

The Greek Public Opinion towards Albania and the Albanians

Social attitudes and perceptions

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ABOUT THE SOUTH-EAST EUROPE PROGRAMME

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PREFACE

ELIAMEP's South-East Europe Programme and the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) have teamed up to implement the first ever joint effort for a comprehensive study of the status of relations between Greece and Albania. The first step in this collaborative effort was to scientifically map the attitudes and perceptions that the two societies hold for one another through the first ever parallel opinion polls conducted in the two countries. The opinion polls were made possible through the generous financial support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The funding for opinion poll in Greece was implemented in the context of the FES-funded project «Promoting the Western Balkan accession process in the context of the Greek EU Presidency».

The two opinion polls were conducted in Albania by the AIIS in April 2013 and in Greece by Public Issue, a prominent polling agency commissioned by ELIAMEP, in November 2013. The two polls are largely comparable. The questionnaires of both polls emanate from a common pool of questions. However, each side had the opportunity (and used it) to adjust questions in order to make them more relevant for the particular public as well as to add questions in order to collect more data and insights useful for analysis. The findings of the two polls were analysed separately by the two partner institutes and published in separate English-language reports in December 2013. The present report presents the findings of the poll conducted by Public Issue in Greece. However, for a comprehensive understanding of the reader is urged to read this report in conjunction with the AIIS report entitled «Albania and Greece: popular perceptions on bilateral relations», which analyses the findings of the poll conducted in Albania.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In what follows we briefly present the most important findings by chapter:

Chapter I: «Perceptions of influence and threat»

The Greek public opinion overwhelmingly believes that either Germany or the US are exert influence on the Greek governments. In contrast, two thirds of Greeks consider some third country to be a threat to Greece. Among these, the vast majority view as threats either Turkey (primarily) or Germany (secondarily). The vast majority of Greeks do not feel threatened by any other Balkan neighbouring country, including Albania.

Greeks assign rather limited importance to their country's relations with neighbouring countries, likely due to the salience of domestic issues over foreign policy in recent years. Relations with Serbia, Turkey and Bulgaria are considered more important compared to relations with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Compared to before fifteen years, the importance assigned to relations with Albania is on the rise (doubled), although it still remains rather limited. With regards to the sub-groups in the population, only the self-identification in the Left/Right scale and the level of education seem to be important parameters that influence the importance that relations to Albania is given.

Chapter II: «Perceptions and attitudes towards bilateral relations between Greece and Albania»

About half of the Greek public opinion views current relations with Albania as neither good or bad, while one third consider them as good. Young, those affiliated with the Centre-Right and the Centre-Left and the cosmopolitans are the groups who view most positively the current state of relations between the two countries. Four in ten respondents expect that the relations will remain at the same situation in the next five years, while one third expects that they will improve.

For the Greek public opinion, by far the most important problem that influences relations between Greece and Albania is immigration; overall, four out of ten (41%) Greeks consider some aspect of immigration to be the main issue influencing bilateral relations. Women, young between 18-34 years of age, the unemployed, housewives, residents in rural and semi-urban areas, and those affiliated with the Right are among those who view the presence of Albanian immigrants in Greece as a problem. Much less salient are issues related to Albanian nationalism (fears of greater Albania, the Cham question) at 15% and concerns over the Greek presence in Albania (Greek minority, Orthodox Church) at 11%.

With regards to the Cham issue, about six out of ten (58%) of respondents have some degree of awareness of the issue. Men, higher education graduates, older people, public sector employees and pensioners and those ideologically associated with the Left are more aware of the Cham issue. Among these who have awareness, the

overwhelming majority of respondents (83%) consider that the fact that Albanian governments raise the property issue is an obstacle to the development of relations between the two countries.

Orthodox Archbishop of Albania Anastasios is very popular among Greek respondents. He's especially popular among men, primary and higher education graduates, age groups 55+, pensioners and those affiliated to the Centre-Right and the Centre. The survey questions on social perceptions on relations between Greece and Albania present a mixed picture. Nine out of ten (88%) respondents believe that Greece has helped Albania in the last twenty years and six out of ten (58%) that the Greek government has assisted Albania in its EU accession process. 32% of respondents believe that Greeks do not want Albania to become a member of the EU, while 56% disagree with that statement. Most Greeks are negative towards the Albanian government policies towards the Greek minority in Albania with 65% believing that the minority's rights are violated. Public opinion is split on the question of whether the Albanian immigrants have helped Greece's economic growth (46% disagree, 51% agree). However, two thirds of Greeks do not consider the Albanian immigrants as a threat to Greece, while, in contrast, one third do believe that they represent a threat to Greece. On this question, there is a 32% difference between those affiliated to the Left, who have the lowest levels of threat perception by Albanian immigrants, and those affiliated to the Right, who see perceive that threat the most.

Chapter III: "Perceptions and attitudes towards bilateral economic relations between Greece and Albania"

Two thirds (66%) of the respondents of the Greek poll believe that Albania benefits more from the economic relations between the two countries, while 29% believe that both countries benefit equally. Interestingly, only a tiny fraction (2%) of the respondents believe that Greece benefits more. Only 28% of the respondents are aware of specific Greek investments in Albania. The public opinion is split with regards to whether the economic crisis in Greece will have a negative impact on Greek investment in Albania. In contrast, the vast majority of Greeks believe that the economic crisis has/will have an impact on the number of Albanian immigrants in Greece; more specifically, 67% believe that their number will decrease as a result of the crisis, while another 21% believe that that number has already decreased.

Chapter IV: "Attitudes towards 'Others' – social relations between Greeks and Albanians"

The poll asked respondents to assess relations between Greeks and Albanian immigrants in Greece. 46% of respondents consider these relations to be good, while 42% to be neither good nor bad; only one in ten (11%) respondents view relations as bad. These evaluations are based on direct experience, given the fact that 95% of respondents state that they have personally met Albanians. Much more limited is the direct experience of Albania itself, since only 8% of respondents state that they have visited the country.

Chapter V: “Scale of attitudes towards Albania and the Albanians”

Based on a scale specifically devised for this survey as well as the corroboration through the use of statistical research techniques, we can draw conclusions regarding the overall level of attitudes towards Albania and the Albanians. The Greek public opinion appears split in its attitudes. A slight majority (54%) of respondents in the poll have generally positive attitude; this breaks down in 30% having ‘positive attitude’ and 24% having ‘purely positive attitude’. In contrast, out of a total of 47%, 26% have ‘negative attitude’ and 21% ‘purely negative attitude’ towards Albania and the Albanians. The highest percentages of ‘purely positive attitudes’ can be found among those affiliated to the Left (38%), graduates of higher education (35%), and ‘cosmopolitans’ (35%). The highest percentages of ‘purely negative’ attitudes can be found among those affiliated to the Right (36%), graduates of elementary schools (31%), housewives (31%), unemployed (25%) and the ‘ethnocentrics’ (39%). Overall, statistical corroboration demonstrates that the biggest factors determining attitudes towards Albanians are (primarily) ideological self-identification and (secondarily) the level of education.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of the study

It is difficult to over-estimate the importance that relations between Albania and Greece hold for both countries. The two nations are bound by geography, history and culture. With the end of the isolationist Communist regime in Albania the two countries' relations intensified at all levels. Strong political, economic and social links were established in the 1990s. Cardinal among the new dimensions of Greek-Albanian relations that emerged in the post-Cold War period were on the one hand the initially disorderly influx of Albanian immigrants in Greece and on the other the intensified economic relations and the Greek investment in Albania. While both of these developments increased the level of knowledge of one nation for the other and the interaction between the two countries, they also produced new bilateral disputes and concerns for one another. In addition, older problems, such as the rights of the Greek minority in Albania, continued to be a concern for both sides and to aggravate diplomatic relations in a period when newly found openness and contact could have brought the countries much closer. Thus, both bilateral political relations between the two countries and the social relations between the two nations throughout the post-Cold War period remained ambivalent. Relations were often marred by old and new problems, social stereotypes and nationalistic trends, conflicting interests and political inconsistencies. At the same time, several mini-crises, diplomatic incidents and the negative role of media frequently aggravated the existing negative legacies in bilateral relations.

