs related to the outside world and neighboring ethnicities, whose ambitions are often viewed as threatening and suspicious.

The differences in attitudes between the two countries are surely associated with a number of historical, political and socio-economic factors that could not be fully analyzed through the findings of this report. A comprehensive and scientifically rigorous explanation for different ethnic attitudes would require future research that goes beyond the two surveys implemented in the context of this project. . .

What is important to note, however, is that the varying degrees of openness and/or intolerance at the social domain do not translate into low desires for bilateral cooperation. Kosovars are especially in favor of cooperation in foreign affairs, as only 5 per cent stated that Kosovo should not have good relations with Greece, whereas 95 per cent said that it should have good relations with all countries. In addition, almost half of polled Kosovars said that they would like to visit Greece, mostly for tourism and leisure, indicating a considerable degree of curiosity and openness for communication with Greek culture.


The mindset is similar albeit a bit less enthusiastic in Greece, as 68 per cent of Greeks think that their country should establish good and cooperative relations with Kosovo regardless of the status issue, whereas a smaller yet still considerable section of society - namely 20 per cent (mostly ethno-centric and social-conservative) - said that Greece should develop no relations with Kosovo whatsoever. Overall, the findings of the surveys highlight the need for policies that will increase the level of knowledge and understanding between the two societies and will facilitate the increase of tolerance and openness towards the ethnic other. Greeks and Kosovars, as do the rest of the Balkan nations, cannot afford to maintain high levels of negative perceptions that might become a source of future animosity in an enlarged European Union.

Pro-Americanism and Anti-Americanism as the Key Cleavage

The polling data highlighted that one of the greatest and fundamental differences between Greek and Kosovar societies is the perception on the role of the United States in global affairs. Greek society has been highly skeptical of the active role of the United States ever since the post-Civil War era in the country, and this stream of anti-Americanism finds support both among the anti-globalist left as well as within the ethnocentric and socially conservative right. Kosovo, on the other hand, is one of the most pro-American countries in the world.

This picture is supported by the data from the polls. Fifty per cent of Greeks polled stated that the role of the United States in foreign affairs was “always negative”, and only 2 per cent thought that it was always positive. This skeptical perception of the US was prevalent also during the NATO led bombings of Serbia in 1999, which effectively ended its rule over Kosovo. At the time, an overwhelming majority saw the intervention as being motivated primarily by US geostrategic interests, and not humanitarian purposes related to Kosovo. To this end, it could be stated with a high degree of confidence that one of the key factors influencing the opinion of Greeks on Kosovo’s political status – especially among the Greek left - is the active role of the United States in the affair, or the perception that Kosovo’s independence is a US project.

Kosovo’s pro-Americanism is by and large a product of the events of 1999. Ninety six percent of Kosovars think that Kosovo could not have been liberated from Serbia without this US-led intervention and 60 per cent think that the US did this with the intention of liberating Kosovo, and not for any geo-political strategic interests. This explains why 57 per cent of Kosovars think that the United States of America is Kosovo’s greatest ally, compared to only 35 per cent who chose Albania, even though Kosovo is overwhelmingly ethnically Albanian. The perception on the role of the US in global affairs is the flipside of the one held by Greeks (see Figure below), as most Kosovars (54 per cent) view the US’s role as being “always positive”.



THE ROAD AHEAD



The good news from both polls is that, despite many differences and points of contention between Kosovo and Greece, including the one on Kosovo's political status, the peoples of both countries state that they are in favor of advancing bilateral cooperation. As the findings from the poll indicate, there are as many challenges and obstacles so many entry points or potential that could be used to ameliorate them.

Efforts need to be made to address the sources of misinformation and misunderstanding that currently exist between the two peoples. Visa liberalization for Kosovo will help a great deal in this direction. Kosovars would be able to materialize their great interest in visiting Greece for leisure, whereas business investments in both directions could lead to stronger economic ties and thus towards an increased interest in one another's affairs. The current distant relations between the two countries is unjustifiable having in mind the physical proximity and the many mutual gains from stronger economic and political ties.

Kosovo currently projects the motives and ambitions of the smaller ethnocentric section of Greek society as representing the mainstream of Greek public opinion in relation to Albanians and Kosovo. The recent increase in electoral influence of the Golden Dawn political party in Greece has also played well within the Albanian nationalist narrative, which portrays Greeks as having a hostile and expansionist agenda towards Albanians. Kosovo needs to get to know more of the "other Greece" – the liberal, progressive and tolerant Greece which, even as it objects to Kosovo's independence, does not do so from a standpoint that is ethnically exclusive and is willing to communicate and cooperate.


