Nuclear disarmament is certainly not a new concept. Many efforts have been made in the past, which principally due to unfavorable political circumstances did not progress.
In a discussion organized by ELIAMEP on “The Obama administration, deterrence and disarmament”, on Thursday, 9 July 2009, Dr. T.V. Paul, Professor of International Relations at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, asserted that this time the initiative taken by the Obama administration is possibly leading us towards a new era. The new initiative has brought forward the rather radical perspective of a completely nuclear weapons- free policy; it remains yet to be seen, however, how genuine this position is. As the initiative appears to be enjoying wider political support and the Obama administration is in its first year there might be a window of opportunity to achieve real progress, depending nevertheless very much on the position other nuclear powers will adopt, whether historic ones, like Russia or emerging regional powers such as Pakistan, Iran and N.Korea.

Why is there a difference today in consensus building? Firstly, wider nuclear proliferation might have an “equalizer” effect, making less clear the distinction between great and small powers. Secondly, the acquisition of nuclear weapons brings an additional strain on the wider regions as in the case of Japan and S. Korea who are in turn pushing harder for nuclear deterrence guarantees from the existing nuclear powers, signatories of the Non proliferation Treaty. Finally, the danger of “revisionism” by new nuclear countries and the temptation of using nuclear weapons, while not prominent, is a determining factor.

There are four different categories of nuclear deterrence that need to be addressed to make nuclear disarmament more feasible.
i)    Deterrence between “old” nuclear powers and the recognition that a NPT entails both horizontal as well as vertical coordination;
ii)   Deterrence between “old” and “new” nuclear powers;
iii)  Deterrence between nuclear and non nuclear states;
iv)  Finally, deterrence of other non-state actors.

The final point is expected to be the most challenging as there are no obvious means to confront non-state actors institutionally, in contrast to state actors like N.Korea and Iran.  A revised NPT treaty will have to address, therefore, not only these issues but also touch upon the subject of weapon destruction, not simply withdrawal from active service and storage. Furthermore, as we are entering a new era of asymmetric challenges it is important to take the necessary measures for the safety of the arsenals of the newer nuclear powers and the strengthening of regional deterrence.

Dr. T.V. Paul CV (in PDF).