In recent years, the problematic aspects in bilateral relations appear diluted. Relations between the two countries somewhat improved already after the mid-1990s. In addition, in the 1990s, after several years of uninspired and, often, narrow-minded policies towards its Balkan neighbours, the Greek diplomacy initiated a promising new policy of engagement with South-East Europe. Greece became the vanguard of the Western strategy of gradual incorporation of the entire Balkan region to the European Union. Greece also initiated an ambitious programme of economic aid to Balkan countries aiming to promote mutual gain and trust through enhanced economic cooperation. Albania was a key component in both of these strategic policy directions in the Balkans.

However, the legacy of the problematic past was not really erased. Disputes and problematic aspects in relations between Greece and Albania remain in place and capable to create tensions if brought back to the forefront at any given moment. Populistic media frenzy in each country frequently finds an easy target in the other country. Several recent examples of the still problematic bilateral relations can be mentioned here: the collapse of the agreement between the two countries over the delimitation of the maritime zones; the central role that hostility towards Greece holds in the nationalistic discourse of new political actors in Albania, such as the Red and Black Alliance; the racist extremism of Golden Dawn directed against all foreigners, including the well-integrated Albanian immigrants, to name but a few. Concerns and complaints over the role of Albanian immigrants in Greece and the Greek minority in Albania persist. The two countries and societies, albeit inextricably linked like very few others in Europe, remain locked in mutual suspicion. It is clear, however, that improving bilateral relations, resolving disputes, removing the element of suspicion and strengthening political, societal and economic collaboration are imperatives for both countries. If they are to progress politically and economically the two countries would better collaborate more.

We believe that the present study contributes valuable poll data that will assist the two countries in their endeavour to deal with these long-standing challenges. In addition, the Greek poll has its own 'stand-alone'

importance. It focuses on issues that are rarely studied through opinion polls in Greece, namely foreign policy questions or the *εθνικά θέματα* as they are often referred to in Greek. What became clear when preparing for the conduct of the poll was the lack of noteworthy comparative data. Public Issue, our partner polling-agency for this project, despite its long experience in conducting opinion polls in Greece, has identified only a limited number of data that could be used for comparative purposes. The lack of polls focusing on foreign policy issues in Greece is more than evident. The present study will by itself do little to fill this important gap in our scientific understanding of foreign policy. It may also contribute only a fraction of the data that a modern diplomacy can use for a comprehensive analysis of the policy environment. We do hope, however, that this project will generate debate over the need for a more systematic use of modern social scientific tools for both the scholarly research on foreign policy and the necessary analysis in support of diplomacy.

The domestic and regional political context

It's impossible to understand Greece's current political situation outside the deep economic crisis that has engulfed the country since 2009. The crisis, and the subsequent bail-out agreements conditioned on painful reforms, has had far reaching effects at all levels of the Greece's contemporary reality. The economic crisis has had dire consequences at the social level with fast deterioration of the standards of living for large parts of the population and the increase of poverty levels. The direct and most obvious effect of the crisis has been the near collapse of the traditional party landscape in Greece - PASOK losing more than 30 percentage points to near extinction in less than three years and the unprecedented weakening of the New Democracy. It also had as an effect the emergence of a new and radically different political situation - the pro-bail-out governmental coalition of former enemies New Democracy and PASOK, radical left SYRIZA coalition becoming the main opposition party, the success of extremist neo-Nazi Golden Dawn et.al. Social radicalization is spreading, as is most evident in the apparent persistence, or even spread, of Golden Dawn's influence in the face of revelations over its criminal activities, including racist anti-immigrant attacks. Among the side-effects of the crisis have also been the manifest change in social values with the weakening of post-materialist concerns over more urgent and immediate material needs. Moreover, there is a self-evident dramatic decrease of awareness and interest in traditional foreign policy issues, while there is more interest in bilateral relations with key European partners due to the 'diplomacy of the bail-outs' and the growing involvement of countries like Germany in public policy making in Greece.

The domestic political situation in Albania is also transitory. The Albanian state celebrated in 2012 its 100th anniversary. However, despite the jubilation, recent years have clearly demonstrated many of the weaknesses that keep Albania from realizing its potential. Inter-party competition has escalated tensions to high that the country hasn't seen since the traumatic 1997. In addition, rising nationalistic trends spread and the nation saw the emergence of new and the strengthening of old nationalist political forces and civil society groups. More worrying still, was the blatant flirtation of top political figures with nationalistic rhetoric, most notoriously by former president Berisha, an act that prompted the barely concealed condemnation by Albania's key ally, the United States. After four years of political turmoil that stalled reforms and the EU accession process, Albania has turned the page in the May 2013 elections.¹ The new government led by the Socialist Party promises to deliver on the reforms required for the country to move faster in its EU accession process but also to offer a spirit of optimism that will create a social and political momentum for genuine change in the country. These are of

¹ See the various reports of the Albanian Elections Observatory of ELIAMEP's South-East Europe Programme at <http://www.eliamep.gr/en/category/security-regional-developments/πρόγραμμα-νοτιοανατολικής-ευρώπης/>.

course noteworthy challenges. Above all, as many officials in high position admit in private,² Albania's biggest challenge will be to deal with its 'bad image' in Western Europe. In the increasingly populist and xenophobic EU societies the image of Albania as a country of weak state institutions and failing rule of law may prove the biggest obstacle to its accession prospects. In that context, and given the rising anti-EU and anti-enlargement sentiments in Western Europe, Greece may prove one of the few genuine supporters of Albania's fast EU accession process. The two countries have incentives to work on addressing the problems that cloud bilateral relations and to strengthen their political and diplomatic links.

The regional political context in South-East Europe has significantly improved since the turbulent 1990s and remains relatively stable despite the occasional domestic political and diplomatic flare-ups. The region is in the process of a prolonged and painful process of stabilization and peace consolidation. The strategy of the international community has for more than a decade now entailed the promise of inclusion to key Western institutions for all countries of the region. Six years after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, Croatia became in 2013 the first country involved in the Balkan wars of the 1990s to have entered the European Union. The remaining Western Balkan states are in various phases of the standard EU accession path with the frontrunner being Montenegro that has recently opened accession negotiations. Serbia and Albania expect to move to their respective next phases (accession negotiations and candidate status respectively) in 2014. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has repeatedly received the Commission's recommendation for starting accession negotiations but is yet to resolve disputes with Greece and Bulgaria in order to get the green light from the European Council. Bosnia and Herzegovina's reform process is particularly slow and the country is not yet ready for submitting membership application. Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, is in the process of preparation for signing its own Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Commission. Most of the countries of the region have joined NATO (most recently Croatia and Albania). The remaining non-members, with the exception of Serbia who has not to date expressed interest in joining the Alliance, are in various phases of the accession process.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn by the above brief expose is that South-East Europe, the epicenter of turmoil and war in the 1990s, is in a steady process of stabilization. However, the international community is advised not to relax its efforts till all the countries are safely put to the path of peace and prosperity. Inter-ethnic tensions and problems in the functioning of democracy in FYROM, the constitutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the difficulties of integrating Serb-majority municipalities in the Kosovar polity, persistent problems of corruption in Montenegro, the social turmoil in Bulgaria, the re-emergence of nationalistic and anti-liberal trends in Croatia, the continuing dispute between FYROM and Greece over the use of the term 'Macedonia', concerns over the protection of human rights everywhere in the region are only few examples of worrying signs that require sustained effort by both the countries themselves and the EU.