In Greek public opinion, Kosovo's independence suffers from the stigma of being a US supported project and as such, in more practical terms, as being a product of an injustice towards Serbia under international law, which also automatically inspires parallels with Cyprus. Kosovo needs to communicate the legitimacy and legality of its cause more effectively towards those sections of Greek society that are not prone to an ethnocentric perspective.

In this direction, Kosovo has strong arguments in its favor that will likely appeal to progressive minds: the successful implementation of minority protection mechanisms enshrined in the Ahtisaari settlement; the ruling of the International Court of Justice on the case of Kosovo's declaration of independence which stresses that this move is not a precedent for the Cyprus question; the fact that Kosovo's independence has been recognized by the vast majority of Western states, including 23 out of 28 EU member states and – last but not least; the widely accepted European perspective of Kosovo that will in all certainty progress together with the accession of the rest of the Western Balkans and with the gradual improvement of Kosovo-Serbia relations.




Kosovo’s almost unanimous and homogeneous pro-Americanism is by and large driven by the dominant belief, empirically supported by this survey, that the NATO and US intervention in 1999 was indispensable in the country’s liberation. As illustrated in Figure 15, an overwhelming majority of Kosovars (96.6%) believe that Kosovo could not have been liberated from Serbia had there not been the NATO and US military intervention. Only 2.7% of respondents said that Kosovo could have liberated itself from Serbia on its own.

Figure 15: "Could Kosovo have been liberated without the NATO and US military intervention against Serbia in 1999?"



The pro-Americanism is also explained by the heavily entrenched belief in the pureness of US intentions in relation to Kosovo. As Figure 16 illustrates, 60.2% of survey respondents believe that the US intervened in Kosovo with the sole purpose of liberating it, whereas the remaining 36.7% think that NATO and the US intervened in order to pursue their own geostrategic interests.

The answers to this question are also quite homogeneous across demographic groups, with only modest variance between those with different levels of educational attainment. Those who have completed higher education are only slightly more likely to believe that the US intervened for its own strategic interests (40.5%). On the other hand, the belief that the US intervened in order to liberate Kosovo is highest amongst those who have not completed basic education (73.0%) and those who have only completed primary school (63.2%).



On the other hand, the findings on who Kosovars thought was their greatest enemy are also not surprising, having in mind recent history and current developments. An overwhelming majority of respondents, 98.1%, said that Kosovo’s greatest enemy was Serbia.

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Annex 1: Survey regarding attitudes of the Greek public opinion towards the inhabitants of Kosovo and the issue of its relationships with Greece

PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE – UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA

Survey regarding attitudes of the Greek public opinion towards the inhabitants of Kosovo and the issue of its relationships with Greece

Good morning, afternoon,

We are calling you from the University of Macedonia. The University is conducting a public opinion survey for the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy on the attitudes of the Greek public opinion regarding the inhabitants of Kosovo and the issue of its relationships with Greece. Would you like us to record your opinion?

We kindly inform you that your telephone number has been randomly selected from a list of random numbers and does not appear on our screens. Your opinion will be anonymously recorded and the call will last about ten (10) minutes. We also inform you that the scientific supervisor of the survey is Assistant Professor of the University of Macedonia, Iannis Konstantinidis.

A. Questions Regarding The Level Of Information About Kosovo

1. A significant part of the international interest regarding the Balkans nowadays has to do with Kosovo. Do you know whether Kosovo has declared its independence?

YES. IT HAS	<input type="checkbox"/>
NO, IT HASN'T	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

2. Do you know whether Kosovo, during the period of the Yugoslav federation, was...

A REPUBLIC OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION	<input type="checkbox"/>
AN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT OF SERBIA	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Do you know whether the majority of the inhabitants of Kosovo today are...

