To evaluate the role of donor assistance in security sector reform in Serbia, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) has commissioned a report that has been drafted by a group of experts, under the guidance of Dr. Amadeo Watkins. Recognising the need to strengthen public dialogue in Serbia, and in order to disseminate the report more widely among stakeholders, the Balkan Fund for Democracy and ELIAMEP organized a workshop in Belgrade on February 2, 2010, on Security Sector Reform in Serbia, with the participation of high-level government officials, experts and representatives of donor organisations in Serbia. The workshop was conducted in the context of the IfP’s Security Cluster by the BTD in collaboration with ELIAMEP. The Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) is supported financially by the EU and draws together the complementary geographic and thematic expertise of 10 civil society organisations (and their networks) with offices across the EU and in conflict-affected countries. IfP partners have joined together to develop and promote international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
For most European countries, security today is primarily measured in non-military terms and threats to security are mainly non-military in nature. These threats include: incompetent government, corruption, organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling [weapons, drugs, contraband, people], illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources [e.g., water] and; of course, terrorism. In this context, it is urgent to generate ideas, stimulate thinking and discuss openly all aspects of security reform, to break down boundaries between different elements of the security sector and to expand the frontiers of what is considered ‘security’. There is an equal need to increase the strength of the ‘security community’ – the body of military and especially of civilian personnel competent in the new security issues and capable [a] of filling posts in national and international institutions; and [b] educating the population to understand the new needs of security so as to ensure their support through the democratic process.
The effective provision of security is one of the main requirements for sustainable peace and economic development. Hence, Security Sector Reform (SSR) in its broader sense is an important aspect in post-conflict and transition environments, including Serbia. However, introducing required change in Serbia has proved to be difficult due to numerous factors. The complexity of the challenge is immense in a country which represents a rare case of simultaneous quadruple transition: post communist/authoritarian reforms, economic transition, post-conflict recovery and EU integration efforts. Domestic stakeholders, which should act as the primary change agents have not found sufficient will (and interest) to initiate reforms more forcefully and do so in a strategic manner. Hence, the role of external factors, both bilateral and multilateral stakeholders, has been significant.
This Country Case Study on Serbia focuses mainly on the policies and approaches that have been pursued by the EU (and other) institutions and Member States in Serbia’s Security Sector Reform (SSR)1 process. More specifically, the case study provides a critical assessment of the past ten years of assistance provided to this important sector and tries to answer the following two questions:
• What is the role of external donor assistance in SSR in Serbia?
• Are there ways to further improve such assistance in the future, especially in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency?
Serbia is firmly in the so-called “first phase” of the SSR process, and has, contrary to expectations, not managed to enter the “second stage”, as described in the following sections.7 Reasons for this are mixed, but if responsibility is to be found, it must ultimately rest with the lack of a clear vision and capacity for the implementation of politically declared goals at the domestic level. Simply put, if reform is to progress, it entails change, which in turn requires change agents, which are not always visible in Serbia at this present time, at least not in terms of required critical mass at the highest levels – making joint development of programmes with local drivers and ownership difficult. Operational thinking and day-to-day (fire-extinguishing) resolution of ad-hoc issues is further burdening the process.
While some argue that there is a general lack of political will (or interest) in Serbia to advance reforms and introduce required change, this argument can also be presented on behalf of the donors – reflected in several respects, including lack of consistency and common SSR strategy. Furthermore, as international attention is moving away from the Western Balkans, so is investment in the region, including Serbia. Countries which have been key stakeholders over the past decades are simply not prioritising Serbia as they once did, which is certainly having a negative impact.
On the domestic front, most effort has been placed on legislative and organisational aspects of SSR. However, while this is required and should not be neglected by any means, it should not be seen as an excuse for no further reform effort. This excuse has come in different forms. In some instances, these first-generation changes (e.g. passing of strategic documents or key laws) are seen as the ultimate goals especially in terms of local politics, meaning that they have a very short shelf life and do not sustain their own content or initiative. In many other cases, the passing of documents and strategies is seen, or presented, as condition for further reform. In essence, it can be said that there is scepticism and in some cases resistance to reform (change) at a strategic level, at least as portrayed or expected by the West, including the EU.8 This scepticism is largely backed by finds from public opinion polls, which show that the ultimate benefactors of sought-after reforms, the citizens, are expecting more to be done.
Under such circumstances, there is no doubt that reform is still top-down, externally driven, with the top represented by NATO, EU, OSCE and other international stakeholders. However, there is scope to improve, as this paper will clearly identify. Although it has mixed results, conditionality has been the primary change management tool, and has largely been misused as very little of the expected reform has taken place.
Most importantly, external assistance has focused mainly on projects, and mostly without a clear vision and coordinated effort.9 Hence, results achieved have been limited and far below both external expectations and possibilities the country clearly possesses.
It is important to note that this is not to say that there is no requirement for change from below, but rather that these pressures have not managed to find critical mass and do not have supportive mechanisms to create strategic change, not only in terms of donor expectations but more importantly in terms of support of declared domestic policy objectives.
Download the programme of the seminar (in PDF).
Download the report in PDF.
List of participants (PDF).