In that context, we believe that think tanks and research institutes have a vital role to play in the process of stabilization, peace-building and consolidation of democracy. This role is twofold. Firstly, they have the responsibility to maintain the labour to resolve the remaining problems of the region high on the agenda of domestic and international policy makers. This is nowadays an uphill battle given the economic crisis, the introversion and the populist tendencies evident in virtually all European societies. Secondly, think tanks and research centres should also strive for a comprehensive and scientifically solid analysis that will assist those

² South-East Europe Programme's interviews in the European Commission, Brussels, November 2013.

political forces that remain immune to the virus of nationalism and populism in Europe. We are confident that the joint problem between AIIS and ELIAMEP is in tune with both of these important functions.

Research design - Methodology - Conceptual issues

Basic Data of the Opinion Poll

The nation-wide poll was conducted by the polling agency Public Issue with the use of structured questionnaires in telephone interviews with respondents in their households. The sample size of the poll was 1,012 individuals 18 and older representative of the general population. The sample was drawn through the technique of multistage stratified random sampling. The margin of error is estimated at +/- 3.2%. Twenty-nine researchers and three supervisors were engaged in the conduct of the poll. The poll was conducted between 11-14 November 2013, a period that was neutral with regards to the investigated topics.

Demographic Composition of the Sample

GENDER

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	492	48,6	48,6	48,6
	Female	520	51,4	51,4	100,0
	Total	1012	100,0	100,0	

AGE GROUPS I

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-24	30	3,0	3,0	3,0
	25-34	92	9,1	9,1	12,1
	35-44	197	19,5	19,5	31,6
	45-54	233	23,0	23,0	54,6
	55-64	205	20,3	20,3	74,9
	65 +	254	25,1	25,1	100,0
	Total	1011	99,9	100,0	
Missing	System	1	,1		
Total		1012	100,0		

AGE GROUPS II

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-34	122	12,1	12,1	12,1
	35-54	430	42,5	42,5	54,6
	55 +	459	45,4	45,4	100,0
	Total	1011	99,9	100,0	
Missing	System	1	,1		
Total		1012	100,0		

LEVEL OF EDUCATION

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Lower (Primary)	133	13,1	13,1	13,1
	Middle (Secondary)	485	47,9	47,9	61,1
	Higher (University)	391	38,6	38,6	99,7
	DA	3	,3	,3	100,0
	Total	1012	100,0	100,0	

EMPLOYMENT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employers – Self-employed	147	14,5	14,5	14,5
	Employees Public Sector	95	9,4	9,4	23,9
	Employees Private Sector	130	12,8	12,8	36,8
	Unemployed	154	15,2	15,2	52,0
	Retirees	356	35,2	35,2	87,2
	Housewives	108	10,7	10,7	97,8
	Students	14	1,4	1,4	99,2
	Other/DA	8	,8	,8	100,0
	Total	1012	100,0	100,0	

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE/INACTIVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Active	377	37,3	37,3	37,3
	Unemployed	154	15,2	15,2	52,5
	Inactive	481	47,5	47,5	100,0
	Total	1012	100,0	100,0	

The Cosmopolitanism Scale³

For more adequately investigating the questions at hand, as part of this report the polling agency Public Issue has devised a cosmopolitanism scale in use specifically for elucidating the Greek society's attitudes towards Albanians. In what follows in this introductory section, we demonstrate the academic rationale and conceptual framework of the cosmopolitanism scale that was used by Public Issue in this study. The findings of the poll based on this 'tailor-made' scale are presented in detail in various points in the main body of this report. The figures that accompany this conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism are presented in Appendix I.

Academic rationale

The classification of the population in 'cosmopolitan' and 'ethnocentric' respondents reveals substantial differences in the thinking and behaviour of individuals. According to scholars Merton and Gouldner 'cosmopolitans' are more receptive to new experiences, judge other cultures more objectively, and adjust better to foreign environments. In contrast, the 'ethnocentric' are reluctant towards change and tend to evaluate the rules and values of other societies by the standards of their own culture.⁴ Similar scales were initially used to investigate consumer behaviour, but, because of their usefulness, they were quickly adopted by other social science disciplines as well. This cosmopolitanism scale was devised by Cannon, Yoon, McGowan and Yaprak 1994, in order to distinguish the personality traits of the world consumer.⁵ The scale was then applied by Yoon et al. (1996) in research on Koreans consumers, and was confirmed as reliable.⁶

Devising the scale

The **cosmopolitanism-ethnocentrism** scale used in this survey consists of three (3) variables (statement questions), which are measured on a 5-point Likert-style, from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to 'I certainly agree'

³ Our special thanks to the polling agency Public Issue for conceptualising and implementing this section of the study.

⁴ For more information regarding cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, see, for example, Merton R. (1957), "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials", *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York: The Free Press, pp. 387-420; Gouldner A. (1957), "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2, pp. 281-306.

⁵ Cannon H., Yoon S., McGowan L. and Yaprak A. (1994), "In Search of the Global Consumer", Paper presented to the 1994 Annual Conference of the Academy of International Business.

⁶ Yoon S., Cannon H. and Yaprak A. (1996), "Evaluating the CYMYC cosmopolitanism scale on Korean consumers", *Advances in International Marketing*, Vol. 7, pp. 211-232.

and 5 to 'I certainly disagree'.⁷ The consistency of the scale is considered satisfactory, with a reliability of Cronbach's Alpha= ,566. The scale was devised in order to measure the degree of extroversion/introversion of Greek society towards the outside world – in other words, contact with other peoples and willingness to become acquainted with foreign cultures.

The survey shows that the vast majority of Greeks (95%) believes it is important to get news and information from around the world,⁸ as well as socialize with people from different cultures (80%). However, the percentages for the possibility to travel to foreign countries for long periods of time (64%) or live in different cultural environments than their native one (37%) are smaller (**Figure 47 in Appendix I**). Combining the values of the three selected variables, it can be concluded that about 1 in 3 Greeks (35%) can be classified in the category of 'ethnocentric', while 2 out of 3 Greeks (66%) in the "cosmopolitans" (**Figure 48 in Appendix I**).

In this way, the degree by which respondents are geared towards the global society, or instead assign more importance to the local community, was measured. 'Cosmopolitans' are those who like to travel to foreign countries for longer periods, live in different cultural environments, and socialize with people from other cultures. In contrast, the 'ethnocentric' tend to live and operate in their environment and socialize with their co-nationals.

Who are the «Cosmopolitans» (Social characteristics)

People most likely to live in different environments are 18-34 years old (44%, versus 31% for ages 55 years and older), university graduates (43%, versus 33% for secondary and 35% primary education graduates respectively), unemployed (45%) and respondents ideologically close to the Left (54%, versus. 27% for those close to the Right). Pensioners (55%) and housewives (50%) are the most reluctant to live in a different cultural environment (**Figures 49-51 in Appendix I**).

When it comes to respondents who prefer to socialize with people from different cultures, those are mainly young people aged 18-34 (86%, versus 76% of people 55 years and older), graduates of higher education (85%, versus 80% and 71% of graduates of secondary and primary education respectively), unemployed (87%), employees in the private sector (84%) and those ideologically close to the Left (91%, versus 68% to the Right) (**Figures 49-51 Appendix I**).

With regards to travel, the age group 35-44 (69%), university graduates (66%, versus 64% and 52% of graduates of secondary and primary respectively), private sector employees (73%) and those ideologically close to the Left (76%, versus 48% of those affiliated to the Right) are the ones who mainly prefer to travel to foreign countries for extended periods of time (**Figures 49-51 in Appendix I**).

Although percentages of Greek citizens who consider important to have news and information from around the world are high for all groups, there is a slight difference in gender (97% men versus 93% women) and age (93% for the group 18-34, 94% for the group 35-54, 97% for 55+). Finally, the highest percentages of 'pure cosmopolitans'

⁷ For more information on the Likert attitudes' measuring scales, see Μιχαλοπούλου Κ. (1992), Κλίμακες μετρήσεως στάσεων, Αθήνα: Οδυσσέας.