OF SERBIAN DESCENT	<input type="checkbox"/>
OF ALBANIAN DESCENT	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

B. Questions On Attitudes Towards Individuals Of Different Origin

4. Some people have a hard time accepting, in their close or wider social environment, individuals of different ethnic origin. Would you accept a person of Turkish origin as **[ANSWERS ARE READ ONE A TIME AND THE QUERY STOPS WITH THE FIRST POSITIVE ANSWER]**

MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR FRIEND	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR NEIGHBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>
A COLLEAGUE AT YOUR WORKPLACE	<input type="checkbox"/>
A CITIZEN OF THE COUNTRY HAVING EQUAL RIGHTS WITH YOURSELF	<input type="checkbox"/>
A VISITOR IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
I WOULD NOT ACCEPT HIS PRESENCE IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. And in the case of a person of Serbian origin? Would you accept him/her as...**[ANSWERS ARE READ ONE A TIME AND THE QUERY STOPS WITH THE FIRST POSITIVE ANSWER]**

MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR FRIEND	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR NEIGHBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>
A COLLEAGUE AT YOUR WORKPLACE	<input type="checkbox"/>
A CITIZEN OF THE COUNTRY HAVING EQUAL RIGHTS WITH YOURSELF	<input type="checkbox"/>
A VISITOR IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
I WOULD NOT ACCEPT HIS PRESENCE IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>

DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>
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6. And in the case of a person of Slavic origin from Skopje (FYROM)? Would you accept him/her as...
[ANSWERS ARE READ ONE A TIME AND THE QUERY STOPS WITH THE FIRST POSITIVE ANSWER]

MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR FRIEND	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR NEIGHBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>
A COLLEAGUE AT YOUR WORKPLACE	<input type="checkbox"/>
A CITIZEN OF THE COUNTRY HAVING EQUAL RIGHTS WITH YOURSELF	<input type="checkbox"/>
A VISITOR IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
I WOULD NOT ACCEPT HIS PRESENCE IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

7. And as a final case, how about a person of Albanian origin? Would you accept him/her as...
[ANSWERS ARE READ ONE A TIME AND THE QUERY STOPS WITH THE FIRST POSITIVE ANSWER]

MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR FRIEND	<input type="checkbox"/>
YOUR NEIGHBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>
A COLLEAGUE AT YOUR WORKPLACE	<input type="checkbox"/>
A CITIZEN OF THE COUNTRY HAVING EQUAL RIGHTS WITH YOURSELF	<input type="checkbox"/>
A VISITOR IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
I WOULD NOT ACCEPT HIS PRESENCE IN GREECE	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

8. Let's assume you are looking for a seasonal employee for your small enterprise. How likely would it be that you hired an Albanian citizen for this position? How likely would it be that you hired a Kosovar citizen for this position?

	Albanian	Kosovar
VERY LIKELY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LIKELY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PROBABLY UNLIKELY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
TOTALLY UNLIKELY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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9. Which status comes **first** to your mind when you hear or read that someone comes from....**[ONLY ONE STATUS IS ELIGIBLE FOR EACH NATIONALITY]**

	worker	criminal	student	tourist	business associate	DON'T KNOW/ DON'T ANSWER
ALBANIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KOSOVO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SKOPJE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SERBIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BULGARIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

C. Questions Regarding Opinion on Relationships of Kosovo With Other Countries

10. Which of the following would you pick as the closest 'friend' of Kosovo? **[ONLY ONE ANSWER]**

ALBANIA	<input type="checkbox"/>
SERBIA	<input type="checkbox"/>
SKOPJE (FYROM)	<input type="checkbox"/>
TURKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>
USA	<input type="checkbox"/>
EUROPEAN UNION	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. Which of the following would you pick as the greatest 'enemy' of Kosovo? **[ONLY ONE ANSWER]**

ALBANIA	<input type="checkbox"/>
SERBIA	<input type="checkbox"/>
SKOPJE (FYROM)	<input type="checkbox"/>
TURKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>

USA	<input type="checkbox"/>
EUROPEAN UNION	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. In reality, Kosovo is a state the independence of which from Serbia has been recognized by the majority of the rest of the states of the European Union apart from Greece and some other countries. Do you believe that Greece... **[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS ELIGIBLE]**

SHOULD RECOGNIZE KOSOVO AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 13
SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE KOSOVO AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 14
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 16

13. Why do you believe that Greece should recognize Kosovo? **[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS ELIGIBLE]**

IN ORDER TO DEVELOP CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS WITH IT	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 16
IN ORDER TO CONFORM WITH THE MAJORITY OF EUROPEAN UNION STATES	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 16
IN ORDER TO AVERT THE INFLUENCE OF TURKEY IN THE REGION	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 16
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO TO QUESTION 16