⁸ Due to the uniformly high percentages observed, and as a result its low explanatory capacity, this variable was eventually not included in the scale.

are found mainly among young people aged 18-34 (45%, versus 28% of people 55 years and older), graduates with higher education (46%, versus 32% and 28% of secondary and primary education graduates respectively), the economically active (44%, versus 30% of the economically inactive) and respondents ideologically close to the Left (58%, versus 23% those close to the Right).

The Scale of Attitudes towards Albania and Albanians⁹

To assess quantitatively and in a comprehensive manner the attitudes of the Greek public opinion towards Albania and Albanians the polling agency Public Issue devised a distinct scale and adopted additional techniques of analysis. We have used a four-point scale 'purely negative (--) / purely positive (++)' attitudes (**Figure 52 in Appendix II**). For devising this scale the following three categories of variables were selected as most adequate to express the issues in question: i) Assigning great importance to bilateral relations with Albania (positions 7 to 10 in the 10-point scale), ii) Percentage of agreement with the statement «The Albanian immigrants have contributed to the economic development/growth of Greece» και iii) Percentage of agreement with the statement «The Albanian immigrants in Greece do not pose a threat to Greece». The coherence (συνοχή) of the scale is evaluated as largely satisfactory, with reliability level (μέτρο) Cronbach's Alpha = ,563. The conclusions from this analysis are presented in Chapter V of this report.

Moreover, for reviewing the above findings and identifying *the factors that are statistically more significant* for determining social attitudes towards Albania and Albanians we segmented the surveyed population in relation to the categories of the 4-point attitudes' scale. To that end, the CHAID method was used and the results of the segmentation are presented in **Figure 57 (Appendix II)**. The CHAID (Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector) method is a technique for constructing a decision tree for the purpose of predicting, classifying data and detecting the inter-action among variables. Following this technique, the population is divided into separate segments on the basis of the dependent variable (the attitudes' scale). The findings from this test case are also presented in Chapter V of this report.

Finally, Correspondence Analysis was used for the clearer detection of the relationship between variables identified (see more below) and the scale of attitudes towards Albania and Albanians. This technique of Correspondence Analysis allows for exploring the relationship between two categorical variables. Using Correspondence Analysis a multilevel graph for the correspondence of categories of relevant variables was formulated (**Figures 58-55 in Appendix II**).

⁹ Our special thanks to the polling agency Public Issue for conceptualising and implementing this section of the study.

ANALYSIS

Outline

Chapter I, «Perceptions of influence and threat», records and analyses the beliefs that citizens have with regards to third countries. More specifically, this chapter examines the perceived influence over Greek governments, the perceived threat that third countries represent for Greece and the importance that respondents assign to relations with neighbouring countries (Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Serbia, Turkey).

Chapter II, «Perceptions and attitudes towards bilateral relations between Greece and Albania», measures respondents' views on past, present and future relations between the two countries. Subsequently, the chapter engages with one of the central concerns of this study, which is to measure the Greek public's attitudes towards various positive and negative aspects in Greek-Albanian relations as well as the Greeks' evaluation of obstacles in further development of these relations.

Chapter III, «Perceptions and attitudes towards bilateral economic relations between Greece and Albania», deals with economic relations between Greece and Albania, Greek investments in Albania, the benefits that business activity has for both countries, and possible impact on the number of Albanian immigrants due to the financial crisis in Greece.

Chapter IV, «Attitudes towards 'Others' – social relations between Greeks and Albanians», is a description of interpersonal relations between Greeks and Albanians, along with a broader evaluation of existing social relations between Greeks and Albanian immigrants who live and work in Greece.

Chapter V, «Scale of attitudes towards Albania and Albanians», concludes the report. In this chapter, a scale of attitudes towards Albania and its people, also based on three (3) selected variables included in the survey questionnaire, is presented. This scale enables the segmentation of public opinion, in a more analytic way and in relation to prevailing social attitudes and perceptions towards the neighbouring country and its people.

Chapter I: Perceptions of influence and threat

Overview


Greek public opinion strongly believes that Greek governments are influenced by the international environment, either because some countries exert a certain influence on domestic political developments or because some other countries are hostile and constitute a threat. More specifically, **Germany** (47%) and **USA** (37%) appear to be the countries with the strongest influence on Greek governments in the past twenty years, whereas the EU as a whole is perceived as exerting influence on Athens by only 2% of Greeks, and the percentage of Greeks who think no country is exerting any influence on Athens is 4% (**Figure 1**). Perceptions of USA and Germany's current influence are explained by the strong position these countries enjoy on the international stage – the former as a superpower and the latter as the economically stronger EU member state. Despite the fact that no comparative data is available for these social indicators for the last 20 years, it can be safely assumed that the appearance of Germany is linked to recent developments over the course of the last four years.

Figure 1

THE COUNTRY WITH THE GREATEST INFLUENCE OVER THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

According to your opinion, is there a particular country that has exerted influence over Greek governments, during the last twenty years? (IF YES) Which one?

Spontaneous answers



In relation to the “threat perception”, in other words, the countries that constitute a threat for Greece, the answers are divided in three, almost equal, parts. One in three (33%) Greeks thinks that Greece is threatened by

no country, one in three (32%) mentions Turkey, and almost one in four (23%) said Germany (**Figure 2**). References to Turkey and Germany – countries which constitute a threat for Greece – are due to known historical and political reasons that have been developed as social stereotypes. It should be stressed that **Albania is not considered as threat for Greece**. The percentage of mentions to Albania is as low as 1%.


Figure 2

THE COUNTRY THAT REPRESENTS A THREAT TO GREECE

According to your opinion, is there a particular country that represents a threat to Greece? (IF YES)

Which one?

Spontaneous answers




Attitudes towards Neighbouring Countries

In relation to neighbouring countries, the importance shown by Greek citizens to bilateral relations with these countries is considered clearly indicative of both the climate in relations between them and the existing degree of trust or distrust between Greece and the governments of neighbouring countries.

In general terms, the majority of Greeks consider cultivating bilateral relations with neighbouring countries of limited importance. On the other hand, this fact demonstrates a neutral, rather than negative, attitude towards improving bilateral relations. This could be attributed to a generally limited interest in foreign policy matters on the part of Greek citizens. This trend is further aggravated as a result of the current economic crisis. Greek citizens were asked to place countries on a 1 to 10 scale (where 1 means no importance and 10 means maximum importance) according to the importance they assign in developing bilateral relations. Serbia had the highest average (6.9) of all neighbouring countries, although the figure is not that high in absolute terms. It should also be

noted that the average for all five countries on this specific scale was 5.5. Relatively low importance is given to strengthening relations with Turkey (6.6) and Bulgaria (6.4), while even lower are the figures for cultivating relations with Albania (5.6) and FYROM (5.4) (**Figure 3**).

Figure 3



These findings suggest that, for the Greek public, relations with Albania are less or considerably less important than relations with Serbia, Turkey and Bulgaria and only slightly more important than those with FYROM. However, when comparing overtime the picture is more optimistic. Available (even though not absolutely comparable) data from a survey conducted by Public Issue in 1999 show that the importance assigned by the Greek public opinion to strengthening relations with Albania was then almost half compared to those 15 years later. The 1999 figure was 2.75, compared to 5.61 of our 2013 survey.

Importance Assigned to Bilateral Relations with Neighbouring Countries

The highest importance to bilateral relations with **Albania** is assigned by Greeks aged 25-34 (average 6.0), higher education graduates (6.3), supporters of the Centre-Left (6.3) and those who consider themselves as 'cosmopolitan' (6.2). Conversely, lower importance is assigned by primary education graduates (4.8), housewives (5.0), supporters of the Right (4.8) and those who consider themselves 'ethnocentric' (4.7) (**Figure 4**).

The highest importance to bilateral relations with **Serbia** is assigned by men (7.4), people aged 55 or older (7.3), higher education graduates (7.3), pensioners (7.4), and supporters of Centre-Left (7.4) and the Left (7.3). The lowest importance is assigned by female respondents (6.3), people aged 18-34 (6.5), housewives (6.1), apolitical citizens (6.5), and those who consider themselves 'purely ethnocentric' (6.5).

The highest importance to bilateral relations with **Bulgaria** is assigned by higher education graduates (6.8) and supporters of the Left (6.9). Conversely, the lowest importance to bilateral relations with Bulgaria is assigned by housewives (5.7), apolitical citizens (5.9), and those who consider themselves 'purely ethnocentric' (5.7).

The highest importance to bilateral relations with **FYROM** is paid by higher education graduates (5.9), private sector employees (5.9), supporters of the Left (5.9) and those who are considered 'purely cosmopolitan' (5.9). Conversely, the lowest importance to bilateral relations with FYROM is assigned by those aged 65 or older (4.8), primary education graduates (5.0), housewives (4.8), supporters of the Right (4.6), and those who are considered 'purely ethnocentric' (4.4).

Finally, the highest importance to bilateral relations with **Turkey** is paid by people aged 25-34 (7.1), higher education graduates (7.2), public sector employees (7.1), supporters of the Centre-Left (7.3) and the Left (7.2), and those who are considered 'purely cosmopolitan' (7.1). Conversely, the lowest importance to bilateral relations with Turkey is paid by Greeks over 65 (5.9), primary education graduates (6.0), housewives (6.1), supporters of the Right (6.0), and respondents who are considered 'purely ethnocentric' (5.5).


Figure 4

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA

In a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1 stands for no importance and 10 for major importance, how much importance should the Greek government give to developing relations with Albania?

Average, by social group

* Indicative due to low sample base



2012038 / Διάγραμμα 13

Chapter II: Perceptions and attitudes towards bilateral relations between Greece and Albania

Assessment of Bilateral Relations between Greece And Albania: Past, Present and Future

Greek public opinion considers bilateral relations between Greece and Albania today as stagnant; half the Greek population (49%) views them as ‘neither good nor bad’, while 35% considers them ‘good’, and 14% ‘bad’ (**Figure 5**). On the other hand, more than one in two Greeks (55%) recognizes that there has been a considerable improvement in bilateral relations – as opposed to one in three (32%) who believe that relations have remained on the same level, and one in ten (10%) who think that relations have deteriorated (**Figure 6**). As far as the future of political relations between the two countries is concerned, the majority of Greek public opinion (39% or 4 out of 10) believe that they will remain on the same level, one in three (34%) that they will improve, and one in six (16%) that they will likely get worse (**Figure 7**).

Figure 5

EVALUATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In general, how would you describe the relations between Greece and Albania today?





Figure 6

EVALUATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA IN COMPARISON TO THE PAST

And how would you describe the relations between Greece and Albania during the last decade, in comparison to the past?




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Figure 7

ESTIMATION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

And the next five years, do you believe that the relations between Greece and Albania will...



public issue

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
Views on Contemporary Greek-Albanian Relations

The positive evaluation of current Greek-Albanian relations is correlated mostly to the educational and cosmopolitan orientation of the respondents. With regards to education, current relations between the two countries are deemed positive by 26% of primary education graduates, 35% of secondary education graduates, and 40% of higher education graduates (**Figure 8**). With regards to cosmopolitan orientation, the percentage of positive evaluations rise as people move towards the cosmopolitan end of the relevant scale: 27% among the “purely ethnocentric”, 34% among the “ethnocentric”, 37% among “cosmopolitan”, and 38% among “purely cosmopolitan” respondents (**Figure 9**). Moreover, relations are considered positive by 47% of the supporters of the Centre-Right supporters and 42% of those of the Centre-Left (**Figure 10**). Older age seems to be correlated to negative assessments of the current Greek-Albanian relations. The percentage of respondents who consider these as ‘bad’ is 7% among young people aged 18-34, 13% among those aged 35-54, and 15% for those 55 or over.

Figure 8

EVALUATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In general, how would you describe the relations between Greece and Albania today?
According to educational level




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Figure 9

EVALUATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In general, how would you describe the relations between Greece and Albania today?
On a cosmopolitanism scale



public issue


PI2013028 / Ανάπτυξη 18

Figure 10

EVALUATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In general, how would you describe the relations between Greece and Albania today?

By self-positioning in a L/R scale



public issue

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
Views on the Past of Greek-Albanian Relations

The belief that relations between Greece and Albania have considerably improved in relation to the past, increases progressively as the age of the respondents rises (45% for those aged 18-34, 50% for those aged 35-54, and 61% for those aged 55 and over (**Figure 11**). This is explained by the fact that middle-aged and older people naturally have better recollection of the turbulent bilateral relations in the 1990s, when mini-crises in the relations between the two countries made headlines in Greek media. It is also a side-effect of the current economic crisis which has relegated questions pertinent to relations with neighbouring countries to secondary priority compared to the management of the economic crisis and relations with European partners. Positive evaluations of Greek-Albanian relations are more widespread among 'cosmopolitan' respondents (56%) than among 'ethnocentric' ones (47%). As far as political ideology is concerned, respondents of Centre-Left (64%) and Centre-Right (63%) persuasion believe that relations between the two countries have considerably improved in relation to the past.

Figure 11

EVALUATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA IN COMPARISON TO THE PAST

And how would you describe the relations between Greece and Albania during the last decade, in comparison to the past?
By age group



public issue

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Estimates for the Future of Greek-Albanian Relations


When it comes to future prospects of bilateral relations between Greece and Albania ('they will improve in the future'), the most optimistic respondents are male (42% compared to 26% of female) (**Figure 12**), pensioners (42% compared to 31% of employees and unemployed), and supporters of the Centre-Right (45%) and the Centre-Left (44%).

Figure 12

ESTIMATION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

And the next five years, do you believe that the relations between Greece and Albania will...

By gender



The Main Problem in Relations between Greece and Albania


According to the respondents of our poll, the main problem that affects relations between Greece and Albania today is, without doubt, the question of immigration, and, more specifically, the presence of Albanians in Greece. The sum of percentages of all spontaneous answers that relate to this issue ('Albanian immigrants', 25%; 'criminality by Albanians', 7%; 'unemployment due to jobs and capital moving to Albania', 7%; the problem of 'illegal immigration', 1%) makes up **41% (Figures 13 & 14)**. It should be stressed, though, that despite the difficulties in the co-existence between the two sides, findings from other parts of the poll demonstrate that the majority of Greeks (63%) do not perceive the presence of Albanian immigrants is not perceived as a threat for the country (**Figure 27**).

Almost one in seven citizens (15%) consider Albanian expansionism and nationalism (as expressed in the vision for a Greater Albania and claims on Greek territory) as the most important bilateral problem (**Figures 13 & 14**). It is in that context that the Greek public opinion views Albania's claims in relation to Cham Albanians' properties in Greek Epirus (this issue polled at 5% as a spontaneous answer by respondents - **Figure 13**). It should be stressed here that the Greek public opinion is to a great extent aware of the Cham issue (that is, six out of ten Greeks or 58% claim knowledge or having heard something about this issue). Out of those Greeks, eight out of ten (83%) consider the Cham issue an obstacle in bilateral relations between Greece and Albania (**Figures 15 & 16**). In Greek Epirus itself, awareness of the Cham issue is overwhelming at 85% (the highest percentage in the country), while nine out of ten residents of that region (89%) consider it an important obstacle in Greek-Albanian relations.