14. Why do you believe that Greece should not recognize Kosovo? **[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS ELIGIBLE]**

TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONSHIPS WITH SERBIA	<input type="checkbox"/>
TO PREVENT NEGATIVE EFFECTS REGARDING THE ISSUE OF CYPRUS	<input type="checkbox"/>
FOR SOME OTHER REASON	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

15. Which do you believe should the relationships between Greece and Kosovo be? **[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS ELIGIBLE]**

THE BEST POSSIBLE WITHOUT GREECE PROCEEDING TO THE RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO	<input type="checkbox"/>
GREECE SHOULD HAVE NO RELATIONSHIPS WHATSOEVER WITH KOSOVO	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

D. QUESTIONS OF ATTITUDE ON WIDER POLITICAL ISSUES

16. As you may remember, the USA and NATO bombarded targets within Serbia in 1999. Which is your opinion on the 1999 bombings?

THE USA AND NATO INTERVENED TO STOP THE WAR	<input type="checkbox"/>
THE USA AND NATO UPHELD THEIR GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

17. Do you in general believe that the role of the USA in international politics is:

ALWAYS POSITIVE [if asked, they elaborate: THE USA IS THE ONLY POWER WHICH MAY OVERPOWER REGIMES WHICH SET WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY IN DANGER]	<input type="checkbox"/>
SOMETIMES POSITIVE AND SOMETIMES NEGATIVE	<input type="checkbox"/>
ALWAYS NEGATIVE [if asked, they elaborate: THE USA IS THE ONLY POWER WHICH SYSTEMATICALLY BYPASSES INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ORDER TO SUPPORT ITS OWN INTERESTS]	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

18. Some people perceive their national culture as superior and have a hard time accepting habits and values of other cultures, while others perceive human culture as uniform and adapt easily to habits and values of other cultures. If the former opinion reflects position 1 on a 7-point scale and the latter opinion reflects position 7, where would you position your own opinion?

Our national culture is superior and I have a hard time accepting habits and values of other cultures						Human culture is indivisible and I adapt easily to habits and values of other cultures
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

19. Some people argue that the state should fundamentally intervene in the national economy in order to achieve equal distribution of incomes, while others argue that the state should not intervene at all in the national economy so as to allow individuals to achieve their economic goals on their own. If the former opinion reflects position 1 on a 7-point scale and the latter opinion reflects position 7, where would you position your own opinion?

The state should fundamentally intervene in the national economy						The state should not intervene at all in the national economy
--	--	--	--	--	--	---

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

20. Some people argue that individuals should totally submit to the traditional and dominant values of society, while others argue that individuals should be free to choose their own personal values, **even if they deviate** from the dominant ones. If the former opinion reflects position 1 on a 7-point scale and the latter opinion reflects position 7, where would you position your own opinion?

Individuals should totally submit to traditional and dominant values of society						Individuals should be free to choose their own personal values, even if they deviate from the dominant ones
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

E. Demographics

1. Age

18-24	<input type="checkbox"/>
25-34	<input type="checkbox"/>
35-44	<input type="checkbox"/>
45-54	<input type="checkbox"/>
55-64	<input type="checkbox"/>
65+	<input type="checkbox"/>

Sex

Man ☐

Woman ☐

2. Educational level

HOLDING NO EDUCATIONAL CERTIFICATE	<input type="checkbox"/>
9-YEAR MANDATORY EDUCATION GRADUATE	<input type="checkbox"/>
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	<input type="checkbox"/>
IEK GRADUATE or TECHNICAL or PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL	<input type="checkbox"/>
UNIVERSITY GRADUATE	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Occupational status

FARMER	<input type="checkbox"/>
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SELF-EMPLOYED SCIENTIST	<input type="checkbox"/>
ENTREPRENEUR or MERCHANT	<input type="checkbox"/>
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE	<input type="checkbox"/>
PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEE	<input type="checkbox"/>
PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONER	<input type="checkbox"/>
PRIVATE SECTOR PENSIONER	<input type="checkbox"/>
STUDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOUSEWIFE	<input type="checkbox"/>
UNEMPLOYED	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. Place of residence

ATTICA	<input type="checkbox"/>
THESSALONIKI	<input type="checkbox"/>
CITY OVER 20000 INHABITANTS	<input type="checkbox"/>
CITY or TOWN UNDER 20000 INHABITANTS	<input type="checkbox"/>
DON'T KNOW/DON'T ANSWER	<input type="checkbox"/>

Annex 2: Survey regarding attitudes of the Kosovar public opinion towards the inhabitants of Greece and region and the issue of its relationships with Kosovo

Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi” Prishtina

A. QUESTIONS REGARDING LEVEL OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE REGION

1. ARE YOU INTERESTED IN AND DO YOU HAVE SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE FOR PEOPLE IN THE BALKANS REGION?