The issue of the Greek minority in Albania, the Albanian state stance towards the minority as well as the treatment of Archbishop Anastasios (all three together making up a sum of 11%) are also mentioned as a problem in bilateral relations (**Figures 13 & 14**). In addition, and on the same subject, 65% of public opinion in Greece believes that 'the Albanian government does not respect the rights of the Greeks who live in Albania (**Figure 27**). The findings of the report point also to a number of problems of lesser importance in bilateral relations: the issue of racism and mutual hostility (5%), different national interests (5%), cultural and religious differences (4%), and inadequacy of governments and politicians (4%) (**Figures 13 & 14**).

MAJOR PROBLEM BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In your opinion, what is the major problem that affects relations between Greece and Albania the most?
Details of spontaneous responses




public issue

Figure 14

MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In your opinion, what is the biggest problem affecting the relations between Greece and Albania the most?

Grouped spontaneous responses



The presence of Albanian immigrants (25% in the breakdown of problems - **Figure 13**) is considered a problem mainly by women (32% compared to 18% for men), people aged 18-34 (33%), unemployed (36% compared to 25% for salaried employees), housewives (35%), residents of rural areas (30% compared to 29% and 23% for residents of suburban and urban areas respectively), and supporters of the Right (30%). With regards to Albanian “expansionism” (10% in the breakdown of problems - **Figure 13**), this issue features more as a problem among higher education graduates (12% compared to 10% and 5% for secondary and primary education graduates respectively). By the same token, the Cham properties issue, which is unilaterally raised by Albania, is identified as a problem by 7% of higher education graduates, compared to 4% and 2% of secondary and primary education graduates respectively.

Visibility of the Issue of Cham Albanians

According to the survey, it is mostly men (70%, against 48% of women) who are aware of the issue of the Chams and their properties in Greece, which is raised by Albania. Similarly, awareness of the Cham issue exists among older people, 55 or over (69%, against 27% of Greeks aged 18-34), higher education graduates (66%, against 55% and 47% of secondary and primary education graduate respectively), public sector employees (73%, against 49% of private sector employees), supporters of the Left (66%), and, unsurprisingly, Epirus region residents (85%) **(Figures 15-20)**. Among those who are aware of the issue in question, those who believe that it stands an obstacle to bilateral relations are women (89%, against 78% of men), higher education graduates (87%), and Epirus region residents (89%).

Figure 15

VISIBILITY OF THE CHAM ISSUE

Regarding the Chams and their properties in Greece, have you ever heard anything?





Figure 16

OPINION ABOUT THE ISSUE OF THE CHAM PROPERTIES AS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

In your opinion, the fact that Albanian governments raise the issue of the Cham properties in Greece is an obstacle for the development of the relations between Greece and Albania, probably yes or probably no?

All those who have heard something about the Chams




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ΠΕ2013 0028 / Δείγμα: 45

Figure 17

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VISIBILITY OF THE CHAM ISSUE-1

Awareness by gender & level of education



public issue

ΠΕ2013 0028 / Δείγμα: 41

Figure 18

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VISIBILITY OF THE CHAM ISSUE- 2

Awareness by age group

* Indicate live data due to low sample base




Figure 19

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VISIBILITY OF THE CHAM ISSUE- 3

Awareness by employment position





Figure 20

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VISIBILITY OF THE CHAM ISSUE– 4

Awareness by level of urbanisation & self-identification In the L/R scale


**The Popularity Of Archbishop Anastasios**

The public awareness of Archbishop of Albania Anastasios is high, reaching 72%, while one in four (24%) of the respondents do not know him (**Figure 21**). Moreover, the Archbishop's image is portrayed as particularly positive, as seven out of ten (69%) of the Greek citizens who are aware of the Archbishop express a positive opinion about him, 28% do not have an opinion, while only 3% have negative opinion (**Figure 22**).

Figure 21

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF ANASTASIOS, ARCHBISHOP OF ALBANIA

Based on popularity




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Figure 22

POPULARITY OF THE ANASTASIOS, ARCHBISHOP OF ALBANIA

What is your opinion of Anastasios, Archbishop of Albania?



public issue

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The popularity of Archbishop of Albania Anastaios is higher among men (77%, against 62% of women), respondents of 55 years of age and older (86%), primary education graduates (74%), retirees (88%), and the supporters of the Centre-Right (86%). It's lower among young people 18-34 years of age (39%), unemployed (58%), and the apolitical ones (61%) (Figures 23-26).

Figure 23

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULARITY OF ARCHBISHOP ANASTASIOS – 1

Positive evaluations by gender & level of educational




Figure 24

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULARITY OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF ALBANIA ANASTASIOS- 2

Positive evaluations by age group

* Indicative data due to low sample base




Figure 25

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULARITY OF ARCHBISHOP ANASTASIOS- 3

Positive evaluations by employment status





Figure 26

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULARITY OF THE ARCHBISHOP ANASTASIOS– 4

Positive evaluations by level of urbanisation & self-identifications in the L/R scale



Social Perceptions and Opinions Regarding Greek-Albanian Relations

Regardless of the identification of problems in the bilateral relations of Greece and Albania, one out of two participants in the poll (51%) recognises that Albanian immigrants «have helped the country's economic development», and almost nine out of ten (88%) believe that «Greece has helped Albania over the last two decades» (**Figure 27**). With regards to EU accession, 58% of respondents believe that «the Greek government has supported Albania's accession process», while only agree with the statement that «Greeks do not want Albania to join the EU» (with 56% being against that statement) (**Figure 27**). Moreover, despite that fact that the majority (56%) of those interviewed believe that Greeks and Albanians «have fought each other in the past», six out of ten (62%) know that the two countries have signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty (March 1996) (**Figure 27**).

Figure 27

ATTITUDES TOWARDS GREEK-ALBANIAN RELATIONS

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?



The highest percentages of those who claim that «Greeks and Albanians never fought each other» are found among women (26%), young people of 18-34 years of age (19%), housewives (18%), the unemployed (23%), and those claiming to be apolitical (23%). (**Figures 28-29**).

With the opinion that «Greece helped Albania over the last twenty years» are in agreement primarily those affiliated with the Centre-Right (93%) and the Right (93%), while young people of 18-34 years (with 17%) and supporters of the Left (with 18%) have the lowest percentages of agreement to that statement (**Figure 29**). With the statement «Albanian immigrants have helped the economic development of Greece» are in agreement mostly men (57%), respondents in the age group 65+ (58%), higher education graduates (62%), supporters of the Left (68%), and those considered as «cosmopolitans» (61%). The greatest degree of disagreement comes from women (53%), respondents in the age group 35-54 (52%), graduates of secondary and primary education (both at 53%), the unemployed (60%), housewives (60%), the supporters of the Right (62%), and those identified as «ethnocentric» (63%) (**Figures 28-29**).

The highest percentages of those in agreement with the statement that «the Greek government has supported Albania's accession process in the EU» are found among men (62%, against 54% among women), respondents in the age group 55+ (65%), and the supporters of the Centre-Left (68%) and the Centre-Right (65%) (**Figures 28-29**).

With the statement «Greeks do not want Albania to become a member of the EU» disagree primarily men (63%, against 50% of women), respondents in the age group 55-64 (67%), graduates of higher education (66%, against 41% of primary education graduates), the employers and self-employed (both at 60%), the supporters of the Centre-Left (69%, against 47% of the supporters of the Right), and those identified as «cosmopolitans» (61%, against 44% of the so-called «ethnocentric»).

The highest percentages of those aware of the Friendship Treaty signed between Greece and Albania are found among those at the age group 55+ (68%), retirees (71%), and the supporters of the Centre-Left (76%). In contrast, the lowest levels of knowledge are found in the age group 18-34 (20%), the unemployed (22%), the supporters of the Right (20%), and respondents identifying with «ethnocentrism» (27%) (**Figure 29**).