☐ 1 YES ☐ 2 NO ☐ 99 don't know/Ref/ NA

2. HAVE YOU EVER VISITED ANY STATE OF THE REGION AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE

☐ 1. Greece ☐ a. Vacation ☐ b. Tourist Visit ☐ c. Shopping ☐ d. Business
☐ Family visit ☐ 2. Albania ☐ a. Vacation ☐ b. Tourist Visit ☐ c. Shopping
☐ d. Business ☐ Family visit

☐ 3. Turkey ☐ a. Vacation ☐ b. Tourist Visit ☐ c. Shopping ☐ d. Business
☐ Family visit

☐ 4. F. Yugoslavia ☐ a. Vacation ☐ b. Tourist Visit ☐ c. Shopping ☐ d. Business
☐ Family visit

☐ 5. Bulgaria ☐ a. Vacation ☐ b. Tourist Visit ☐ c. Shopping ☐ d. Business
☐ Family visit

☐ 6. None

☐ 99. Ref / NA

3. [IF YOU HAVE VISITED GREECE]: YOU MENTIONED GREECE, WHAT WERE YOUR IMPRESSION OF THIS COUNTRY?

☐ 1 very good ☐ 2 good ☐ 3 so and so ☐ 4 bad ☐ 5 very bad ☐ 99 Ref /pp

4. WHICH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION YOU HAVEN'T BEEN TO, BUT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT

THEM? WHAT WOULD BE the purpose?

1. for pleasure and tourism ☐ 1 Greece ☐ 2 Turkey ☐ 3 other ☐ 4 NONE ☐ 99 DK/DA
2. for shopping ☐ 1 Greece ☐ 2 Turkey ☐ 3 other ☐ 4 NONE ☐ 99 DK/DA
3. for business or employment ☐ 1 Greece ☐ 2 Turkey ☐ 3 other ☐ 4 NONE ☐ 99 DK/DA

B. WE ARE INTERESTED ON YOUR PERSONAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC ORIGIN, LIVING IN OUR REGION. [Read question in the rows and stop at the positive answer]

[illegible]

5. WHAT COMES FIRST TO YOUR MIND WHEN YOU HEAR OR READ THAT SOMEONE CAME TO KOSOVO FROM REGIONAL COUNTRIES (ONLY ONE STATUS IS ELIGIBLE FOR EACH NATIONALITY), THAT HE/SHE SHOULD BE

[illegible]

C. **QUESTIONS REGARDING OPINION ON RELATIONSHIPS OF KOSOVO
WITH OTHER REGIONAL COUNTRIES**

6. DO YOU KNOW WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES IN THE REGION HAVE NOT
RECOGNIZED THE STATE OF KOSOVO YET

1. Greece	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Rumania	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. wrong answer	<input type="checkbox"/>
99. don't know / NA	<input type="checkbox"/>

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES THAT I WILL READ OUT WOULD YOU PICK AS THE
CLOSEST “FRIEND” OF KOSOVO? (**ONLY ONE ANSWER**)

7.

1. Albania	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Serbia	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Macedonia	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. USA	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. EU	<input type="checkbox"/>
99. DK/ref/DA	<input type="checkbox"/>

8. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES THAT I WILL READ OUT WOULD YOU PICK AS THE BIGGEST “ENEMY” OF KOSOVO? (**ONLY ONE ANSWER**)

1. Albania	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Serbia	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Macedonia	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. USA	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. EU	<input type="checkbox"/>
99. DK/ref/DA	<input type="checkbox"/>

SINCE THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IT WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT RECOGNIZE KOSOVO?

8. ☐ 1. YES ☐ 2. NO ☐ 99. DK/ref/DA

9. WHAT ABOUT GREECE, HOW DO YOU THINK THIS STATE WILL RESPOND TOWARDS KOSOVO?

1. It will recognize the independence of Kosovo	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 19
2. It will not recognize the independence of Kosovo	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 20
99. DK/ref/DA	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 21

10. WHY DO YOU THINK GREECE WILL RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO? [Only one answer]

1. 1. in order to develop closer relationships with it	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 21
2. 2. in order to conform with the majority of European union states	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 21
3. To reduce Turkey's influence	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 21
99. DK/REF/DA	<input type="checkbox"/>	GO to question 21

11. WHY DO YOU THINK GREECE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO? [ONLY ONE ANSWER]

1. to maintain good relationships with Serbia	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. to prevent negative effects regarding the Cyprus issue	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. for some other reason	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. DK/ref/DA

☐

12. WHICH DO YOU BELIEVE SHOULD THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GREECE AND KOSOVO BE?

[Only one answer is eligible]

1. Kosovo must develop good relations with all neighboring countries, including Greece	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Kosovo should not develop good relations with Greece	<input type="checkbox"/>
99. DK/ref/DA	<input type="checkbox"/>

D. QUESTIONS REGARDING GENERAL ISSUES

13. COULD KOSOVO BE LIBERATED WITHOUT SUPPORT OF NATO AND USA, WHO BOMBED SERBIA IN 1999?

☐ 1. YES☐ 2. NO☐ 99. DK/ref/DA

14. DID THE USA AND NATO BOMB SERBIA TO STOP THE WAR AND HELP KOSOVARS OR TO ADVANCE THEIR GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS? [Only one answer is eligible]

1. The USA and NATO intervened to liberate Kosovo	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The USA and NATO upheld their strategic interests	<input type="checkbox"/>
99. DK/ref/DA	<input type="checkbox"/>

15. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE ROLE OF THE US IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IS:

☐ 1. ALWAYS POSITIVE☐ 2. SOMETIMES POSITIVE, SOMETIMES NEGATIVE☐ 3. ALWAYS NEGATIVE☐ 99. DK/ref/DA

16. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR CULTURE AND NATIONAL VALUES AND OTHER NATIONS' CULTURE AND VALUES. SHOULD WE APPRECIATE ONLY OUR CULTURE AND VALUES OR SHOULD WE BE OPEN TO THE INFLUENCES OF OTHER CULTURES AND VALUES? POSITION YOUR OPINION IN 1-7 POINT SCALE, WHERE 1 NOTES THAT YOU APPRECIATE ONLY YOUR OWN CULTURE AND VALUES WITHOUT BEING INFLUENCED BY OTHER CULTURES, WHILE 7 MEANS THAT YOU ARE COMPLETELY OPEN TO INFLUENCES

[Only one answer is eligible]

<u>1. Our national culture is superior and I am not affected by other cultures</u>						<u>7. I am open other cultures' influence and values</u>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

17. HOW DO YOU ASSESS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND ECONOMY? SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN ORDER TO ENSURE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES, OR SHOULD THE STATE NOT INTERVENE AT ALL IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS THAT INVEST HAVE THE RIGHT TO EARN MORE THAN THOSE WHO DID NOT INVEST. POSITION YOUR OPINION IN 1-7 POINT SCALE, WHERE 1 NOTES THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF STATE TO INTERVENE IN NATIONAL ECONOMY, AND 7 MEANS THAT THE STATE SHOULD NOT INTERVENE AT ALL IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

<u>1. The state should intervene in the national economy</u>						<u>7. The state should not intervene at all in the national economy</u>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18. OUR SOCIETY HAS SOME TRADITIONAL VALUES THAT PREDOMINATE AND REQUIRE INDIVIDUALS TO SUBJECT TO THOSE VALUES. BUT THERE ARE ALSO INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO TRADITION BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN VALUES EVEN WHEN THEY ARE NOT IN LINE WITH THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY. POSITION YOUR OPINION ON A 1-7 POINT SCALE, WHERE 1 MEANS RESPECTING TRADITIONAL VALUES, AND 7 MEANS THAT YOU FULLY BELIEVE IN THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS TO RELY ON HIS/HER PERSONAL VALUES

<u>1. Individuals should subject to traditional and dominant values of society</u>						<u>7. Individuals should be free to choose their own personal values, even if they are not in line with the dominant ones</u>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