The stance towards the statement «Albanian immigrants in Greece are a threat for the country» largely correlates to respondents' level of education, political ideology, world-view. More specifically, high percentages (one out of two respondents or more) of agreement to this statement are found among primary education graduates (53%), the supporters of the Right (51%), and those identified as «ethnocentric» (60%). High percentages (two out of five respondents) are also found among those in the age group 65+ (39%), housewives (43%), and the residents of semi-urban areas (40%). The highest percentages of disagreement to the statement «Albanian immigrants in Greece are a threat for the country» is found among respondents in the age group 18-34 (68%), higher education graduates (72%), public sector employees (76%), supporters of the Centre-Left (80%) and the Left (79%), and the «cosmopolitans » (73%) (**Figure 29**).

With the statement «Albanian governments respect the rights of the Greek minority in Albania» disagree primarily men (69%), and supporters of the Right (73%). Higher percentages of agreement are found in the age group 18-34 (29%), primary education graduates (31%), the residents of semi-urban areas (31%), and the supporters of the Centre-Right (29%) (**Figure 29**).

Figure 28

ATTITUDES TOWARDS GREEK-ALBANIAN RELATIONS

Agreement with the following statements:
By gender





Figure 29

ATTITUDES TOWARDS GREEK-ALBANIAN RELATIONS

Agreement with the following statements:

By Self-identification in the L/R scale



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Chapter III: Attitudes towards bilateral economic relations between Greece and Albania


Attitudes and Perspectives towards Economic Relations between Greece and Albania

Two out of three (66%) of the people surveyed believe that Albania has benefitted the most from the existing economic relations between the two countries, while 29% believe that both countries benefitted equally and 2% believe that Greece benefitted the most (**Figure 30**). This attitude is linked to a perception Greek investment in Albania, while profitable for businessmen, has nevertheless as a consequence the reduction of the number of jobs in Greece.

Figure 30

THE COUNTRY THAT BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

What is your opinion of the economic relations between Greece and Albania? Would you say that ...




With the opinion that Albania benefits the most from the bilateral economic relations agree primarily those in age group 55+ (70%, against 57% in the age group 18-34), graduates of primary education (74%, against 58% of higher education graduates) (**Figure 31**), the unemployed (71%), retirees (71%), the residents of rural areas (70%), the supporters of the Right (79%, against 55% of the supporters of the Left) (**Figure 32**), and those considered «ethnocentric» (71%, against 57% of the «cosmopolitans»).

Figure 31

THE COUNTRY THAT BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

What is your opinion of the economic relations between Greece and Albania? Would you say that ...

By level of education



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
In contrast, with the view that both countries benefit equally from bilateral economic relations agree mostly respondents in the age group 18-34 (34%), higher education graduates (37%), employers (35%), the self-employed (35%), public sector employees (37%), the supporters of the Centre-Left (39%) and the Left (38%), and the «cosmopolitans » (37%).

Figure 32

THE COUNTRY THAT BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE & ALBANIA

What is your opinion of the economic relations between Greece and Albania? Would you say that ...

By self-identification in the L/R scale



public issue


Π20α 30/25/ Διάγραμμα 30

Public Awareness of Greek Investment in Albania

The public awareness of Greek businesses active in Albania appears to be limited (28%) (**Figure 33**). Some of the Greek businesses in Albania are known to the public opinion (the most visible ones are listed by name in **Figure 34**). The businesses in question are active in the areas of: banking (6%), construction (5%), food (4%), supermarkets (3%), telecommunications (3%), and to a lesser extent tourism (2%), medical services (2%), education (2%), clothing retail (1%), department stores (πολυκαταστήματα) (1%), small industry (1%), energy sector (1%) and others (**Figure 35**).

Figure 33

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF GREEK INVESTMENT IN ALBANIA



Those who seem to be most unaware of the Greek investments in Albania are women (77%, against 67% of men), primary education graduates (80%, against 76% and 64% of the secondary education and higher education graduates respectively), housewives (82%), those who are non-active economically (76%, against 65% of those economically active), the apolitical ones (78%), and the «ethnocentrics» (79%, against 67% of the «cosmopolitans»).

Figure 34

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF GREEK INVESTMENT IN ALBANIA

Can you mention a Greek investment in Albania that you personally know or you have heard about?

Spontaneous reference to specific companies

- **AKTOR** (N=15 persons)
- **OTE** (N=11 persons)
- **National Bank** (N=10 persons)
- **Arsakeio** (N=9 persons)
- **Ygeia Hospital** (N=9 persons)
- **Piraeus Bank** (N=6 persons)
- **Cosmote** (N=5 persons)
- **Veropoulos** (N=4 persons)
- **Marinopoulos** (N=4 persons)
- **Goody's** (N=4 persons)
- **TITAN Cement** (N=4 persons)
- **Vasilopoulos** (N=3 persons)
- **FAGE** (N=3 persons)
- **Alpha Bank** (N=2 persons)
- **Levi's** (N=2 persons)
- **Sklavenitis** (N=2 persons)
- **Vodafone** (N=2 persons)
- **Coca Cola** (N=2 persons)
- **Jumbo** (N=2 persons)

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
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Figure 35

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF GREEK INVESTMENT IN ALBANIA

Can you mention a Greek investment in Albania that you personally know or you have heard about?

Responses grouped by sector



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
Assessments on the Impact of the Economic Crisis

The Greek public opinion is divided over its assessments about the impact that the current economic crisis will have on the future of the Greek investments in Albania. More specifically, 47% of respondents believe that there will not be a negative impact on these investments, while 43% believe the opposite (**Figure 36**).

Figure 36

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISIS IN GREECE ON GREEK INVESTMENT IN ALBANIA

What is your opinion of the Greek investment in Albania? Will the current economic crisis in Greece influence them negatively, probably yes or probably not?




However, two out of three respondents (67%) believe that the economic crisis will likely have as a consequence a decrease in the number of the Albanian immigrants residing in Greece. Furthermore, one in five (21%) of those polled believe that the economic crisis has already produced an exodus of Albanian immigrants from Greece (**Figure 37**).

Negative impact on Greek investment in Albania is predicted mainly by unemployed (49%) (**Figure 38**), the residents of rural areas (48%), and the supporters of the Left (50%). In contrast, the highest percentages of those who do not expect a negative impact on these investment are found among the age group 18-34 (51%), higher education graduates (53%, against 39% of the primary education graduates), the economically active (53%), and the supporters of the Centre-Left (52%) and the Centre (51%).

Figure 37

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISIS IN GREECE ON THE NUMBER OF ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS IN GREECE

Do you believe that the number of Albanian immigrants working in Greece will decrease due to the economic crisis, probably yes or probably not?




Among those who anticipate a decrease in the number of immigrants are mainly the age group 18-34 (74%), higher education graduates (73%, against 64% and 60% of secondary and primary education graduates respectively), those employed (71%, against a 64% for both unemployed and the economically inactive) (**Figure 39**), the supporters of the Centre-Left (73%, against 64% percent of the supporters of the Centre-Right), and the «cosmopolitans» (71%, against 61% of the «ethnocentrics»).

Figure 38

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISIS IN GREECE ON GREEK INVESTMENT IN ALBANIA

What is your opinion of the Greek investment in Albania? Will the current economic crisis in Greece influence them negatively, probably yes or probably not?

By type of employment



public issue


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Figure 39

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISIS IN GREECE ON THE NUMBER OF ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS IN GREECE

Do you believe that the number of Albanian immigrants working in Greece will decrease due to the economic crisis, probably yes or probably not?

By economically active/inactive respondents



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Chapter IV: Attitudes towards the «Other» - Social relations between Greeks and Albanians


Overview

In general, the relations between Greeks and the Albanian immigrants who live in Greece are described as «good» by almost one out of two or 46% of respondents, «neither good nor bad» by 42%, and «bad» by 11% (roughly one out of ten) (**Figure 40**). These findings point to a «stagnation» that characterises coexistence with Albanian immigrants in Greece. This is because the findings from other parts of the poll show that there is anything but lack of interaction with the «Other», since the vast majority of Greek citizens (95%) has had a personal contact with Albanians in Greece («has personally met and talked with a male or female Albania») (**Figure 41**).

Figure 40

EVALUATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREEKS AND ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS LIVING IN GREECE

In general, how would you characterize relations between Greeks and Albanian immigrants living in Greece?



The opinion poll also suggests that first-hand experiences of Albania itself are extremely limited: only 8% of respondents have ever visited Albania (**Figure 42**). Among that 8% of respondents, more than half (56%) have visited Albania for tourism, a 19% did so for meeting with relatives and friends, and a 16% in search for a job (**Figure 43**). The percentage of Greeks who have a relative, or a family member, who lives in Albania today, is estimated at 2% (**Figure 44**).

Figure 41

PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH ALBANIANS

Have you ever met and spoken personally to an Albanian, male or female?




Figure 42

VISIT IN ALBANIA

Have you ever visited Albania?




Figure 43

REASON FOR VISITING ALBANIA

What was the main purpose of your visit/stay in Albania?

Among those who have visited Albania





Figure 44

HAVING RELATIVES IN ALBANIA

Do you have a family member/relative who is currently living in Albania?



Evaluation of Relations between Greeks and Albanians Residing in Greece

Relations between Greeks and Albanians are perceived as positive mainly by older respondents in the age group 55+ (50%, in contrast to 43% and 39% for the age groups 34-54 and 18-34 respectively), graduates of higher education (50%, in contrast to 44% and 40% of graduates of secondary and primary education respectively) (**Figure 45**), private sector employees (50%), retirees (50%), the supporters of the Centre-Left (57%) and Left (53%, in contrast to 34% of supporters of the Right) and the «cosmopolitans» (51%, in contrast to 30% of the «ethnocentrics») (**Figure 46**).


The percentage of inter-personal contact between Greeks and Albanians remains high in all sub-groups of the population. Higher education graduates are marginally more likely to have personally met Albanians (97%, in contrast to 95% and 92% for graduates of secondary and primary education respectively). Similarly, 97% of «cosmopolitans» in contrast to 92% of «ethnocentrics» have personally met Albanians. The percentage of Greek men who have visited Albania is relatively higher (12%, in contrast to 5% of Greek women); 12% of the supporters of the Left, compared to 8% of those of the Right, and 11% of «cosmopolitans», compared to 2% of «ethnocentrics» have visited Albania.

Graph 45

EVALUATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREEKS AND ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS LIVING IN GREECE

In general, how would you characterize relations between Greeks and Albanian immigrants living in Greece?

By level of education



public issue


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Graph 46

EVALUATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREEKS AND ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS LIVING IN GREECE

In general, how would you characterize relations between Greeks and Albanian immigrants living in Greece?

By positions in the cosmopolitanism scale



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Chapter V: Scale of attitudes towards Albania and the Albanians

Finally, we turn now to the scale of attitudes towards Albania and Albanians (see conceptual section in Introduction). We remind the reader that for devising this scale we have used the following three questions as variables: i) Assigning great importance to bilateral relations with Albania (positions 7 to 10 in the 10-point scale), ii) Percentage of agreement with the statement «The Albanian immigrants have contributed to the economic development/growth of Greece» και iii) Percentage of agreement with the statement «The Albanian immigrants in Greece do not pose a threat to Greece».

Combining the findings of the three variables we find that *almost 1 in 4 respondents (24%)* expresses a «purely positive» attitude/stance (position ++ in the relevant scale) and an additional 30% positive attitude/stance (position + in the relevant scale), towards Albania and Albanians. Consequently, the sum of positive attitudes/stances (positions ++, + in the relevant scale) represents the 54% of the total, which is somewhat higher than the total of the negative attitudes, the total of which is at 47% with 21% «negative» (--) and 26% «purely negative» (-) attitudes (**Figures 52-56 in Appendix II**).

From the above description we can draw the following conclusions. The highest percentages of the «purely positive» attitudes in the scale are found:

- a) Among those who ideologically self-identify with the Left (38%, contrast to 14% for the who identify with the Right).
- b) Among higher education graduates (35%, contrast to 18% and 14% for the graduates of secondary and primary education respectively).
- c) Those characterised as «cosmopolitans» (35%, contrast to 9% for the «ethnocentrics»).

Conversely, the highest percentages of «purely negative» attitudes towards Albania and Albanians can be found among those who ideologically identify with the Right (36%, contrast to 9% for those who identify with the Left), primary education graduates (31%), housewives (31%), unemployed (25%, contrast to 19% of self-employed) and those characterised as «ethnocentrics» (39%, contrast to 14% for the «Cosmopolitans»).

Furthermore, the utilization of the CHAID method (see conceptual section in Introduction and **Figure 57 in Appendix II**) led to the conclusion that the *most important factors determining* attitudes towards Albania and Albanians are (by order of significance):

- 1. The political-ideological positioning in the Left-Right axis.
- 2. The level of education.

Finally, for the clearest detection of relationship between the two variables (political-ideological positioning and level of education) with the scale we additionally used Correspondence Analysis. This technique allows for exploring the relationship between two categorical variables. Using Correspondence Analysis we formulated a multilevel graph, in which the correspondence of categories of relevant variables can be found. Correspondence analysis confirms the finding that the level of education and the self-identification in the Left/Right scale influence

respondents' attitudes towards Albania and the Albanians. More specifically, those with higher education are more positively predisposed towards Albania. Conversely, those with less education are less positively inclined towards that country and its people. Similarly, those ideologically affiliated to the Left have more positive attitudes towards Albania and the Albanians, compared to those affiliated to the Right who are more negatively inclined (**Figures 58 & 59 in Appendix II**).

APPENDIX I: FIGURES FOR COSMOPOLITANISM SCALE

Figure 47

COSMOPOLITANISM SCALE - VARIABLES

Do you agree or disagree with the following opinions about the contemporary world?




Figure 48

4-POINT COSMOPOLITANISM INDEX

The index is composed by combining responses to the three (3) variables of the cosmopolitanism scale




Figure 49


COSMOPOLITANISM SCALE - VARIABLES

Percentage (%) of agreement to statement


By age group

* Indicative data due to low sample base


It is important to get news and information from a round the world*




Would like to travel to foreign countries for longer periods



Enjoy socializing with people from different cultures



Enjoy living in cultural environments different from their native one



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• Does not participate in the index

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Figure 50

COSMOPOLITANISM SCALE - VARIABLES

Percentage (%) of agreement to statement
By level of education





Figure 51



APPENDIX II: FIGURES FOR SCALE OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS

Figure 52

4-POINT INDEX OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS

Devised on the basis of the combination of responses to three select variables of the attitudes scale





Figure 53

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 4-POINT INDEX OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS– 1

Gender and level of education



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
Figure 54

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 4-POINT INDEX OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS– 2

Age group



* Indicative due to low sample base




public issue

Figure 55

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 4-POINT INDEX OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS– 3

Employment




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Figure 56

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 4-POINT INDEX OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS – 5

Self-identification in the Left/Right scale




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Figure 57

POPULATION SAMPLE SEGMENTATION WITH REGARDS TO ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS

Using the statistical technique CHAID (CHI-squared Automatic Interaction Detector)




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Figure 58

CORRESPONDENCE OF SCALE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS WITH THE LEVEL OF EDUCATION (Correspondence Analysis)

Entire sample




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Figure 59

CORRESPONDENCE OF SCALE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALBANIA & THE ALBANIANS WITH SELF-IDENTIFICATION IN THE L/R SCALE

(Correspondence Analysis)

Entire sample



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